INTERGENERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

Socio-economic, Family and Cultural Patterns of Stability and Change in Turkey and Europe
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We conclude by noting that the authorship of this book is ordered according to the time at which members joined the ‘2000 Families’ project and does not reflect the individuals’ contribution to this volume.
Part I
A short history

Osman worked in a tea factory in Turkey. He was married with three children, two daughters and a son. His father was dead and his brother had moved to Europe. They used to work in the tobacco fields in Acısu, a village in Akçaabat. But in the 1960s, the tobacco fields were badly damaged by blue mould, causing many men to look elsewhere for work. Osman secretly wanted to move to Europe; although his wife supported him, his mother was worried that her sons would lose their belief and get lost in a non-Islamic land. His application was initially declined because he was diagnosed as having anaemia; as luck would have it, the officer said they desperately needed workers, but gave him a very short time to prepare his move. He quickly convinced his mother and said goodbye to his wife and children.

After working for several years in a tin can factory, Osman was injured while trying to rescue the misplaced cans under the machine; he lost two fingers of his left hand. He then found a job as a kitchen cleaner. Osman’s brother in Germany returned to Turkey for good in 1978, but Osman stayed in the Netherlands. He bought a house and brought his family. His son worked in the tin can factory for ten years before losing his job. His son married a distant relative from Turkey and is still living in Deventer. Of his four children, three are living in the Netherlands: one is a medical doctor, one is a poet, and one plays soccer. The fourth moved to work in Istanbul as project manager after she obtained her Master’s in Engineering.

Osman’s older daughter lives and works in Deventer in a beauty specialist shop; she married a Turk she met at high school. One of her four children has completed his studies to become a lawyer and all others are still studying. Osman’s younger daughter was sent back to Turkey to study in a Koran school to fulfil a cherished dream of guest workers: ‘We will go back one day’, they say. After completing her degree, she went to the Netherlands to do her Master’s and PhD. She then moved to the US as a university professor.
Three of the husbands of Osman’s granddaughters are Turkish in origin, and one is a native Dutch man.

Osman bought a small piece of land and built a little house in Görele, a town in the west of Turkey. After his retirement, Osman and his wife cultivated olive trees there and moved back and forth between Deventer and Görele. They often wondered whether they would have had a hard but peaceful life had Osman stayed in Akçaabat. Osman died in 2000 at the age of 62.

Introduction

This short history is typical for many Turks in Europe. A majority of studies show that labour migrants from poorer countries and their descendants tend to end up at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder in countries of destination, and their cultural, political and religious incorporation remains slow, even in the second generation (Brynin and Guveli 2012; Fleischmann et al. 2012; Gungor et al. 2013; Guveli and Platt 2011; Kogan and Kalter 2006; Kristen, Reimer and Kogan 2008; Phalet and Heath 2010; Platt 2005b; Platt 2007; Platt 2009a; Platt 2009b; van Tubergen 2006a).

Reading these studies, we would be forgiven for thinking migration has no positive impact on migrants themselves. So if migration does not improve migrants’ lives or the lives of their children, why do they move, leaving the country and social networks behind? Would it have been better for them and their communities if they stayed put? Alternatively, these conclusions may derive from a tendency in the migration literature to focus on the ‘wrong’ questions from the point of view of identifying the gains and impacts of migration from the migrant’s own perspective.

Many studies miss an important aspect of international migration. The prevalence of return migration, the transnational character of today’s migration, and the complexities of migration chains are often studied as separate fields of interest, not as factors that complement studies of international migration. In addition, many studies ignore the comparison with and consequences on those who stay behind (Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014; Harzig and Hoerder 2009; Koser 2007). These lacunae in our knowledge of migration derive from a fundamental flaw in much migration research, particularly research driven by policy concerns (Amelina et al. 2012; Harzig and Hoerder 2009) which limits its perspective to those who arrive and, among these, to those who stay in their new country. The experience of this settler population is interesting and policy relevant, of course, but is limited for explaining migrant outcomes.

If we want to account for who moved, who stayed and who returned, and to map out the consequences of the migration decision on both the migrants and those left behind, we need to start from the population of origin. Most migrants move to improve their life chances and the life chances of their
families compared to what they would have been without migrating. This calls for a causal analysis of migration in a counterfactual framework, asking what the migrants’ situation would have been had they decided not to migrate. We must also ask whether migrants, their children and grandchildren continue to display the behaviours and beliefs of their non-migrant counterparts or develop distinctive trajectories in response to the migration experience and destination context. To answer these questions, we develop a unique perspective and make two novel comparisons: first, a comparison across three family generations and second, a comparison of migrants and a control group of non-migrants in the origin society Turkey. Our unique findings allow us to answer the questions posed above.

This book investigates multiple domains of experience and intergenerational transmission, including education, occupation, entrepreneurship, marriage, fertility, friendship, religion, attitudes and identities. These central topics are contextualised by an overview of migration patterns and a detailed discussion of the regions from which the research design and sample derives. The various chapters approach the key question of the volume from different angles, testing relevant hypotheses derived from a general theoretical perspective (dissimilation from origins) developed below; they also draw on theories specific to the topic under discussion and to dominant disciplinary debates. In what follows in this opening chapter, we discuss the limitations of international migration studies and note the contribution of our study and its theoretical framework. Next, we discuss the potential of Turkish migration in Europe to fill the gaps in international migration studies. We conclude by outlining the topics of the individual chapters.

**Limitations in migration research and our contribution**

Scholars are searching for new perspectives across migration research. On the one hand, the limitations in our often-used theoretical and empirical approaches to understand migrant incorporation in destination countries have been the subject of heated debate, with calls made for a new theoretical understanding of the incorporation trajectories of different migrant groups and contexts. On the other hand, numerous discussions consider the new challenges in migrant transnationalism and note the problems of methodological nationalism in international migration studies. Many call for new methodologies to understand the causes and consequences of migration, rather than answering questions for policy purposes.

Another new perspective entering social mobility and transmission studies is the impact of one’s grandparents on one’s socio-economic attainment, attitudes and values. Generational change has been an important element of international migration studies, although these studies have often used migration and family generations interchangeably and both are predominantly based on two generations. This study extends analysis of
family generations to at least three generations, allowing the incorporation of grandparental influences, among both migrants and non-migrants, as detailed below.

**Search for new theoretical perspectives**

Even though Thomas, and Znaniecki (1918) offered alternative explanations as early as a century ago, most studies on migration to Western Europe or the US have taken an assimilation (or ‘integration’) perspective, asking questions about the situation of migrants and their offspring in destination societies, especially the extent to which they become economically, culturally and socially indistinguishable from natives. To this end, they are compared to natives or to other migrant groups assumed to be on the same pathway to integration (albeit at a different stage).

Assimilation theory has recently been revived to incorporate the wider dynamics of American society (Alba and Nee 2003) and, additionally, segmented assimilation theory was developed to address some of the limitations of this theory (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). While the former claims differences between natives and migrants will fade linearly over time and generations, the latter asserts that the pace of acculturation and incorporation depends on the paths migrants and their descendants follow and on the context of reception (Portes and Zhou 1993). The importance of group characteristics has also been given weight in this theory, but explanations of assimilation mechanisms remain within the borders of destination countries.

A major criticism of both theories comes from European scholars noting their limited application to the European context. Schneider and Crul (2010) assert these assimilation theories were developed in and for the US. However, Europe comprises many destination countries with different policies on migration and migrant integration with a range of institutional and contextual diversity across countries (Ersanilli 2010; Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel 2012). Crul and Schneider (2010) propose and test an alternative ‘comparative integration context theory’ in their study of the European second generation. Although this development encompasses the diversity of receiving country contexts and of sending countries, it does not bring a country of origin perspective to bear on the study, nor does it explain the changes experienced by the first generation.

Furthermore, theories in migration literature commonly approach migrants and the second generation as ‘people without history’ (Vermeulen 2010: 1224), implying the ‘baggage’ migrants bring from the origin countries and pass on to their children is not accounted for sufficiently in existing international migration studies. At the beginning of the 20th century, Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) focused on both destination and origin country contexts and individual characteristics to understand social change among migrants and those left behind. The inclusion of origin country characteristics has recently made a comeback in large-scale quantitative
Introduction: The Origins of Migration

studies; yet these studies predominantly include fixed-time characteristics of the origin country to explain change in migrant lifestyles in the course of assimilation in the destination countries, as if the origin context were static. Of course, social change has also been taking place in the origin countries among those left behind, but this has rarely been taken into account in these studies on a large-scale.

Search for new empirical perspectives

Discussions of methodology and the search for research designs have mainly focused on transnational migrants and methodological nationalism. Since the last decades of the 20th century, studies of transnational migration have been popular (Waldinger 2013). Many researchers limit themselves to discussing the importance and magnitude of transnational activities, especially with respect to migrants' locations in the destination countries (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003; Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003; Morawska 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Portes 2003; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Such studies shed light on the substantial consequences of globalisation in migration processes and its effects on individual migrants (Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003; Levitt 2003; Levitt 2007).

Cross-border connections and transnational activities are not new, but their conceptualisation is a relatively new perspective in migration studies (Portes 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Many acknowledge the novelty of the transnational perspective in migration studies but argue scholars exaggerate the impact of transnational activities on migrant incorporation in destination and origin societies. Studies show, for example, that in the US, migrants' transnational activities are marginal but this varies for different migrant groups (Portes 2003; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Waldinger 2013).

Transnational migration studies tend to be overwhelmingly limited to qualitatively oriented research and although there are some novel empirical studies (Levitt 2007; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999), they mostly represent small-scale, ethnographic work. Large-scale surveys are scarce, resulting in a lack of representative data to reveal the scale of cross-border activities. Hence, it is hard to draw conclusions about their impact or relevance to migrants' lives. Simply stated, there is an ongoing need for large-scale research on transnationalism. Although our study is not solely on transnationalism, our unique research design enables us to include transnational activities in our investigation of different domains of interest in order to understand the implications of the whereabouts of migrants and their offspring.

Another key methodological discussion in migration research is found, for instance, in the work of Amelina and Faist (2012) and their colleagues (Amelina et al. 2012; FitzGerald 2012; Horvath 2012; Meeus 2012; Schrooten
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration (2012; Shinozaki 2012; Zirh 2012). These researchers take a critical look at studies on migration and point out the need for new research designs to capture the pathways of causal relationships in international migration. They highlight two key limitations in existing studies.

First, they discuss the difficulties involved in capturing the complexity of international migration and floating populations using limited time and resources to include people who are moving across borders and who do not show up in registers (Meeus 2012; Shinozaki 2012; Zirh 2012). For example, if we only rely on destination country surveys, undocumented and return migrants cannot be found with samples taken from registers or obtained by scanning specific high-density regions. Studies on migration need to include origin, destination and possibly various other sites to examine undocumented and return international migrants and to cover a longer time span if the complexities of international and internal migration are to be unravelled (Meeus 2012). Our study locates men within a fixed birth cohort in multiple sending sides and follows them and their offspring in various destinations.

Second, they note that the nation-state and its policies are at the centre of research on migration, and migration processes are generally explained using the terminologies and categories of destination nations (Amelina and Faist 2012; FitzGerald 2012). Wimmer and Schiller (2002) use the term ‘methodological nationalism’ to point to the limitations of adopting categories of destination societies; they can be politically loaded, for example, or designed to create a model nation-state. Assimilation and segmented assimilation theories are often implemented to explain the mechanisms and building blocks of a nation-state (Bommes and Morawska 2005), not to reveal the mechanisms behind migration processes and changes in migrant lifestyles. In short, the story of the other site – the origin countries and those left behind – has not been told. Our study corrects that omission by comparing migrants and their children and grandchildren with those left behind to reveal the impact of migration and to illuminate the mechanisms behind it.

Multi-generation families
Individual and societal change need time to occur; the speed of the transformation increases with successive generations. In international migration studies, a multi-generational approach is rarely applied, even if it is implicit in the theoretical expectations for patterns of assimilation (Alba et al. 2002). Over time and for subsequent generations, the features of origin are expected to become less relevant in migrants’ lifestyles (Zhou 1997). For example, segmented assimilation theory is mainly developed for and overwhelmingly tested on the second relative to the first generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Some early papers address the ‘three-generations hypothesis’ (Lazerwitz and Rowitz 1964), but in contemporary
analysis, the third generation is rarely investigated (see e.g. Alba et al. 2002; Montero 1981).

A significant exception in the literature is Telles and Ortiz's (2008) study *Generations of Exclusion*. They show European Americans have fully assimilated into the American society by the third generation, but ethnic boundaries among the fourth-generation Mexican Americans remain salient (2008: 266). Extending the focus to the fourth-generation is rare; their study makes a unique contribution, showing the persistence of origin country identities and the exclusions operated by the destination country across multiple family and migration generations. This type of examination could fruitfully be extended to the European context.

Studies typically equate family generation with migrant generation. That is, the second generation are taken to be the children of the first generation on the basis of being born in the destination country (to migrant parents) (Park and Myers 2010). Such studies thereby implicitly accept processes of family transmission without necessarily measuring them directly (Guveli 2015; Guveli and Platt 2011; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013; Phalet and Schonpflug 2001). However, from an origin country perspective, family generation is central. By tracing the processes of transmission through family generations regardless of their migration status, we can fully acknowledge the complexity of migration trajectories (including return and remigration) and accurately identify the impact of migration, including its gains and losses, across multi-family and, potentially, multiple-migration generations.

Migration is a major event or ‘interruption’ that constitutes a breakpoint in the individual and family life course. Economic, cultural or social capital of parents and grandparents may be devalued or lost, and intergenerational transmission processes of these resources to children may be hampered or, at least, challenged (Nauck 2001). Therefore, transmission of resources across multi-generations is likely to play out differently for migrants and non-migrants.

By combining country of origin and multi-generational perspectives, our work makes a major contribution to the literature: despite the obvious advantages, such a combination has rarely been attempted. In other words, our study constitutes an overdue and significant exception to the rule.

**Our perspective: dissimilation from origins**

The assimilation perspective and approaches in existing research have accumulated valuable knowledge of migrants within the borders of destination nation-states, but a fundamental problem of such approaches is that they tell us little about the causal mechanisms at work in migration. Comparing natives and migrants or comparing several groups of migrants does not reveal what might have happened had the migrants not migrated. In contemporary science, causality is understood in a counterfactual framework: applied to
migration, a counterfactual and dissimilation perspective might argue that migration has an effect on outcomes, if these outcomes would be impossible without migration. Migrants have not typically moved in order to do as well as the natives in the destination countries, let alone to compete with other migrant groups in these destination societies. Simply stated, migrants are seeking gains that would otherwise not be possible. This requires a counterfactual point of view, one that compares migrants and non-migrants (and migrants and return migrants).

Our theoretical framework implements and expands on the concept of dissimilation from origins. Dissimilation means the processes of becoming different, and it considers the opposite direction to assimilation, which literally means becoming similar. Dissimilation has occasionally been applied to describe the changes in migrants’ lives. While assimilation blurs the dividing lines between social groups, dissimilation reinforces the cleavages between migrants (or ethnic minorities) and non-migrants.

A few scholars have used this perspective, but to account for different processes (Volkov 2006; Yinger 1981). For example, Yinger (1981) uses the notion to describe how ethnic groups reaffirm and revitalise their earlier ethnic identities and lifestyles after having assimilated into the mainstream. Specifically, he uses it to explain the emphasis various ethnic and religious groups put on their separate ethnic and religious identities after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Volkov (2006) uses assimilation and dissimilation to describe opposite processes among Jews in the historical period before World War II, juxtaposing an ‘Era of renewed self-consciousness’ (dissimilation) to an ‘Era of assimilation’. The period of dissimilation started with a resurgence of anti-Semitism; their resulting alienation caused heightened self-awareness among Jews who began to emphasise the distinctions of their identity, religion and ethnic costumes. Also of interest to the present study, FitzGerald (2012) proposes the notion of homeland dissimilation to trace changes in migrants’ lives, especially how they become different from those left behind in the origin country. We adopt this understanding of dissimilation, but expand upon it.

Homeland dissimilation is a useful concept to understand the mechanisms behind the process of changes in migrants’ lifestyles and chances. While dissimilation can occur over the life course, it can also prevail over generations. Therefore, we implement the notion of dissimilation from origins to trace two processes: changes across the life course and changes over generations. The first entails changes over the life course of migrants in their resources, lifestyles, customs, values and behaviours, whereby they become differentiated from their counterparts in the origin country. The second occurs over generations by means of weakening (or strengthening) generational reproduction of family traits, economic, social, cultural and religious resources and behaviours. Intergenerational change touches on social mobility and changes in values, attitudes and behaviour.
Dissimilation from origins in economic, social and cultural domains

Improving one’s life chances is typically the goal of migration. Migrants move because they want to enjoy a better life than their parents and their compatriots in the origin society or to offer this opportunity to their children. This is a basic assumption of the international migration literature (Massey 1998). In this understanding, migrants will try to improve their economic conditions and life chances in the destination country. This is the basis of our argumentation when we compare the economic attainment of migrants to those who stay behind. Labour migrants will not make the expensive and risky journey if conditions in destination countries are worse than those in their origin country. Consequently, dissimilation requires migrants to obtain better economic resources in their destination country than their comparators in the origin country. Of course, other factors such as the extent of the human capital migrants bring with them and the conditions of the receiving society enhance or moderate migrants’ socio-economic achievement.

This argument also applies to the descendants of migrants, especially those who are low-skilled and low-educated, for example, guest workers recruited in the 1960s (Akgunduz 2008; Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014). Research on social mobility and intergenerational transmission of economic resources and behaviour is rare (Platt 2005) and to our knowledge there is no study of three-generational transmission of social mobility of migrants. Nevertheless, one motivation for migration is increased educational and labour market outcomes for children and successive generations. Relatively higher equality of opportunity in the destination countries will also contribute to the improvement of migrants’ life chances. That is, children and grandchildren will become independent of their social origins, if they acquire more socio-economic status than their parents and grandparents. Consequently, we would expect to find the social reproduction of economic resources is weaker among migrants than among those in origin countries.

We argue that migrants, on average, gain from migration economically, but the changes in their social, cultural and religious lives are not unidirectional. On the one hand, the impact of globalisation is making all societies converge, a process predominantly governed by the Western way of life (Ritzer 1993) and perceived as the natural evolution of Western societies. It is commonly accepted that the American way of life has infiltrated the everyday lives of people in the remotest places of the world. This process brings the social and cultural lifestyles of origin and destination countries closer. On the other hand, we have also experienced a process of localisation, whereby local and ethnic traits become more important in people’s lives (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006). Migrants bring their customs, enterprises, food, culture and religion to the West and establish ethno-religious
institutions. These may persist across generations and contribute to changing the socio-cultural landscape of their countries of residence.

As the previous paragraph suggests, even as migrants seek a better life in destination societies, they may retain their social, cultural and religious heritage. As a result of modern media, especially the Internet (Schrooten 2012), and unlike former times when contact with those left behind was difficult and infrequent (Schiller 1999), migrants and their descendants now interact regularly with relatives and friends in their countries of origin. This facilitates the exchange of ideas and lifestyles and bilateral involvement in social processes. This may mean migrants will never become fully assimilated into mainstream destination societies. That is, they may change to the extent they would have changed had they stayed in the origin country. In this case, migration has no impact. However, they may change more and, hence, dissipate from their counterparts in Turkey, embodying a ‘migration effect’. At the same time, stronger or weaker transmission across generations might slow down or increase intergenerational and, hence, socio-cultural change.

**Directions of dissimilation**

The directions of the dissimilation processes could take three forms. First, we might see a process of *dissimilation toward assimilation*; in this process, migrants and their offspring leave behind the lifestyle and behaviour of their origin society and adopt the traits of their destination country, following the course predicted by assimilation theories. This process includes a migration effect. Second, *dissimilation toward globalisation* could occur in a process parallel to global changes in values, attitudes and behaviour. Changes will also occur in the lives of non-migrants in the origin country and possibilities in the lives of natives in the destination countries. Therefore, migration will not be the cause, and dissimilation toward globalisation will not presuppose dissimilation from origins. To give an example, support for traditional gender-role attitudes might change at a similar pace among migrants and non-migrants in the origin countries because of increasing support for human rights worldwide. Third, migrants and their descendants may encounter no or fewer changes, or the historical features of the origin society may be reaffirmed or revitalised in terms of social, cultural and religious norms, values and behaviour. In this *dissimilation toward revitalisation* process, migration will potentially cause the restatement of traditional lifestyles. For example, religious involvement might increase among migrants in more secular societies because of the needs religion fulfils in their lives and their descendants’ lives, such as giving them a sense of belonging or providing a familiar network in an unfamiliar environment.

Stronger or weaker transmission across generations might slow down or increase intergenerational and socio-cultural change. Change across generations is likely to take place more quickly from the first to the second
generation in the migrant lineage because migration is likely to weaken the ability to achieve effective transmission from parent to child. Migration is an event of social and familial disconnection, making it difficult to move resources and skills from the origin to destination country and pass them on to offspring. The alteration of old lifestyles will slow down after the second family and migration generations; that is to say, the consequences of ancestral migration will stabilise in the second generation even if the children of the migrant ancestor have stayed put.

Why study Turkish migration?

It is estimated that between 1961 (when the first labour agreement was concluded between Germany and Turkey) and 1974, almost one million people (mostly young men) migrated for a shorter or longer period to Western Europe. The number of Turkish migrants and their descendants is difficult to determine because it varies by year and by source. Based on the International Labour Organization’s 1989 statistics, Martin states ‘Turkish nationals’ comprised one-quarter of the eight million non-European Community migrants in Western European countries (1991: 1 [footnote 2]). By 2010, estimates from Turkey suggest the number of Turkish citizens in Western European countries equalled three million.² Today, estimates suggest five million people of Turkish descent are living in Western Europe: of these, around 3.5 million are in Germany, close to half a million in each of the Netherlands, France and Austria, with smaller but significant groups in Sweden, Denmark and Belgium and small numbers in Norway and the UK.

Turkish migration is the basis for an enormous amount of social scientific research, ranging from studies of migration flows to detailed investigations of Turks’ settlement, labour market outcomes, values, culture, family forms and religiosity. These studies are mostly based on register data and seek to analyse the organisation and the processes of labour migration flows to Europe (Abadan-Unat 2011; Akgunduz 2008; Martin 1991; Paine 1974; Penninx 1982; Sayari 1986; Straubhaar 1986a; Tunali 1996) and the impact of migrants’ social and economic remittances to Turkey, including to their villages and relatives (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Castles and Wise 2007; Day and Icduygu 1999; Icduygu, Sirkeci and Muradoglu 2001; Straubhaar 1986b). Scholars have also focused on migrants’ settlement and organisation (Canatan 2001; Doomernik 1995), their socio-economic conditions using general or specific small- and large-scale surveys (Faist 1993; Kogan and Kalter 2006; Kristen, Reimer and Kogan 2008; Schoeneberg 1985; Simon 2003; Wahlbeck 2007), cultural patterns (Akgonul 2009; Diehl and Fick 2012; Ehrkamp 2005; Fleischmann et al. 2012; Kucukcan and Gungor 2009), political expressions (Ogelman 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003), religious adaptation (Diehl and Koenig 2009; Koenig et al. 2017; Guveli and Platt 2011;
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013), and family processes (Cesur-Kilicaslan and Terzioglu 2008; Merz et al. 2009; Nauck, Kohlmann and Diefenbach 1997; Razum, Sahin-Hodoglugil and Polit 2005; Schoenmaeckers, Lodewijckx and Gadeyne 1999). Turkish migrant women have been studied at some length as well, including the impact of migration on women (Abadan-Unat 1977; Day and Icduygu 1997; Erman 1998; Mirdal 1984; Munscher 1984).

This impressive body of research reflects the significance of Turkish migration as a focus for study. First, Turkish migration should be an important item on the agenda of migration research simply because of its size. Research has repeatedly shown that the size of migrant groups matters as a factor for theorising migrant incorporation (Esser 2004). Second, Turkish migration occurs in a region where mass migration is a relatively new phenomenon. Until 1945, many societies in Western Europe defined themselves as potential sources of out-migration. People from these countries were moving to the US, Canada and Australia (Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014). But after World War II, Western European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK, began actively and extensively recruiting labour migrants, first from Southern European countries and later from Morocco and Algeria, the Caribbean, Turkey, Pakistan and India. These migrants were expected to be temporary (Castles 1985; Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014), and of the many Turkish labour migrants recruited between 1960 and 1974, a substantial number did indeed move back. But many more stayed. After 1974, migrants were often motivated by family reunion, but employment, education and political protection became and/or continued to be important reasons to move (and stay).

At first glance, we see immediate similarities between Turkish migration to Western Europe and Mexican migration to the US. Both involve mass migration from a less developed region to a nearby, economically more advanced society, with the explicit aim of working for (comparatively) high wages in low status manual jobs. The similarities end here, however. Except for the initial period, Mexican migration has been largely illegal, but Turkish migration has mostly been regulated and government sanctioned, starting with Turkish migrant workers in the 1960s. In the subsequent era of family reunion, regulations changed; by and large, however, the flow of people remained structured: illegal migration and undocumented aliens are part of Turkish migration but not its primary characteristic.

Third, as noted, Turkish migrants and their descendents are spread over nine Western European countries. Their dispersion helps to shed light on the importance of different contexts, policies and societal structures in settlement, integration and reception. Crul and Schneider (2010) and their colleagues made good use of this feature of Turkish migration to develop their comparative integration context theory.

Fourth, Islam was not unknown in Europe. In fact, in Spain, it was a major religion until the 15th Century. That said, together with other
migrant groups to Europe after the 1960s, Turkish migrants were largely responsible for introducing Islam to European Christian destination countries. This characteristic may make the Turkish presence and reception in Europe different from other labour migrations, such as the Mexican migration to the US or southern European migration to northern European countries (without considering Moroccans, Pakistanis and many Indians). Religion is considered an important building block for migrant communities, especially in earlier flows from Europe to America (Herberg 1955; Smith 1978). Our understanding of the role of religion in migrants’ and their offspring’s life comes from the literature on international migration to the US, and except for some very recent studies (Diehl and Koenig 2013; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Guveli 2015; Guveli and Platt 2011), it is based on Catholic, Protestant and Jewish migrants. Studying Turkish migration and migrants in Europe broadens our perspective by including Islam in the discussion.

Last but by no means least, Turkish migration has relevance because of Turkey’s ongoing attempts to acquire full membership in the European Union. Turkey and wider Europe have a contentious history, but contemporary political constellations have increased the importance of Turkey to the Western world. During the Cold War and in several contemporary theatres of Middle Eastern political conflict, Turkey has been a pivotal ally of Western European (cum American) interests. Given its geopolitical location and its position in the Islamic world, Turkey is destined to become an even closer ally. If/when Turkey enters the European Union (and the monetary zone), this will ensure free movement of labour and trade. Since Turkey would then be the second largest member state of the EU, it is crucial to learn more about the changes in Turkish identities and Turkish migrants and their offspring in Europe.

Chapter outline

This volume comprises four sections. The first section gives an overall introduction to the book (Chapter 1) and explains our research design, data and methodology (Chapter 2). It describes the various research sites/sending regions (Chapter 3) and discusses the individual and family factors of (re)migration of Turks in a historical perspective and across three generations (Chapter 4). Sections two to four deal with different dimensions of the main research question. The second section looks at economic outcomes, namely educational outcomes (Chapter 5), occupational status (Chapter 6), and self-employment (Chapter 7); the third section focuses on social aspects: arranged marriage (Chapter 8), fertility (Chapter 9) and friends and connections (Chapter 10); the fourth section discusses cultural aspects, including religion (Chapter 11), gender attitudes (Chapter 12), and identities (Chapter 13). The concluding chapter (Chapter 14) considers how patterns and processes
of dissimilation from origins are similar and different for economic, social and cultural outcomes. Chapter 14 also offers the opportunity to synthesise our findings in the various chapters, notes their contribution to the migration literature, and suggests their value to research agendas.
Introduction

The data on which this book is based were collected for the 2000 Families: Migration Histories of Turks in Europe project. The unique design of the study can be characterised as origin-oriented, multi-site and multi-generational. It is origin-oriented because we focus on migrants and their descendants in European countries alongside their comparators who stayed behind in Turkey. It is multi-site because it starts in five distinct origin regions and traces migrants in nine main European destination countries: Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Finally, it is multi-generational because we start with the cohort of labour migrants, born between 1920 and 1945, who moved to Europe between 1961 and 1974. We identify them and their equivalent, non-migrant comparators and trace both lineages over generations, following their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren wherever they are on the globe.

Data collection comprised three stages: first, screening the sites in the five regions to identify migrant (and non-migrant) families; second, following up with family members for interviews; third, tracing difficult to find family members for interviews. The screening stage took place in five high-sending migration regions across Turkey: Acıpayam, Akçaabat, Emirdağ, Kulu and Şarkışla (see also Chapter 3). In each of those regions, we identified a representative sample of men who migrated as labour migrants to Western Europe between 1961 and 1974 along with a sample who could have migrated in this period but did not do so. Women were not included in our initial sample as they only formed a minority of the original ‘pioneer’ labour migrants. In identifying the migrant (and non-migrant) men of the relevant cohort, we did not require that they be alive; we simply had to know the fact of their migration. We then constructed the complete genealogies (family trees) of the migrant and non-migrant ancestors, identified their current location, and obtained contact details of at least two family members. This was all part of the initial screening.

At the same time, we took the opportunity to interview face-to-face those ancestors or family members who were eligible for an interview and who
were present in the regions during our screening fieldwork period. As well as the family tree, we used two interview instruments, the proxy questionnaire and the personal questionnaire. We provide more details on these instruments and who was eligible to complete them below. In the follow-up stage, eligible family members were tracked down using information provided at the screening stage and interviewed over the phone. These family members could have been anywhere in the world, but they were predominantly in Turkey and in European destination countries. In our final stage of tracing, the hard to find family members were traced (and subsequently interviewed) using various approaches, ranging from searching for these family members on social media such as Facebook, Twitter and so on, and contacting as many family members as possible to find one who could give us the contact details of the target interviewee.

Implementing an origins-of-migration study: design and data collection

Selecting the sending regions

As explained above, the families were sampled from five migration regions across Turkey. Table 2.1 presents the five high-migration sending provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Male Inhabitants 1970©</th>
<th>Male Inhabitants 2010¹</th>
<th>N to Europe between 1961–1974</th>
<th>% moved Europe</th>
<th>Receiving country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon County</td>
<td>79,622</td>
<td>763,714</td>
<td>20,346</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>All countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denizli County</td>
<td>75,470</td>
<td>931,823</td>
<td>19,536</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>France/ all countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>97,713</td>
<td>642,224</td>
<td>15,626</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>All countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afyon</td>
<td>77,599</td>
<td>697,559</td>
<td>10,901</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Belgium/Netherlands/ France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya County</td>
<td>178,316</td>
<td>2,013,845</td>
<td>22,880</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>All/Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Authors’ calculations from the 1970 and 2007 Turkish Censuses (© Turkish Statistical Institute) and Akgündüz (2008).
* Figures are for the total male population.
¹ Figures are for the general population.
(il) of the counties (ilçe) identified for screening; all sent large numbers of labour migrants to Europe during 1961–1974. Figure 2.1 illustrates their location within Turkey. Note that provinces (il) include one big city and many towns and counties (ilçe). Counties include one town with a town centre and many large, medium and small villages. We could not calculate the percentage of migration between 1961 and 1974 for counties (ilçe) because there are no figures about how many migrants moved to Europe in this period on a county level; there are figures for the provincial level, however. In Table 2.1, we show the percentage of migration from the regions at a provincial level using 1970 Census data and the figures Akgündüz (2008) collected per province for total numbers of migrants between 1961 and 1973. We used the number of men between 20 and 45 years of age as the denominator to calculate the percentage of migrants, as this was the age of the overwhelming majority of migrants at the time of their departure for Europe. Table 2.1 shows that between 13 per cent (Konya) and 28 per cent (Trabzon) of the male population aged 20 to 45 moved to Europe during that period.

In a second stage, we selected one high migration county (ilçe) in each of these five provinces: Akçaabat (Trabzon province), Acıpayam (Denizli province), Şarkışla (Sivas province), Emirdağ (Afyon province) and Kulu (Konya province). Each of these counties (ilçe) was a semi-urbanised region with

![Map of Turkey illustrating low, medium and high migration sending provinces between 1961 and 1974, including five selected regions (Akçaabat, Şarkışla, Kulu, Emirdağ and Acıpayam) for the 2000 Families study.](image)

**Figure 2.1** Map of Turkey illustrating low, medium and high migration sending provinces between 1961 and 1974, including five selected regions (Akçaabat, Şarkışla, Kulu, Emirdağ and Acıpayam) for the 2000 Families study

*Note:* To create the map, we used the total number of migrants from each province of Turkey between 1961 and 1973 sent by the IIBK (Akgündüz 2008: Appendix 2). We then used the population size for men aged 20–45 for each province from Census Turkey 1970 (Turkish Employment Office). Finally, we determined the percentage of migrants for each province.

*Sources:* (1) Appendix 2 of Akgündüz (2008); (2) Census Turkey 1970 (TUIK – Turkish Statistical Institute).
between 42,000 and 110,000 inhabitants in 2010 when we started regional fieldwork (Table 2.1).

We employed four selection criteria to identify the regions for our study, as outlined below. In part, the selection of the specific ilçe was driven by pragmatic concerns about the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of obtaining the sample. For example, we only selected regions from the high-sending and semi-rural areas because screening highly urbanised areas to identify migrants who moved from those regions to Europe during the labour migration period would have been very time consuming and costly, due to higher numbers of ineligible respondents and greater mobility. The metropolises, such as Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, sent high numbers of migrants to Europe as well, but these were predominantly internal migrants who first moved to the larger cities from rural regions and then moved on to Europe (Akgündüz 2008). It is also important to note that only 34 per cent of the Turkish population was living in urban areas in 1965; this figure had risen to 71 per cent in 2010 when we started screening the regions. This rapid urbanisation means urban-dwellers were much less representative of the Turkish population in our period of interest; in addition it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to find people who originated from these cities and moved to Europe.

Our first criterion for selecting the regions for the study was that they should have sent high numbers of guest workers to European countries between 1961 and 1974. Information about the proportion of migrants sent from the regions is mainly based on the statistics of the Turkish Employment Service (TES), as documented by Akgündüz (2008: see Appendix 2). The TES arranged 80 per cent of the recruitment of the Turkish labour migration to Europe between 1961 and 1974, and 20 per cent of migrants found work in Europe independently (Akgündüz 2008; Penninx 1982). Our five regions represent a good coverage of migrants who moved from the towns, districts, sub-districts and villages in their provinces.

The second criterion was that the regions should represent a good distribution of Turks in all the main European receiving countries. The last column of Table 2.1 notes the main receiving countries by regions. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of Turkish citizens currently (2011) living in the European destination countries, according to the statistics of the Turkish Foreign Ministry: about 60 per cent reside in Germany, 14 per cent in France, 12 per cent in the Netherlands, and 4 per cent in Austria, with lower shares in other European countries. While this figure shows the contemporary distribution of Turks, it continues to represent the main European destination countries for Turkish guest workers between 1961 and 1974.

We should emphasise that a low share of Turks in a country in Figure 2.2 does not necessarily mean people of Turkish origin in this country are an insignificant group. For example, although the share of Turkish citizens in Denmark (from the total of all Turks in Europe) is only two per cent, Turkish
origin people in Denmark are the largest non-Europe Union migrant group in that country, consequently making them an important group for Danish research.

To identify the main receiving countries from particular regions (as identified in Table 2.1), we relied on existing studies and on ‘common knowledge’ of the migration links between particular counties and specific European countries. For example, we know from destination country studies that emigrants from the county Emirdağ live predominantly in Belgium and the Netherlands (Ersanilli 2010). Although there is no study on the distribution of European destination countries by Turkish sending regions, some case studies focus on particular regions, such as Emirdağ, Kulu and Acıpayam, and particular destination countries (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Akgündüz 2008; Ersanilli 2010; Exter 1993; Gumusoglu et al. 2008). We based our decision on the regions used in these studies and on our personal knowledge of the remaining regions. Our findings in the field confirmed migration from those regions was to the expected destination countries.

Our third criterion for selecting the regions was that our sample should include the major ethnic (Kurds) and religious groups (Alevis) in Turkey. The regions Şarkışla, Emirdağ and some few villages in Akçaabat have Alevi populations; Kulu was selected because of its Kurdish population.

Finally, our fourth criterion was the inclusion of the regional distribution of the sending regions in Turkey in the sample. That is, our sample includes Akçaabat from the northeast of Turkey – the Black Sea region – a mountainous region with a scarcity of fertile land, causing people to migrate seasonally
to other parts of Turkey or abroad. Kulu and Şarkışla are in central Anatolia with plenty of fertile land; Emirdağ and Acıpayam are in western Anatolia – the Aegean region, the most developed part of Turkey.

The mapping of the four criteria across our five regions is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.3.

**Pilot study**

We conducted a pilot study in the first of our regions to test our processes and instruments. We screened Şarkışla during the summer of 2010; we followed up with the family members over the autumn and, in a final clean-up, into early 2011. In the pilot study, we tested our research design and the screening of the region; we obtained information about the family tree and administered proxy and personal questionnaires. To identify the migrant and non-migrant ancestors and interview them and their family members, we relied on the willingness of doorstep informants to give us contact details of their relatives who met the criteria. In the pilot study, we paid special attention to our success obtaining contact details for family members. While we had a few refusals, people in the regions were generally very interested in the study and were happy to provide details about ancestors and families. This enabled us to proceed to the main stage with confidence that we would access our full, diverse sample.

The questionnaires predominantly comprised questions used in other major surveys, but we constructed some questions particularly for this study. We tested all questionnaires and questions before the pilot fieldwork, with the pilot representing a second test for these instruments. We describe these processes in more detail in the data documentation (Ganzeboom et al. 2015). The pilot study was contracted out to a survey research company but strongly supported and directly monitored in the field by the research team. Given the success of the pilot and the quality of the fieldwork company,
we were satisfied that the model would work well for the main stage of the study. Therefore, we followed the same procedure in the main stage; while we contracted with a different fieldwork company, as in the pilot, we supported and monitored the performance in the field.

Main stage
The main stage of field work in Acıpayam, Akçaabat, Emirdağ, and Kulu was carried out from summer 2011 to mid-2012, with the regional fieldwork taking place over July and August 2011 and the follow-up interviews taking up autumn 2011 and spring 2012.

Apart from some relatively minor tweaks, the processes and instruments for the main stage were largely retained from the pilot. Alterations to the questionnaire comprised dropping a few questions considered redundant or relatively unimportant, to reduce respondent burden, replacing some with additional questions theoretically relevant to our research topic and where evaluation of the pilot data had revealed an important lacuna. The questions added or dropped are shown in the data documentation (Ganzeboom et al. 2015) but the number was limited.

A significant change to the screening process implemented in the main stage was the introduction of a definition of migrant for the first generation men. That is, as we detail below, we stipulated the migrant ancestor must have stayed at least five years rather than one year in Europe before returning. The pilot revealed the one-year limit resulted in the dominance of our ‘migrant’ sample by those who had moved to Europe on a very temporary basis and had not disrupted family or ties in Turkey or taken families with them before their speedy return, causing them to appear far more like their non-migrant counterparts. The five-year rule provided a clear window for migration effects, even if the migrant subsequently returned to Turkey; during this time, family reunification could more easily have taken place.

Screening in the five regions
In each region, we drew a clustered probability sample, using the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TUIK) address register to identify 100 primary sampling units. The research team carried out the probability sampling as a systematic sample with a random beginning and proportional to the estimated population size of the local community. The sampling points were then provided to the fieldwork agency teams to begin the screening. From the primary sampling point onwards, randomisation was archived by random walk, starting at the specified address and knocking on every other door in places where the population consisted of 1,000 or more inhabitants and knocking on every door when the number of inhabitants was less than 1,000. Knocking on doors continued until four migrant families were identified. After the identification of four migrant families, the interviewers were asked to locate one non-migrant family. The random walk stopped
when 60 households were screened or when the cooperation of eight families was obtained.

**Defining eligibility and establishing the sample**

A crucial step in our research design was defining the migrant and non-migrant family. To identify the migrant and non-migrant (to whom we refer as ‘ancestors’ or ‘G1’), interviewers asked the following question of the doorstep informant: ‘Amongst your, or your partner’s close or distant relatives, is there a man who is alive or dead, is (or would have been) between 65–90 years old, grew up in [REGION] (i.e. lived here until he was at least 16), migrated to Europe between the years 1960 and 1974 and stayed in Europe for at least five years?’ To locate the non-migrant ancestor, we asked exactly the same question of the doorstep informant but the question ended with ‘who stayed in Turkey’ instead.

Altogether we identified 1,580 migrants (dead or alive) and 412 non-migrant men (dead or alive), making 1,992 families in total. The non-migrant men served as the control group. These 1,992 men were the patriarchs of the almost 2,000 families mentioned in our project title. Initially, we intended to sample only 100 families in each region (500 in total). We increased the number of families to 400 per region (aiming for about 2000 in total across the five regions) after the pilot study. In the pilot, we discovered a large number of first generation migrants (ancestors – G1) who moved to Europe and stayed there for some years and then returned to Turkey without bringing any family members to Europe in the meantime. As a result, in our pilot data the majority of second and third family generations had never moved to Europe, with non-migrant family members constituting the vast majority of the sample. We therefore concluded we would include the return migrants in our data but would need to increase the total number of migrants to ensure adequate coverage of those who stayed longer in and brought their family members to Europe. We also increased the minimum period of stay requirement as discussed above.

Increasing the number of families allowed us to capture the complex nature of Turkish migration to Europe. More specifically, we obtained analytic samples of all the various migration statuses: non-migrants, return migrants, and migrants in Europe, including the first migration generation and the second and third generations who were born in Europe.

**Instruments and data collection**

After we identified an ancestor in the screening fieldwork, we gathered the family tree information of the first generation men from the doorstep informant as shown in Figure 2.4. The figure presents the generations of the ancestor (G1), children (G2), grandchildren (G3) and great-grandchildren (G4). On the basis of the family tree information, we took two further steps. First, interviewers obtained contact details of the proxy informant(s)
identified as the most suitable person(s) to conduct the proxy interview (see below). Second, adult children, grandchildren and, if applicable, great-grandchildren were randomly selected for personal interviews; contact details of at least two of them were secured at this stage of the fieldwork.

On the basis of this information, we traced and interviewed the family descendants of the 1992 ancestors using three data collection instruments: the family tree, the proxy questionnaire and the personal interview questionnaire.

**Family trees**

As discussed, the family trees comprise a complete inventory of all descendants (genealogy) of the G1 ancestor’s children (G2), grandchildren (G3) and great-grandchildren (G4), as illustrated in Figure 2.4. The family tree recorded basic information about the ancestor’s migration, that is whether migrant or non-migrant, country he moved to, year of migration, duration of stay in destination country, his age, whether dead or alive, and number, sex and age/year of birth of his children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. The family tree questionnaire also collected information on number, sex and migration status of the ancestor’s brothers and sisters (other members of the G1 generation). The information was mostly collected in the field from a family member but often supplemented in later stages of the data collection. In total, the family tree information covered 48,978 family members across four generations. Of these, 6,810 of were realised in the pilot period in Şarkışla, with the rest of the information collected during the main fieldwork in Akçaabat, Kulu, Emirdağ and Acıpayam (see Table 2.2).

**Proxy interviews**

Obviously it was not feasible (for both time and cost reasons), nor even necessarily desirable to personally interview all the living adult family members in these family trees. Therefore, we designed a proxy questionnaire to obtain further factual information about all adult (aged 18 or over at the time of the survey) descendants of the ancestor (G1), whether living...
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

or dead, including the ancestor himself. The questions in the proxy questionnaire are exactly the same for all adult family members but there are more questions about the ancestor. The data from the proxy interviews provide a basic inventory of demographic information: migration motive and history, marital status, marriage mode (arranged marriage, marriage with a relative), education, country of education, occupation (first and most recent), sector of employment, ethnicity and religion. The additional questions about the ancestor are whether he is alive, if dead, which country he died in, whether and what year his wife joined him in Europe, occupation of his father, and his marriage and divorce history. A well-informed proxy informant, that is someone who knew the family well, supplied this information about the adult family members. Most often the informant was a member of the middle generation (G2); occasionally there was more than one informant. Proxy surveys were completed either face-to-face in the field or over the phone. We obtained 1,544 proxy interviews (i.e. families) from the 1,992 families (78 per cent), covering information about 19,666 adult family members in these families.

Personal interviews

Personal interviews were conducted with up to seven members of each ancestor’s family. We selected the following persons for a personal interview: (A) all surviving ancestors, (B) two randomly selected G2 children (if alive), and (C) two randomly selected children (if adult and alive) of each of selected G2 family members. The design was targeted at obtaining data from complete lineages (G1 → G2 → G3) within families and allowed us to compare siblings, within the middle and third generations. It also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2</th>
<th>Response rates for family, proxy and personal questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main stage*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families with a family tree</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant families</td>
<td>1,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant families</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals in family tree</td>
<td>42,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy interviews</td>
<td>1,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals within proxy</td>
<td>16,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal interviews</td>
<td>5,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Completed families’**</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Includes tracing outcomes.
** Refers to families that provided a fully constructed family tree, proxy interview and personal interviews with all selected adult members.
provided information about aunts and uncles, as well as the parents of G3. Respondents were sampled from the family tree according to a randomisation rule for G2 and G3; this ‘AZ’ rule meant we selected the two family members within that generation whose first names started with the letter closest to ‘A’ and ‘Z’.

The resulting personal interviews provided information on socio-demographics, social networks, values, attitudes, behaviours, religiosity and national and political identity. The majority of personal interviews were completed over the phone as respondents were dispersed over Europe and Turkey. However, some were completed face-to-face during the screening fieldwork in Turkey. We obtained personal information about 5,980 family members of the total 9,787 adult family members who were eligible for a personal interview, representing a 61 per cent response rate (Table 2.2).

Since the aim was to achieve complete three-generation lineages as far as possible, the numbers for ‘Completed families’ in Table 2.2 provide the numbers of families for whom we obtained a fully constructed family tree, a complete proxy interview about the family and personal interviews with all selected family members. We have complete family data for 759 out of our total of 1,992 families, a rate of 38 per cent. To put this response rate in context, we should note that unlike standard surveys, which typically require simply an interview with one person or occasionally all adult household members, to complete all our family data across all three instruments, we required responses from numerous – as many as eight – different individuals living in different households (and countries).

All our instruments were developed in English – the project language – and translated into Turkish. The questionnaires used in the proxy and personal interviews were also translated into German, Dutch, French, Danish and Kurdish. We employed interviewers fluent in the languages of the interviewees. However, in practice, very little use was made of the non-Turkish instruments, which is in accordance with previous studies (Kentel and Kaya 2005). Kentel and Kaya (2005) found that among European Turks, even in the third generation only one per cent was not able to conduct the interview in Turkish.

Regardless of the language of administration, country specific categories were used for educational level and political party choice based on the respondent’s country of residence.

Note that we use data from all three instruments, either separately or in combination, in this volume; we specify which dataset is being used at the start of each chapter.

Quality issues and consistency of proxy and personal data
Social science scholars often use proxy data in questionnaires and research. For example, they regularly draw on information about the reported education and occupation of the respondent’s father and mother to explore social
mobility and the influence of family background. But the reliability of these data has rarely been assessed (De Vries 2006), although studies in the health sciences are promising (Dorman et al. 1997; Magaziner et al. 1997; Sneeuw et al. 1997; Varni, Limbers and Burwinkle 2007). The minimal discussion is due to a lack of appropriate comparators against which to validate responses. Self-reports from the respondents whose situation is being given by proxy does not necessarily provide accurate data but would constitute a reference when evaluating the consistency between personal and proxy data.

The 2000 Families data include information on the same questions in the proxy interviews and personal (self-reported) interviews, such as education, country of education, occupation, religion, country of birth and so on. Therefore, our data represent a valuable source for the analysis of the proxy and self-reported data. In a recent article, Bayrakdar (2015) demonstrates the general consistency between the personal and proxy data on education and country of education. He shows that, overall, proxy informants report educational outcomes with high consistency in the 2000 Families dataset. This gives us confidence in the use of these proxy data for analysis and suggests the validity of the approach to collect more comprehensive family-level data from key informants in other studies.

Further analysis could usefully test the value of our approach and the quality of the 2000 Families proxy data by evaluating other measures provided by the proxy informant and self-reported in the personal questionnaire, such as occupation, country of birth, migration year and so on, taking into account various characteristics of the proxy informants (such as the distance and relationship between the proxy informant and the person on whom they are supplying information) and the type of information (factual, behavioural or attitudinal data).

Implementing an origins-of-migration study: strengths and challenges

Strengths of the 2000 Families design and data

The research design has many strengths deriving from its carefully selected sampling plan, instruments and measurement procedures. Three of the strengths are worth discussing at greater length. First, the design is origin country based. This means we were able to cover all migrants, including return migrants, with one possible exception, namely, if all family members had left the region without leaving a trace, an eventuality which is highly unlikely, as we discuss below. International migration literature has emphasised the limitations of previous studies in capturing all sorts of migrant experience, for example return migrants, undocumented migrants or chain migrants (Amelina and Faist 2012; Guveli et al. 2014). Our study can
address these limitations because of its origin-based data collecting and its systematic sampling.

Second, the design is *region* based. While we do not claim the sample is representative of the distribution of emigrants, we argue the care taken in selecting the regions enables us to cover the diversity of Turkish migration at this period. Moreover, our design permits us to investigate local factors stimulating migration and to consider how migration, in turn, affects the region of origin.

Third, the design is *family* and *generation* based, covering three and in some cases four and five generations.¹ This allows us to compare between generations within families and between siblings within generations, providing four advantages over more commonly used designs. First, it is possible to use the generational comparisons to trace historical changes. This is adequate for characteristics that can be assumed not to change over the life cycle (migration, education, first occupation), but not for characteristics that can change over the life course (friendships, attitudes). Second, the data comprise a rich set of control variables, covering in principle, all characteristics of the previous generations. This allows us to isolate migration and transmission effects from other confounding influences. Third, the design makes it possible to trace possible grandfather effects, which are of increasing interest in sociological work more widely and of specific interest in migration research. Fourth, we can employ sibling models to control for unmeasured family characteristics that siblings have in common. These advantages are exploited for our specific purposes in the following chapters. At the same time, however, they render the data of ongoing interest to other researchers.

Certain advantages flow from the separation of data collection instruments in the implementation of data collection, in this case, the separate collection of the family tree, the proxy data and the personal interviews. The use of a family tree provided an initial sampling frame from which it was possible to select the within-family random sample, before any other information was collected. Moreover, it helped us convey the intentions of the research to our respondents and obtain their collaboration. Family histories are typically an attractive subject for respondents in research studies. The proxy interviews allowed us to build up a demographic database on Turkish migration of unprecedented size and range, covering multiple generations within families. Dependence on the same information from the personal interviews would have restricted the range of analysis of migration patterns, marriage and fertility and occupational and educational transmission. Finally, the personal interview provided rich and varied information on the respondent’s characteristics, attitudes, behaviours and values.
Challenges of the research design

Admittedly, the 2000 Families study has a number of potential limitations. The most obvious one in our research design is the under-representation of Turkish families who had entirely left the region of origin and abandoned their family properties by the time of the fieldwork. Fortunately, our research design was still able to include these families, unless the entire extended family had left, because we allowed the doorstep informant to give us contact details of a relative who was not from the immediate family. In addition, our design was premised on the expectation that even migrant families retain strong or weak ties with their region of origin, including their original family home. This assumption was supported by existing research and empirical observation and strengthened by our experience in the field. During our fieldwork in the various regions, we found a substantial number of newly built houses which were occupied only during the summer months. We carried out our screening with this in mind, concentrating on the summer period.

Realistically, however, our design was biased towards families with relatively strong ties to their families and regions of origin. Research shows that using snowball sampling in the origin countries of migrants tends to selection bias in over-representing migrants with stronger connections to their origin societies (Beauchemin and González-Ferrer 2011). To minimise this kind of bias and avoid snowball sampling, we screened a random sample of addresses within the regions, rather than using any form of snowballing. And we asked doorstep informants about relatives rather than close family members who had moved to Europe within the period of initial labour migration. Therefore, our sample differs from typical snowball-based samples in that it also includes first generation ancestors and their children who are not necessarily strongly connected to Turkey. Even with some bias towards more strongly connected migrants, as with every study, which necessarily includes their own biases, the critical issue is whether this bias is systematically linked to the outcome variable of interest in addressing key research questions. At this point we can say that, with regard to educational outcomes (Chapter 5), occupational status (Chapter 6), religiosity (Chapter 11) and gender-role attitudes (Chapter 12), our data show reassuringly similar findings to other studies which have surveyed Turkish origin people in Europe, such as the European Social Survey and The Integration of the European Second Generation project data (TIES) (Crul and Schneider 2009a; Guveli 2015; Zuccotti, Ganzbeoom and Guveli forthcoming). Future studies will determine whether there is an impact of this possible bias on other outcomes.

Furthermore, the bias linked to a stronger connection to the origin country bias needs to be considered in comparison with the bias incurred by other designs. Most migration research sheds no light on the places of
origin, nor does it cover return migrants. Drawing a representative sample of migrant populations in the destination countries is not always possible, as most countries do not have registers of migrants and/or their offspring or information about their ancestors or origins. As a result, destination country samples are typically drawn by screening larger cities and migrant concentrated areas, introducing various systematic biases related to the structural and cultural integration outcomes.

Another potential criticism is that our design lacks a control group in the destination societies. While we argue that causal interpretation of migration requires a counterfactual point of view (what would have happened to the migrants had they not migrated) which cannot be provided by samples drawn from destination societies, the comparison with natives and/or other migrants has value. That said, there is some potential for making such comparisons, as illustrated in a number of the chapters in this volume, because we selected many of our measures to be directly comparable with those in European sample surveys, in particular, the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European/World Value Survey. While studies like ESS lack our generational design, they provide useful benchmarks for both demographics (education, occupation) and personal variables (e.g. political preferences and value orientations), and they include Turkish migrants or Turkish origin respondents.

To what extent are our five regions representative of the migrant population at large? Despite regional variations (e.g. in religious and ethnic composition) our study misses some regional representation; for example, we have a limited number of Kurds in our sample and none from the Kurdish region itself. Similarly, starting our sample in the 1961–1974 labour migration limits our view of later migratory flows, such as political migration, except to the extent to which they appear in existing migrant and non-migrant families from our regions.

Finally, our family-based design generates statistical complexities that would not have occurred in a simpler, individual-based design. Specifically, observations within families are not independent of each other – and this can lead to errors in estimation of confidence intervals if we do not take account of this dependence. However, adjusting for within-family clustering is straightforward with commonly used statistical packages and is adopted in all analyses in the following chapters.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have outlined our implementation of a multi-generational origins-of-migration study, explaining the decisions we made and how they were operationalised in the fieldwork and data collection. We have highlighted the strengths of the resulting 2000 Families data (Guveli
et al. 2016) and addressed their potential limitations for migration research, including the impact of migration on individuals, families and family transmission.

The unique features of this design are exploited in different ways in the chapters that follow, addressing specific empirical questions. Therefore, this chapter serves as background and reference point for what follows. At the same time, it offers a blue-print for future projects that may wish to implement an origins-of-migration design, noting some issues to consider and how to implement it most effectively.
The Five Regions of Origin in Turkey

Location and characteristics of the regions

The regions covered by the ‘2000 Families’ study are in five of the 81 provinces of Turkey: Acıpayam (province of Denizli), Emirdağ (province of Afyon), Kulu (province of Konya), Şarkışla (province of Sivas), and Akçaabat (province of Trabzon) (see also the discussion in Chapter 2). In this chapter, we introduce these five regions, discuss their locations, note the migration patterns in the 1960s and 1970s and comment on their previous and current state of development. This discussion provides a rich context for the analysis of migrant and non-migrant outcomes that follows in the book and paints the backdrop for the transnational links that persist to the present time.

These regions experienced massive labour migration in the 13 years of labour recruitment to Western Europe between 1961 and 1974. They were selected for the ‘2000 Families’ study for four reasons. First, they were all high-sending areas which enabled the identification of a sufficient number of labour migrants; second, they were rural or semi-rural during the targeted period of migration to Europe which enabled the identification of the ‘typical’ labour migrant to Europe; third, migrants from these regions left for different European countries, allowing a certain diversity in destination contexts, and fourth, they incorporate some degree of religious and ethnic diversity.

Figure 3.1 shows the geographical location of the rural districts (in Turkish: ilçe) and larger cities of Turkey today and in 1965. All of our five regions have a larger town at the centre, surrounded by widely spread out villages. They differ in their locations, and present different aspects of Turkey. While Acıpayam, Emirdağ, and Kulu draw a curve from the inner western part of Turkey to central Anatolia, Şarkışla and Akçaabat are positioned in the eastern part of central Anatolia and north coast of Anatolia, respectively. Kulu is located between Ankara and Konya. Ankara, the capital city, has always been large, and Konya has recently grown. Acıpayam, Akçaabat and Emirdağ are close to cities in their wider region, whereas Şarkışla is positioned in a relatively more remote region.
Geographically, while Acıpayam lies on a plain and enjoys a Mediterranean climate, the climate of Emirdağ and Kulu is between Mediterranean and terrestrial. Located in eastern central Anatolia, Şarkışla has a strong terrestrial climate, while Akçaabat is characterised by high levels of rain throughout the year because of its position on a hillside facing the sea.

Kulu is home to a large Sunni Kurdish minority whose origin is not clear (local stories refer to the eastern part of Turkey); in all other regions, families belong to ethnic Turks or other smaller minorities. In Şarkışla, the Alevi constitute an important religious group. In total, in Turkey the proportion of Alevi is estimated to be somewhere between 15 to 30 per cent (Gunes-Ayata 1992; Shindeldecker 1998), with the large majority of the population of Turkey belonging to the Sunni denomination.

**Labour migration to Europe**

In the 13-year period of official labour migration to Europe, about 1.3 million workers left Turkey for Western Europe (Akgündüz 2008: 81). In 1961, the first bilateral recruitment agreement was signed with West Germany, the country which eventually recruited the large majority of all Turkish workers (see Figure 3.2). Later contracts with Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands (1964) and France (1965) followed. Denmark, Switzerland and the UK also admitted Turkish labourers, without signing an official labour recruitment agreement. Migration to Sweden was self-organised, as a contract signed in 1967 never came into being.

Most labour migrants were actively recruited. Industrial firms and factories in western European countries sought labourers from Turkey, and Turks left the country in large numbers. Economic and social risks and costs of
migration were buffered, allowing people to migrate who otherwise might not have gone. Later migratory flows acquired their own dynamics and mechanisms, stemming from this initial flow.

Turkey considered migration to European countries a shortcut to economic and social development (Martin 1991). The country lacked colonial roots, but based on bilateral historical ties, Europe was seen as an ally and model. Whereas Turkey stressed its belonging to the West, western countries were eager to employ labourers who could easily be sent back home (Castles 1986). Sending and receiving countries aimed to benefit from migrants and considered their migration to be temporary. Migrants themselves typically intended to return fairly soon. The common aim was to save money in order to improve life by buying agricultural machinery or creating a business upon return. Soon after the introduction of a two-year-rotation rule, however, German institutions realised this period was too short to train workers in their jobs. Turkey, therefore, had to allow open-ended individual migration to be regulated only by the receiving society.

In the first years of labour migration, workers, including internal migrants, mainly came from the larger cities and urban, more developed areas. Over time, the number of workers to Europe grew steadily. Workers increasingly migrated directly from rural central Anatolia (Akgündüz 2008: 133), but migration from underdeveloped provinces, from the southeast in particular, remained low during the whole recruitment period. Official migration started in 1961 with 1,207 workers leaving from the provinces of Ankara, Istanbul and Zonguldak. A year later, 11,024 workers were sent abroad. In 1964, the number reached 66,000 and now included representatives from most Turkish provinces (Akgündüz 2008: 181–183). For the most part, subsequent fluctuations in numbers were a consequence of economic conditions in Europe: during the recession of 1966–1967, for example, many Turkish workers lost their jobs, and either returned to Turkey or went to other European countries, and a smaller number of new workers migrated to Europe (see Table 3.1). The recession did not provoke mass return migration, but returnees outnumbered new migrants at this point. Shortly after this, workers were re-employed and the number of migrants rose again. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the desire to migrate had increased considerably.

In 1973 and 1974, against the background of the oil crisis and large-scale unemployment, official labour recruitment was abruptly stopped. Germany prohibited its employers from recruiting non-European Community migrants in November 1973, and France and the Netherlands followed suit in the early months of 1974. By the second half of 1974, official labour recruitment came to an end. But the European countries coupled the halt to recruitment with a reaffirmation of the right of migrants to reunify their families in Europe and to remain living and working there.

Return migration over this period was substantial and included both single labour migrants and their families (Icduygu 2012). At the same time,
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

The changing demographic composition of the migrant population marked a settlement process in Europe. Family reunification and formation in Europe did not necessarily mean migrants had given up the idea of return, but at this time, it was deferred by many (Castles 1986). In following decades, family reunification, (undocumented) labour migration, refugee and student movements, as well as marriage migration, contributed to ongoing migration from Turkey to Europe. The number of Turkish citizens in Europe had reached 3 million by 2010 according to Turkish official statistics.  

Table 3.1  Workers sent abroad through the Turkish Employment Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11,025</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>5,605</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23,436</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>6,651</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54,902</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,973</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>45,652</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>32,580</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7,199</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>41,409</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>98,142</td>
<td>3,404</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10,622</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>3,507</td>
<td>9036</td>
<td>96,936</td>
<td>4,843</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7897</td>
<td>65,684</td>
<td>4,853</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10610</td>
<td>65,875</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7,083</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>17544</td>
<td>103,793</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10577</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual reports of the Turkish Employment Service (cf. Akgündüz 2008: 79).  

The changing demographic composition of the migrant population marked a settlement process in Europe. Family reunification and formation in Europe did not necessarily mean migrants had given up the idea of return, but at this time, it was deferred by many (Castles 1986). In following decades, family reunification, (undocumented) labour migration, refugee and student movements, as well as marriage migration, contributed to ongoing migration from Turkey to Europe. The number of Turkish citizens in Europe had reached 3 million by 2010 according to Turkish official statistics.  

For the five regions selected for the ‘2000 Families’ study, official numbers of labour migrants exist at the province level only, but they mirror the pattern for the whole of Turkey (see Figure 3.2).  

Characteristic of Turkish migration flows, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, is the slight increase and a first peak before 1965, the sharp decline during the recession in 1967, and the even more profound rise until the end of the 1960s. But we also find some differences between the regions: the province of Trabzon (with the district of Akçaabat) is characterised by intensive early migration which was only marginally surpassed in the period after the recession. A blue mould disease on tobacco plants is reported as an important trigger for the migration. Konya, the largest province (containing the district of Kulu), experienced its peak emigration in 1969, with migration remaining quite high until the end of the recruitment era. Again, a natural disaster (drought in the 1960s) is reported to have initiated migration to Europe. Afyon (including the district of Emirdağ) started sending workers much later and only experienced considerable migration after the recession. This pattern is typical of chain migration processes, as they tend to start slowly and then expand. In total, the number of workers officially sent by the Turkish Employment Service from Denizli was 19,500, very close to
Trabzon’s total (20,300). Konya sent more (22,900) but had a much larger male population at that time. There was less official migration from Afyon (1,900) and Sivas (1,500). No information exists on the number of workers from these provinces who were not selected by the official authorities but migrated following nominative demands or travelled at their own risk and expense on tourist visas.

Contrary to common assumptions, many officially recruited labour migrants had a certain level of formal education or held skilled positions before departure. Existing official data suggest the migrants who left were rarely landless peasants or the officially unemployed (Abadan-Unat 2005: 54). Many were small- or medium-sized land-holding farmers. Further, according to Martin (1991: 25) and Akgündüz (2008: 156), about 33 per cent of all migrants were registered as ‘skilled’ workers, and about one-fifth of the stock of skilled Turks in the mid-1960s migrated. Akgündüz concludes that both the educational level of the migrant workers and the proportion of the skilled among them were significantly higher when compared to the economically active population of Turkey (Akgündüz 2008: 20 and 155).²

This pattern is reflected, to some extent, in the sample of the ‘2000 Families’ study. Table 3.2 presents the education levels and the first occupational status after finishing education of the men we selected as ancestors (family heads). When we compare the labour migrants with the stayers, the data support the existing evidence that the higher rather than the lower educated left to a larger extent (see also Chapters 4, 5 and 6). This pattern applies to all regions, with the exception of the western region of Acıpayam,
where the pattern is reversed. In this region, educational attainment is higher altogether, and the stayers show the highest educational levels of all. Educational levels are lowest in the district of Akçaabat, for both migrants and stayers.

A somewhat different pattern is found for selectivity patterns according to pre-migratory occupational status. Overall, the men with lower status seem to have left (see Chapters 4 and 6). This pattern applies to all regions except for Emirdağ. In this region, occupation status is low, with the stayers displaying the lowest occupation status of all. Despite low educational status, migrants and stayers from Akçaabat have medium-level occupations. In Acıpayam, however, high educational status is clearly linked to higher occupational status, with the stayers in that region showing the highest occupational levels of all.

**Socio-economic and demographic developments over time**

The five provinces in which the selected regions are located largely resembled each other in their levels of economic development in the migration period of the 1960s and 1970s. Three decades later, all selected regions can still be placed at a medium level of development as compared to other regions in...
The Five Regions of Origin in Turkey

Table 3.3 Characteristics of the regions at province (1970s) and ilçe level (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Development Index, 1973*</th>
<th>Development Status, 1974</th>
<th>İlçe</th>
<th>Socio-economic Development Group, 2004**</th>
<th>Socio-economic rank, 2004***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denizli</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Acıpayam</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afyon</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Emirdağ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>Kulu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
<td>Şarkışla</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Akçaabat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
* This development index considers 12 indicators, including proportion of urban population, literacy rate and numbers of university or high school graduates. It ranges from 19 to 288.
** The socio-economic development classification is based on the ranking of the ilçes according to the socio-economic development index comprising 32 different indicators, such as employment rate, GDP per capita, literacy rate or urbanisation rate. It ranges from 1 (most developed) to 6 (least developed).
*** The number refers to the ranking among all 872 regions (ilçe), with the first ilçe being the most developed.

Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics (cf. Akgündüz 2008: 187) and State Planning Agency (Dincer and Ozaslan 2004).

Turkey. Table 3.3 shows the development status of the selected provinces in 1973–1974 based on calculations by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics and the Socio-economic Development Index for the regions (ilçe) calculated for 2004 by the State Development Agency. In the 1970s, during or right after peak labour migration to Europe, the level of development was lowest in the province of Sivas (‘underdeveloped’), highest in Konya (‘developed’) and somewhere in between (‘developing’) in the remaining regions. About 30 years later, at the turn of the new century, Şarkışla in the province of Sivas was still the least developed region, while Acıpayam, Emirdağ, Kulu and Akçaabat belonged to the third group (developing provinces). Briefly stated, then, when compared to all other districts (ilçe), the five selected for the ‘2000 Families’ study are about mid-level developmentally, with Şarkışla ranking lowest.

All regions and the whole of Turkey have experienced massive socio-demographic and socio-economic transformations in recent decades. Although these changes have barely affected the developmental differences between the five regions of interest, they have led to substantial levels of overall change. This is reflected in various indicators available for Turkey as a whole and for the five provinces of interest more specifically.3

Table 3.4 presents the various indicators of development, starting with the shares of different economic sectors, that is, the nature of economic life and main economic activities in the regions. Since 1980, the share of individuals
## Table 3.4  Indicators of development (percentage of eligible population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces/Country</th>
<th>Denizli</th>
<th>Afyon</th>
<th>Konya</th>
<th>Sivas</th>
<th>Trabzon</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Employed by sectors</strong></td>
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*Continued*


Table 3.4  Continued

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<th>Provinces/ Country</th>
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<th>Konya</th>
<th>Sivas</th>
<th>Trabzon</th>
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<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.79</td>
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<td>3.76</td>
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</table>

**Note:**
* Including construction sector.
** From 1960 to 2000, numbers were calculated by considering the total population divided by the total number of households. In 2011, the total number of people living in households was considered and divided by the total number of households.

Source: TSI Population census; TURKSTAT Household Labour force Survey.

employed in agriculture dropped from 60 per cent to 23 per cent in Turkey. In the five selected provinces, the share of agriculture is relatively higher than the average, yet a rapid decline in agriculture is obvious across the regions. As for the expansion of education, literacy rates went up dramatically from 1960, from about 40 per cent in Turkey as a whole, and especially in the middle and western provinces (only 30 per cent in Sivas and Trabzon), to well above 90 per cent in 2010. At the same time, labour force participation went down from 63 to 48 per cent across Turkey, with similar trends in all regions. Simply stated, decreasing participation was driven by the decreasing economic activity of women. Over time, the share of workers in the agricultural sector diminished considerably, leaving many unpaid family workers out of the labour force, particularly women who were largely employed in the agricultural sector. Unemployment rose from 4 to 9 per cent from 1980 until 2000, and dropped to 8 per cent in 2010.

It is important to recognise that official rates only partly reflect the overall economic situation. More significantly, many individuals work in family businesses, disguising under- and unemployment in official statistics. Nevertheless, across the provinces, these data suggest more intense economic activity in some areas (mainly Konya and Afyon) but, overall, they show average and similar socio-economic patterns in the five regions.

A further dimension of change is the massive demographic transformation across Turkey, reflected in the continuous decline of both infant
mortality rates and fertility. Infant mortality rates have declined from about 15 per cent to 1 per cent in the last 40 years. At the same time, fertility rates across Turkey have decreased from 3.4 to just below the replacement level of 2.1. This development is visible in all five provinces, even though the levels diverge slightly. A further indicator of family development is household size, which has gone down steadily over time in all provinces.

Together, the indicators show the massive transformation processes that Turkey has been undergoing since the 1960s when the first labour migrants left for Europe. As discussed, the patterns of change are similar across the regions, even though some differences are visible, mostly reflecting the well-known west-east divides that continue to characterise Turkey. On the one hand, Denizli stands out as more westernised and modern in terms of demographic indicators such as fertility and household size. In addition, it is more industrialised in its economic activities, arguably affected by its geographical location closer to the western, more urban and industrialised parts of Turkey. On the other hand, as evident from the indices, as well as the detailed indicators, Sivas stands out as the most deprived region economically, with relatively lower labour market participation and higher unemployment rates. What becomes clear, however, are the very different contexts now experienced by individuals and families in Turkey. This must be kept in mind when we study the effects of international migration by comparing international migrants with stayers. Clearly, we are not using a static population in our comparison; further, the context for the original migrants is very different from that experienced by contemporary families and individuals in Turkey who are contemplating migration.

**Migration destinations and today’s residence patterns**

As we saw in Table 3.1, the larger share of official labour migration was to Germany. Yet other countries hosted large numbers as well. We may observe different patterns in destination country distributions when we consider whether certain migration destinations are preferred by particular regions or explore the development of chain migration processes. In fact, existing literature and formative research by the ‘2000 Families’ team suggest certain destination countries were likely to be typical for certain regions (see also Chapter 2). This variation is reflected in the ‘2000 Families’ data, when we inspect the destination countries of the original labour migrants.

Akçaabat experienced early and large-scale migration in the 1960s; for its migrants, the main destination countries were (and still are) Germany, followed by Austria and the Netherlands. For the other regions, Germany has been of lesser importance, even though it remains the major destination for migrants from all regions except Emirdağ. Certain destination countries have been more important for some regions than for others. Denmark, for instance, is a relevant context for migrants from Şarkışla and Kulu, but completely irrelevant for those from Akçaabat and Acıpayam. The main
destinations for migrants from Emirdağ in the 1960s were Belgium, France, and to a far lesser extent, Germany. The story of chain migration from Emirdağ to Belgium is an interesting one. The bulk of Turkish migrants who went to the Belgian coal mines were from Emirdağ. The first group encouraged kin and friends to follow, aided by Belgium’s liberal work and residence permits policy (Karci Korfali, Üstübici and De Clerck 2010; Timmerman, Lodewyckx and Wets 2009). By contrast, for Kulu, Sweden was a prominent destination and even became a sort of icon in the region. Turkish migration to Sweden consisted only of self-organised migration channelled by social networks; according to Akgündüz, the connection between Kulu and Sweden developed as follows:

In the beginning of the 1960s, some individuals from Ankara who had contacts in Sweden acted as interpreters for Swedish employers and mediated the initiation of labor migration from Kulu, a district of Konya, where they had ties. The initial migrants then paved the way for the chain migration of members of their lard kinship groups and friends, who left the country on work passports as well as tourist passports. In consequence, Kulu, with only 8905 inhabitants by October 1965, supplied an estimated 4000 migrants to Sweden by the end of 1975. Thus, Kulu emerged as the main area of supply for Turkish labor to Sweden. (2008: 90)

The total number of people who migrated from Kulu to Sweden amounted to at least 8,000 (Lundström 1991). The largest group of Turks in Sweden still comprises those from Kulu. They live chiefly in certain regions of Greater Stockholm. Today in Kulu, the main street and the biggest park in the town are named after social democrat former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. Swedish politicians make occasional visits to Kulu to garner Kulu votes. The story of the Swedish emigration has even entered local folklore.

Table 3.5  Destination countries of labour migrants (G1) (column = percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acıpayam</th>
<th>Emirdağ</th>
<th>Kulu</th>
<th>Şarkışla</th>
<th>Akçaabat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study; family tree data and proxy data
The ‘2000 Families’ study gives insight into the family patterns that have evolved in the course of a half-century of migration between Turkey and Western Europe. Table 3.6 presents the present country of residence of the G1 labour migrants and provides information about the share of family members who never left the region or reside in Europe today. In fact, in our selected regions, we find a large share of labour migrants who returned to Turkey for good, and many migrants’ children and grandchildren have never left Turkey.

Particularly notable is the high share of returnees in Akçaabat. Today, 88 per cent of all living labour migrants from this region are returnees and live in Akçaabat. Many returned to their regions without ever taking their families abroad: 71 per cent of their children and 78 per cent of their grandchildren have never lived in Europe. Accordingly, in this region, migration left its mark during the period of migration. Long-term effects, however, seem to be lower than in other regions.

In Acıpayam, many labour migrants returned as well, but the share of children and grandchildren who live in Western Europe is larger. Unlike Acıpayam and Akçaabat, in Emirdağ, migration is still at the centre of socio-economic and daily life. Table 3.6 indicates that the share of labour migrant returnees is lowest for Emirdağ (39 per cent). The majority of children and grandchildren live in Europe. In Kulu, more labour migrants returned (66 per cent), yet the share of residents in Europe is high for children (56 per cent)

Table 3.6 Migration and residence patterns in the selected regions (column = percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acıpayam</th>
<th>Emirdağ</th>
<th>Kulu</th>
<th>Şarkışla</th>
<th>Akçaabat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1: Labour migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees to TR</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants still (mostly) abroad</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2: Children of labour migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayers in TR</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migrants in TR</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents abroad</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>1431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3: Grandchildren of labour migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayers in TR</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migrants in TR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents abroad</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>2,095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study; proxy data.
and grandchildren (60 per cent). The families in Kulu and Emirdağ are much more characterised by migration and residence in Europe than families from Acıpayam and Akçaabat. Several authors discuss the proposition that ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey are more likely to migrate and less likely to return due to experiences of harassment or lower affection for the place or country of origin (e.g. Martin 1991: 60). The numbers for Kulu, with its minority of Kurds, seem to support this claim, at least in comparison with the numbers we find for Acıpayam and Akçaabat. In more detailed analyses, the effect of minority membership on migration outcomes is evident (see Chapter 4).

As for return, the numbers indicate a pattern that locates Şarkışla with its minority group of Alevi between Acıpayam and Kulu: the return rate of labour migrants is higher than in Kulu despite the similar minority structure but lower than in the high return-region Acıpayam, where almost half of all children and grandchildren never left for Europe.

Table 3.7 presents the present countries of residence of children and grandchildren of the ancestor (G1). The shares refer to the descendants of migrant first generation men (G1) on the one hand and those of their stayer comparators on the other. The numbers reflect the regional differences in shares of migrants’ descendants living in Turkey, as illustrated in Table 3.6, although the definitions are slightly different, resulting in some

Table 3.7 Residence countries of children and grandchildren from migrant (Mig) and stayer (Stay) families in the selected regions (column = percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acıpayam Mig Stay</th>
<th>Emirdağ Mig Stay</th>
<th>Kulu Mig Stay</th>
<th>Şarkışla Mig Stay</th>
<th>Akçaabat Mig Stay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-European country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (100%) 2,560 1,826 2,833 1,887 4,126 2,518 2,057 1,652 3,954 2,320

Source: 2000 Families study; proxy data.
differences. The table also reveals the regional variation in destination countries evident in Table 3.5. Most noteworthy, however, is that many children and grandchildren of stayers actually live in Europe today. They generally moved to the same countries as the first generation migrants from their region, as evident in the similar residence country patterns of migrant and stayer descendants. Children (and grandchildren) migrated in the context of chain migration processes, seeking either family unification or family formation (marriage). Descendants originating from Emirdağ, for instance, have mainly migrated to Belgium and France; those from Kulu have gone to Sweden and Germany; those from Şarkışla have moved to Germany and Denmark; finally, descendants from Acıpayam and Akçaabat have mostly settled in Germany – independent from whether their (grand)fathers originally migrated there or not.

Migration outcomes in transnational contexts

The ‘2000 Families’ study samples regions making relatively large contributions to both labour migration and later (family) chain migration. Not only the migrant families but the regions and the stayer families must have been affected by the migration and the developing ties to Europe. Most research on the economic outcomes of labour migration conducted in the 1970s and 1980s suggests low effects on regional development (cf. Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz 1986). Europe profited enormously from the additional labour supply, whereas in Turkey, the expected developmental benefits did not materialise. In all regions, people told us about various attempts to set up factories with migrant money – most eventually proved unprofitable. Failure in management discouraged migrants from investing in business, so they turned to housing and land.

Most researchers now agree the financial gains from Turkish migration were mostly those attained by the individual migrants and their families. Remittances were directed at family members. Even so, those flows helped sustain the regions’ economies. Non-migrant family members or other relatives profited, gaining higher income for higher consumption or financial support for education and so on, in ways that would not have been possible without the migrants.

Even today, remittances are sent to family and friends, as well as the local community. In the personal interviews, we asked about remittances in terms of money sent to Turkey during the 12 months prior to the interview. Not surprisingly, family and friends are supported to a larger degree, but the overall extent of transnational financial support is astonishing: about a fifth of all residents in Europe sent money to their local community; among people from Emirdağ the rate is as high as 27 per cent. Emirdağ also stands out for migrants’ support of family and friends: almost half of all people from Emirdağ had sent transfers. Elsewhere, the share is about a
third; Akçaabat is lowest at about 31 per cent, and Akçaabat is close behind at 39 per cent.

Our data indicate that in terms of contact, whether by phone, mail, email and so on or face-to-face, transnational ties to Turkey are intense, as illustrated in Figure 3.4 (see also Chapter 10). Almost a quarter of all the residents abroad have daily contact, and more than half report weekly contact. Although remittances may be rarer, contact is most intense among those originating from Acıpayam. The least contact is reported by people from Şarkışla; here the share of people who never have contact with those still in the region is 7 per cent.

![Figure 3.3 Remittances sent to Turkey by those living abroad](image)

*Source: 2000 Families study; personal data.*

![Figure 3.4 Contact of residents abroad with people in the regions](image)

*Source: 2000 Families study; personal data.*
Contact patterns are reflected in regularity of visits to the regions, or at least to Turkey. We asked for the total number of visits to Turkey in the five years prior to the interviews and found intense mobility patterns, summarised in Table 3.8. People originating from Acıpayam reported going to Turkey most frequently, almost on a yearly basis (4.9 times in five years). Only 2 per cent reported no visits to Turkey. Among people from Şarkışla, the share of those who never went to Turkey was highest, at 5 per cent, and among those who went to Turkey, the average number of visits was 3.7 in five years.

**Conclusion**

The five regions sampled for the ‘2000 Families’ study reflect the sending regions of Turkey between 1961 and 1974 (see Chapter 2). Clearly, the migrants from these regions do not form a representative sample of Turkish migrants and their descendants in Europe. Nevertheless, they cover many key attributes of the overall migration flow and reveal interesting similarities and differences by regional origin.

This chapter has explored the social and economic contexts of these regions. These regions are not only the places of origin but also places to which many migrants have returned, from which many still migrate to Europe, and with which many continue to maintain close ties. They also constitute the context for the stayer (non-migrant) families in the sample of the ‘2000 Families’ study. At different levels, all five areas were high-migration regions during labour recruitment in the 1960s and 1970s to Western European countries. On balance, all five regions were very similar in terms of socio-economic developmental status during the period of labour recruitment. Subsequent changes have clearly affected all regions and mirror the general development in Turkey. The labour migrants left at a particular stage in Turkey’s history and established flows and connections with destination countries that continue to be relevant, even as the context from which and the conditions under which newer migrants leave has altered substantially.
4 Migration and Return Migration

Introduction

Simply stated, the Turkish migrant population in Europe is large. In 2010, more than 1.6 million Turks lived in Germany, more than 450,000 in France, more than 370,000 in the Netherlands, and in excess of 110,000 in Austria. In total, more than 2.9 million Turks lived in the countries of the EU, with more than 56 per cent of these in Germany. These figures do not include naturalised European Union citizens of Turkish origin. Until 1973, when the period of labour recruitment by European countries ended, Turkish migration virtually equated to migration to Europe. Thereafter, it diversified considerably, first to Arab countries and then to other countries after 1990. Migration to Europe peaked at about 130,000 three times, in 1970 and 1974 just before and right after the stop of labour recruitment and again in 1992. Since 1992, Turkish migration has been continuously in decline (Icduygu 2008).

A closer look at the migration dynamics of Turks in the major receiving country of Germany, illustrated in Figure 4.1, shows migration flows have changed significantly over time. The first phase, which lasted until the mid-1980s, was characterised by extreme exchanges between the sending and receiving society, with high migration flows to Germany accompanied by high remigration rates to Turkey. The subsequent phase has been characterised by much lower but stable migrant exchange rates. The migration balance also shows different characteristics in the two phases. In the first phase, years of high immigration surplus were followed by some years of emigration surplus (in 1967, 1975 and the early 1980s). In the second phase, a continuous, low immigration surplus lasting until 2003 has been followed by a continuous, low emigration surplus. Since 1997, the absolute balance has stayed below 10,000 migrations. Peaks in the 1970s and 1980s represent more than ten times that number.

The following analysis contributes theoretically and empirically to the understanding of Turkish migration in five distinct ways. First, it
Figure 4.1  Migration of Turks from and to Germany, 1960–2013
complements existing macro-analysis (Akgündüz 2008) with an explicit micro-perspective that looks at the individual determinants of migration on the basis of individual-level data. Second, it treats individuals not as socially isolated monads, as is usually the case for randomly selected sample surveys, but as embedded in social relationships – in this case, in the ‘strong’ ties of kinship genealogies. It investigates the influence of network members on individual migration decisions and, thus, picks up the issues of joint migration decisions in households (Kalter 1998, 2000: 460ff.), the effects of network structures (Haug 2000; Massey et al. 1993; Nauck and Kohlmann 1999), and chain migration (Haug 2000).

Third, it extends the scope of migration beyond classical European labour migration and looks at migration decisions based on marriage, family and kinship. It takes a multitude of migration motives into account, not just economic ones (Kalter 2000). This is necessary because some key conditions for migration have changed since the early phase of labour migration, which also happens to be the period in which most macro- and micro-economic explanations of migration are based. These conditions are threefold: first, the growing affluence in the societies of origin has increased the salience of non-monetary benefits of migration; second, the reduced costs for transportation and communication have enhanced the option for transnational social ties and multi-sequenced migration life courses (Massey et al. 1987); third, the mounting legal barriers and dramatically decreased labour demands have limited the opportunities for labour migration, whereas other entry tickets into European societies such as marriage and family unification are still available and provide strong incentives for relationship-based chain migration through established transnational networks (Baykara-Krumme and Fuß 2009).

Our fourth contribution is our focus on family-based and kinship-based migration; these forms of migration involve pre-existing strong network ties that serve several functions, including providing information about opportunities on the labour and marriage markets in both the society of origin and the receiving society, opportunities for accommodation to the migrant situation and for returning to the society of origin, and role models for imitation that may lead to ‘spill-over’ effects within entire family and kinship networks. Kinship and family networks are, in this regard, superior to other social ties. For one thing, their tight-knit structure is associated with the high mutual social control that results when all members know each other (Lin 2001). For another, they may be activated even after long periods of dormancy, as exchange in these networks is based on longer sequences of give and take than in, for example, friendship, neighbourhood or ethnic networks. From a methodological point of view, kinship networks have another advantage in that the diffusion process of information on migration consequences is close to perfect, resulting in an almost ideal situation for the study of ‘spill-over’ effects (Haug 2000: 153ff.).
Our fifth and final contribution is our systematic study of lasting migration effects across generations. Whereas migrants of the ‘second’ and ‘third’ generations – that is, the descendants of migrants staying in the receiving society – have been a subject of research for some time (Hansen 1938), the impact of migration on family members who stayed behind or returned to the society of origin is relatively new. Because of the increasingly transnational character of migration, the influence of migrants on close relatives and extended kin who never migrated or who returned may increase as well.

To address these theoretical issues, we ask the following interrelated research questions. First, to what extent is Turkish migration triggered by family and kinship networks? Does the influence of family and kinship change across generations? Second, to what extent is there a spill-over effect between generations and siblings in Turkish kinships? Does the spill-over effect become more pronounced in subsequent generations and after the establishment of a migration chain? Third, to what extent does a migration dynamic within Turkish kinship have consequences for the social selectivity of Turkish migrants? Does the replacement of pioneering labour migration by chains of family and kinship migration result in changes in the composition of migrant and stayer populations? Fourth, how have incentive structures changed from pioneering situations, in which migration intentions are solely based on expectations of higher returns of human capital investments, to chain migration situations, in which migration intentions could be based entirely on the expected social benefits of migration, such as living close to family and kinship members and enhanced mutual exchange relationships?

Data, variables and analytical approach

To address these questions, we use the 2000 Families study data (Guveli et al. 2016; see also Chapter 2). The data include complete information on all family members of 1,992 families from five regions of origin across multiple generations (for information on sample see Chapter 2 and for information on the five regions, see Chapter 3). The analysis of family-based and kinship-based migration patterns requires a dataset that reveals the spill-over effects across siblings and generations. Therefore, the dataset was first organised in a ‘long’ format in which all 38,941 members of the 1,992 family lineages are represented as individual cases. Thereafter, information on the other members of the lineage was added to individual cases in a ‘wide’ format. The analysis assumes the spill-over effects operate only downwards between generations. The effects of the behaviour of grandchildren on the behaviour of parents and grandparents are not considered, but mutual sibling influence is. Thus, in our analysis, for the oldest generation (G1), that is the work migrants of the 1960s and their non-migrant comparison group,
only information on wives and siblings (G1) is used. For their children (G2), information on parents (G1) and on siblings (G2) is used. For the grandchildren (G3), information on grandparents (G1), parents (G2), uncles and aunts (G2), and siblings (G3) is used.

Information in the 2000 Families dataset derives from three different sources: the ‘doorstep’ informant, the ‘proxy’ informant, and members of the respective generations of the genealogy about whom personal attitudes and more detailed life course data were gathered through a personal interview (see Chapter 2 for details on the different instruments). As the three data sources overlap on a number of variables, we are able to cross-check the reliability of the respective data sources. This is especially valuable for the proxy interviews because these represent the main data source for the following analysis. In general, the consistency of the data is satisfactory, that is the proxy-informants – in most cases female G2-members – proved very well informed about all members of the genealogy. The study, thus, profited from the cultural characteristics of the Turkish unilineal kinship system (Nauck and Klaus 2005, 2008). For editing inconsistencies, information from personal interviews was preferred over proxy interview information, and proxy interview information was preferred over family tree information.

The analysis of spill-over effects requires a complete dataset for all members of the genealogies with information on their birth dates to determine parity and on relevant events in the life-course – including migration, marriage and parenthood – for determining the sequence of intra- and intergenerational events. In most cases, data on the life course events of other family members are treated as time-dependent covariates and are relevant only for the chronological ordering of the respective events. For these reasons, the missing data in parts of the proxy information are imputed by means of multiple imputation techniques using causal antecedents as predictors.

All members of the genealogies who had not reached the age of 18 at the time of the interview are excluded from the following analysis of migration and remigration behaviour. This decision is justified on two grounds. First, their migration decisions are determined in large part by their parents, and they are not directly influenced by spill-over effects. Moreover, they have not yet established their own human resources, which are relevant for labour-market related migration and remigration decisions, and they are not yet of age for marriage-related migration. Second, proxy information was only collected for individuals above the age of 18. Individuals’ migration probabilities were estimated as time-dependent risk, with the risk time starting with birth and with an episode length of one year. Remigration behaviour could not be analysed in the same way because the time of remigration was available only for those with whom a personal interview was performed.
Multivariate models for out-migration are estimated as Cox-regressions in which both time-dependent and time-constant covariates are introduced. Starting with the time-dependent covariates, we distinguish between ‘spill-over’ and ‘family-life-cycle’ variables. A spill-over effect of migration from a respondent’s parents, grandparents and siblings is assumed if any of these individuals migrated at least one year before the respondent’s own migration, that is joint migration in the same year is not classified as spill-over but rather as a joint family decision. In contrast, events like one’s own marriage or the birth of one’s own children are considered influential when they happen in the same year as the migration event. Family life-cycle variables are considered because marriage, especially in the case of arranged marriages, is understood as part of family-based and kinship-based migration strategies, which may instrumentalise marriage purposively as a means for migration (Baykara-Krumme and Fuß 2009; Lievens 1999; Straßburger 2003). Children born before a migration event increase its costs and, thus, can decrease migration probability (Huinink and Kley 2008; Wagner 1989).

Continuing with time-constant covariates, we use several socio-structural indicators. Rural family background is measured by whether the father’s occupation (for G1) was in the agricultural sector or not. Educational level is measured as educational level obtained, ranging from ‘illiterate, no schooling’ to ‘tertiary degree’. Previous aggregate data analyses have shown that G1 labour migrants had a more predominately urban background and were better skilled than the non-emigrating reference population (Akgündüz 2008: 175ff.). The occupational prestige of the first and the current (or last) occupation is classified using the new International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status ISEI-08 (Ganzeboom et al. 1992; Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996, 2003). Additionally, ethnic minority status is controlled for, because minority membership may be an additional incentive for migration; in many cases, it is related to unequal returns on human capital investments (Kalter 2003). Finally, characteristics of the family of origin are controlled for, including number of siblings. The number of siblings limits the resources of the family household and, thus, may become an incentive for migration, whereas being the first son in a patrilineal kinship system may be related to specific, selective investments. These investments, in turn, may be related to an existing high-level of economic capital and result in a lower probability of emigration, or they may be related to human capital investments and to higher income returns in the case of migration, resulting in a higher probability of emigration.

G1 and G2, and perhaps also G3 to a lesser extent, were heavily influenced by period effects such as economic crises and changes in the legal regulations for migration in the European Union. Around 1968, Europe experienced its first economic crisis after the post-war boom. In 1973, new legal regulations came into force, restricting labour migration exclusively to family unification and marriage migration (asylum-based migration remained).
These became the major forms of legal migration to the European Union for Turkish citizens. To disentangle generational effects of chain migration from period effects of economic crises and legal changes, historical period effects are controlled for. A cut-off point at 1968 is set for G1 to control for changes in labour market opportunities for incoming migrants of the pioneer generation. A cut-off point at 1973 is set for G2 to control for the labour migration restrictions that came into force at that time and required migrants to choose between permanent residence in the receiving context or permanent remigration. An analysis of period effects is not feasible for G3 using the same method; no such marked events were happening at the time of their migration, and the time span of their migration is much broader.

Results

In this section, we present multivariate analyses of the likelihood of migration events in each generation in the order of the generations, starting with the generation of male migrant workers (G1) followed by their children (G2) and grandchildren (G3). We conclude with a comparative analysis of patterns of continuity and change across generations, exploring lineages.

First generation

Using the 2000 Families data, we can compare the migration behaviour of male migrant workers born between 1920 and 1945 who migrated between 1960 and 1974 for at least five years with the behaviour of the non-migrant group from the same regions and living situations. In this chapter, we are concerned with the issue of selectivity, especially of the pioneer migrants who, as a rule, predominate in the early phases of migrant outflows from Turkey. Are minority members more likely to migrate than the Turkish majority population? Can family strategies of sending members abroad be identified? Are there patterns of selective investments based on parity, and does marriage behaviour or the stage in the family life cycle play a role?

The age-dependent migration risk results shown in Model 1 of Table 4.1 are based on data collected on 1992 G1 members. Unfortunately, data were collected about the parity but not about the time of the migration of siblings. Thus, their migration cannot be modelled as time-dependent covariates (TD); instead, the proportion of migrated siblings is entered next to their numbers. The model compares the stayers in Turkey with migrants who migrated before and after the median 1968, also the year of the first recession in Europe and a watershed year for migration flows (Akgündüz 2008: 99ff.).

The general picture emerging from Model 1 is that both socio-structural factors and family-related and kinship-related migration strategies have a significant effect on the probability of migration. Socio-structural factors are related to labour market qualifications (level of education and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp (B)</th>
<th>(1) Migration G1</th>
<th>(2) Remigration G1</th>
<th>(3) Migration G2</th>
<th>(4) Remigration G2</th>
<th>(5) Migration G3</th>
<th>(6) Remigration G3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural family background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First son</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First/last occupational status(^2)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (TD)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriage (TD)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse migrated (TD)</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion migrating siblings</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children (TD)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration before 1968/1974/2000(^3)</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration before 1968 (\times) Ethnic minority</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration before 1968 (\times) First occupational status</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First son (\times) Educational level</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of migrated aunts and uncles</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father migrated (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>1st sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>2nd sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>3rd sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>4th sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Father’s educational level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother migrated (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th sibling migrated (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s educational level</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s last occup. status</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of migrated grand-aunts and grand-uncles</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather migrated before (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandmother migrated before (TD)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather’s educ. level</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather’s occup. status</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* 2000 Families study, proxy data. +/- *p < 0.05; ++/ -- *p < 0.01; +++/ -- *p < 0.001 n.s. not statistically significant; ¹ controlled for the year of birth; ² First occupational status for migration; last occupational status for re-migration; ³ 1968 for G1, 1974 for G2, 2000 for G3; TD = time dependent covariate in the Cox-regression; * not included in the analysis.
occupational prestige) or signify underemployment (rural background and number of siblings). Migration strategies related to family and kinship are linked to the position in sibling hierarchy and the sequencing of migration and family formation.

A comparison of individuals scoring below, at, and above average in educational level and occupational status reveals that those with low status but higher education are more likely to migrate, whereas those with high occupational status but lower education are more likely to stay in Turkey (see also the discussion in Chapter 6). This finding confirms the status-inconsistency explanation of migration suggested by Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, 1973). This result can be seen in Model 1 of Table 4.1 with a significant negative effect of occupational status on the likelihood of migration when controlling for educational level.

Chain-migration mechanisms are visible, even in the first generation of work migrants, as individuals with more migrant siblings are also more likely to migrate. The incentive to migrate is even higher if the spouse has already migrated. Already having children is a major barrier to migration, even for the pioneering male labour migrants of the first generation. Marriage or marriage arrangements, however, have no effect on this migrant group. As the interaction effect reveals, first sons are less likely to be sent abroad if their educational level is above average. This seems to be related to specific investment strategies of (patrilineal) sending families, reserving human capital investments in the first son for payoff in the country of origin.

Obviously, historic events of the period play an important role in shaping migration decisions. In the period after 1968, minorities are more likely to migrate than the Turkish majority. Especially important for the assessment of changes in the composition of migration flows is the interaction effect of historical period and occupational status on the likelihood of migration. In the first phase of Turkish migration to Europe up to 1967, the occupational status of the migrants is higher than in the second phase between 1968 and 1973. This indicates a significant decrease in the human capital of Turkish labour migrants, on average.

Many migrants to Europe in our sample returned to Turkey: 70 per cent of migrants were living in Turkey at the time of the interview or had died there; 30 per cent had stayed in Europe until the time of the interview or until death. As no population statistics on Turkish return migrants are available, it is unclear whether these proportions are representative or are skewed by the sampling strategy, which passed over migrants whose entire extended kinship system left the region of origin. Moreover, many of the migrants have developed a lifestyle based on having homes both in a European country and in Turkey. It is unclear in these cases how much time is spent in each place and to what extent personal identities are equally distributed between the two residential locations.
The analysis in Model 2 of Table 4.1 displays the results of a logistic regression on the probability of migrants returning to Turkey (up to the time of interview). It contains similar variables as in Model 1, but time-dependent modelling is not possible because data on the return year were not gathered in the proxy interviews. The results on remigration behaviour complement the findings on migration in many respects. Migrants migrating before 1968 are more likely to re-migrate than later migrants, underscoring the temporary character of work migration in the initial phase. Selectivity in remigration occurs with regard to ethnic minority membership, the family situation of the Turkish migrants, and their position in the labour market.

Ethnic minorities, who are more likely to migrate in the second half of the period, are also less likely to go back to Turkey later. The connection between the marriage relationship and the likelihood of re-migrating to Turkey is especially strong; if the wife stays in Turkey, a return of the G1 migrant is very likely. The migration of the husband alone is obviously a very strong indication of the intention to return and, hence, of reduced investment in the receiving society; in contrast, involvement in chain migration (in which most siblings have also migrated) reveals a strong incentive to stay in Europe.

The pattern in the relationship between achieved educational level and occupational status is reversed for first-generation migrants who re-migrate to Turkey in comparison to those staying in Europe. Re-migrants have lower educational levels and significantly higher occupational status than those remaining in Europe. This indicates that in proportion to their human capital, they have been relatively successful in the European labour market and refutes the idea that only ‘losers’ return to Turkey.

The mechanisms causing this selectivity in remigration remain unclear. The phenomenon may be related to the generally higher adaptive capacities of better-educated migrants to new social environments which, in turn, increases the incentive to stay in Europe. Those with higher occupational status after resettlement may also perceive the potential of earning more in Turkey, whereas migrants with lower education may be risk-avoidant, preferring to remain in the migrant situation, even if dissatisfied with it.

Second generation
The analysis of G2 migration behaviour is more complicated than the analysis of G1 behaviour. Members of G2 include stayers and emigrants from Turkey, as with G1, but they also feature individuals born in Europe who may have embarked upon a reversed migration career. This kind of migration behaviour has to be taken into account when comparing changes in family-based migration strategies in this generation or when trying to understand whether migration dynamics change across generations. Moreover, spill-over effects for G2 potentially exist not only among siblings
but also between generations. These dimensions of migration behaviour are reflected in the descriptive statistics in Table 4.2.

The first result of central interest in Table 4.2 is the G2 frequency distribution among G1 stayers. Their descendants include 'first generation' migrants, so their numbers provide some estimates for the intensity of migration in the five selected areas of Turkey. About one-quarter of the children of G1 stayers have some migration experience, indicating a high frequency of migration behaviour in the selected high-migration contexts within Turkey. The G1 experience with migration increases migration frequency even further: nearly one half of the children of G1 migrants who return to Turkey after some time in Europe become migrants themselves, and 26 per cent stay in Europe after being born there. This group has the highest share of second-generation return migrants, and more than 50 per cent of their children have never left Turkey. Over 75 per cent of the children of those G1 migrants who stayed in Europe until the end of their lives or until the interview also have stayed in Europe, whereas about 25 per cent have either never left Turkey or have returned. In total, less than 50 per cent of the descendants of G1 work migrants remain in Europe (up to the time of the interview). In other words, half of the intergenerational impact of migration experience does not show up in the receiving societies in Europe but in their parents’ society of origin.

Model 3 in Table 4.1 explains G2 migration behaviour from Turkey to Europe. Included in these analyses are individuals who stay in Turkey from birth onwards or who migrate to Europe for at least five years; not included are G2 members who stay in Europe for their lifetimes or who migrate to Turkey (categories 3 and 4 in Table 4.2). The model comprises spill-over effects in conjunction with predictors related to individual family and work situations.

Model 3 reveals that the spill-over effects of previous migration behaviour of family members are generally extremely strong. The strongest effect is linked to the migration of the spouse, which makes migration almost four

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G1 Stayer</th>
<th>G1 Migrant</th>
<th>G1 Returner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G2 Stayer in Turkey</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 Migrant to Europe</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 Stayer in Europe</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 Migrant to Turkey</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 Return Migrant to Turkey</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>(2290)</td>
<td>(2129)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.*
times more likely, followed by the migration of the father, which doubles the likelihood. But the migration of the mother and of siblings has strong effects as well. The migration of any of these persons increases the likelihood of an individual’s migration by about 50 per cent.

The model shows the spill-over effects of family migration behaviour remain strong even when predictors of work and family situation are introduced. Moreover, both have additional, independent effects. Just as for G1 work migrants, G2 members show a discrepancy between work entitlements achieved through education and occupational status. G2 migrants, too, are more likely to be better educated but less likely to have adequate occupational status in their initial jobs. This constellation is not intergenerationally transmitted, as neither the father’s educational level nor his occupational status has any effect on the likelihood that his children will migrate, when individual factors are controlled for.

The family situation has almost the same effects for G2 as for G1. Marriage increases the likelihood of migration, whereas the presence of children and the number of siblings decreases it. This general pattern suggests social ties are much more important for the migration behaviour of the second generation than for the first. Spill-over effects for migration become more salient, as do factors associated with incentives to stay, particularly the number of children or of siblings.

G2 members from ethnic minorities are more likely to migrate to Europe than members of the Turkish majority. This effect may be related to a decreased importance of the labour market for migration decisions, or it may signify a period effect of circumstances in the society of origin that urges minority members to leave the country, as the G1 results suggest (Model 1 in Table 4.1). This question can be explored by separate analysis of period effects possibly influencing G2 migration behaviour. At the same time, family migration strategies may have been changing, as selective investments in the first son’s human capital dwindles in importance.

The determinants of G2 remigration behaviour are analysed in Model 4 of Table 4.1. Included in this analysis are all G2 members who have ever lived in Europe for any time; excluded are the stayers in Turkey (category 1 in Table 4.2). The dependent variable is the place of residence at the time of the interview.

In comparison to G1 members, minority G2 members are more likely to return to Turkey. Return migration of G2 depends, in almost all cases, only on whether the majority of siblings and the spouse are living in Turkey. This means, in other words, that investments in the receiving society are made only if the chain migration process of the family and kinship network reaches a certain level, whereas pioneer migrants with no or very few family members in the receiving country tend to return to the country of origin (of their parents). Interestingly, educational level and achieved occupational status – either one’s own or those of the father – have no effect on
the likelihood of G2 remigration to Turkey. The type of marriage, however, does: G2 who marry later in life and who choose their partner individually are more likely to re-migrate, whereas those who marry earlier and who live in an arranged marriage are less likely to go back to Turkey. In short, those with a marriage pattern that adapts to European standards tend to leave but those with a less adaptive pattern tend to stay. This finding may be related to the tendency of Turkish kinship groups to enable its members to live on a long-term basis in Europe by arranging (early) marriages, a trend that becomes more pronounced after labour market closure in 1974.

Third generation

Tracing the extent to which the migration behaviour of the third generation depends on the behaviour of G1 and G2 in any detail necessitates the discussion of a table with 75 cells. Therefore, the following discussion focuses on a narrowed research question: Where did G3 descendants of G1 migrants reside at the time of the interview? Table 4.3 distinguishes G1 migrants who stay in Europe from those who return to Turkey. It also distinguishes G2 and G3 according to their present place of residence, with two possible locations of residence but multiple possible prior biographical paths. Those in Europe were either born in Europe or moved there from Turkey (alternative 1); those in Turkey were either born there and stayed (or returned after migrating) or were born in Europe and migrated to Turkey (alternative 2). It has to be considered, however, that this is a cross-sectional snapshot and only comprises a limited span of the life course, as the median age of G3 is 19. Further migration events in both directions may yet occur.

As a general trend, migration behaviour is perpetuated across generations. About 76 per cent of G3 stay in Europe if their parents and grandparents have stayed there, meaning, of course, that 24 per cent return to Turkey. Conversely, 67 per cent of G3 stay in Turkey if their grandfather has returned and their parents also live in Turkey, but again this means 33 per cent of the grandchildren of G1 returners live in Europe. This finding is a strong indication of high mobility among the descendants of migrants. In total, the lasting effect of Turkish labour migration is the following: about half

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G1 Europe stayers</th>
<th>G1 Turkey returners</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G2 in EU</td>
<td>G2 in TK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 in EU</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 in TK</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>3957</td>
<td>1393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
of the adult grandchildren were living in Europe at the time of the survey and about half were living in Turkey. Thus, the impact of labour migration is equally distributed between the country of origin and the receiving societies. But a considerable proportion of the grandchildren of the G1 comparison group of non-migrants have had migration experience. At the time of the survey, 10 per cent were living in Europe and 28 per cent had stayed in Europe for some time as a result of their parents having migrated.

Model 5 in Table 4.1 explains G3 migration behaviour from Turkey to Europe. Included in this analysis are all G3 members who had reached the age of 18 by the time of the interview. Again, we include (as in Model 3) only individuals who have stayed in Turkey from birth onwards or who have migrated to Europe for at least five years. Because many G3 members are descendants of parents who stayed in Turkey their entire lives (but might have parents with migration experience), the migration behaviour of G3 reflects, in many ways, the aggregate behaviour of the entire Turkish population. Yet this generation, unlike the pioneering G1, has the added option of chain and marriage migration because a Turkish migrant minority has established itself in Europe.

Model 5 in Table 4.1 reveals that the spill-over effect of the migration behaviour of lineage members is very strong for G3. Again, the previous migration of the spouse has the strongest effect, but in this group it was closely followed by the previous migration of a sibling. With the addition of each sibling who has migrated more than one year before, the likelihood of migration increases by about 50 per cent. Interestingly, lateral kinship members from previous generations are important for the migration decisions of G3. The proportion of migrated aunts and uncles has a very strong effect, doubling the migration likelihood, suggesting migration among G3 members is strongly determined by a previous, relatively high level of chain migration and indicating the presence of an ethnic community.

The model shows spill-over effects are, as in G2, not significantly reduced if the family situation and work-related resources are introduced as controls. Intergenerational transmission of human or economic resources plays no role in the migration of Turkish G3 members. Neither the grandparents’ nor the parents’ educational level nor their socio-economic status is influential.

The stage in the family career and minority membership are strong determinants of migration, operating in the same way as in previous generations. Minority and married G3 members are more likely to migrate, whereas having children is an incentive to stay (and a barrier to moving). These findings, in combination with the strong spill-over effects from spouse, siblings, parents, uncles, and aunts, underscore the general conclusion that established transnational family and kinship ties became increasingly important the longer the migration process lasts intergenerationally and across historical periods, with the classical incentive structure of labour migration becoming unimportant. This conclusion is corroborated by the additional
finding that occupational status is significantly lower for G3 migrants leaving Turkey after the year 2000 compared to those migrating before.

Determinants of the remigration behaviour of G3 members are analysed in Model 6 of Table 4.1. All G3 members who have stayed for any time in Europe are included; the stayers in Turkey are excluded.

G2 minority members and those living in arranged marriages are less likely to return to Turkey if family and labour market related factors are controlled for. Basically, only one additional set of factors influences re-migration, namely the allocation of the family. Labour market considerations play no apparent role, as no selectivity is evident for educational level and occupational status. Nor does the respective status of the parents play any role, with the exception that grandparents’ occupational status has a significant effect on remigration. With regard to the family situation, spouses who never left Turkey and siblings staying in Turkey are extremely strong incentives to return, whereas neither the parents’ nor the grandparents’ place of residence is important as long as the residence of the same-generation family members is controlled for.

**Changes across generations**

The preceding series of cross-sectional analyses is completed by summarising the cross-generational comparative perspective. Table 4.4 displays the bivariate relationships among the same set of indicators and migration probabilities in the life course for all three generations; thus, it represents the *unconditional* change between generations.

Strikingly, Table 4.4 shows ten systematic trends across generations, which are, in most cases, linear. First, in later generations, ethnic minority membership becomes more predictive of migration from Turkey to Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp (B)</th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.31***</td>
<td>1.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male sex</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.24***</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First son</td>
<td>0.84***</td>
<td>1.14**</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational degree</td>
<td>1.53***</td>
<td>1.24***</td>
<td>0.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.92***</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.77***</td>
<td>4.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged marriage</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.48***</td>
<td>3.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse migrated</td>
<td>4.52***</td>
<td>4.68***</td>
<td>5.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated siblings</td>
<td>2.23***</td>
<td>9.54***</td>
<td>4.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.60***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.*
Second, gender selectivity of migration from Turkey to Europe is highest in the first generation with a preponderance of males (not tested here, but shown by official migration statistics), but unselective in the third generation. Third, first sons are less likely to migrate to Europe in the first generation but more likely in the second generation, whereas parity plays no role in the third generation. Fourth, educational qualification is positively related to migration in the first (and second?) generation but becomes negatively related to migration in the third generation. Fifth, the occupational status of migrants in all three generations is lower than their non-migrant counterparts. Sixth, status inconsistency of Turkish migrants to Europe is highest in the first generation and lowest in the third generation. Seventh, being already married is unimportant in the labour migrant generation but is increasingly predictive for migration in the second and third generations. Eighth, living already in an arranged marriage is unimportant in the labour migrant generation but becomes increasingly predictive of migration in the second and third generation. Ninth, in all three generations, having a spouse who has already migrated is the strongest single predictor of (chain) migration, but its predictive power increases in later generations. Tenth, having children is a strong barrier to migration, but the predictive power of this factor is highest in subsequent generations.

These systematic trends are complemented by results for remigration (not shown). In the first generation, Turkish migrants returning to Turkey have below-average educational and above-average occupational status compared to all Turkish migrants in Europe. This status discrepancy is reversed in the group of migrants coming from Turkey and vanishes in subsequent generations. Instead, the proportion of siblings still staying in or moving to Turkey and the spouse staying in Turkey or marriage having been the reason for migrating to Turkey become increasingly important for remigration behaviour.

**Conclusion**

The complete analysis of the migration behaviour of a large sample of men born between 1920 and 1945 in five high-emigration areas in Turkey, together with the analysis of changes over two subsequent generations, augments the picture drawn from official statistics in many ways. For one thing, we find the level of international migration within the kinship groups of these regions is high. This is evident in those kinship groups included in the non-migrant control group. More than 20 per cent of the children of these G1 stayers in Turkey have migrated to Europe, becoming ‘first generation migrants’ themselves. For another, the international migration of Turks is by no means unidirectional from Turkey to Europe. Instead, the longer the migration flows last, the more they become bidirectional, either within one generation as a temporary stay in Europe, or between generations with
the parents (temporarily) staying in either area and the children moving permanently or temporarily in either direction.

The major trend is temporary migration. Only 30 per cent of first-generation Turkish migrants in our sample still lived in Europe at the time of the interview (or had died there); 70 per cent had gone back to Turkey, with almost 60 per cent of their children never leaving Turkey. However, about half of the children of G1 migrants who stayed in Europe also stayed in Europe. This pattern is repeated in the third generation: about half of the grandchildren of G1 migrants live in Europe and the other half in Turkey.

The intergenerational pattern of Turkish migration to Europe is triggered, to a large extent, by early decisions. Although initial decisions to migrate may be the result of status discrepancy in the country of origin and expectations of higher returns to human capital investments (in terms of formal education), the intergenerational migration pattern is determined by initial decisions to leave the family behind – which itself is frequently a consequence of having already reached family completion (in terms of number of children already born). A spouse or children staying in Turkey is the most significant predictor of return migration and, hence, low investment in the receiving society.

Reaching a ‘tipping point’ in chain migration within the kinship group sets off an intensified chain migration. Having spouses, parents, and siblings who have migrated are equally strong incentives for chain migration in the second and third generation. These incentives for descendants of migrants and even for unrelated members of kinship groups living in high sending areas (like those where the ‘non-migrant’ comparison group lives) are, by far, stronger than any individual qualification for the labour market abroad.

These trends allow us to make two conclusions on the social selectivity of the migration process. First, whereas labour market qualifications are characterised in the first generation by a marked discrepancy between above-average education and low achieved occupational status and, hence, a strong incentive to acquire an occupational position adequate to educational level through migration, this discrepancy vanishes in later generations. The third generation levels out to selectivity by low education and low occupational status. Second, factors not related to labour market qualifications, such as minority membership, marriage arrangements, and the location of spouses, children and siblings, become increasingly predictive of migration decisions across generations. The incentive structure for migration changes across generations from achievement-oriented calculations to ascriptive opportunity structures. Under these conditions, migration in later generations is chiefly promoted by previous migration decisions within the kinship network, resulting in increasing spill-over effects across generations; in other words, migration only occurs if chain migration has already passed a threshold.
The empirical results from a research design allowing the analysis of migration behaviour of interrelated individuals within a kinship group demonstrates that these close relationships have a strong impact on the incentive structure for migration and re-migration. This indicates a need to reconsider theoretical approaches to the analysis of social selectivity in migration behaviour, which have focused on the individual fit of migrants to labour markets in terms of occupational qualifications and skills and on the potential increase in returns from human capital investments. These reflect the traditional view of migrants as pioneering labour migrants. Clearly, this approach has to be complemented by a perspective allowing for the possibility that the position in the labour market is a secondary issue in situations where family and kinship ties become the most salient incentive structure for migration decisions. Accordingly, the analysis of social selectivity should take place on at least three levels. We should not simply consider the individual characteristics of the population ‘at risk’ of migration. We should also examine the collective characteristics of the respective kinship group and their social selectivity, along with the position of the respective members within this kinship group. This perspective opens up a number of new research questions beyond the comparison of individual migrants to non-migrants when considering which kinship groups are likely to be the pioneering group to start a migration chain and which members are most likely to be sent abroad under various conditions.

We should note that the analysis here is based on data from a specific historical period and from a specific sending country. This may raise questions about the generalisability of our findings, especially considering the uniqueness of the historical period, the uniqueness of the Turkish case, and the uniqueness of the receiving areas in Western Europe. Some might argue, for example, that the decreasing selectivity of migrants according to their status discrepancy in, and fit to, the European labour market and the increasing selectivity according to the number of relatives already living abroad stems from the changing regulations governing migration to Western Europe. European countries, in general, severely restricted labour migration from Turkey after 1973 and made marriage migration and family unification almost the only legal entry tickets for Turks. Others might argue that Turks differ in their culture of kinship collectivism from other potential sending countries. This may imply that in their (migration) decisions, Turks, in comparison to societies with a more individualist culture, rely on ‘strong’ ties to kinship members and give kinship solidarity more place in their behaviour than potential migrants from, say, Lithuania, Poland or Ireland. Finally, since the vast majority of Turks have gone to Germany, still others could argue that the German social welfare state provides an incentive structure specifically attractive to kinship-based chain migration, which would not have occurred or, at least, would have been less pronounced in a liberal welfare state.
Although comparative empirical evidence permitting us to test these counterarguments is scarce, theoretical considerations allow us to conclude that this case study of Turkish intergenerational migration patterns can be generalised beyond its specific conditions. For example, there is no reason to assume that liberal welfare states are less attractive for chain migration, as the accumulation of social capital in the receiving contexts enables migrants to counterbalance the lack of welfare benefits when establishing an elastic exchange system among kinship group members. In fact, liberal welfare states such as the United States and the United Kingdom have experienced at least the same amount of chain migration as countries in central or northern Europe. Moreover, we may assume that changes in the selectivity of migrants’ social characteristics would have occurred even if political regulations had not changed. The changes in the incentive structure are not exclusively based on state regulations but, to a large extent, have been created independently by the kinship groups themselves. The place where significant others – spouses, parents, siblings, and children – live changes the costs and benefits of migration under any conditions, at least to some extent.

One interesting empirical question remains open. What role did the Turkish ‘culture of relatedness’ (Kağitçibaşı and Sunar 1997; Kağitçibaşı 2005, 2007) play in migration processes, especially in the extent and pace of chain migration? Since cultural factors have rarely been taken into account in migration research, and cross-cultural comparative analyses of intergenerational migration flows are nearly absent, this remains an important issue for future exploration.
Part II
5
Educational Attainment

Introduction

The educational outcomes of individuals with a migrant background have attracted widespread interest from social researchers, policymakers, politicians and others. While the significantly lower performance of children with a migrant background in many receiving societies is well documented, a key question if we are to draw a more complete picture of the socio-economic outcomes of migrants remains unanswered: what would they have achieved if they or their parents had not migrated? This chapter focuses on the educational outcomes of Turks in Europe in comparison to their cohorts who stayed behind in Turkey. It also examines the impact of grandparents and parents on the educational outcomes of the (grand) children of Turkish migrants. It is well documented that transmission of parental resources is weaker among migrants than majority populations in destination countries. However, research that compares the strength of transmission of educational resources among Turks in Europe and those in Turkey is rare.

In the course of this chapter, by drawing on the 2000 Families study used throughout this book (Guveli et al. 2014), we are able to answer four hitherto unanswered but interrelated research questions. First, do the educational outcomes of Turks in Europe differ from those of their non-migrant counterparts in Turkey. Second, do any differences change across family generations? Third, do socio-economic characteristics of grandparents have a direct effect on their grandchildren’s educational outcomes after controlling for socio-economic characteristics of parents? Fourth and finally, does the influence of grandparents’ characteristics differ between Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey?

The unique design of the 2000 Families study allows us to contribute to the debate on socio-economic outcomes of migrants and their children in two ways. First, we apply an innovative research perspective and include the context of origin. Second, because the dataset has information on family
members of the same lineage in migrant and non-migrant families, we can compare the transmissions of resources over three generations in these two groups. This allows us to extend models exploring the effect of the parental socio-economic background on educational outcomes beyond the typical two-generation framework and determines the influence of grandparents’ socio-economic characteristics.

In the next section, we outline the theoretical background to our research questions and discuss some recent findings on educational outcomes of Turks in Europe. We then introduce our research design, data and methods of analysis. The fourth section details our results, while in final section, we discuss the implications and offer some concluding remarks.

Current debates, recent findings and hypotheses

Educational outcomes across generations: family background and country context

Parents’ level of educational, social and cultural capital has been widely argued to be the main factor affecting people’s educational achievement (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). Those not equipped with the necessary level of these kinds of capital are, therefore, less likely to achieve a higher educational level and economic status. In all destination countries, Turks have lower educational outcomes than the native population (Ammermuller 2005; Crul and Schneider 2009a De Rycke and Swyngedouw 1999; Heath et al. 2008; Marks 2005; Schnepf 2004; Van De Wefhorst and Van Tubergen 2007). Most studies explain the gap in educational outcomes by pointing to differences in socio-economic background. Van Tubergen and van de Werfhorst (2007) and Kristen and Granato (2007) suggest lower socio-economic background (measured in terms of parental education and occupational status) of Turks accounts for all educational differences in the Netherlands and Germany. Phalet, Deboosere and Bastianssen (2007) and Fekjaer (2007) find ethnic differences in educational outcomes in Belgium and Norway can, to a large extent, be explained by education level, occupational status and accumulated wealth of parents. However, some degree of ethnic disadvantage, called the ‘ethnic penalty’ by Heath et al. (2008), remains after controlling for socio-economic background.

At the same time, even though it is widely accepted that the socio-economic characteristics of parents play an important role in the underperformance of Turks in Europe, several researchers argue the transmission of socio-economic status, or more generally, human capital which supports the educational career of children, does not operate in the same way for migrants as it does for majority populations in the receiving countries (Heath et al. 2008; Nauck, Diefenbach, and Petri 1998). Parental education and other socio-economic markers have a smaller effect on second-generation
migrants than on their native peers in the host societies in Europe (Bauer and Riphanh 2006; Kristen and Granato 2007; Wolbers and Driessen 1996). The argument about the strength of transmission should also apply to a comparison of migrants and non-migrants. The transmission of resources to the following generations may be weak in migrant families because of the impact of migration, but non-migrant families in Turkey will not experience such a disruption. Therefore, we expect the effect of parental education and occupation will be lower for individuals in Europe.

Migrant parents who were educated in Turkey are likely to have limited information about the educational system of the receiving society and be less able to guide their children throughout their educational career. Conversely, non-migrant parents with their education in Turkey should be more able to assist their children in their educational achievement, as they will know the education system or have social contacts able to provide the relevant information (see Chapter 10). As a result, the impact of parental socio-economic characteristics may be lower for Turks in Europe than for non-migrant Turks in Turkey. Therefore, among individuals in Europe, the effect of parental education and occupation is likely to be smaller for those whose parents have had their education in Turkey.

Weaker transmission of resources within migrant families may not necessarily represent a disadvantage, as the socio-economic status of Turks, on average, is lower than the native population in the receiving country. However, it points to the fact that the descendants of Turks in Europe are less dependent on and do not necessarily inherit their parents’ occupational status (and lower education).

While most studies on the experience of Turks in Europe focus on their integration within the destination countries, a small number of extant studies compare migrants or those of migrant origins to those in the country of origin. To do this, such studies make use of the PISA dataset, which measures the knowledge and skills of students at the age of 15. Investigating differences in educational outcomes of the children of migrants and the children of natives in both destination and origin countries, Dronkers and de Heus (2012) show that the science scores of children of guest workers are substantially lower than comparable majority pupils, even when taking into account the average performance of native pupils in both destination and origin countries. Luthra (2010) compares students in Germany from the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and Turkey to non-migrants in the countries of origin. She finds that Turks in Europe perform better than Turks living in Turkey. This finding contradicts Dronkers and de Heus and suggests Turkish children with a migrant background perform somewhere in between native European students and non-migrant Turks in Turkey. That is, although they do not perform as well as natives in Europe, they do improve their performance by migration, resulting in a certain degree of socio-economic assimilation into the destination countries.
Following the study by Luthra for Germany, Dutsmann et al. (2012) adopt non-migrant Turks as a control group, this time comparing Turkish migrants across countries rather than different migrant groups in a single country. They compare Turks in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and Denmark to Turks in Turkey, and find that Turks in Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark perform significantly better than Turks in Turkey, once controlling for parental background and language spoken at home. They suggest the difference found between destination countries and Turkey is mainly due to the higher quality schools and higher peer quality.

Crul and Schneider (2010) argue that studies investigating the educational attainment of migrants and the second generation tend to focus disproportionately on individual and group characteristics. In their view, educational systems should be also taken into consideration as these are likely to affect outcomes. Since we are comparing educational outcomes of Turks in Europe and in Turkey, it is useful to consider the contextual effects stemming from institutional differences as an explanatory factor in educational outcomes.

According to international organisations, educational systems in the destination countries can be considered more saturated, that is, absorbing a higher proportion of the eligible population at all levels, than in Turkey (OECD, 2007). This is argued to render them more inclusive and of better quality. A country’s educational expansion provides more opportunities to students to achieve higher levels education (Raftery and Hout 1993). It makes education accessible for more people, especially those with limited financial resources. That is, as education expands, more individuals will reach higher educational outcomes, and inequalities at a certain educational level will disappear when this particular educational level is saturated (Tolsma et al. 2007). Thus, differences between countries in the extent of their educational expansion are likely to affect the educational outcomes of even the most disadvantaged individuals.

Educational expansion in Europe started roughly with the cohort born in the 1930s and increased steadily until the 1980s (Ballarino et al. 2013). Expansion at different levels (lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary) shows similar patterns, with saturation not yet reached at the tertiary level. However, even for the tertiary level, the share of individuals increased around 20 per cent between the 1930s and 1980s, suggesting that more individuals have an opportunity to pursue tertiary education. A similar pattern of expansion in Turkey started only in the 1980s (for cohorts born in late 1950s and early 1960s), accelerating after 1997 with the introduction of eight years of compulsory education (Mihci and Mihci 2008).

Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of people with higher education for different cohorts in Turkey and in the European destination countries. The pattern is similar to that found by previous studies. The proportion of people with higher education is lowest – by far – in Turkey. As noted above, however, Turkey has experienced a rapid educational expansion in recent
Educational Attainment

decades, causing the gap between Turkey and the destination countries in terms of access to a secondary school diploma to diminish across birth cohorts. The trend in educational expansion initially observed in Europe is now taking place in Turkey, and the gap may gradually disappear with educational reforms in Turkey aiming for a higher rate of school attendance. Although there is some variation among the destination countries, they all have considerably higher ratios with higher education.

Based on the numbers above, we might assume that even individuals with a migrant Turkish background who come from low socio-economic classes may be able to achieve higher educational outcomes than non-migrant Turks with similar socio-economic backgrounds. In other words, Turks in Europe may benefit from a more inclusive and expanded educational system. That said, the higher attainment of Turks in Europe may be less pronounced in the younger cohorts because of the recent improvements in the Turkish educational system. Therefore, we hypothesise that Turks in Europe have better educational outcomes than non-migrant Turks in Turkey. The differences in educational outcomes between migrant and non-migrant Turks will be smaller in younger cohorts, that is in the third (family) generation.

Reproduction of educational outcomes over three generations

The impact of the socio-economic position of parents on the attainment of their children has been extensively discussed and demonstrated in the
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

A new body of research is now emerging on multi-generational transmission and ties. The work covers a range of topics, from social stratification to family sociology but with mixed results on the effect of grandparents’ socio-economic status. While some studies show a direct effect of grandparents on their grandchildren’s outcomes (Chang and Boliver 2011), others report no significant influence (Warren and Hauser 1997; Erola and Moisio 2007).

Mare (2011, 2014) points out several reasons for studying three generational processes. He argues that the traditional ‘parent to the child’ studies overlook the role of extended family members and their involvement in children’s lives. Increasing length of life makes it possible for grandparents to spend more time with their grandchildren. As a result, they are expected to have a longer and more engaged relationship with their grandchildren. With the availability of data that allows us to study three-generation lineages, the increasing importance of grandparents can be investigated more thoroughly.

As mentioned, social mobility research on two consecutive generations shows that the socio-economic outcomes of individuals are, to a large degree, dependent on the socio-economic position of their families (Blau and Duncan 1967; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Investigating social mobility in Finland, Erola and Moisio (2007) show that taking account of mobility over three generations offers little additional explanatory power. Grandparents’ social position only affects grandchildren’s outcomes in two ways: as ‘lagged inheritance’, which leads to a greater probability for the grandchildren of self-employed farmers and the service class to stay in their grandfathers’ class, and ‘lagged barrier’, which leads to better possibilities for the grandchildren of particularly disadvantaged fathers. However, using three different datasets from Britain to investigate social mobility, Chan and Boliver (2013) find ‘clear evidence of the dependence of absolute mobility rates in parents-children mobility’. When grandparents and parents come from the same social class, this increases class immobility; in other words, the probability of changing the social class is lower for a grandchild whose parents and grandparents are in the same social class. Their analysis shows that when parents and grandparents are in different social classes, the effect of grandparents leads to a higher level of counter-mobility which reduces the influence of father’s class. The rationale behind the counter-mobility, according to Chan and Boliver, is that the socio-economic status of parents experiencing downward mobility may not reflect the resources transmitted across generations. Grandparents who are better off than parents can directly transmit resources to grandchildren.

A similar mechanism appears to be valid for educational outcomes. Recent studies focusing on educational outcomes suggest there is more than parents and children to study in the field of social stratification. Using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, Jaeger (2012) investigates the effect of extended family
on educational outcomes. Controlling for siblings’ similarities, he finds a significant effect of the factors shared by the cousins, which he attributes to the other family members. He shows families’ socio-economic characteristics beyond parents can affect educational success; grandparents are important and likely to have a strong direct effect when families are not able to support their children and turn to the extended family. Like Jaeger, Hagestad points to the importance of grandparents ‘being there’; transmissions are stronger when there is a need for support (2006: 325). Similarly, Hallsten (2013) finds for Sweden that cousins’ socio-economic outcomes are correlated even after controlling for family characteristics. Finally, Wightman and Danziger (2013) find that the socio-economic status of parents during their adolescence has an effect (net of parents’ current socio-economic status) on the educational attainment of young adults in the US, and this effect is stronger in low-income households.

Transmission across three generations in the migration context has not been investigated; yet migration is likely to affect transmission across generations and change people’s socio-economic characteristics relatively easily, making this an important area to consider. As migration has a disruptive effect on transmission between parents and children, it is likely to have the same effect on direct transmissions of grandparents to individuals in Europe. In addition, as found in previous research, grandparents are more likely to transmit their characteristics or show support if parents are unable to support their children. In the context of migration, these two mechanisms might interact. Where migrants improve their socio-economic status, there might be even less of a role for grandparents. In sum, we expect there will be a positive effect of the grandparents’ socio-economic characteristics on the educational outcomes of third- (family) generation individuals, but the effect of the grandparent’s socio-economic characteristics (due to the disruptive effect of migration) will be smaller for individuals who complete their education in Europe. Finally, we expect grandparents’ socio-economic characteristics will be greater for the children whose parents have low socio-economic status.

Design, data and variables

Data and sample

We draw on a unique dataset (Guveli et al. 2016) that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families dataset, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012 (Guveli et al. 2016; see also Chapter 2). From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412
men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone.

As the data include respondents from different generations within migrant and non-migrant families, we can investigate the effects of a wide range of parental and grandparental characteristics on educational outcomes. For this chapter, we make use of the data collected from the proxy questionnaire (for more detailed information, see Chapter 2). The number of family members from the second and third family generations (i.e. children and grandchildren of the ancestors (G1)) is 7,829 and 10,095 respectively. We exclude any cases with missing information on any member of the three-generation lineage. The first analysis covers generational change in educational outcomes and, therefore, includes second and third family generation individuals. We only use parental information for family background. The sample size for this analysis is 15,539. The model of grandparents’ effect on educational outcomes includes information from grandparents along with parents and focuses on the outcomes of the third family generation, yielding a sample size of 7,668.

**Dependent variable**
The dependent variable is *highest educational qualification*, based on the internationally comparable ISCED scale. The scale comprises eight categories: illiterate (no schooling), literate (no schooling), primary drop-out, primary completed, low secondary, high-secondary, low tertiary, high tertiary. The first two categories exist only for the first generation (G1).

**Independent variables for comparison across generations**

*Migrant status:* The main explanatory variable is the migrant status. As we are interested in educational outcomes obtained in the destination, we use both country of birth and country in which education is completed to construct the measure. We use the information about the place where the highest level of education has been obtained because migration might have occurred after education was completed. The variable, therefore, has four categories: (1) those who were born and educated in Turkey (TR-born TR-educated); (2) those who were born in Turkey but educated in Europe (TR-born EU-educated); (3) those who were born and educated in Europe (EU-born EU-educated); and (4) those who were born in Europe and educated in Turkey (EU-born TR-educated). Because the EU-born TR-educated group (i.e. returnees) is expected to have different mechanisms and a different framework, we do not present the results for this last group.

*Family generations:* We look across different generations in the family lineage. Unlike the common use of generations in the migration literature, in our work, the third family generation (G3) is the grandchild of our first
generation (G1) men (either migrant or non-migrant ancestor) and the second family generation (G2) is a child of his. Such use of generations facilitates our investigation of the educational outcomes through time in different settings.

Parents’ socio-economic characteristics: These are the parents’ educational level, and parents’ ISEI score. Parents’ level of education is measured in the same way as our dependent variable. For parental occupational status, we use the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treimann 1996; see also Chapter 6).

Parents’ country of education: This is a dummy variable showing whether the parent was educated in Europe or Turkey. We also control for age, sex, sex of parent, sending region and country of destination.

Independent variables for the analysis of three-generational transmission processes

Migrant status: As this model focuses on the transmission over three generations, we refine our measure of migrant status to reflect patterns of migration histories. We use the personal migration status of each individual in the lineage, namely individual, parent and grandparent. For the grandparent and parent, we use the criterion whether they are or have been in Europe to define their migrant history. This includes being born in Europe or migrating to Europe, regardless of the current country of residence. For the third generation individuals who are the focus of the analysis, we use country of education information for their migration status. As a result, we have a variety of migration patterns across generations. We drop those lineages with rare combinations of migration experience across the generations. As a result, we end up with four main categories that define the main migration patterns: those who had education in Turkey and have a completely non-migrant lineage (TRTRTR), those who had education in Turkey and have a migrant parent and a non-migrant grandparent (TREUTR), those who were educated in Europe and have a complete migrant (or exposed to Europe) lineage (EUEUEU), and finally, those who were educated in Europe with migrant parent and non-migrant grandparent (TREUEU).

Grandparent’s socio-economic characteristics: These are the grandparents’ (G1) educational level, measured in the same way as our dependent variable, and grandparents’ ISEI score (Ganzeboom and Treimann 1996). For parent’s (G2) socio-economic characteristics, we use the same operationalisation as in the previous analysis.

Control variables
Finally, our control variables include age, sex, sex of parent, sending region, and country of destination. The models include several interaction effects between migrant status and socio-economic characteristics of
parent and grandparent. For both analyses, we estimate linear regression (OLS) models and adjust the standard errors for multiple observations within families.

Results

Trends across generations

Educational outcomes are expected to be higher through decades, as a result of the educational expansion which has taken place in all countries in our study. Table 5.1 shows the means of educational outcomes for all three generations and the occupational status for family members in the first and second family generations. We are not surprised to see educational outcomes are higher for all migrant status groups in G3 than in G2. This reflects the expansion of education in both Europe and Turkey, as more individuals stay in education for longer in the third generation.

The EU-born EU-educated individuals have much higher educational outcomes than non-migrant individuals (TR-born TR-educated). This is true for both the G2 and G3 individuals, although the gap is much smaller for G3. In other words, although individuals who completed their education in either Turkey or Europe have higher educational outcomes than the previous generation, the increase in educational outcomes in Turkey has been much greater than in Europe. However, those who were born and who completed their education in Europe are still doing better than non-migrant Turks. In line with the previous findings in the field, this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1</th>
<th>Educational outcomes and parental characteristics by individual migration status of G2 and G3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educational outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN1</td>
<td>Non-migrant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN2</td>
<td>TR-born TR-educated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EU-born EU-educated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TR-born EU-educated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN3</td>
<td>TR-born TR-educated</td>
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<td>EU-born EU-educated</td>
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<td>TR-born EU-educated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
Educational Attainment

reflects the better educational opportunities available in Europe compared to Turkey.

The results for G1 are shown according to the individual’s migration status (migrated to Europe between 1960 and 1974 or not). All these men completed their education in Turkey. For G1, migrants are slightly positively selected in terms of education and slightly negatively selected in terms of occupational status (see also the discussions in Chapters 4 and 6). The differences are not large, but are statistically significant (0.001, chi2).

Table 5.2 shows the results of the regression analysis for the educational outcomes of G2 and G3 individuals. Differences in educational outcomes change as new variables are added to the models, and, thus, characteristics are held constant. The first model shows how educational outcomes change through two family generations and how they differ on the basis of migration status. The second model adds the potential influence of socio-economic background (parent’s level of education and occupational status) and parent’s country, while the third model interacts the individual’s own migrant status with parent’s background, parent’s migrant status and family generation.

The results are clear: G3 individuals have better educational outcomes than G2. This is as expected and can be explained by educational expansion in both European destination countries and Turkey. But as the educational expansion started much later in Turkey, as we saw in Table 5.2, the increase in the educational outcomes is, on average, much greater for the G3 individuals who completed their education in Turkey. Educational expansion in Turkey gained speed while some of G2 were still in education, but most had already left, so G3 experienced a more accelerated expansion. As a result, the difference between G2 and G3 for the TR-born TR-educated group is larger than for the EU-born EU-educated groups and the TR-born EU-educated group.

In Figure 5.2, we present the predicted outcomes for educational outcomes from our model above. Both the EU-born EU-educated and the TR-born EU-educated groups obtain better educational outcomes than our non-migrant group (TR-born TR-educated). This difference is significant for both generations.

The analysis leads to a set of consistent findings: individuals who were educated in Europe have better educational outcomes than those educated in Turkey, while generational differences among our three groups are biggest in the non-migrant group (TR-born TR-educated), supporting arguments on the expansion of education. Parental educational level and occupational status are important influences on educational outcomes for all groups, but the educational level of parents has a smaller effect on the educational outcomes of both migrant groups (EU-born EU-educated and TR-born EU-educated): see Model 3 of Table 5.2. This finding accords with the expectation that migration represents a point of rupture in the life
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Outcomes:</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>(-14.37)</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>(-12.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>(-9.96)</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>(-10.48)</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>(-10.52)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G3 (ref. cat: G2)</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>(6.09)</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>(3.14)</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>(4.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-born EU-educated</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>(6.25)</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
<td>(7.56)</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td>(10.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR-born EU-educated</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
<td>(8.15)</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>(8.74)</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>(8.30)</td>
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<td>Parent educated in EU</td>
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<td>(-7.31)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>(-0.48)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parent’s educational status</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>(14.20)</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>(12.65)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Parent’s occupational status</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>(5.19)</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>(5.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Interactions

| G3 * EU-born EU-educated | -0.66*** | (-6.97) |
| G3 * TR-born EU-educated | -0.20+ | (-1.82) |
| Parent educated in EU * EU-born EU-educated | -0.13 | (-0.54) |
| Parent educated in EU * TR-born EU-educated | -0.11 | (-0.39) |
| Parent’s educational status * EU-born EU-educated | -0.06 | (-1.47) |
| Parent’s educational status * TR-born EU-educated | -0.13** | (-2.78) |
| Parent’s occupational status * EU-born EU-educated | -0.13*** | (-3.87) |
| Parent’s occupational status * TR-born EU-educated | -0.07 | (-1.29) |

Constant

| 6.57*** | (54.21) |
| 6.35*** | (57.29) |
| 6.19*** | (53.19) |

R2

| 0.229 |
| 0.262 |
| 0.270 |

N

| 15539 |
| 15539 |
| 15539 |

Clusters

| 1576 |
| 1576 |
| 1576 |

Note: Models control for sending region, country of destination, sex of parent and EU-born TR-educated individuals.

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data. +<0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Transmission of educational outcomes across three generations

We now investigate educational transmission patterns over three generations. As noted, we use a different set of migrant status categories, which incorporate the migration status of the grandparent as well as the parent and the individual. We have four groups: three-generation non-migrants (TRTRTR) – those who had education in Turkey and have a non-migrant parent and grandparent; three-generation Europeans (EUEUEU) – those who had education in Europe and have a parent and grandparent who are or have been in Europe; migrant-parent (TREUTR) – those who had education in Turkey and have a migrant parent and non-migrant grandparent; finally, European non-migrant grandparents (TREUEU) – those whose who had education in Europe and have a migrant parent and non-migrant grandparent.

We expect to find a direct effect from the grandparent’s occupation, especially for non-migrant individuals and for individuals with lower parental background. We also expect our migrant parent group (TREUTR) to show course, hampering intergenerational associations. While we cannot find any specific positive effect of parents who had their education in Europe on their offspring, the analysis suggests that Turks in Europe who are from lower-class families benefit from the decision to migrate in terms of their educational attainments.
stronger G1-G3 transmission than the other groups, as grandparents are in the same country and may contribute more to the grandchildren’s school outcomes. While we are primarily interested in the possible effect of the grandparents (G1), we also expect an effect from parents (G2), as their socio-economic status is typically the main explanatory factor for educational outcomes of children (G3) (see also Table 5.2).

Table 5.3 shows the correlations between the occupational status and level of education of G1, G2 and G3, grouped according to our three-generation migration status categories.

| Table 5.3 Correlations for occupational status and education level for three generations |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| TRTRTR                                        | G3 Education     | G1 Education     | G2 Education     | G1 Occupation    |
| G1 Education                                 | 0.11 ***         |                  |                  |                  |
| G2 Education                                 | 0.28 ***         | 0.14 ***         |                  |                  |
| G1 Occupation                                | 0.13 ***         | 0.11 ***         | 0.07 ***         |                  |
| G2 Occupation                                | 0.19 ***         | 0.03 *           | 0.48 ***         | 0.10 ***         |
| N: 4223                                      |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| EUEUEU                                        | G3 Education     | G1 Education     | G2 Education     | G1 Occupation    |
| G1 Education                                 | 0.07 **          |                  |                  |                  |
| G2 Education                                 | 0.22 ***         | 0.14 ***         |                  |                  |
| G1 Occupation                                | -0.02            | 0.08 **          | 0.05             |                  |
| G2 Occupation                                | 0.07 **          | 0.07 *           | 0.31 ***         | 0.11 ***         |
| N: 1460                                      |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| TREUEU                                        | G3 Education     | G1 Education     | G2 Education     | G1 Occupation    |
| G1 Education                                 | 0.14 ***         |                  |                  |                  |
| G2 Education                                 | 0.16 ***         | 0.16 ***         |                  |                  |
| G1 Occupation                                | 0.06+            | 0.18 ***         | 0.08 **          |                  |
| G2 Occupation                                | 0.07 *           | 0.06+            | 0.21 ***         | 0.10 ***         |
| N: 1137                                      |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| TREUTR                                        | G3 Education     | G1 Education     | G2 Education     | G1 Occupation    |
| G1 Education                                 | 0.08 *           |                  |                  |                  |
| G2 Education                                 | 0.30 ***         | 0.18 ***         |                  |                  |
| G1 Occupation                                | 0.04             | 0.26 ***         | 0.13 ***         |                  |
| G2 Occupation                                | 0.21 ***         | 0.11 **          | 0.39 ***         | 0.13 ***         |
| N: 848                                       |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| Total                                         | G3 Education     | G1 Education     | G2 Education     | G1 Occupation    |
| G1 Education                                 | 0.10 ***         |                  |                  |                  |
| G2 Education                                 | 0.27 ***         | 0.15 ***         |                  |                  |
| G1 Occupation                                | 0.09 ***         | 0.12 ***         | 0.07 ***         |                  |
| G2 Occupation                                | 0.14 ***         | 0.03 **          | 0.38 ***         | 0.10 ***         |
| N                                            | 7668             |                  |                  |                  |

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
One of the most striking findings is that the highest correlations for socio-economic characteristics of the grandparent, parent and grandchild are in the three-generation non-migrant group (TRTRTR). That is, there are moderate to strong positive associations between the socio-economic characteristics of these lineage members in the non-migrant group. In the three-generation migrant group (EUEUEU), the correlations are fairly low and even statistically insignificant between G1 and G3, pointing to a rupture in the transmission process. These findings support the expectation that transmission is stronger among non-migrant than migrant families because migration functions as a breakpoint in the inheritance of education and occupational status.

Table 5.4 displays the results of the OLS regressions of G3 educational outcomes with parental and grandparental socio-economic indicators as explanatory variables. As before, we first present a base model with a migrant-status variable, grandparental characteristics, and other control variables. In the following models, we add indicators of parental socio-economic status and then add interactions investigating the different effects of family background for different groups as well as between parental and grandparental characteristics.

Consistent with our earlier results, in G3, those educated in Europe (EUEUEU and TREUEU) have better educational outcomes than those in the non-migrant groups (TRTRTR and TREUTR). Among non-migrant individuals, three-generation non-migrant individuals (TRTRTR) have better educational outcomes than those with only a migrant parent (TREUTR). Adding parents’ socio-economic background decreases the gap between these groups. The difference only remains substantial for the non-migrant grandparent (TREUEU) group compared to the three-generation non-migrants, while it becomes insignificant (but still sizable) for the three-generation migrant (EUEUEU) group. This suggests family background explains some part of the difference in educational outcomes between migrants and non-migrants, especially the difference between three-generation non-migrant individuals (TRTRTR) and three-generation European individuals. This could be linked to the relative improvement in socio-economic conditions of those families who stayed in Europe across three generations.

The grandparent’s socio-economic background influences educational outcomes positively before controlling for parental background, as we expected. Interestingly, although the effect of occupational and educational status of grandparents decreases once parental characteristics are added, it remains significant, albeit small.

The interactions in the final model demonstrate that the effect of the family’s socio-economic background does not function the same way for individuals with a migrant background as it does for non-migrants. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>beta</th>
<th>t</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-0.04*** (-9.78)</td>
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<td>-0.04*** (-10.12)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.06 (-1.84)</td>
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<td>-0.07* (-1.98)</td>
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<td>-0.06* (-1.97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUEUEU</td>
<td>0.36** (3.14)</td>
<td>0.17 (1.55)</td>
<td>0.17 (1.53)</td>
<td>0.17 (1.54)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TREUEU</td>
<td>0.46*** (3.37)</td>
<td>0.39** (3.06)</td>
<td>0.34** (2.79)</td>
<td>0.34** (2.78)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TREUTR</td>
<td>-0.18* (-2.14)</td>
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<td>-0.20* (-2.50)</td>
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<td>Family Background</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.P. education</td>
<td>0.09** (2.75)</td>
<td>0.06* (1.96)</td>
<td>0.07+ (1.70)</td>
<td>0.09* (2.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.P. occupation</td>
<td>0.09** (3.07)</td>
<td>0.07* (2.55)</td>
<td>0.12*** (3.78)</td>
<td>0.14*** (4.41)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.36*** (10)</td>
<td>0.36*** (9.89)</td>
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<td>0.10** (3.29)</td>
<td>0.10** (3.24)</td>
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<td>Interactions for EUEUEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.P. education</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.69)</td>
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for TREUEU

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<tr>
<td>G.P. occupation</td>
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<td>-0.19* (-2.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. education</td>
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<td>-0.21** (-3.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. occupation</td>
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for TREUTR

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<td>G.P. education</td>
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<tr>
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Family background interactions

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<th>TREUTR</th>
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<tr>
<td>P. edu * G.P. occ.</td>
<td>0.05+ (1.71)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P. edu * G.P. edu.</td>
<td>0.04 (1.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. occ * G.P. occ.</td>
<td>-0.02 (-1.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. occ. * G.P. edu.</td>
<td>-0.04+ (-1.65)</td>
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</table>

Constant

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<th>6.87***</th>
<th>-34.34</th>
<th>6.66***</th>
<th>-34.86</th>
<th>6.70***</th>
<th>-35.57</th>
<th>6.71***</th>
<th>-35.58</th>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7668</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>N of clusters</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Note: Controls included for sending region, destination country, parent’s sex.

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data. +<0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
effect of the grandparent’s occupational status is, in fact, negative for migrant groups (–0.09 for EUEUEU (0.14–0.23) and –0.05 for TREUEU (0.14–0.19)) suggesting there is no direct transmission from grandparents to the children in these groups. Similarly, the effects of the educational status of parents are smaller for these groups compared to the non-migrant (TRTRTR) group, albeit still positive and sizable.

Although the results suggest direct transmissions from grandparents are weaker for the TREUTR (those educated in Turkey with a migrant parent and non-migrant grandparent) than for our non-migrant group (TRTRTR), these groups do not significantly differ from each other.

Finally, we interact parental background with grandparental socio-economic characteristics to test our final hypothesis that grandparents’ socio-economic characteristics will be greater for the children whose parents have low socio-economic status. We find mixed results: a negative interaction between parental occupation and grandparental education and a positive interaction between parental education and grandparental education, although both are significant only at the 0.1 level, providing no clear support for this hypothesis.

In sum, our main findings are as follows: stronger transmission of resources occurs in non-migrant families, while the effects of educational and occupational status of parents are weaker but still substantial for individuals with a migrant background. This confirms that the main indicators of educational outcomes of Turks in Europe are parental characteristics. Regarding reproduction over three generations, in line with our expectations, our analysis suggests a small but statistically significant effect of the grandparent’s occupation for non-migrants. Finally, we have limited evidence to support our hypothesis that the grandparental effect is stronger when the parent’s socio-economic status is low.

Conclusion

In the first section of this chapter, we compared the educational outcomes of individuals with a migrant background to those of non-migrants, with a focus on generational differences and found educational outcomes improve across generations in Turkey and for the Turkey-born Europe-educated groups. Yet in both generations (G2 and G3), individuals with a migrant background who completed their education in Europe have better educational outcomes than non-migrants, although educational improvement across generations is stronger in Turkey. These results are in line with our expectations, but our analysis provides a much sharper test than previous studies. We suggest migrants’ descendants have secured better educational opportunities in Europe in spite of the cost migration brings, such as a possible lack of knowledge of the educational system, language problems or discrimination in the destination countries. This is especially true for those
from lower-class families – the majority of Turkish migrants. Admittedly, as a result of the expansion of education in Turkey, non-migrant individuals are steadily improving their outcomes, but they have a long way to go before they catch up with their counterparts in Europe.

In other words, the decision to migrate has resulted in positive outcomes for the migrants’ descendants. Although multiple studies find they underperform compared to native groups in many destination countries, they are educationally more successful than their counterparts in Turkey. That said, the gap between migrant and non-migrant Turks is diminishing over time, possibly because of the rapid educational expansion in Turkey in recent decades. Therefore, whether people of Turkish descent in Europe will continue to enjoy educational gains from the migration decision remains an open question.

In the second section of the analysis, when we investigated educational mobility over three generations for our migrant and non-migrant groups, we only found a direct effect of the grandparent’s occupational status on an individual’s educational outcomes for non-migrants in Turkey. The returns to parental socio-economic status are positive and significant for all groups, but parental background has a smaller effect for Turks who live in the European countries for two or more generations. Our findings suggest dissimilation from the origins is stronger for Turks if all three generations of family members live in Europe. That is, the grandchildren in our sample become (more) independent of the low education and low occupation of their parents and grandparents, promoting higher educational outcomes.

In this chapter, we treat all migrants across Europe in a single group. This does not mean we consider European destination countries as a single entity with no variations in migration policies, educational settings or other characteristics that may have an impact on educational outcomes. There are, in fact, many differences that may affect the educational outcomes and integration trajectories of individuals with migrant backgrounds, including school starting and selection ages (Crul and Schneider 2009a, b). In our statistical analysis, we control for destination country to absorb such differences, but we have not investigated their specific contribution. Such a comparison is left for future research.
Introduction

Over 50 years ago, large-scale Turkish migration to Western Europe started as institutionalised labour migration or the ‘guest worker’ system. At that time, factories, with the help of Turkish government agencies, started contracting Turkish workers to work in those industries suffering from a shortage of domestic employees. Turkish migrant workers took up jobs that were hitherto unknown to them and thus became occupationally mobile, almost by default. But little is, in fact, known about the distribution of the occupational and family backgrounds of these workers. The prevailing view is that recruitment was targeted at unskilled workers, predominantly with rural, if not agricultural backgrounds, whose occupational mobility after migration was, on average, upward (Castles and Miller 2009). However, in line with theories of migrant occupational mobility, the guest-worker system may have also attracted skilled and even professional workers, who gave up their initial calling in favour of better wages (but worse jobs) (Akresh 2008; Chiswick, Lee and Miller 2005). Using the 2000 Families study data, we can investigate how far Turkish migrants were positively selected by comparison with non-migrants from the same region, and even other members of the same families. This, in turn, will help us identify the implications for occupational mobility across generations (Ichou 2014).

In this chapter, we examine occupational status attainment and intergenerational occupational mobility in three generations of Turks in Turkey and Europe. We compare first and last occupations, which for G1 migrants is equal to their occupations before and after migration but not necessarily so for G2 and G3 migrants. We relate migrants’ and non-migrants’ occupations to their own education and their father’s occupation and, thus, test whether international migration is, in fact, strongly associated with intergenerational social mobility. This allows us to identify the gains and losses of migration in terms of occupational status. Specifically, we compare mobility between Generation 1 (G1), a large cohort of 1960s male labour migrants
with a control group of men from the same cohort and regions who did not migrate, G2, the sons and daughters of these ancestors, and G3, the children of the middle generation family members and grandchildren of the G1 ancestors. G2 and G3 may themselves be migrants to Europe, or have been born – or equivalently, for the purposes of this chapter – educated there.

In what follows, we first discuss the merits of occupation as an indicator of social standing, in particular, in the case of international migration. We then introduce Blau and Duncan's (1967) classic status attainment model that relates occupation status attained in first and last jobs to education and to the occupational status of the father. The status attainment model decomposes intergenerational transmission of occupational status into a number of pathways, each of which can be affected by international migration. We outline our expectations of how these will be affected by migration, drawing on theories of international migration and social mobility, before testing the extent to which these expectations are realised in the data. We find that those G1 men who migrated are more likely to be those whose occupation is out of line with their educational attainment (see also Chapter 4). In line with our expectations, we find social mobility is stronger among migrants, but by G3, there is no apparent effect. Our results confirm the importance of education in determining occupational attainment in both G2 and G3; thus, the extent to which migration influences educational attainment is highly relevant for occupational attainment (see also Chapter 5). We conclude, however, that overall, the impact of migration on intergenerational social mobility is very strong for the first generation, but differences between migrants and non-migrants largely disappear by the third generation.

**Occupation as an indicator of social position**

The primary focus of the chapter is on occupations and the relationship between occupations within and between generations. That is, we investigate occupational mobility, or its reverse, occupational reproduction. Occupations are used by sociologists as the basis for determining a person’s position in society, his/her social class or status (see Platt, forthcoming 2016; Guveli et al. 2005, 2006, 2007). Occupations owe their favoured role in the sociological analysis of social inequality and the reproduction of inequality within families to four main characteristics, both conceptual and practical. First, occupation is typically used in everyday social interactions to assess a person’s personal standing: ‘What do you do for a living?’ is a standard question on first meeting around the world. Second, occupations provide a relatively stable measure of people’s position in society, compared, for example, to income, which tends to be favoured by economists for measuring both intra- (life course) and intergenerational social mobility (see, e.g. the discussion in Jäntti and Jenkins 2015), but is much more volatile.
Third, occupations are easy to report with relative accuracy. This is true not only of respondents’ current occupation, but also for previous occupations and those reported by others. Research has tended to confirm that occupational positions are among the few social characteristics that can be reported accurately after a considerable time and about other persons. Finally, occupational hierarchies, that is, how occupations are scaled relative to one another, have the unique property of being highly stable across national and historical contexts (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Although technological and social change generates new occupational duties and structures and causes others to disappear, the basic structure of occupational hierarchies has an impressive stability that lends itself to comparisons across time and space.

Taken together, these characteristics make occupation the most accessible and relevant indicator of status in society. In addition, many analysts regard occupation as a good approximation of earnings; some would, in fact, be willing to interpret occupation as a better indicator of economic status in society than direct income measures (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2010; Guveli et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; see also the discussion in Jäntti and Jenkins 2015), as incomes are complicated to measure and volatile by nature. However, the link between occupation and income is less meaningful in the case of international labour migration. Turkish labour migrants, like many other economic migrants, were willing to change jobs (via migration) for economic reasons (Borjas 1987) and were not directly motivated by the job to do. But such gains in income could well accompany a loss of social status in terms of occupation.

While occupations are sociology’s main instrument to model social stratification, there is substantial debate as to how occupational status is best conceptualised and measured (Platt, forthcoming 2016). First, there has been much discussion of whether social stratification can best be conceptualised as a continuous hierarchy (the social ladder) or a system of discrete categories (social classes). Both approaches have advantages and are supported by empirical results. On the one hand, those who argue in favour of discrete classes (Breen 2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) have convincingly shown that ‘gaps’ exist and patterns of occupational mobility (both intergenerational and intragenerational) cannot be adequately captured without taking into account at least some of this separation between classes. On the other hand, those who favour a continuous hierarchy (see e.g. Lambert, Prandy and Bottero 2007) can use simpler and statistically more powerful methods of analysis. The second conceptual issue of occupational status measurement relates to how social status, whether measured in categories or continuously, is derived from occupational position. Competing claims are made for allocating occupational status on (1) the basis of social prestige, that is, how members of society perceive and evaluate positions (e.g. Treiman 1977); (2) socio-economic status, capturing the resources that occupations bring,
occupational position (e.g. Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996); and (3) whether people with different occupations accept each other as equals, derived from occupational friendship and occupational homogamy data (e.g. Prandy 1990). While all scalings of occupational positions are strongly related, they are not identical and do not always behave the same way in empirical data. In this analysis, we employ a continuous measure of occupational stratification enabling us to replicate the status attainment model of Blau and Duncan (1967) and take advantage of its statistical properties. More specifically, we use the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), which is based on how occupational position translates education into earnings and has the benefits of cross-national coverage and comparability (see Ganzeboom, de Graaf and Treiman 1992).

### The intergenerational status attainment model

Occupational attainment and occupational mobility patterns can be usefully analysed using the intergenerational Status Attainment (SAT) model of Blau and Duncan (1967). Figure 6.1 illustrates the SAT, showing how it connects, in a causal framework, five variables: father’s education and occupation, and respondent’s education, first occupation and most recent (current) occupation. Relationships in this model are conveniently provided in standardised terms, allowing the analyst to compare effect sizes across different parts of the model and calculate (and compare) direct and indirect effects. Although Blau and Duncan estimate these relationships using path calculations, they can also be obtained using straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis on standardised variables, this is the approach we use in this chapter. Despite its apparent simplicity, the SAT model is an informative tool for summarising status attainment and intergenerational mobility patterns.
For men in the United States in 1962, Blau and Duncan (1967) found strong intergenerational links between fathers and sons. The simple associations between father's and son's education is 0.45, between father's occupation and son's first occupation, 0.41, and between father's occupation and son's current job, 0.42. It is useful to keep these (standardised) numbers in mind when assessing intergenerational associations elsewhere, for example, our Turkish generations.

The SAT model's path diagram reveals the extent to which these associations are direct or mediated by other routes in the model. It shows the pivotal role in intergenerational status reproduction of education: fathers transmit their occupational status to their sons predominantly via education (indirect). Sons of fathers with high status and high education are likely to obtain a high education themselves (lines from FaOc and FaEd to Ed). Education is a strong determinant of status in both first jobs and current jobs (lines from Ed to 1stOc and Occ). Together, these two steps produce the indirect effects.

Nevertheless, there are substantial direct transfers between father's occupation and son's first and current occupation: high status fathers are better able to position their sons higher in the occupational hierarchy than low status fathers, over and above the educational status obtained by these sons. Note, in particular, in the SAT model, a direct effect even occurs for current occupation (FaOc to Occ). Also note that no such role is found for the father's education: his education does not matter for the son's occupational outcomes beyond its influence on the son's education. All of the effect of the father's education on occupational outcomes is, thus, indirect. As a result, in most of our analysis we do not include the father's education.

Finally, the basic correlations from the SAT model suggest continuity between first and current jobs at first appears, perhaps unsurprisingly, rather strong, with an association of 0.54. At the same time, the path diagram reveals that about half of this continuity is produced by earlier conditions, in particular, education and father's occupation. The SAT model thus suggests differences in occupational returns to education arise primarily after labour market entry.

The SAT model has been replicated often in different samples and in various societies and contexts (Breen 2004; Ganzeboom, Luijksx and Treiman 1989; Treiman and Yip 1989). This literature confirms the utility of the model for comparative analysis. However, most replications suggest that, in general, the role of first job is much more important than the original SAT model indicated. Instead, in subsequent studies, first job has been found to be a stronger predictor of current job, suggesting the crucial moment for investigating social reproduction is career entry. Before implementing the SAT model in order to understand the influence of migration on social mobility and social reproduction among Turkish migrants, we now elaborate on our expectations for these relationships.
International migration and intergenerational mobility

A classical hypothesis in the stratification literature is that international migration generates intergenerational mobility (Chiswick et al. 2005). With the SAT model in mind, we can anticipate this may be true for a number of different reasons. Figure 6.2 shows a simplified version of the SAT model between origins, education and destination (OED) and the ways migration can impact the relationships between all of these.

There are several ways in which $O \rightarrow E$, the effect of the father's occupation on his offspring's education, might be weakened by international migration (see also the discussion in Chapter 5). For migrants who obtain or complete their education in the destination country, the father's occupational resources and associated cultural resources may be less effective than in the origin country. At the same time, migrant children often have high educational expectations (Kao and Tienda 1995, 1998) and perform educationally better than their often modest origins might suggest (Strand 2014). Both processes would lead to reduced association between background and educational outcomes and, hence, higher mobility among migrants. But even when the education is completed in the country of origin, we can speculate that prospective migrants differ from non-migrants in the association between attained education and parental background. People who are already socially mobile in education may be more likely to become international migrants (Feliciano 2005a).

![Figure 6.2](image_url)  How international migration can influence social mobility
We turn now to $E \rightarrow D /\!/ O$, the direct effect of education on occupational outcomes, controlled for social origin effects. We can expect this relationship to be weaker among migrants who complete their education in the origin country before moving, because educational credentials are locally valued and credentials lose their value in the new labour market (Feliciano 2005b). This scenario is likely to apply to Turkish first generation labour migrants, but also to those who subsequently migrate for family reunification. However, we also expect this association to be weaker among those who completed their education in the country of destination, given the extensive evidence on ‘ethnic penalties’ in labour market outcomes among migrants (Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008). At the same time, a body of evidence suggests that once we control for social class background, such penalties often disappear (Platt 2005, 2007; Zuccotti 2015). Overall, then, we expect there is a weaker association between education and outcomes among migrants than among non-migrants.

The direct effect of parental background on occupational outcomes, net of education is shown in $O \rightarrow D /\!/ E$. This is perhaps most usefully thought of as resulting from direct inheritance of occupations. If direct inheritance is the major mechanism behind the direct effect, there is a clear reason to expect migrants to be more socially mobile than non-migrants: it is hard to transfer property and capital across borders in the case of businesses or farming, and the occupational structures migrants move from and to tend to be different. Therefore, we expect a weaker association among migrants than among non-migrants in this direct effect.

In sum, there are multiple reasons to expect international migration will cause intergenerational mobility. We should note that all these arguments are about social fluidity, that is the (absence of a) statistical association between origins and destinations. The expectations about fluidity do not suggest whether migration leads, overall, to migrants having higher or lower positions in the social ladder compared to non-migrants. For migrants and their children themselves, this may be a crucial issue, although as we have also noted, for labour migrants driven by earnings gains, there may be an accepted trade-off between income and occupational position. In relation to Turkish migration specifically, it is likely that many, particularly those migrating from the sorts of regions we cover in our data, are from very modest, rural and mostly agricultural backgrounds. This implies the occupational distributions at origin are very compressed, and any mobility is likely to be upward.

Expectations of mobility are likely to be influenced by the point where migrants find themselves in the migration chain. Those migrating for family re-unification or born in Europe are likely to be less selected than original labour migrants (McKenzie and Rapoport 2010; see also Chapter 4). At the same time, the transmission of occupational status between migrants and their (migrant) children is likely to be more straightforward than between
migrants and their non-migrant parents. Nevertheless, the points about potential ‘ethnic penalties’ made above, still apply.

Finally, given today’s transnational mobility, close links between Turks in Europe and Turkey, occupational outcomes and migration to or residence in Europe might not be independent. That is, Turks with a foot in both Turkey and Europe may opt to live where their occupational outcomes are optimal.

Against this background, we aim to answer the following four questions. First, how have socio-economic backgrounds (parental occupational status and level of education) shaped the likelihood of migration from Turkey to Western Europe? That is, to what degree can we regard Turkish migrants as positively or negatively selected, and how does this vary over the three family generations? Second, how has migration impacted the occupational status of migrants compared to Turks in Turkey? How has the impact of migration on the occupation status of Turkish migrants changed over the three generations (G1, G2 and G3)? Third, for the first migrant generation, how does occupation prior to migration affect occupational destinations after migration? Fourth and finally, what are the differences in intergenerational occupational mobility among migrants compared to non-migrants?

Sample and measures

Sample

We draw on a unique dataset (Guveli et al. 2016) that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families study data, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012. From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone.

In this chapter, we draw on the sample of adult family members across the generations covered by the proxy questionnaire (see Chapter 2). We supplement these as appropriate with measures of the same variables (occupation, education, migration) collected in the personal interviews. As noted in Chapter 2, there is a sufficient degree of correspondence between proxy and personal reporting to allow us to use them interchangeably. Our analytical sample comprises adults aged 18 or over covered by the proxy questionnaire and for whom we have valid occupational information. This amounts to 1,627 from G1, 5,132 from G2 and 4,517 from G3. Note that in any given table, the exact numbers may differ slightly because of the variables included and/or small numbers of missing values.
Migration status

The 2000 Turkish Families sample was stratified by whether the ancestor (G1) had or had not migrated to Europe for five years or more (see Chapter 2). This initial status does not fully determine the migration status of his children and grandchildren, although parental migration strongly influences the likelihood of subsequent generations either migrating to or being born in Europe. Using information from the family tree, proxy and personal interview questionnaires, it is possible to construct the migration status of all individual adult family members. We use information on whether migrated and current country of residence to inform the analysis that follows. We should note that we find that some 70 per cent of all G1 migrants returned to Turkey at some stage. These return migrants are potentially problematic for our analysis, as we cannot be entirely sure whether the last occupation they hold refers to occupation after migration to Europe or after return migration to Turkey.

Education

Education was asked about in the 2000 Families proxy questionnaire in a cross-nationally harmonised format derived from the categories most relevant to persons educated in Turkey. These six categories comprise: primary incomplete (0); primary complete (1); low secondary (2); high secondary (3); low tertiary (4); high tertiary (5). We give an ordinal interpretation to the education variable and, in fact, treat the categories (0–5) as a metric scale. Preliminary in-depth analysis shows this to be a fair representation of distances between the educational categories.

Education levels show variation by country. The education level of Turks educated in Turkey is decidedly lower than for Turks educated elsewhere. In our sample, Turks educated in Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands achieved the highest levels of education (cf. also Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

Occupation and occupational status

Occupations were asked about in the proxy questionnaire using a single open-ended question, supplemented with a pre-coded question on self-employment. As well as the three main generations covered in the study (G1, G2 and G3), there was a question about the occupation (except self-employment) of the ancestor’s (G1) father. This provides a measure of parental background for G1; we refer to this antecedent generation as G0.

The verbatim occupations have been classified into the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88). ISCO-88 consists of a detailed four-digit code, classifying occupations by major group, sub-major group, minor group and unit groups and allows for over 521 detailed categories. Despite its level of detail, ISCO-88 suffers from limitations in capturing all relevant aspects of occupations. These problems are concentrated in ISCO’s limited capacity to accommodate self-employed and
supervisory status. Another weakness – and one that plays a significant role in our research – is the somewhat ambiguous position of farm work in the classification.

Our major measure of occupational status is the International Socio-Economic Index of occupation status (ISEI), constructed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992, 1996), devised for and often used in internationally comparisons, as discussed above. ISEI scores range between 13 (for Kitchen Helper and Unskilled Farm Worker) and 88 (for Judge).

The most obvious problem arises with farm occupations, which are typically inherited by sons from their fathers; there are many of these in the Turkish data, but it is ambiguous where to scale these in ISEI. We must use a hybrid model to accommodate the peculiarities this causes.

Results

Occupational distribution

Table 6.1 illustrates the occupational distributions across the generations and for both first and last job, using a discrete (class) measure that yields a qualitative view of occupational differences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First job by generation, class categories</th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>5,013</td>
<td>4,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most recent job by generation, class categories</th>
<th>G0</th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>5,017</td>
<td>4,336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
As expected, the occupational distributions of ancestors (before migration) and their fathers are heavily dominated by farm occupations. Sixty-eight per cent of the ancestor G1s were in farm occupations before migration, that is, their first job. And for their fathers (G0), this was even higher, at 83 per cent. While the high prevalence of farming is not surprising, given the characteristics of Turkish migration and our sample regions, it is perhaps more surprising that a substantial number of non-farm occupations can be still found among the first jobs of the G1 ancestors and their fathers. A more detailed analysis shows non-farm occupations are found both among migrants and the non-migrant control group. Therefore, we explore whether occupational differentiation conditions the decision to migrate. It seems reasonable to expect that farm workers disproportionately decided to try their luck in Western Europe, as mechanisation of agriculture and related circumstances created a large surplus of workers in the farm sector. Alternatively, better equipped manual workers may have chosen to migrate internationally to capitalise on their skills, while farm work, especially farm ownership, kept others at home.

Analysing the effects of farm background on migration and subsequent occupational attainment suffers from two analytical problems. First, is it possible to measure further differentiation in occupational status among the farm workers that would be relevant for our research problem? Second, how are farm backgrounds (and farm destinations) to be scaled relative to other occupational categories?

Unfortunately, it turned out to be impossible to differentiate the substantial proportion of farm workers among the ancestors’ fathers in more detail because the survey did not inquire about status-in-employment for the G0 generation (as we did for the following generations), but only asked for an occupational title. It is striking that Turks seldom distinguished between farm owners and farm workers in the 1960s. Neither the verbatim descriptions of farm occupations (çiftçi, çiftçilik), nor an analysis of the influence of status-in-employment for G1 suggests a relevant internal division among the farm population. Farming in Turkey in and before the 1960s was almost exclusively confined to family farms, unskilled work, not requiring skills acquired in formal education. We therefore scale all farmers as Unskilled Farm Workers (ISEI=13). This choice implies that we interpret mobility from farm work to industrial work as upward occupational mobility.

Keeping this in mind, we can turn to Table 6.2, showing the ISEI of first and last job by generation and migration status. G0 occupations have a modest mean status, around 25, the level of an unskilled factory worker. Since the farm workers are allocated an ISEI of 13, this means the remaining 17 per cent of non-farm G0s have an average ISEI of 32. The G1 occupations have not, on average, obtained higher status than their fathers, with little status growth between first and last occupations. Below these numbers, we find considerable heterogeneity, especially for the migrants, who frequently
Table 6.2  Mean level of ISEI of occupation in first and last job by generation and migrant status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G0</th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job</td>
<td>First job</td>
<td>Last job</td>
<td>First job</td>
<td>Last job</td>
<td>First job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant to Europe</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Europe</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.

replace farm work with factory work, giving them a similar level of occupational status while doing quite different jobs. However, it is interesting to note that for occupational status in most recent jobs, the control group of G1 non-migrants ends up two points higher than the migrant group.

In G2 and G3, we can distinguish three major groups: non-migrants who stayed in Turkey, non-migrants who were born in the EU and stayed there, and those who, like the G1s, migrated from Turkey to the EU. For G2, occupational status favours the EU settlers over the non-migrants: Turks in Western Europe have, on average, better occupations than Turks in Turkey. The group who migrated to Europe in the G2 generation has significantly lower occupational status than either non-migrants or settlers but still holds, on average, better jobs than the G1 ancestors at the end of their career. This is consistent with a pattern of less-selective migration among family migrants and returns to migration being focused on the children of migrants. In the G3 generation, however, for which we can only study first jobs, given the youth of this sample, the average occupational status is clearly highest for Turks in Turkey, who have made substantial gains (four points) relative to the previous generation. Settled European Turks remain at the same level as the previous generation, while migrants to Europe have the lowest average occupational status.

In sum, the pattern of average occupational attainment of migrants and non-migrants across generations is complex. Migrants to Europe have improved their occupational status across generations, as well as somewhat between the job before migration and the job after migration, but this trend is even more salient among non-migrants in Turkey. On average, the non-migrants have better jobs than their migrant counterparts. While those born in Europe make occupational gains when they are in the second family generation, in G3, this has turned around, with the non-migrants in Turkey doing better.

In the next section, we address whether these apparent differences persist when we take into account differences in education, family background,
gender and age. We first address the selectivity of migrations in terms of who migrates, according to background, education and first occupation. See Chapter 4 for further discussion of migration patterns. Note that in subsequent analysis, we standardise both occupation and education within generations, to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (known as Z-scores). This eases interpretation and comparison of direct and indirect effects. We also use a linear probability model (OLS) for the analysis of the decision to migrate, to facilitate comparison with the analysis of occupational attainment and the SAT model.

Who migrated?

Table 6.3 shows the results from a model evaluating the role of family background, education and first occupation in the migration decision of the G1 ancestor. We first estimate how the migration decision is related to the occupation of the G1s’ fathers. Given the predominance of farming among G0s, we estimate farm background separately; the influence of ISEI is then driven by differentiation among other occupations. The effects point in different directions: farm background decreases the likelihood of migration: given the low status of farmers, this implies migrants are a positive selection of the sending population. Conditional on non-farm background, the G0s’ ISEI has a negative effect that is a higher score is associated with a lower migration probability, implying that within the non-farm population there is a (modest) negative selection. However, the relationships are weak to begin with and barely statistically significant, as indicated by the t statistics (where a value greater than about 2 indicates statistical significance at conventional levels). In brief, we do not find strong selectivity with respect to parental occupation background.

When we add in G1 characteristics (model 2 and 3), the G0 farm effect becomes non-significant and indirect, while the G0 occupational status effect decreases to borderline significance. As a large proportion of first jobs among G1s are in farming, we again separate the effect into a farm/non-farm effect and an occupational status effect that overwhelmingly refers to non-farm occupations. We find a positive effect for G1s’ level of education, indicating migrants are (educationally) a positive selection of the sending population, and a negative effect for status of first occupation, indicating migrants are more likely than non-migrants to have had an occupation that did not match their education (or parental occupation). While the effects are weak, the best interpretation is that migrants to Europe moved having been unable (or failing) to translate their education into corresponding occupational attainment.

Turning to G2 and G3, in the lower panels of Table 6.3, we see that for these generations, migration can occur in two directions: from Turkey to EU or from EU to Turkey. Migrants from Europe to Turkey are relatively
Table 6.3: Who becomes a migrant to Europe? (Linear Probability Models). B-coefficients with (absolute) t-statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: G1 is migrant (N = 1,376)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Dependent variable: G2 is migrant (N = 4,965)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Dependent variable: G3 is migrant (N = 3,329)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>G1 Education</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>G2 Education</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 Farmer</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>G1 ISEI</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>G2 ISEI</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Education</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>G1 Farmer</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>G2 Farmer</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 ISEI</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>G2 Education</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>G3 Education</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Farmer</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>G2 ISEI</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>G3 ISEI</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Farmer</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>G2 ISEI</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>G3 Farmer</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data. Notes: education and ISEI are Z-standardised, Bs for these denote the increase in the probability of being a migrant for a 1 standard deviation change on these variables. Farmer variables are 0/1: the Bs for these variables denote the difference in probability of being a migrant between a farming and non-farming background. All models refer to persons educated in Turkey. Missing values are treated by mean substitution.
were rather well qualified for their jobs compared to non-migrants and that these (non-farming) jobs were of lower status than those of non-migrants: a standard deviation increase in occupational status decreases the likelihood of migration by about 14 per cent. At the same time being in farming was negatively linked to migration: with a 20 per cent lower probability of migration for farmers/farm workers. Both these associations are about twice the size of those in G1.

For G3, the estimates all indicate a shift towards negative selection, rather than occupational mismatch. As with G2, G3s education (Model 2) is negatively associated with migration. The negative effect of parental characteristics (G2 education and occupation) in Model 1, can therefore be seen to operate indirectly through lower educational attainment in G3. Moreover, when we turn to Model 3, we see that education and non-farming occupations (ISEI) are both negatively associated with the probability of migration: rather than those who have high education for their occupation, we see that it is those who have low education, even net of occupation who are more likely to migrate. Once again we see the negative association of being in a farming occupation with propensity to migrate. This is therefore a consistent pattern across all three generations. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the overall pattern shows family migrants in the second and third family generations to be more negatively selected than in the first, pioneer generation.

**Occupational attainment and mobility**

We now turn to occupational attainment and intergenerational transmission (Table 6.4). Analysis of status attainment in first jobs is unambiguous in the G1 generation of ancestors. We can safely assume these jobs were located in Turkey before migration. We find the occupations of migrants to be of slightly lower status than those of non-migrants, reiterating the findings of the preceding analysis. In addition, the ISEI of first jobs is strongly related to father’s (G0) occupational status for non-migrants (0.38), significantly less so for migrants. While there is a standard expectation that migration increases social mobility (in terms of lack of association between parents and children), this analysis suggests Turkish guest workers were already occupationally mobile before migration. So the pattern speaks instead to the hypothesis that occupational mobility produces migration.

Given the dominance of farm backgrounds, in practice, this means guest workers were recruited from among sons who had already left their father’s farm. If we elaborate on this pattern by taking education into account (model 2, in the lower panel of Table 6.4), we see a significantly weaker relationship between education and status in first occupation among migrants. Again, this is in line with the interpretation that the migration decision was disproportionately taken by those who could not find a job matching
Table 6.4  Determinants of status attainment in first occupation by generation, regression coefficients (with t-statistics) on standardised variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G1: ANCESTOR</th>
<th></th>
<th>G2: MIDDLE</th>
<th></th>
<th>G3: GRANDCHILDREN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G1 First occupation (N = 1,376)</td>
<td></td>
<td>G2 First occupation (N = 4,444)</td>
<td></td>
<td>G3 First occupation (N = 2,515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>G2 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>G1 ISEI</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI*G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>G1 ISEI* G2 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>G2 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>G1 ISEI</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI* G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>G1 ISEI* G2 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Education</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>G2 Education</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Education*G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>G2 Education*G2 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Education and ISEI variables are z-standardised.
Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
their resources at the time. Note further that the education effect for non-migrants remains modest (0.38). As we will see, education becomes a much stronger predictor of occupational outcomes in the following generations.

At this point it becomes interesting to consider the occupation attainment of the G1 generation in the most recent job (Table 6.5). For G1 there is some ambiguity in interpreting these results as we do not know for certain whether the last job was held in Europe or in Turkey after return migration (for those 70 per cent of G1s who returned at some point). For the moment, we will assume most actually refer to a situation in Europe. We find migrants have gained in occupational status relative to non-migrants (Model 1), though this largely reflects our decision to scale farm occupations at an ISEI rank of 13. In model 2, we see the impact of father’s occupation differs strongly between non-migrants and migrants. There is strong social reproduction (0.44) for those who stayed in Turkey, but it is virtually absent for those who migrated. For the international migrants, the effect of the father’s occupation is only 0.06 (0.44–0.38) and is not statistically significant. Destinations of guest workers are, therefore, shown to be independent of paternal origins back in Turkey. This finding is both logical – international migration makes migrants socially mobile by loosening them from their parental background – and telling, even if the most recent job, in fact, followed a return to Turkey.

Model 3 shows education makes basically no significant difference to migrants’ (or non-migrants’) last occupation when we control for first job. Intermediate analysis (not illustrated in Table 6.5) controlling just for education and parental background, showed an influence of education on last job for non-migrants, but this is all absorbed by first job, when we add that to the model. This is because there is enormous continuity between first and most recent jobs for non-migrants: they are essentially in the same occupation, and, therefore, the influence of education has already taken effect at labour market entry (as we see in Table 6.4). For international migrants, there is only a very modest (0.78–0.57) association between first and last job. In sum, we find the G1 migrants to be an extremely socially fluid group, with almost no connection whatsoever between their most recent occupation and the parental occupation, education and occupation in Turkey before migration.

Interpreting the occupational attainment of the middle (G2) generation is more complicated. The middle generation can be non-migrants in both Turkey and in Europe, but also migrants in both directions. Another important issue is whether we regard the 1.5 generation (those who migrated as children) as non-migrants or migrants. A further complication is that this generation is composed of both men and women, and we know the occupational careers of men and women are so different that they cannot meaningfully be merged in one model. We face the additional complication that the data do not allow us to ascertain definitively the country of employment.
Table 6.5 Determinants of status attainment in most recent occupation by generation, regression coefficients (with t-statistics) on standardised variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G1 Last occupation (N = 1,367)</th>
<th>G2 Last occupation (N = 4,346)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Migrant</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Migrant</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI*G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.379</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.237</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Migrant</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G0 ISEI*G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Education</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 Education* G1 Migrant</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 ISEI in first occupation</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1 ISEI first occ* G1 Migrant</td>
<td>-0.572</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Education and ISEI variables are z-standardised.

**Source:** 2000 Families study, proxy data.
Taking all these factors into account, even with a total of around 4,500 cases, we have limited statistical power to make each of the relevant comparisons. For this reason we establish the pooled pattern, merging men and women and migrants and non-migrants of both kinds.

Among our comparison groups, the return migrants are only a small group, and the migrant effect refers to the comparison between Turks who remained in Turkey, and Turks who moved to Europe or were located in Europe from birth or early childhood onwards. From model 1 in Table 6.4, we find migrants have significantly lower occupational status than Turks in Turkey: migration does not pay off for this generation. As for G1, we find G2’s migration has loosened the association between father’s occupation and a G2 individual’s first occupation, although the contrast is not as sharp as it is for G1. It reduces, but does not eliminate, the influence of father’s occupation on G2 migrants’ first occupation. When we add education to the equation, we find an extremely strong connection between education and first occupation for non-migrants and, to a slightly lesser extent, for migrants as well. The inclusion of education decreases the negative interaction between father’s occupation and migrant status, suggesting the weaker association is driven by differences in the association with education.

When we move to most recent occupation (Table 6.5), we see strong continuity between G2’s first and current occupation, and for this generation, this does not differ between migrants and non-migrants. Almost all of the dynamics in most recent jobs are covered by occupation status at labour market entry. Given occupation at entry, father’s occupation makes no further difference. However, education still has a positive effect, indicating that occupational differences between those with higher and lower levels of education continue to grow throughout the career. For this middle generation, then, migrants overall fare worse in both first and final jobs, but the influence of parental background and one’s own educational attainment show parallel processes among both migrants and non-migrants.

Looking at G3, the grandchildren of the original ancestor, we face many of the same difficulties of interpretation as for the second generation. A further complication is that G3 members are, on average, 19 years of age; hence, many have not yet entered the labour market, even though a minority have already completed a substantial part of their careers. We therefore restrict our analysis (Table 6.4) to first jobs to ensure comparability. The results reveal no differences in occupational outcomes between migrants and non-migrants. The contribution of education is equally strong for both and accounts for all the influence of parental occupation. Its magnitude (0.61) compares with that found in other countries. Model 1 still modestly confirms the hypothesis that international migration increases intergenerational mobility, but the difference does not greatly reduce the strong effect of social reproduction. In the third generation, the expected intergenerational pattern is almost fully restored and the experience comparable
across sites, with no specific migration impact. Across generations, education becomes the route by which intergenerational social reproduction is achieved, whether for migrants or their non-migrant counterparts.

Conclusions

We began the chapter by discussing the extent to which background influences migration and examining the association between migration and occupational attainment. We asked if migration weakens intergenerational transmission of status, and if so, how. We considered the extent to which socio-economic backgrounds shape the likelihood of migration from Turkey to Western Europe. In the next part of the chapter, we explored the extent to which occupational attainment is more or less favourable for different generations of migrants. Finally, we addressed the extent of occupational mobility or social reproduction between migrants and non-migrants.

For the first question under consideration, we find occupational background weakly determines the likelihood of migration of G1. With respect to paternal occupation of the G1 ancestors, we find that sons of fathers with low status occupations are more likely to migrate than sons of fathers with higher status. However, if we take into account the education and occupation of the G1 group before migration, we find an overrepresentation of the relatively higher educated with somewhat lower occupational positions, whereas the (negative) effect of father’s occupational status diminishes. That is, the influence of parental background on migration is indirect, via an influence on first occupation. We conclude that the original labour migrants were selected in traditional terms, given their higher education, but our findings additionally suggest that those who migrated were those who could not find appropriate returns to that higher education in the country of origin.

Among subsequent family generations of migrants, migrating is not associated with greater selectivity. Indeed, in terms of educational attainment, these subsequent generations appear negatively selected. This is likely linked to the change in type of migration, moving from ‘pioneer’ labour migration to family-based migration (see also Chapter 4). Hence, by contrast with the first generation, subsequent generations are less likely to have favourable attributes that, even if not reflected in their own outcomes, shape the outcomes for the subsequent generations. At the same time, among G2 migrants, there is a pattern of occupational mismatch, in that education is higher than for non-migrants in similar occupations, as we saw for G1. Thus G2 appear to show a more hybrid migration pattern than G1 or G3. By G3, the story is overwhelmingly one of negative selection on migration.

Turning to our exploration of the extent to which occupational attainment is favourable for different generations of migrants, for the first generation, we find post-migration occupational outcomes demonstrate significant
gains from migration. This group escapes relatively low occupational posi-
tions prior to migration to move upwards in status attainment. Interestingly,
though, those in farming occupations are somewhat less likely to migrate
than those in other low-status occupations. Even if ultimate destinations
are relatively low-status within Western hierarchies, they represent a step up
from pre-migration circumstances. These subsequent jobs show little influ-
ence of educational attainment, consistent with the difficulty of translating
educational attainment into occupational outcomes in a foreign context.
Instead, their educational advantage realises gains through the act of migra-
tion itself. By contrast, non-migrants’ original occupations are linked to
their educational attainment, and their subsequent occupational careers
are, then, relatively fixed.

For subsequent generations, migration is associated with either negative
(G2) or no (G3) occupational gains relative to non-migrants. For the second
generation, this negative impact of migration is net of education. That is,
not only is this generation more likely to be negatively selected on educa-
tion, even when we take account of the substantial and significant asso-
ciation of education with occupational status, albeit not as strong as for
non-migrants, the act of migration still yields negative returns. This high-
lights the relevance of migration route, position within family migration
process and initial selectivity for understanding outcomes of migrants in
their destination contexts. By the third generation (G3), occupational attain-
ment of migrants and non-migrants equalises, with educational attainment
an equally key factor in occupational outcomes (cf. Chapter 5).

Finally, we address the extent of occupational mobility or social repro-
duction between migrants and non-migrants. In line with existing litera-
ture, we hypothesised there would be a weaker association between parental
origins and occupational outcomes among migrants, and this is, indeed,
what we find for G1. Among non-migrants, parental status is an impor-
tant influence of first job even net of education, and of last job even net of
first job, representing a direct effect of origin status on outcomes. Among
migrants, the association is already weaker for those who subsequently
migrated and disappears in relation to post-migration jobs. This suggests
social mobility is a consequence of migration, as expected, but in addition,
those who are already more socially mobile are more likely to migrate. For
G2, we find a lower association between occupational origins and desti-
nations among migrants relative to non-migrants, but the role of parental
background, interestingly, remains important, even for migrants. By G3,
the impact of migration on enhancing social mobility is barely evident.
Moreover, for both, the effect is channelled through educational attain-
ment. Thus, migrants and non-migrants from this generation show similar
patterns of social reproduction in their first job, with the effect of parental
background being indirect, through education.
Overall, then, we find some support for our expectations that migration will both increase upward mobility and reduce the association of parental origins with migrants’ own occupational outcomes. But this is most applicable to the first, male, labour migrant generation. They seem to fit a classic pattern of unfulfilled expectations prior to migration, with subsequent post-migration gains and little ongoing role of parental origins or education in their outcomes. The picture for the second and third generation is more complex, partly because the sample is more complicated, combining men and women, as well as those migrating at different stages. However, it suggests that while social reproduction remains important for non-migrants across the generations, it increases in importance for migrants. Combined with educational expansion in Turkey, the differences between migrants and non-migrants in both occupational outcomes by the third generation are negligible. The findings are consistent with research on the lower selectivity of family migrants. At the same time, they indicate that when evaluating the gains from migration, it is important to take account of the reasons why people migrate and the nature of the family flows within which they are embedded.
7
Self-Employment

Introduction

This chapter explores migrant entrepreneurship through an intergenerational examination of self-employment. In Europe and North America, certain migrant or ethnic groups are known to engage in businesses in large or growing numbers, often disproportionately to their group size. For example, Turks in Europe, especially the second generation, have increased their participation in self-employment since the economic crisis of the mid-1970s to avoid unemployment (Abadan-Unat 2011; Avcı 2006, Erichsen and Şen 1987; Toksöz 2006; Wets 2006). Some scholars view these developments in a positive light. They regard migrant entrepreneurship as a significant path to economic success, resulting from favourable self-selection (Chiswick 1986). According to the view of positive selectivity, migrants, especially those who move for economic reasons and settle in the host country, are favourably selected in terms of motivation, ability and other broadly defined skills. These translate into the motivation and personal and social resources required to develop businesses. Others, however, are more reserved, emphasising the role of discrimination and disadvantage in pushing migrants into self-employment, with negative implications for social mobility and adaptation into the host society (e.g. Abadan-Ünat 2011; Light 1972).

In this chapter, we provide insight into migrant selectivity, adaptation and discrimination by comparing Turkish migrants who live in Europe (i.e. settlers), migrants who moved (back) to Turkey (i.e. returnees) and those who stayed in Turkey (i.e. stayers) over three generations. The aim is to understand the extent to which these groups differ in their propensity to engage in and transmit self-employment and to explain the observed differences. The chapter starts with an overview of the empirical and theoretical work on migrant entrepreneurship. We then outline the methods used for data collection and analysis, followed by a presentation of the results. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings.
Empirical context and previous research

The bulk of the empirical literature on migrant entrepreneurship has a host country focus, with studies investigating the determinants of business start-up and/or performance in the country of destination. Some focus on one or more migrant groups living in the same urban locality, while others draw spatial comparisons between one or more migrant groups in different localities (e.g. Edin et al. 2003; Goldscheider 1986; Light et al. 1994; Light and Rosenstein 1995; Min and Bozorgmehr 2000; Rusinovic 2006; Sanders and Nee 1987; Wilson and Portes 1980). There are also single country case studies from Europe and North America which either investigate a specific migrant group (e.g. Perez 1986) or compare across different groups of migrants and/or between migrants and natives (e.g. Abada et al. 2012; Andersson and Hammarstedt 2010; Borjas 1986; Clark and Drinkwater 2000; Constant and Zimmerman 2006; Fairlie and Meyer 1996; Hammarstedt 2001, 2006; Hou et al. 2011; Hout and Rosen 2000; Kanas et al. 2009; Le 2000; Light 1979; Razin and Langois 1996; Ward 1985a; Yuengert 1995). Cross-country comparisons, however, remain a rarity (van Tubergen 2005a; Ward 1985b).

Within the growing literature on transnationalism, several researchers explore whether well-adapted or marginalised migrants set up businesses in the country of origin (Landolt 2001; Portes et al. 2002; Roberts et al. 1999). Others focus on return or out-migrants and the determinants of business formation in the country of origin (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; Massey and Parrado 1998). Massey and Parrado, for instance, show young, well-educated and married migrants living in communities characterised by high levels of self-employment, wages and industrial development are more likely to form a business.

Three major gaps can be identified in the literature. First, no existing work compares the settled and/or return migrants with those who stayed in the country of origin. As discussed below, such a comparison is of particular relevance to the self-selection hypothesis that expects settlers to be the most entrepreneurial group (Chiswick 1986).

Second, the intergenerational transmission of migrant or minority entrepreneurship has not been explored in depth. Most existing research is within a North American context. Some investigate transmission within particular minority groups such as Jewish or African Americans (e.g. Goldscheider 1986; Fairlie and Meyer 1996), while others compare natives and migrants by treating them either separately (Hout and Rosen 2000) or collectively (Abada et al. 2012; Hou et al. 2011). As a result, we know little about the extent of intergenerational transmission for migrants in Europe, in general, and among Turks, in particular. Two studies explore transmission among migrants in Sweden and Germany, but neither specifically focuses on Turks (Andersson and Hammarstedt 2010; Constant and Zimmerman 2006). Few
studies extend beyond the second generation (Abada et al. 2012; Andersson and Hammarstedt 2010; Hou et al. 2011), and only one of these finds a greater propensity for subsequent generations with self-employed fathers to become self-employed, with some variation in the strength of the transmission between migrant groups. Studies on Jewish and European migrants to the US show self-employment does not tend to be inherited, however. This is attributed to the high levels of educational attainment and the lessening of corporate discrimination, both of which diminish the allure of small enterprises for descendants by lowering the barriers to desirable positions in large enterprises (Goldscheider 1986; see also a review by Waldinger et al. 1990).

Third, although Turks represent one of the largest migrant groups in Europe with a disproportionately high propensity towards self-employment, empirical studies investigating self-employment among Turkish migrants are sparse and mostly country specific. One cross-national survey of migrant self-employment in 17 Western societies includes Turks (van Tubergen 2005a). Two other large-scale surveys also include Turks, but only those settled in Germany and the Netherlands (Constant and Zimmerman 2006; Kanas et al. 2009). Those studies focusing exclusively on Turkish migrants explore the reasons for business start-up and/or success in German or Dutch contexts (Blaschke and Ersöz 1986; Erichsen and Şen 1987; Rekers 1993; Rusinovic 2006). A single study examines the economic potential of Turkish enterprises in Germany and other parts of Europe (Şen 1999). There are two studies of Turkish migrants with a generational focus but neither investigates the extent of direct transmission. Blaschke and Ersöz (1986) explain the increased rate of self-employment amongst the second generation of Turks in Germany, and Rusinovic (2006) compares the self-employment behaviour of the first and second generation of Turks in the Netherlands. One of her findings is that the former generation was mostly driven to self-employment by ‘push factors’ (e.g. unemployment and blocked labour market opportunities), whereas the latter was more motivated by ‘pull factors’ (e.g. the desire to search for new opportunities and to become occupationally independent).

In short, no research on self-employment compares three family generations of Turkish migrants to Europe with their returnee and stayer counterparts; this chapter represents an attempt to bridge this gap.

Theoretical background and hypotheses

To develop a set of hypotheses on differences in the self-employment behaviour of migrants and stayers, we first review the key sociological theories of migrant entrepreneurship. The relevant works date back to early *middlemen theories* discussing the role of groups who occupy an
intermediate position in the status hierarchy. While early theories stress the role of hostility as an element in group solidarity and middlemen activity, a well-known version of the theory developed by Bonacich (1973) emphasises the sojourner orientation of those taking on middlemen roles. The *ethnic economy model*, devised in response to Bonacich's middlemen theory, directs attention to the group characteristics of migrants and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, as Heisler (2008) points out, the model approaches ethnic entrepreneurship from the perspective of ‘reactive solidarity’, which does not exist before migration but later becomes a resource for members of the group. Ethnic resources represent the socio-cultural and demographic features of the ethnic group, including the entrepreneurial heritage of values and attitudes and social networks. The original version of the model introduced by Bonacich and Modell (1980) lacks a spatial dimension. However, its subsequent version, the *ethnic enclave model*, is spatially defined to investigate the effects of migrant enclaves on self-employment (Portes and Jensen 1992; Sanders and Nee 1992).

The failure of these models to account for factors other than group characteristics and social structures led to the development of the *interaction theory* which, in essence, focuses on supply and demand (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Light and Rosenstein 1995; Ward 1985a; Waldinger et al. 1990). The theory is, however, criticised for paying little attention to the role of wider processes, such as the economic and institutional contexts (Rath 2000).

Several approaches have since been developed to explore the effects of context-related factors on the extent or success of entrepreneurial activity. Three are particularly worthy of attention. First, Portes and colleagues emphasise *modes of incorporation* as a means to understand the economic adaptation of migrants and their descendants into the host society (Portes 1995; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). They outline three ‘contexts of reception’, which inform whether and how migrants assimilate into the economic realm: government policies aimed at migrants; civil society and public attitudes towards particular migrant groups (i.e. discrimination and prejudice); and the characteristics of the ethnic community. Second, the notion of *mixed embeddedness* rests on the idea that economic action and outcomes are embedded in social, economic, politico-institutional and spatial contexts (Kloosterman 2000; Light 2005; Rath 2000; Rekers and van Kempen 2000; Rusinovic 2006). Here, the emphasis is on the role of wider structural forces (global, national and urban economy, migration policy, etc.) in shaping migrants’ decisions to become self-employed. Third, the *new institutionalist theory of assimilation* emphasises the interplay between the resources and purposive actions of migrants and their descendants and the contexts, including institutional structures, cultural beliefs and social networks (Alba and Nee 2003).
In keeping with resource-based perspectives (Bebbington et al. 2007; Eroğlu 2011), this chapter recognises the significance of context-related factors in shaping the entrepreneurial behaviour of migrants by virtue of their role in enabling or constraining the availability, capacity and effective management of resources other than income (i.e. social, economic and cultural capital). It acknowledges the role of individual and household characteristics (e.g. sex, marital status and stage in the life-cycle) and family legacies (e.g. parental employment) in determining future probabilities of self-employment.

The growing emphasis on context-related factors has significant repercussions for the argument that migrants are positively self-selected, and this governs their greater participation in self employment (Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1986). The positive self-selection argument overlooks the fact that the interaction of human capital with the various contexts of reception determines the extent to which these resources can be used and enhanced (Portes 1995). Discrimination experienced at school or in the labour market is a key context-related influence that has retained its significance since the early theories of migrant entrepreneurship. Furthermore, disadvantage theory suggests discrimination, unemployment, language barriers and/or inequalities in access to education and training can push migrants/ethnic minorities into self-employment by lowering their returns from paid employment (Light 1972, 1979). This proposition has, however, been disputed by subsequent studies that consider migrant/ethnic entrepreneurship as a significant to economic success (see, e.g. a review by Portes and Zhou 1996). Some of these studies highlight a multiplicity of reasons for migrant entrepreneurship, one of which is the higher earnings prospects it generates. Others demonstrate a higher propensity for self-employment amongst migrants who are more advantaged in terms of earnings (Fairlie and Meyer 1996). More recent studies, however, support disadvantage theory by demonstrating how discriminatory wages push migrants into self-employment (e.g. Abada et al. 2012; Clark and Drinkwater 2000; Hammarstedt 2006).

The basic presumption of the positive self-selection argument equating entrepreneurship with economic success should be approached with care. Indeed, scholars argue that for migrants and their descendants, economic success obtained via self-employment does not necessarily mean upward social mobility or successful adaptation into the host country (Abadan-Ünat 2011; Bechhofer and Elliot 1981). Arguably, in the general economy, the petit bourgeois tend to survive largely through recruitment from lower social classes, as the marginal character of the small business position drives heirs from inheriting their parents’ modest enterprises (Bechhofer and Elliot 1981). This presumption about the general economy may, however, only partially apply to the ethnic economy. Migrant
owners of small businesses are very likely to belong to lower social classes but, as pointed out by Granovetter (1995), discriminatory influences blocking labour market opportunities elsewhere may encourage them to transmit their enterprises to subsequent generations, including the better educated.

As for the implications of migrant enterprises for adaptation into the host society, Abadan-Unat (2011), for instance, argues these provide migrants with an adaptation model incompatible with the notion of a ‘melting pot’, as it merely requires them to obey the formal rules and regulations of the host country. From this perspective, ethnic enterprises are conceived as a ‘niche economy’, allowing migrants to achieve economic success without having to go through an intense process of acculturation. This means both newly arrived migrants and the poorly educated descendants of migrants can create a niche for themselves, provided they have access to an ethnic community and the necessary human and material resources. By contrast, the proponents of the new assimilation theory suggest migrant niches are likely to lose their significance for subsequent generations, as they will have better opportunities outside the niche (Alba and Nee 2003).

Overall, as the above review suggests, a focus on migrant entrepreneurship and its intergenerational transmission is relevant to debates on positive self-selection, discrimination and adaptation into the host society. The hypotheses emerging from this review are listed below.

Positive self-selection proposition: Migrants are likely to be more entrepreneurial than returnees and the stayers, while returnees are likely to be more entrepreneurial than stayers. Children of migrant entrepreneurs are more likely to become entrepreneurs, but to the extent that they are less positively selected, the transmission will be partial. Overall, settlers will be more entrepreneurial than their Turkish-based comparators.

Discrimination and assimilation proposition: If discrimination against the descendants of migrants fades and they become better integrated into the host society, small businesses will lose their significance as a niche economy; the better-educated will become less involved in self-employment, and the intergenerational transmission of family businesses will decline. However, persistence of discrimination will lead to continued entrepreneurial activity in subsequent generations.

Researching self-employment

This chapter focuses on self-employment as a particular, but substantial, section of entrepreneurial activity. We compare the settler and returnee migrants with their stayer counterparts in Turkey to understand the differences in self-employment behaviour and transmission across
generations. *Settlers* refer to migrants from Turkey who have been living in Europe for at least a year and include those born in Europe of Turkish descent. *Returnees* are those who moved (back) to Turkey after having spent at least five years in Europe and include the European-born of Turkish descent. *Stayers* comprise those who never left Turkey for more than a year. These groups are compared to answer three main research questions. First, to what extent do settlers, returnees and stayers differ in their propensity to engage in self-employment? Second, to what extent do these groups differ in their tendency to transfer their entrepreneurial behaviour and resources to subsequent generations? Third, how can we explain the observed differences?

**Sample and analysis**

We draw on a unique dataset (Guveli et al. 2016) that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families dataset, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012 (Guveli et al. 2014; see also Chapter 2). From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone.

The data used in this chapter are drawn from personal interviews with 5,980 individuals spread across three generations within 1,992 families (see further the discussion of the different data in Chapter 2). We restrict our sample to those 4,150 cases that are/were economically active at present or in the past. Qualitative data obtained from interviews with key informants from migrant and non-migrant family backgrounds supplement the quantitative data and provide additional contextual detail.

We estimate binary probit models of the probability of being self-employed. We estimate separate models for settlers, returnees and stayers as well as pooled models combining all three groups. The pooled models test the positive self-selection hypothesis. We use parent-child dyadic data to estimate the effects of parents’ self-employment on their children’s decisions to become self-employed. Again, we estimate both separate and pooled models for the three migrant status groups. Of the total of 1,880 parent-child dyads, 1,105 are between the first (G1) and the second generation (G2) and 771 are between the second (G2) and the third (G3). The first generation (G1) is included only as fathers as the self-employment status of their own fathers remains unknown (see also the discussion in Chapter 6). Adjusted standard errors account for within-family association. Table 7.1 describes the variables used in the analysis.
Table 7.1  Dependent, independent and control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable (N = 4,150)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-employment</strong></td>
<td>1 if self-employed in current/last job</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 if private or public sector employees or unpaid family labour</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>generations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 first generation (male ancestor) G1</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 second generation G2</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 third generation G3</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>family migration background</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 if male ancestor is a migrant</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 if non-migrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>individual migration status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 settler</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 returnee</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 stayer</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>highest educational qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 primary dropout</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 primary</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 lower secondary</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 higher secondary</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 lower tertiary</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 higher/post tertiary</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>parental self-employment status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 if father self-employed in current/last job</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 otherwise</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>18 to 90 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean = 45; std dev. = 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 if man</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 if woman</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>marital status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 if currently married</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 otherwise</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7.1 shows, around 24 per cent of the sample are self-employed. The remainder are public sector employees (14 per cent), private sector employees (60 per cent) or unpaid family workers (2 per cent). In total, 14 per cent (247 out of 1,780) of the settlers are involved in self-employment. The respective figures for the returnees and stayers are 31 per cent (245 out of 786) and 32 per cent (499 out of 1,563).

Results

The self-employed do not form a homogenous group; the nature and the scale of their businesses and the size of the earnings they generate from these
businesses vary. Such differences are presented in Table 7.2 by reference to the individual migration status of the self-employed. Three key tendencies emerge from this table. First, the settlers are predominantly engaged in the general management of various small, non-farm businesses, while farming (including crop growing, animal husbandry and fishery) constitutes the most common activity for returnees and stayers. Second, the settlers are more likely to own businesses with a greater number of employees. The proportion of businesses with 10 or more employees remains low across all three groups but, relatively speaking, the settler businesses tend to be larger. Third, the settlers generate the highest earnings from their businesses, followed by the returnees.

Table 7.3 demonstrates the results obtained from the pooled analysis, estimating the likelihood of self-employment by individual migration status. Contrary to the positive self-selection argument, though consistent with the argument made in Chapter 6 on the ways migration interrupts resource transmission, we see that, consistent with Table 7.2, the propensity to engage in self-employment is lower for the settlers than the stayers and does not vary significantly between the returnees and the stayers. It is worth noting, however, that a similar picture emerges when farmers are excluded and is largely maintained when cross-country differences are taken into account.1

The results from the separate analyses presented in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 reveal differences between the three groups in the predictors of self-employment. Table 7.4 shows family migration background (i.e. having a

### Table 7.2  Self-employment by individual migration status: business type, scale and size of earnings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Most common type of business</th>
<th>Mean number of employees</th>
<th>Mean individual monthly earnings *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed settlers</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Non-farm small business (18%)</td>
<td>4.9 [sd = 8.5]</td>
<td>4254$ [sd = 5421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed returnees</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Farming (35%)</td>
<td>1.8 [sd = 7.1]</td>
<td>2604$ [sd = 3172]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed stayers</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Farming (25%)</td>
<td>1.2 [sd = 4.8]</td>
<td>1594$ [sd = 1924]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 [sd = 6.7]</td>
<td>2552$ [sd = 3734]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Adjusted for purchasing power parities, i.e. ‘the price relatives that show the ratio of the prices in national currencies of the same good or service in different countries’ (OECD, Statistics Directorate).

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
Table 7.3  Pooled models of self-employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Dyadic Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.61*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-1.14*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-1.3*** (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family migration background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant ancestor</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.23* (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant ancestor: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual migration status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler</td>
<td>-0.61*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.60*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.39*** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayer: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.41*** (0.11)</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>-0.47*** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.22** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.26* (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest educational qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary dropout</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.62 (0.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>0.08 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lower) tertiary</td>
<td>-0.39*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.32** (0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher/post tertiary</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.29)</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parental employment status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not self-employed: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4124</td>
<td>3775</td>
<td>1786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; Controlling for age, sex and marital status.
Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.

Male migrant ancestor makes no significant difference to the settlers’ or returnees’ level of self-employment but increases it significantly for the stayers. We also see that the second generation (G2) of settlers is more likely than its first (G1) and third generation (G3) counterparts to become self-employed even when controlling for age. By contrast, no significant differences are observed in the case of the returnees and the stayers. Regarding the role of education, striking differences emerge between the settlers and the other two groups. We find a positive relationship between the educational attainment and self-employment levels of the settlers, but the opposite is the case for the other two groups. This might suggest self-employment offers a positive opportunity for settlers, whilst among
Table 7.4  Separate models of self-employment for settlers, returners and stayers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Settlers</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
<th>Stayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.26*** (0.26)</td>
<td>-1.23* (0.54)</td>
<td>-1.49*** (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family migration background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant ancestor</td>
<td>0.11 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.26 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.20* (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant ancestor: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>-0.67** (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>-0.32** (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest educational qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary dropout</td>
<td>0.03 (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong>: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>0.50*** (0.14)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.20)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary</td>
<td>0.58*** (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.21 (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.34*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lower) tertiary</td>
<td>0.70*** (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.53* (0.25)</td>
<td>-0.84*** (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher/post tertiary</td>
<td>0.87** (0.32)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1636</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses; Controlling for age, sex and marital status.

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.

those in Turkey, educational qualifications are used to escape from small family business.

This is explored further in Table 7.5, which models intergenerational transmission from parent to child. Here, transmission from parents to children is only significant among settlers, indicating entrepreneurial activities may provide a protective niche for migrant families. Interestingly, the picture changes when farmers are excluded (analysis not shown). Although the settler parents remain the strongest transmitters of entrepreneurial behaviour and/or resources their returnee and stayer counterparts appear to transfer their non-farm businesses to a significant extent, indicating the lack of association overall is driven by children of farmers abandoning the family farm in favour of other opportunities.

**Making sense of the differences in self-employment**

By and large, those who migrated to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s were landless or owned land yielding little food and generating little money. As
we know from Chapter 6, those with farming backgrounds were less likely to migrate, but among non-farmers, those of lower occupational status but higher education – the unfulfilled workers – were more likely to migrate. The following interview with two stayers from Acıpayam illustrates this phenomenon.

**Interviewee A:** The families who migrated [to Europe] in those years were the ones who couldn’t make ends meet over here. I mean, the well-off didn’t go. The worse off went. That’s the difference.

**Interviewer:** Did they benefit from this [move], do you think?

**Interviewee A:** They got a job there. Now they can make do. The poor went. One or two people went in our time; it was indeed my uncle who sent them there. He told me ‘I would send you there, if you wish’. I said no, why should I become a worker for the Germans? I was ignorant, we stayed like this.

Table 7.5 Separate dyadic model of self-employment for settlers, returnees and stayers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Settlers</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
<th>Stayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−2.75*** (0.46)</td>
<td>−0.79 (1.06)</td>
<td>−2.04*** (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family migration background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant ancestor</td>
<td>0.405 (0.26)</td>
<td>−1.14* (0.55)</td>
<td>0.245 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant ancestor: REF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2: REF</td>
<td>−0.53** (0.16)</td>
<td>−0.35 (0.44)</td>
<td>−0.06 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest educational qualification</strong></td>
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<td>−0.36 (0.49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
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**Note:**
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses; Controlling for age, sex and marital status.

**Source:** 2000 Families study, personal data.
Interviewer: Do you feel you should have gone?
Interviewee A: Perhaps it would have been better if we [I] did.
Interviewee B: He [Respondent A] had a lot of land, an awful lot of land then. He also has [also had] mules and machinery. Why should he have gone?

Most male ancestors who migrated to Europe were not thinking of settling there. A common plan was to return to Turkey as soon as they had saved enough money to buy agricultural land, equipment and/or livestock. A 59-year-old man who migrated to Switzerland from Acıpayam said the following:

The first ones who went there [to Europe] were thinking like this: I shall go there, save money, come back [to Turkey], buy a tractor and continue [living] here. ... The initial motivation was to save some money and return to Turkey to live comfortably.

But things did not always turn out as planned. Some migrants returned to join the wives and children they had left behind or to start anew. Many others stayed; they reunified with their families or established new ones in Europe and ended up settling there. Contrary to the positive self-selection thesis, the settlers became less involved in self-employment following migration (see Table 7.3). The male ancestors were either invited to Europe as guest workers or went there as tourists and moved into work when employment demands were high. They had easy access to salaried positions in factories, mines and so on until the economic crisis hit Europe in the mid-1970s. Typically, these men lived in Europe as sojourners with the hope of returning to Turkey. By the time such hopes faded and the restrictions to their right to settlement and citizenship were softened or lifted, some had probably reached a stage in the life cycle when it was financially less worthwhile to start up a business.

Having said this, Turks in Europe are known to overcome legal barriers by establishing partnerships with native citizens. In addition, business is often seen as a family venture that extends beyond a single individual’s lifetime. As the middleman hypothesis posits, sojourner status itself prompts certain groups to fill niche occupations (Bonacich 1973). There is, therefore, some reason to suggest the first generation of settlers had a certain element of choice in their decision not to go take the risky path of entrepreneurship but to remain in salaried jobs and retire from them.

The first generation men who returned to Turkey show to have been more entrepreneurial, given their share of the self-employed: 33 per cent of return migrants became self-employed. Of these, 46 per cent became involved in farming, thereby realising the plan occupying the minds of many rural migrants. With the help of the money they saved through migration, these men seem to have caught up with their stayer counterparts, among whom
44 per cent are self-employed. The returnees are by no means the only group who managed to channel ‘migrant money’ into business. Given the significant tendency for stayers with migrant backgrounds to become self-employed, it seems likely that this group of individuals also invested some of the migrant money in business (see Table 7.4).

To what extent do subsequent generations follow in the footsteps of the first generation men? For the stayers and the returnees, the levels of engagement in self-employment do not differ from one generation to the next. However from the significant tendency for the parents of the returnees and the stayers to pass on only their non-farm businesses, it can be inferred that the younger generations cut links with farming. A detailed investigation of the reasons for this is beyond the scope of the chapter, but in brief, these extend from land fragmentation through inheritance and the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies to the desire of the young people to explore new opportunities elsewhere. As an 81-year-old stayer from Akçaabat pointed out:

[The new] generation is not a generation connected to land. They’re gradually becoming disconnected from land. Land is difficult to cultivate. Working the land is very difficult. They’re keen on having an occupation and pursuing a more comfortable life. ... I mean, now other options are available to the youth. I mean the world got smaller. More correctly, the youth’s world got bigger. Now young people see the other end of the world.

Many of the younger generations of stayers and returnees must have explored or wanted to explore their job chances elsewhere rather than taking up their parents’ small, low-status businesses. Of these, the better-educated seem more able to break links with small business ownership.

Turning to the settlers, members of the second generation seem to have taken a different direction than first generation men, entering into self-employment in significant numbers either by inheriting parental businesses or by setting up new ones. The worsening economic climate of the mid-1970s is likely to have played a role in this. By contrast, the third generation settlers are less engaged in self-employment, overall, but we still see a significant transmission of self-employment status: 22 per cent of the second generation and 23 per cent of the third generation of self-employed settlers have a self-employed father/parent.

How can we explain the differences observed in the self-employment behaviour of subsequent generations of settlers, returnees and stayers? As shown earlier, the settlers tended to possess somewhat larger and more lucrative businesses than the returnees and stayers. Moreover, those enterprises passed on to second and third generation settlers generated a monthly average income that fell above the overall average. Thus, the profitable nature of the settler enterprises seems to have attracted the younger
generations. It is understandable that self-employment can be a lucrative niche for those with limited education who also may have limited language ability, but this does not fully explain why the better-educated settlers opted for self-employment to a greater degree.

Some consider the desire for autonomy and independence a key motivation for the second generation of migrant entrepreneurs (e.g. Rusinovic 2006). This leaves unanswered why the better-educated returnees and stayers do not demonstrate a similar motivation. Arguably, the European labour markets offer specific incentives to encourage the skilled migrants to become self-employed. This remains to be explored, but even if there are such incentives, they do not change the fact that the majority of the better-educated settlers have been trapped in small, low-status businesses. Despite the tendency for this group of settlers to own relatively larger businesses, 71 per cent (30 out of 42) employ fewer than 10 people, keeping them in the small business owner category. Nor are they necessarily engaged in prestigious occupations. The top three occupations for this group are general management of various small businesses (20 per cent), of hotels and restaurants (11 per cent) and of retail and wholesale (9 per cent). These tendencies apply to both second and third generations, who respectively represent 65 per cent and 31 per cent of the self-employed settlers with a university or higher degree. In light of the evidence, it is difficult to present any such incentive as the ultimate driver.

The persistence of discriminatory influences in the labour markets of the receiving countries remains a plausible explanation. Being faced with blocked opportunities elsewhere, the better educated settlers are likely to have been driven to self-employment as a lucrative but low status option that allows them to bypass possible discriminatory mechanisms operating in other parts of the labour market.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined differences between the Turkish settlers in European destination countries, returnees and stayers in their propensity to engage in self-employment and to transfer their entrepreneurial behaviours and/or resources to subsequent generations. Our findings contribute to debates on migrant selectivity, adaptation and discrimination. To begin with, they pose a challenge to the idea that migrants are more favourably selected than stayers and, hence, tend to be more entrepreneurial. Given the tendency for settlers to engage in larger and more lucrative businesses, we might consider them the most entrepreneurial group of migrants. Contrary to the positive self-selection argument, however, the settlers prove less likely than the stayers to become self-employed. The absence of significant differences in the self-employment levels of the returnees and the stayers
reinforces the conclusion that migrants may not be more entrepreneurial from the outset.

The results challenge the view that equates self-employment with economic success. The self-employed settlers may have become economically successful, but they are mostly concentrated in small, low-status businesses. Unlike their counterparts in Turkey, they seem to have been less able to explore their job chances in other parts of the labour market. It is plausible, then, that the parents of settlers transfer their financially rewarding businesses not only to provide their children with a high income but also to protect them from blocked labour market opportunities elsewhere.

The results lend support to the discrimination thesis while raising doubts about the successful economic adaptation of Turkish migrants in Europe. In line with the expectations of the new assimilation theory, one might interpret the reduced tendency for the third generation of settlers to become self-employed as a dwindling of discrimination, but the entry of the better-educated settlers into small, low-status businesses suggests its continued salience. The persistence of such businesses as a shield against discrimination makes it difficult to argue that the three family generations of Turks in Europe have successfully adapted to the host country labour markets.
Part III
Introduction

A prominent topic in migration research on marriage is interethnic marriage of migrants with members of the destination country (Glick 2010). Alternatively migrants may select partners from their own ethnic group in the destination country or, more rarely, migrants from other countries. The country of origin is another relevant place to search for partners, at least for certain migrant groups (Charsley 2012). Turkish migrants in Europe draw on all these marriage markets. The incidence of interethnic marriage is comparatively low but is increasing over generations (Huschek et al. 2011; Schroedter and Kalter 2008). At the same time, a considerable share of Turkish migrants select spouses from Turkey (Baykara-Krumme and Fuß 2009; Carol et al. 2014; Gonzales-Ferrer 2006).

The primary focus on marriage markets has led to a neglect of more specific characteristics of union formation and partner choice patterns among Turkish migrants. Marriage modes such as family-initiated or arranged marriages have rarely been researched. Little is known about the prevalence of arranged marriages and the underlying mechanisms for migrants from Turkey. Most research looks at other countries in the Asian or Arabic world and, if the focus is on Europe, other migrant groups (e.g. Nasser et al. 2013; Shaw 2006). Yet the topic is of great relevance in western European public debates on Turkish migrants’ marriage behaviour and is highly controversial (Penn 2011). A few qualitative studies suggest the continuing significance of parental influence on partner choice in Turkish migrant families (e.g. Hense and Schorch 2013; Straßburger 2003). This is supported to some extent by the recent Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) Survey (Huschek et al. 2012; Milewski and Hamel 2010). But we lack more detailed understanding of arranged marriages among Turks in Europe.

In this chapter, we address the prevalence of arranged marriages among migrants and stayers and their descendants. We describe differences over time and in the transmission processes between generations. We ask to what
extent migrants and their descendants in European countries diverge from their counterparts in Turkey with regard to arranged marriages and how patterns of intergenerational transmission vary between migrant and stayer families. After briefly introducing the topic of marriage mode, we describe the data and present our results. The main findings are summarised and discussed in the conclusion.

Background

Marriage arrangement

In non-western societies, family-initiated arranged marriages have been the dominant pattern for several centuries (Buunk et al. 2010). They are characteristic of the descent marriage regime (Nauck 2001b; Nauck and Klaus 2008) where the main concern of the family and its members is the maintenance of descent-related intergenerational solidarity, inheritance rules and control rights. The aim is compatibility of the new spouse with the family rather than spousal love; marriages are not for the individuals’ benefit, but for the family or kin as a whole. Marriage is, thus, a process of agreements and rituals between families rather than an interpersonal event (Allendorf 2013; Ghimire et al. 2006; Goode 1970). By contrast, couple-initiated love marriages characterise the affinal marriage regime in parts of the non-western and most of the western world (Nauck 2001; Nauck and Klaus 2008). With the exception of (regional) subgroups or aristocratic dynasties that practice kin marriage (Davidoff 2006), family involvement is low.

In the affinal marriage regime, marriage processes follow different patterns (Nauck 2002). Even though researchers generally differentiate between couple-initiated (love match) and family-initiated (arranged) marriages (as we do in this chapter), empirically there are many gradations, comprising different degrees of individual and familial influence on choice of spouse (Allendorf 2013; Charsley and Shaw 2006; Hortacsu 1999). It is argued that marriage modes need to be understood as ‘continuously overlapping rather than distinctive categories’ (Straßburger 2003: 229). This implies a scale, with marriages arranged by parents without spousal input (sometimes against their will) at one end and love marriages undertaken independently of (or maybe against) parental advice at the other. Parental arrangements with consultation of the future spouses or couple-initiated marriages with high levels of family intervention fall somewhere in between. Allendorf speaks of hybrid forms of ‘arranged love marriages’ in Nepal (Allendorf 2013: 463), and Mody applied the term ‘love-cum-arranged marriage’ to the Indian context (Mody 2002: 248). But even in mixed forms, we argue, it is still possible to identify who took the initiative and to what degree or at which stage of the spouse selection process the other party became involved (Uslu 2011).
Dissimilation: the context of origin as the blueprint

Attitudinal or behavioural changes among migrants over time are at the core of classic theories of assimilation and acculturation. ‘Acculturation’ has been defined by Gordon as one step in the assimilation framework, namely ‘the change of cultural patterns to those of host society’ (1964: 71). This may entail marital patterns and, according to classic assimilation theory, a subsequent decreasing prevalence of arranged marriages in migrant cultures due to low family involvement in partner choice in the western European destination contexts.

However, various authors have stressed that migrant adaptation processes through changing family patterns cannot be adequately understood without considering socio-demographic changes in both origin and destination contexts. It is unclear where behavioural shifts actually take place (Glick 2010: 508). Following FitzGerald’s suggestion of the ‘homeland dissimilation’ perspective, we consider ‘the process of becoming different’ from the country of origin (2012: 1733), an ‘important slice of migrant reality’ (2012: 1735) that is often overlooked. The inclusion of home-country developments enables researchers to better understand the effects of migration.

Historically, arranged marriages were widespread, but never universal in Turkey; in certain urban settings and among certain ethnic minority groups, the affinal marriage regime has always dominated. Even so, structural and cultural changes over recent decades have led to a decrease in arranged marriages in Turkey. According to recent data from the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, the share of arranged marriages declined from 74 per cent in older marriage cohorts (1944–1948) to 50 per cent in younger cohorts (1989–1998; Nauck and Klaus 2008). A recent Family Survey shows 70 per cent of first marriages of those over 65, and only 39 per cent of the 18- to 24-year-olds were arranged. Going beyond a dichotomous categorisation, the answer categories in the survey ranged from ‘my own decision, without parental approval’, ‘my own choice, with parental approval’, ‘arranged with my approval’, ‘arranged without asking me, decision of my family’. The share of arrangements without spousal consent decreased from 21 to 3 per cent across these same cohorts (Uslu 2011: 198). Whereas the arranged mode with spousal consent is the dominant pattern in older cohorts (among all aged 45 and older), in the younger cohorts (34 years and younger), the pattern of couple-initiative with parental consent clearly dominates. The share of individuals marrying without parental consent only increased from 2 to 5 per cent, but there are systematic variations by region of residence and educational level. The share of couple-initiated marriages (mostly with parental approval) increased almost linearly with educational attainment (Uslu 2011: 198).

After the Republic’s foundation in 1923, national government policies were issued with the intention of expediting modernisation and
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

development. State-registered marriage, a minimum age and the consent of both partners became a requirement for marriage, as the government set out to ‘Westernize’ practices (Kavas and Thornton 2013: 7). In the following decades, large population growth, structural changes, subsequent industrialisation, internal rural-urban migration, urbanisation and educational expansion promoted massive change (Kagitcibasi and Ataca 2005; Rankin and Aytac 2006). Even so, the descent marriage regime still prevailed in many rural areas, with ongoing influences of both peasant practices and the tradition of patrilineal kinship and the patrilocal residence system (Nauck 2002).

Sociological theories of social change typically focus on transformations from the arranged marriage towards the couple-initiated mode or hybrid patterns (Ghimire et al. 2006; Goode 1970; Thornton 2005). The main argument is that socio-economic development in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, educational expansion and related modernisation affect the options available to individuals and the constraints binding them. Individuals gain freedom to date, to form friendships and to marry based on mutual attraction. Independence from kin is considered functional (Goode 1970). Education is considered one of the main structural factors of social change, because it affects both the opportunity structure and decision power within the family and individual preferences (Allendorf, 2013; Ghimire et al. 2006). The notion of ‘developmental idealism’ proposes that the Western family model with a conjugal family based on love marriage has a strong positive connotation. It is dispersed worldwide in the course of expanded school education and through international social movements, organisations and treaties, mass media and travel (Thornton 2005). Cherlin speaks of the ‘soft power’ of Western cultural hegemony (2012: 593). The question, then, is whether migration to Europe has additional effects on decreasing traditional marriage practices.

Three generations: a dynamic approach

One way to describe and explain change over time is to use multi-generational family data. The theoretical notion of ‘linked lives’ within the life course perspective explicates the embeddedness of individuals, with the family as the principal agent of socialisation (Elder 1994). Transmission processes within the family occur through direct teaching or indirect role-modelling, typically from parents to their children. Over the life course, influences may invert, become mutual or include grandparents (Glass et al. 1986). Interest in far-reaching triggering mechanisms beyond the nuclear family is increasing in light of population aging and longer years of shared lives between generations (Bengtson 2001). A multi-generational perspective takes account of the fact that events and circumstances in one generation may have long-term consequences for later generations. Family experiences ripple through the lives of descendants; the transmission of habits,
orientations or cultural and economic capital occurs through direct and indirect interactions. Grandparents may be directly involved in childrearing if they live nearby, or they may exhibit a certain cultural-normative power from a distance. Recent findings suggest grandparent effects in the transmission of self-employment propensities among migrant families in Sweden (Andersson and Hammerstedt 2010), in the transmission of class positions (Chan and Boliver 2014; see also Chapter 5) or divorce (Amato and Cheadle, 2005).

Intergenerational differences, by contrast, are explained by the rapidly changing world, in which age-peers, age-graded institutions such as school, and socio-historical events impinge in special ways on family members at different life stages. Their influences may result in a ‘generational gap’ (Mead 1970) rather than continuing ‘path(s) of similarity’ (Glass et al. 1986).

Families are not passive recipients of social change but ‘active agents’ in how they respond (Bengtson and Allen 1993: 489). Powerful external events, such as major economic depression, political turmoil, war or international migration, may interrupt the flow of habit and give rise to new conditions of consciousness and practice (cf. Elder 1994: 10). The socialisation challenges specific to migrant families have been described as the ‘paradox of cultural transmission’ (Phalet and Schönpflug 2001: 187) which is more complicated but, at the same time, more strenuously pursued in response to culturally different contexts and experiences of societal exclusion.

In migration theory, intergenerational change is of major interest (Alba and Waters, 2011; Gordon 1964; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The classic assimilation framework proposes irreversible, successive steps into mainstream society as ‘generational inevitability’. Generations are the motor of ethnic change as each generation faces ‘a distinctive set of issues in its relationship to the larger society and to the ethnic groups’ (Alba and Nee 1997: 832). In recent decades, various alternative outcomes to acculturation and assimilation have been proposed. Rather than acculturation, cultural incorporation outcomes may comprise an (intergenerational) linear continuation of cultural traditions brought from the home country or new emergent patterns in terms of an ‘immigrant culture’ and reactive identity formation (‘reactive ethnicity’; see Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 284). An early alternative to straight-line assimilation was ‘the three-generation hypothesis’ with its notion of ‘ethnic revival’ among migrants’ descendants, but it has received little empirical support (e.g. Lazerwitz and Rowitz 1964; Montero 1981). Some recent studies have returned to consideration of patterns in the third generation (e.g. Alba et al. 2002; Levin et al. 1996), but the third generation is still relatively small, at least in Europe.

Migration effects: three patterns of change

Migration has been described as an accelerated (intergenerational) modernisation process. Change, in general, speeds up value-shifts and changes in
family structure (Foner 1997), and in the context of migrant marriage, competing partner-choice models in the destination are likely to challenge cultural transmission. Behavioural changes may, however, also take place without value shifts as a situational reaction to new context conditions (Glick 2010; Nauck 2001). A decline in arranged marriages may be due to a lack of partner availability (a shortage of available families wishing to arrange a partner for their children), to economic and social welfare contexts that require less family cohesion, to opposition by children or other members of relevant social groups or experiences of failed or unhappy marriages. The forces of change may be the same as in non-migration contexts but their impact may be more powerful because of the larger differences in opportunity and cultural context that individual migrants and their descendants face. Based on these assumptions, we hypothesise that marital mode change occurs faster in migrant families than among stayer families in Turkey (‘dissimilation through adaptation and acculturation’). If this is the case, it will be demonstrated by greater intergenerational decline of arranged marriages consequent on migration and western European exposure. From a dissimilation perspective, two alternative hypotheses can be derived. Patterns of change may, in fact, be similar between origin and destination contexts (‘similarity in change’). As migrant families deliberately preserve certain homeland marital values and behaviours and at the same time appreciate and adopt some of the western destination context, they may resemble stayer families in times of transformations (Allendorf 2013). New ways of combining traditional and modern spouse selection procedures in the sense of ‘creative culture building’ in subsequent generations may occur in both contexts (Foner 1997: 961). The underlying mechanisms are alike: families and individuals react to changing (modern and modernising) contexts not by abandoning, but by modifying original patterns. Cultural preservation in migration may also imply stronger intergenerational continuity. Differences may, then, arise as stayer families change faster (‘dissimilation through preservation or revitalisation’). Specific conditions of migration may lead to an intensification of minority customs through the intense and conscious socialisation of the next generation within the family and co-ethnic community (Hense and Schorch 2013; Straßburger 2003). Families may purposely seek to strengthen co-ethnic ties and maintain or gain reputation and social status by arranging marriages with children of co-ethnic minority members. The wish to preserve cultural homogeneity and children’s loyalty may be considered to be best achieved by parental control of the partner choice process. Having had positive experiences with arrangement and being less familiar with alternative marriage procedures, parents may aim for children’s happiness by supporting partner selection. If marriage markets in the ethnic minority group are limited, children may engage family to look for suitable partners or obtain necessary information. The theoretical framework of transnationalism offers a further
explanation for intensified family-involvement as a pragmatic strategy: due to lack of suitable spouses and an interest in ethnic-religious homogeneity and close ties home, families may seek a spouse from the country of origin, including from among kin, and arrange marriages accordingly (Carol et al. 2014; Charsley and Shaw 2006).

Data and methods

The 2000 Families study is the first to allow an analysis of marriage modes that addresses these hypotheses. Marriage-related questions were included in the proxy interview (Guveli et al. 2016; see Chapter 2). These questions referred to the current or last marriage (i.e. in case of remarriage, the information refers to the most recent partner) and included a question about whether the marriage was arranged (görücü usulu evlendi) or couple-initiated (tansarak evlendi). The former comprises arranged marriages where parents wield the primary decision making power; the latter refers to spouses as primary decision makers. We define migrants as all individuals who were exposed to Western Europe before marriage. They were either born in Turkey and migrated to Europe before the age of 17 or were born in Western Europe and remained living there. All migrant ancestors (G1) are included as migrants in terms of intergenerational migration lineages, even though, by definition, they migrated after age 16. Stayers are defined as those who were born in Turkey and never migrated abroad.

In the first part of the analysis, we pool the generations to address patterns of socio-cultural change in the two groups. We include all adult individuals, ancestors (G1), children (G2) and grandchildren (G3), who were or had been married. Like other studies on marriage modes (e.g. Ghimire et al. 2006), we focus only on married individuals and do not include singles. In total, proxy interviews covering 1,525 families provided information on 18,822 individual family members older than 17 (see also Chapter 2). Of these, 15,645 cases were identified as migrants or stayers in the terms of this chapter, and 10,443 had been married at least once by either marriage mode. In G1, 100 per cent were married, decreasing to 93 per cent of G2 generation and 47 per cent of G3. Of those married, for 8,421 individuals, we have clear information that they married between 1935 and 2012 at an age older than 14 years. After taking account of missing values on our control variables (sex and education) and supplementing these, where possible, with information from the personal interviews, our sample consists of 8,138 cases.

Since the timing and the mode of marriage are related (arranged marriages tend to be earlier; see Apostolou 2007: 406; Fox 1975: 185; Ghimire et al. 2006: 1188), we may overestimate the prevalence of arranged marriages. However, in our data, average age at (last) marriage is 22 for arranged marriages and 23 for couple-initiated, so the differences are not that great.
The median age at marriage is 22 years for G1 (men only), 21 years for G2 and 21 years for G3.

We estimate logistic regression models for the probability of an arranged versus a couple-initiated marriage, evaluating the influence of year of marriage, sex and education. We also assess whether migration interacts with marriage cohort to speed up (or slow down) the process towards more couple-initiated marriages among migrants. We present our results as odds ratios. If greater than one, the effect is positive, and every unit change in the independent variable increases the odds of arranged marriage; if less than one, the effect is negative and reduces the odds of arranged marriage relative to couple-initiated. All models control for region of origin and adjust the standard errors for within-family correlations. Destination country effects are analysed separately and discussed in the text.

In the second set of analyses, we address transmission and intergenerational change across three-generational lineage data. Here, individuals are embedded within their family lineages. We identified 2,986 three-generational lineages where either all three lineage members were migrants (‘pure migrant lineages’) or all were stayers (‘pure stayer lineages’). We selected and compared only ‘pure’ migrant and ‘pure’ stayer lineages without mixed migration patterns in order to clearly differentiate between the two intergenerational family contexts of non-migration and migration. In 1,228 of these lineages, all three members were married at least once, whether by family-initiated or couple-initiated mode. In 50 lineages, remarriages occurred after the descendant had married. For example, grandfathers married a second time after their child or their grandchild had gotten married. Since our aim is to investigate sequential intergenerational transmission processes, we dropped these lineages. For the final analysis, and taking account of cases with non-missing values on covariates, we have a sample of 1,020 lineages, from 280 families. We report descriptive statistics and estimate logistic regression models to evaluate transmission patterns for the second (G2) and third generation (G3) from parents and grandparents.

Results

Developments across generations and marriage cohorts

Using the pooled sample, Figure 8.1(a) compares stayers and migrants across the three family generations. The members of G1, G2 and G3 belong to different, but to some extent overlapping, marriage cohorts, as we can see from Figure 8.1(b). There is a clear decline in the share of arranged marriages over generations and cohorts. The decline occurs among both stayers and migrants, but is slightly less marked among stayers.

The data highlight the extraordinary dominance of the arranged marriage mode for the first generation, with more than 80 per cent of the grandparents
(G1) marrying following an arrangement by family or kin. The percentage is a little lower for migrants than for stayers, but the difference is not statistically significant. We see a strong decline of arranged marriages in the second generation (G2), a trend more intense among migrants, leading to larger and statistically significant differences between migrants and stayers in the second generation ($p < 0.001$). Nonetheless, more than two-thirds of stayers and more than half of all migrants in Western Europe in G2 have an arranged marriage.

\[\text{Figure 8.1(a) Percentage of arranged marriages among all marriages, by migrant and generational status}\]

\textit{Note}: $n = 4,835$ (stayers) and 3,303 (migrants).

\textit{Source}: 2000 Families study, proxy data.

\[\text{Figure 8.1(b) Percentage of arranged marriages by migrant and generational status across marriage cohorts}\]

\textit{Note}: $n = 4,835$ (stayers) and 3,303 (migrants).

\textit{Source}: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
In the third generation (G3), the proportion of arranged marriages decreases, but the marriage mode remains important: among stayers, 46 per cent marry after an arrangement, and among migrants, more than one third of all individuals of that generation have arranged marriages. Differences between migrants and stayers are again statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

Turning to the multivariate analysis illustrated in Table 8.1, we see that when controlling for sex, education and marriage cohort, there are significant differences between migrants and stayers in their probability of having an arranged marriage (Model 1). There appears to be a genuine migration effect in terms of less family involvement in the partner choice process among migrant families in Western Europe. Arranged marriages decline significantly over marriage cohorts: those who married more recently are less likely to have met and married by means of arrangement. The interaction of migration status and marriage cohort on arranged marriage is statistically insignificant (Model 2) and in separate models (not illustrated), the effect of marriage cohort is the same for both migrants and stayers (OR = 0.80, $p < 0.001$), suggesting that the decline across marriage cohorts is consistent between the two groups, after conditioning on education.

The pattern is consistent with the development described in Turkey-wide surveys. For migrants, the data lend support to the hypothesised pattern of ‘dissimilation through adaptation and acculturation’ due to the lower prevalence of arranged marriages in later generations. However, the pace of change does not differ greatly, showing a constant gap that supports the concept of ‘similar change’. There is no evidence of cultural preservation or revitalisation among migrants. Importantly, the pattern applies to migrants in all European countries. When compared to the stayers in Turkey, all destination country coefficients are below one (results not illustrated), suggesting

<table>
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<th>Model 2 with interaction</th>
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<td>Migrant (Ref.: Stayers)</td>
<td>0.70 (0.06)***</td>
<td>0.63 (0.14)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women (Ref.: Men)</td>
<td>1.08 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.08 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.68 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.68 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 ‘drop-out or primary’ to 5 ‘higher tertiary’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage cohort</td>
<td>0.81 (0.01)***</td>
<td>0.80 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant*Marrige cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>16.72 (2.60)***</td>
<td>17.94 (3.69)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pseudo $R^2$</em></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $n = 8,138 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001$. Models control for regions of origin.

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
lower rates of arranged marriage, even if, because of sample size issues, only those for Germany and the Netherlands are statistically significant. The lower likelihood of arranged marriages among migrants can, thus, be interpreted as a migration effect largely independent of national country-specific context factors.

**Intergenerational continuity and change**

Figure 8.2 shows how the marriage modes have changed relative to the pattern within families in the preceding generation. The left-hand white half of the oval represents the percentage of arranged marriages and the grey half, couple-initiated marriages. For instance, in the stayer lineages (2a), the vast majority of grandparents (95 per cent) have arranged marriages. When we follow the lineages of those grandparents (G1), we find 84 per cent of the children (G2) also marrying by arrangement. Intergenerational continuity is high. This changes as we follow the lineage. For those whose grandparents (G1) and parents (G2) are in an arranged marriage, 57 per cent of G3 show the same pattern. By contrast, 43 per cent are married through couple-initiated partner selection. The intergenerational gap between the second (G2) and the third generation (G3) is substantial.

Figure 8.2 also shows that intergenerational transmission or intergenerational change from the arranged to the couple-initiated mode is by no means the only pattern for stayers. Change from arranged to couple-initiated marriage is not an irreversible process of development (Thornton 2005). Many grandparents (G1) in couple-initiated marriages have children who live in an arranged marriage (52 per cent). And even among grandchildren whose grandparents and parents were in a couple-initiated love marriage, one-third married in the arranged mode. Case numbers are rather low (15

![Figure 8.2](image-url) **Figure 8.2** Intergenerational transmission in stayer and migrant lineages (per cent)

*Note:* $n = 591$ stayer lineages, 429 migrant lineages, if related to less than 30 cases, numbers in italics.

white fields = percentage of arranged marriages, grey fields = percentage of couple-initiated marriages.

*Source:* 2000 Families study, proxy data.
grandchildren had both parents and grandparents with couple-initiated marriages), but they support – at least by tendency – the notion of multiple patterns of family change.

Migrant families differ to some extent from the described pattern, as illustrated in Figure 8.2(b). To start with, family involvement was lower in the first generation (86 per cent). More importantly, only 70 per cent of all grandparents (G1) who were in an arranged marriage were themselves (maybe with others) involved in the partner selection of their children (G2). In about a third of these lineages (30 per cent), the children (G2) selected their partner themselves instead. In the third generation the share of arranged marriage is even lower: 28 per cent of all grandchildren whose parents and grandparents were in an arranged marriage show the same marriage mode. The large majority (72 per cent) lived in a couple-initiated marriage. Intergenerational transmission of marriage modes in a migration context is obviously lower and the prevalence of family involvement has decreased tremendously, yet arranged marriages remain common.

Among migrants, various family patterns of change exist. For instance, most children (G2) whose parents (G1) chose their own partners themselves got married by means of arrangement (87 per cent). This pattern clearly deviates from that of stayer families in which only 52 per cent of children from couple-initiated marriages were married in the arranged mode. Intergenerational parental transmission seems to be lower among migrants, but in an unexpected direction, indicating some ‘revitalisation’ between first and second generations. This may be due to some form of ethnic community-based impact or other migration-specific motives for (transnational) marriage arrangement. Among the grandchildren of these families, 33 per cent experienced an arrangement by parents or kin. The share is similar to those of the grandchildren whose parents and grandparents were in an arranged marriage (28 per cent), suggesting a process of ‘normal’ decline. None of the migrant grandchildren, whose grandparents and parents were in couple-initiated marriages, were living in arranged marriages, though the numbers at this point are very small. The percentage of grandchildren whose grandparents were in an arranged marriage but whose parents selected their partners themselves is quite similar in stayer and migrant families (28 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively), indicating little support for ethnic-marital ‘revitalisation’ among third-generation Turkish descendants.

Table 8.2 shows the results from a multivariate model of the transmission process, controlling for the significant impact of education. We see migrant children and grandchildren show a lower likelihood of arranged marriages than their stayer peers, although the effect is only significant among grandchildren once taking account of level of education, a major negative influence on the probability of an arranged marriage. Transmission processes from parents (G1) to their children (G2) are extraordinarily high in stayer families (OR = 4.83, \( p < 0.001 \), separate models for children, not
shown), but very low and negative in migrant families (OR = 0.47 n.s., see also interaction effect in Model 1c, Table 8.2). This stems from the frequent intergenerational change between migrant parents and their children in both directions, shown in Figure 8.2, above.

For grandchildren (Models 2a–e), their parents’ marriage mode is important for their own marriage: if parents of G2 are (not) in an arranged marriage, their children (G3) are significantly more (less) likely to live in an arranged marriage as well, indicating strong intergenerational transmission. There is no significant transmission effect of grandparents (Model 2c/d). The relationship with grandparental mode is positive, but not statistically significant. Regarding the relations between G2 and G3, there appears to be a weaker transmission for migrants (Model 2e). While the interaction effect itself is not significant, separate models for migrants and stayers (not shown) find parental transmission is very strong in stayer families (OR = 3.42, \( p < 0.01 \)), less so among migrants (1.43, n.s.). The direction of change is clear from Figure 8.2: more migrant than stayer grandchildren whose parents are in an arranged marriage choose their partners themselves.

Table 8.2 Logistic regression estimates of the probability of arranged vs. couple-initiated marriage, odds ratios (standard errors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmission</th>
<th>Children (G2)</th>
<th>Grandchildren (G3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s mode</td>
<td>1.12 (0.43)</td>
<td>4.75** (2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandparent’s mode</td>
<td>1.44 (0.69)</td>
<td>1.47 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission in migration</td>
<td>0.10** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant (Ref.: stayer)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1–5)</td>
<td>0.74* (0.10)</td>
<td>0.74* (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.89*** (2.00)</td>
<td>4.42** (1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( n = 517, 1,020, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 \). Models control for region of origin.

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.
Conclusion

This chapter has addressed marital change in Turkish families in the course of migration to Western Europe, focusing on arranged versus couple-initiated marriages across three generations. The findings suggest that about 37 per cent of the migrant married third generation are in an arranged marriage. A roughly similar pattern is found in the European TIES data (Huschek et al. 2012). Given the dominant couple-initiated pattern in the European destination contexts, it is often argued that these numbers for arranged marriages show the strong maintenance of traditional marriage patterns in (Turkish) migrant families, with enduring high parental influence in union formation and little evidence for acculturation.

The 2000 Families study offers two ways of providing an alternative and more precise contextualisation of these findings. The ‘three generation approach’ shows the massive changes in the prevalence of arranged marriages over generations. The proportion of arranged marriages is very high among the grandparent generation (about 85 per cent), and drops sharply over a rather short period of time.

Using the ‘binational view’ (Glick 2010) and the ‘homeland dissimilation perspective’ (FitzGerald 2012), the study also draws attention to the parallel socio-demographic developments in the context of origin. The design, thus, responds to contemporary debates and the general critique that ‘although an increasing number of migration scholars have responded to the criticisms of methodological nationalism, they rarely use it to transform their research strategies’ (Amelina and Faist 2012: 1713). The findings for the five rural regions of origin in the ‘2000 Families’ study reflect the general trend in Turkey, as documented in the research literature.

Our findings suggest that change in migrant families is somewhat more intense than in stayer families. Migrant lineages start with lower shares of arranged marriages in the first generation and show similar patterns of change over time, yielding a pattern of ‘similar change’. The result is an overall significant negative migration effect on the prevalence of arranged marriages, over and above differences in the probability of arranged marriage linked to changes in educational attainment, which tends to be higher among migrants (see Chapter 5).

More detailed analyses with lineage data show multiple patterns of change behind this general decrease in migrant and stayer lineages. Forms of intergenerational change sometimes occur in the opposite direction, from couple-initiated in the parental generation to arranged marriage in the children’s generation. For migrants but not for stayers, there is some evidence of ‘revitalisation’ between grandfathers who marry in the couple-initiated mode and their children whose marriage is arranged. But patterns in which children (G2) are in couple-initiated marriages and grandchildren (G3) are in arranged marriage are rare, occurring equally infrequently in
migrant and stayer lineages. Finally, after two generations, the arranged mode seems to be entrenched among migrants, with lower probabilities of arranged marriage among this generation, regardless of preceding generational patterns. This lends little support to claims of ‘dissimilation through revitalisation’ in the third migrant generation.

Lower intergenerational transmission found in the migration context is mostly due to a more intense decline of the arranged marriage mode as compared to stayer dyads. The development between the second and third generation supports the hypothesis of ‘dissimilation through adaptation and acculturation’. For the third (grandchildren) generation (G3), we can conclude that the significantly lower likelihood of arranged marriages among migrants as compared to stayers is due to lower starting points in the first generation and also to less intense transmission in the migration setting, indicating more profound change in families that have experienced migration. Regarding the influence of the grandparents, marriage practices do not appear to be sensitive to grandparental marriage mode. Our findings indicate that in times of intense social change, grandparent-grandchildren transmission processes are weak.

The analysis suggests strong educational effects in the expected direction, but the exact mechanisms driving the large changes in practice, in Turkey and in the migration context, have yet to be addressed. The degree of arrangement by family or kin (or others) can be interpreted as a marker of endogamy preferences (Hense and Schorch 2013), implying marriage patterns are a critical domain for assessing acculturation and the persistence of ethnic boundaries. Marital change may be part and parcel of more general cultural change towards individual independence from family and kin influences, but an arranged marriage can also result from situational responses or pragmatic considerations (Nauck 2001; Reniers 2001). It is unclear whether child or parental characteristics (or both equally) are tied to change. We also need to address the role transnational marriages (as a subset of arranged marriages or as partner-initiated) play in the pattern of ‘revitalisation’ more generally. Researchers stress that the underlying motivations and intentions of arranged marriages change in the migration context; transnational partner choice processes constitute one important aspect of this change (Charsley 2012; Schmidt 2010; Shaw 2006).

Future research needs to include a more explicit transnational perspective. As suggested by the debate on transnationalism, even the counterfactual approach of ‘homeland dissimilation’ is, in fact, quite complex (cf. Amelina et al. 2012). We must not ignore that the entities of comparison we study are not independent units of analysis but mutually influencing. From the transnational perspective, the regions of origins and destinations have become ‘sets of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organised and transformed’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 132). Through
social transnational networks, both the flow of people and related economic and social remittances, stayers are likely to be indirectly affected by migration (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Timmerman 2008). Understanding the specific effects of migration in a context of worldwide social change, global communication, media consumption, education expansion and intense transnational ties remains a demanding but ultimately rewarding task.
9
Fertility

Introduction

Fertility indicators receive substantial attention in migration research, with childbearing trends of migrant populations studied to obtain a complete picture of fertility in the destination countries (Sobotka 2008) or to understand the changes following an international migration and subsequent incorporation processes (Adsera and Ferrer 2014; Andersson 2004; Kulu and Milewski 2007; Okun and Kagya 2012). Typically, fertility patterns of different migrant groups are compared to the native population of the destination country in previous research. Alternative approaches to provide a better understanding of the influence of migration on fertility have often been demanded but rarely applied (Glick 2010; Nauck 1997). Various authors have argued that disentangling ‘the net effects of migration’ requires a comparison of the migrant population with those who did not migrate (Schoenmaeckers, Lodewijckx, and Gadeyne 1999: 926). This chapter responds to those demands for a bi-national country-of-origin perspective, focusing on Turkish families in Turkey and in various countries in Western Europe.

Given their numbers and their cultural background, western European Turkish migrants’ fertility patterns are intensely studied (e.g. Cifuentes, Wagner and Naderi 2013; de Valk 2013; Milewski 2007, 2010, 2011; Nauck 1997). Comparatively early entrance into marriage, early childbearing and greater numbers of children relative to the populations of the destination countries are typically interpreted as characteristic of a ‘Turkish family culture’ which is transmitted to subsequent generations (cf. Milewski 2011: 179). However, not all divergences in fertility between migrant and majority populations can be linked to the home context in terms of ‘imported behaviours’ (Andersson 2004; Milewski 2011). Rather, ‘migrant cultures’ may emerge with distinct patterns. At the same time, demographic changes in migrant communities cannot simply be interpreted as the result of migration and integration (Glick 2010; Nauck 2007a). Changes in fertility patterns may
have occurred without migration to Western Europe. Migration research often neglects wider global trends in socio-demographic change. These are clearly evident in Turkey (e.g. Eberstadt and Shah 2012; Thornton et al. 2012), where fertility has declined since the middle of the last century after a peak of 6.9 in 1950 to the replacement level of 2.1 in 2012 (www.turkstat.gov.tr). Similarly, the median age at first birth rose from 21 years in older cohorts (1959–1963) to 24 years among younger cohorts (1979–1983). There are variations by region and educational level, but the trend is common across all groups (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies 2009: 72). This development has been linked to changes in the social and economic realms in the course of industrialisation, urbanisation, internal migration and rising education (Ergöcmen 2012; Klaus 2008; Yavuz 2008).

Few studies have addressed the ‘country-of-origin’ perspective by comparing migrants and stayers (cf. Glick 2010; Nauck 1997; White 2011). A major drawback is the lack of adequate comparative data. Where comparison studies exist, the comparisons are typically made with the countries of origin as a whole rather than the populations from specific regions of origin. This makes a crucial difference when regional differences in fertility patterns and fertility change are large, as they are in Turkey (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies 2009; Işık and Pinarcioğlu 2007; Koc, Hancioğlu and Cavlin 2008; Yavuz 2006). Whereas in the western regions of Turkey, the fertility rate was below 1.8 in 2012, in the eastern Anatolian regions, it was between 2.8 and 3.5 children per woman. In our ‘2000 Families’ data, all women originate from the same five (rural) regions of origin in Turkey (Guveli et al. 2014; see also chapters 2 and 3), providing a more precise ‘region-of-origin’ comparative perspective. The destination contexts of Western Europe are characterised by fertility decline with profound family and marital change. The total fertility rate has dropped to (far) below 2.0 in western European countries (below 1.5 in the German-speaking countries), while the age at first birth has steadily risen, and now lies between 27 and 30 years.

This chapter addresses occurrence and timing of first and subsequent births in Turkish families and answers the following question. To what extent do differences in costs and benefits of children lead to specific fertility behaviours among migrant women and their descendants when compared to their peers in Turkey? By probing and describing these differences, we can offer a better understanding of the changes brought about by migration. The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical background and our hypotheses. After a description of the data and methods, we introduce the empirical results. A concluding section discusses their implications.
Theoretical background

Fertility behaviour

Micro-level explanations of fertility behaviour consider the number of children and the timing and spacing of births as outcomes of individual decision-making processes (Balbo, Billari and Mills 2013; Huinink and Kohli 2014). While economic theories deal with the costs of children in the context of specific opportunity structures (Becker 1991), demographic and sociological theories such as the value-of-children approach have additionally stressed the supply side, that is, the rewards that accrue from having children. It is assumed that individuals rationally consider both the costs and rewards of children and make their decisions accordingly (Liefbroer 2005). It is also assumed that the guiding premise for potential parents is their own well-being, including a physical/material, a psychological and a social dimension (e.g. Nauck 2007b). Children are considered an instrumental goal for achieving subjective well-being or welfare by providing, for instance, economic support and insurance for old age, emotional gratification, with affective stimulation and dialogical benefits, and social esteem. Decisions in favour of children are taken when the benefits are judged to outweigh the direct and indirect (opportunity) costs, based on the parents’ (perceptions of their) resources, opportunities and alternatives.

In the fertility literature, there are strong claims that fertility decisions are not only based on rational decision-making processes. Other influences may be at play, including adherence to social and cultural norms. However, rational cost-benefit calculations may be specifically likely to occur under conditions of rapid social change and in new situations where there is extensive intergenerational (spatial and social) mobility. In familiar, strongly culturally framed and normatively regulated situations, by contrast, individuals may rather follow conventional or spontaneous influences (Nauck 2007b: 618).

In times of social transformations, new opportunities, emerging alternatives and changing resources, putative parents may alter their fertility decisions. In Turkey, changes in the course of urbanisation, increasing higher education and higher occupational status over the past decades have clearly altered the perceived cost-benefit calculus for having children (Kağıtçubaşı and Ataca 2005). Over time, children in Turkey have become valued less for their economic benefits (such as for support in old age, which is related to high parity) and more for their psychological value (i.e. for pleasure and gratification). When parents seek to maximise psychological benefits, it is rational to invest in a smaller number of children. In Turkey, fertility has declined, but childlessness remains rare (Nauck and Klaus 2008: 305).

International migration causes changes which might have similar effects on fertility behaviour. The question is which additional effects an
international migration to a western European destination context may have. In his early framework for migration effects in the context of labour migration, Nauck suggests migration is ‘a natural experiment, in which families change their social-ecological context in a comprehensive and profound way’ (Nauck 1997: 175). He proposes three stages and processes of change to engender new family behaviours. First, the new opportunity structure leads to short-term changes. Second, differences in individual alternatives produce medium-term changes in the cost-benefit calculations of children, with education a major factor. Third, in the long run, cultural changes with different valuation of children and related fertility preferences occur. We consider the three processes below as we develop our hypotheses, but first, we turn to evidence from more recent fertility research on migrants, which has gone beyond the classical labour migrant generation to consider the disruptive and family-motivated effects of migration and include migrants’ descendants.

Effects of migration on fertility

In demographic migration research, five different mechanisms for explaining migrants’ specific fertility patterns have been proposed: selection and composition (migrants are a selected group with regard to fertility behaviour), socialisation (migrants stick to the fertility behaviour of their contexts of origin), disruption (migrants delay childbearing due to the stress of migration), family formation (migrants start childbearing earlier because family formation is a major migration motive) and adaptation (migrants adapt to the fertility behaviour in the destination context) (Kulu and Milewski 2007).

Existing empirical research on the Turkish-European case lends some support to adaptation taking place. Married Turkish women of the second migrant generation have timing of first birth similar to that of West Germans (Milewski 2007; White 2011), and later than first generation migrants or than stayers in Turkey as a whole (White 2011). But whereas the chance of second births is similar, that of third births is significantly higher among Turkish migrants (Milewski 2010). By age 35, second generation Turks are more likely than Germans to have three or more children (34 per cent). Yet this is a significant drop compared to the first generation in which it was 59 per cent (Milewski 2009). There is similar evidence for adaption across generations for the Netherlands (Garssen and Nicolaas 2008; Schoorl 1990) and, to some extent, for Belgium. Following an ‘early start’ as compared to the native population and other migrants, findings from Belgium suggest a ‘stopping pattern’ limiting total family size (Schoenmaeckers et al. 1999: 912). Various studies further show a strong link between (marriage) migration to Europe and child birth (Cifuentes et al. 2013; Schoenmaeckers et al. 1999; Schoorl 1990). Milewski speaks of the ‘3 pack’ of marriage, migration, and motherhood: ‘The transition to a first pregnancy is much elevated in the first year
following immigration... it rather seems that a first child marks the end of a couple’s migration process’ (Milewski 2007: 884). White shows that these first births among first generation women occur earlier than among average stayer women in Turkey, the country of origin (White 2011).

This origins perspective enables us to study selection effects as well as processes of ‘homeland dissimilation’, that is ‘the process of becoming different’ from the home context (FitzGerald 2012: 1733). Importantly, this approach allows us to control for the ‘cultural context of origin’ which is often referred to in attempts to explain migrants’ specific behaviours without really being tested. In what follows, we develop hypotheses to test in our empirical analysis with reference both to the causes and the framework suggested in sociological research and the various mechanisms outlined in recent demographic research.

Explaining fertility differences between women in Turkey and in Europe

With international migration, structural-institutional differences arise and affect the cost-benefit calculations underlying fertility decisions (Nauck 1997). For the Turkish-western European context, there are two opposing influences. Despite some changes over recent decades, family policies and social security systems still profoundly differ between Turkey and the western European countries. Various kinds of child allowance and state-organised day care exist in western Europe, but less so in Turkey (Buğra and Yakut-Cakar 2010; Dedeoglu 2012). The direct and indirect opportunity costs of having children are, therefore, lower in Europe. At the same time, health care and pension systems in Western Europe mean there is less reliance on family support for the ill and the old than in large parts of the population in Turkey (Gal 2010; Grütjen 2008). Accordingly, not only the costs but also the (economic) benefits of children and (a large) family are lower in European welfare regimes. With regard to structural-institutional effects we could, thus, expect that, compared with their stayer peers, either migrant women start family formation earlier and have more children (Hypothesis 1a), or they start parenthood later and have fewer children (Hypothesis 1b).

International migration opens up new chances for individuals. Employment (as part of the migration project or for economic necessity) and better educational opportunities and job chances for women (whose access may be more restricted in the home context) change the salience of alternatives to parenthood. This may apply to stayers to similar degrees when they experience internal migration or larger socio-economic changes with educational expansion in their regions. Opportunity costs of parenthood, as well as the values attached to children and expectations of parenthood, change. Education speeds up the process from valuing children for their economic contribution to valuing them for psychological or
affective benefits (Nauck and Tabuchi 2012). For both stayers and migrants, we expect later parenthood and fewer children among the more highly educated and earlier parenthood with more children for women with low or no education. Differences between migrant women and women in Turkey may, then, result from higher educational attainments among the former (Hypothesis 2).

The degree to which migrants experience these alternative opportunities also depends on the legal and social ‘openness’ of the systems in the destination contexts. Individual alternatives are sometimes limited for migrants. A lack of work experience and destination country language fluency can restrict employment options (at least outside ethnic niches). As a result, the opportunity costs of children directly after migration may be low. With a lack of good alternatives, parenthood may be particularly attractive, in particular when family formation is the very migration motivation (Milewski 2007). We therefore expect marriage migrants to enter parenthood earlier and have a higher number of children than women in Turkey from the same regions of origin (Hypothesis 3).

For all actors taking rational fertility decisions, the ‘shadow of the future’ looms large because parents commit themselves to responsibility for their children over a long time (Huinink and Kohli 2014: 1297). They want to be sure the consequences of present actions are compatible with future plans. This applies in times of economic insecurity and may be specifically relevant for first generation women who arrived as adults, but not in the course of a marriage. Their stay in the destination country may be – voluntarily or involuntarily – uncertain, and migration is likely to disrupt and postpone their family formation process. At the same time, higher parental aspirations regarding the ‘quality’ of life of the child (Becker 1991) may be a major migration motivation. Providing children with optimal means for being successful in society induces high direct costs of children (but enables parents to enjoy their children’s success). This will lead to an investment in a small number of children. For both reasons, uncertainty and children as migration motivation, first generation women may, independently of their own educational background, delay parenthood and have a smaller number of children as compared to women in Turkey (Hypothesis 4).

Fertility patterns may be a situational or rational response to new individual options without implying large changes in original preferences. Alternatively, they may reflect an internalisation of new life goals (or other intermediate goods for individual well-being and welfare) stemming from social change in the home context (Axinn and Barber 2001) or from peers in the low-fertility destination contexts of Western Europe (Milewski 2011). It has been argued that fertility changes caused by modifications in values and preferences relating to children occur only in the long run (Nauck 1997: 176). In the migration context, this is based on the assumption that assimilation processes and related acculturation towards and identification
with dominant values in the host context take time (Glick 2010). Whereas first generation women may still stick to their (family) scripts and biographical orientations developed before migration (socialisation hypothesis, see also Huinink and Kohli 2014: 1302–1303), second generation women may have absorbed the dominant value pattern of the low-fertility destination contexts. If value change among migrants’ descendants outweigh the cultural changes in the home context, second generation women’s fertility behaviour should differ from that of women in Turkey. Such value changes and related behavioural changes regarding motherhood, if they exist, should be observable independently of educational effects (Hypothesis 5).

Data, variables and methods

To investigate these hypotheses we draw on the personal interview data from the ‘2000 Families’ study (see Guveli et al. 2016; for an extensive account, see Chapter 2). In this study, we carried out personal interviews with the (male) ancestor (G1), if living, with two of his children (randomly selected) (G2) and with two each of their children (G3). For this chapter, we focus on female respondents from the children’s (G2) and grandchildren’s (G3) generation, as we did not interview any women from the first generation. We use the personal interview data as they contain complete migration histories, which are necessary to identify the country in which women gave birth or were at risk of giving birth. By ‘risk’ we refer to the potential childbearing of women over time. Some of these women will end up having a child (or a second, third, or fourth etc. child) within their fertile years, and some of them will not. It is the comparison of time to the first (second, third or fourth) birth among women who are ‘at risk’ of such a birth that is at the heart of the analysis in this chapter.

Personal interviews were conducted with 2,281 women. After replacing missing values in the personal interviews with proxy data wherever possible, we restricted our sample to all women born after 1950 for whom we had valid information on age, educational status, migration experience and years of birth of any children. In total, this left us with a sample of 2,192 women who were or could have become parents by the time they were interviewed. It is worth noting that the focus on G2 and G3 limits our sample primarily to migrants who were ‘tied movers’, that is, women who followed later as children or spouses, rather than female pioneer labour migrants.

The (potential) country in which childbirth took place was calculated based on information of the women’s migration biographies and the year of the children’s birth or the current age of (potential) mothers, respectively. Migration and remigration events before each (potential) birth event were taken into account. Unlike destination country based surveys, the ‘2000 Families’ survey includes female family members regardless of their place of residence and captures complex migration biographies. We
focus on the major migration patterns only in line with our hypotheses, but future research could expand the analysis to more explicitly incorporate the complex migration patterns. Since the data were gathered retrospectively, we can assume there are some inconsistencies in age and year information, but having checked against the proxy data, we are confident the overall quality is good.

As main predictor and control variables, we use women’s birth cohort in ten-year categories from 1950, their educational status as a metric variable (with 1 ‘primary drop out’, 2 ‘primary’ as the reference category, 3 ‘lower secondary’, 4 ‘higher secondary’, 5 ‘lower tertiary’ and 6 ‘higher tertiary’) and their migration background. We differentiate between the reference group of women in Turkey (i.e. mothers who lived in Turkey when giving birth to their child), European-born Turkish descendants (‘second generation’) who were born in Europe and gave birth to their child in Europe, women who were born in Turkey and migrated before the start of the fertility period (i.e. before age 13: we call these the ‘1.5 generation’ even though the age cut may differ from other definitions) and those who migrated at older ages (‘first generation’). The latter group is further divided by their motivation for migration. If the reason for migration was ‘getting married/joining spouse’, they are defined as ‘marriage migrants’, whereas all those migrating for other reasons including ‘joining family other than spouse’, ‘moving with parents/spouse’, ‘for a job’, ‘for study’, ‘other’ or without an answer are considered ‘other first generation migrants’.

In our total sample of 2,192 women, 1,409 had at least a first child, 1,165 had at least a second child, 639 had at least a third child, and 270 had at least a fourth child. The distribution of the main variables of interest is shown in Table 9.1. The table presents the information for those women at risk of having a first, second, third and fourth child, respectively.

Table 9.1 shows clear differences in educational level between the groups. Overall, women in Turkey have had less education than women in Europe, mainly because of the higher educational outcomes among those completing school in Europe. The highest educated are the second generation, followed by 1.5 generation women. First generation (marriage) migrants are, by contrast, lower educated than women in Turkey. Educational outcomes decrease with number of children, a first indicator of education being related to a fertility pattern of postponing and stopping.

As not all the women in the sample have yet completed their fertility biographies, we used survival analysis methods to investigate the differential chances of having a baby at any given age across groups of women. Specifically, we estimated multivariate Cox regression models to investigate fertility dynamics, taking account of the right-censored data (Dickman et al. 2012; Jenkins 2005). We report the hazard ratios from these models which represent the chance of an event occurring in group A as compared to group B. A hazard below 1 represents a lower chance of the event occurring,
and a value above 1 means a higher chance. The focus is on the differences in time to the birth of the first, second, third and fourth child, that is the chance of having given birth to first and subsequent children for Turkish women living in Europe compared to those in Turkey. The time scale is age, the process (survival) time is years until the event, that is the age at the event of childbirth, starting at the age of 13. The end of the process is either age at the event, that is the birth of the (first, second, third or fourth) child, the age of 50 (exit) or the age at the time of the interview between 2010 and 2012 (in which case the observation is ‘right censored’), whichever comes first.

**Results**

We now test the hypotheses developed above, taking account of the large socio-demographic changes in Turkey over recent decades by controlling for birth cohort. We begin by presenting models for the birth of the first child and, conditional on earlier births, for the second, third and fourth child in turn.

Table 9.2 shows the results from the models for transition to the first child.

---

**Table 9.1 Description of the sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At risk of...</th>
<th>1st child</th>
<th>2nd child</th>
<th>3rd child</th>
<th>4th child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women in Turkey</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All women in Europe (vs. Turkey)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation marriage migrant</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation other</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 generation</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort of woman 1950–1959</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1969</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1979</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1989</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–2000</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All women’s education</td>
<td>3.2 (1.30)</td>
<td>2.7 (1.17)</td>
<td>2.6 (1.13)</td>
<td>2.3 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of women in Turkey</td>
<td>3.0 (1.36)</td>
<td>2.5 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.4 (1.08)</td>
<td>2.0 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of women in Europe</td>
<td>3.6 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.2 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.1 (1.07)</td>
<td>2.8 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation marriage migrant</td>
<td>2.6 (0.89)</td>
<td>2.5 (0.88)</td>
<td>2.4 (0.85)</td>
<td>2.3 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation other</td>
<td>2.7 (1.08)</td>
<td>2.4 (0.90)</td>
<td>2.4 (0.84)</td>
<td>2.2 (0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 generation</td>
<td>3.5 (1.06)</td>
<td>3.3 (1.03)</td>
<td>3.2 (1.02)</td>
<td>3.1 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>4.0 (0.86)</td>
<td>3.8 (0.91)</td>
<td>3.8 (0.86)</td>
<td>3.7 (1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 2000 Families study, personal data, percentages and means with standard deviation in parentheses.*
Table 9.2  Relative risk of 1st childbirth, origin-destination differences and migration effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Origin-destination differences</th>
<th>Migration effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Europe (Ref.: in Turkey)</td>
<td>0.81**</td>
<td>0.90+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migrant</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation other</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.78+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 generation</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.78**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–1959</td>
<td>1.34**</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1969</td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>1.14+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1989</td>
<td>0.59***</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–2000</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.76***</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. cohort</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. cohort</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. cohort</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. cohort</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. cohort</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data. Cox regression, hazard ratios, n = 2,192. Significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.10. Controlled for regions of origin.
Model 1 in Table 9.2 suggests the likelihood of having a first child is lower in Europe than in Turkey; in other words, the transition to the first birth occurs earlier in Turkey. Taking account of the different cohorts, our findings show strong effects of demographic change over time (Model 2). The reference category comprises the cohort born between 1970 and 1979, and the results suggest a linear decline. Earlier cohorts show a significantly higher transition risk, whereas later cohorts show a significantly lower risk, supporting the notion of time-dependent fertility change as described for Turkey (see above). In Model 3, we take account of composition effects in terms of education. When we take account of education, the differences in transition rates between women in Turkey and Europe become insignificant (1.01, n.s.).

The delayed (or non-occurring) birth of first children among Turkish women in Europe is, thus, primarily due to their higher educational status (Hypothesis 2). Education has the expected highly significant negative effect on fertility. And changes in educational levels also largely explain cohort effects: divergences between the early cohort and the reference cohort disappear when we take account of education. However, fertility decline in younger cohorts is still significantly different from the reference category, suggesting factors in addition to educational expansion are responsible for more recent socio-demographic changes. In Model 4 we interact location with cohort to test whether the pattern of temporal change differs between women in Turkey and Europe. We find no evidence that this is the case. The development towards later transition is the same in both Turkey and Europe, suggesting similar patterns of change over time.

Turning to the specific effects linked to migration status, we find second generation migrants display substantially lower transition rates (Model 5), which are mediated by time (Model 6) and, more importantly, education (Model 7). The lower fertility in second generation women is still significantly different from the reference category, suggesting factors in addition to educational expansion are responsible for more recent socio-demographic changes. For first generation women, we find an impact of migration towards delaying childbirth (Hypothesis 4), but marriage migrants’ fertility behaviours are not specifically different from those of women in Turkey, giving no support to the accelerated childbearing of the marriage migration hypothesis (Hypothesis 3).

In the following analyses, we only include women who have already had a first child. This already implies some selection on the basis of education (see Table 9.1). Overall, Table 9.3 shows the factors influencing transition to the second child (Table 9.3) are quite similar to those relating to transition to the first child. The lower transition rate among Turkish women in Europe can be explained by cohort-related compositional and educational
### Table 9.3 Relative risk of 2nd childbirth, origin-destination differences and migration effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin-destination differences</th>
<th>Migration effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Europe (Ref.: in Turkey)</td>
<td>0.89+ (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation marriage migrant</td>
<td>0.93 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation other</td>
<td>0.99 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 generation</td>
<td>0.99 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>0.76** (0.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Birth cohort**

| 1950–1959 | 1.48*** (0.15) | 1.17 (0.12) | 1.30* (0.15) |
| 1960–1969 | 1.44*** (0.10) | 1.28** (0.09) | 1.23* (0.11) |
| 1980–1989 | 0.90 (0.08) | 0.96 (0.09) | 0.83 (0.10) |
| 1990–2000 | 0.51 (0.51) | 0.52 (0.52) | 1.58 (1.59) |

**Education**

| Europe* 1. cohort | 0.60* (0.14) |
| Europe* 2. cohort | 1.11 |
| Europe* 3. cohort | Ref. |
| Europe* 4. cohort | 1.42+ (0.27) |
| Europe* 5. cohort | – |

### Source
2000 Families study, personal data. Cox regression, hazard ratios, \( n = 1,409 \). Significance levels: *** \( p < 0.001 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), * \( p < 0.05 \), + \( p < 0.10 \). Controlled for regions of origin.
differences. No significant difference between the two groups remains after factoring these in (Model 3).

Across birth cohorts, we again find a decreasing likelihood of a second child, indicating demographic change towards later transitions and fewer children. That said, patterns of change differ to a larger extent between Turkey and Europe, with a more intense fertility decline in recent birth cohorts in Turkey.

With regard to different migrant types, once again there is little evidence of dissimilation from homeland among marriage migrants. When controlling for education, both second generation mothers and those who were socialised to some extent in Western Europe (1.5 generation) display higher transition rates to the second child, suggesting a tendency towards dissimilation from women in Turkey, not in terms of adjustment to lower fertility and later transitions but to earlier births and higher transition rates – once the decision for a first child has been taken.

This specific pattern of dissimilation applies even more to the transition to the third child. When cohort and education effects are controlled, the chance of transition to a third child is higher among the women in Europe (Model 3, Table 9.4). Again, the effect of education has a highly significant negative effect and only slightly reduces the impact of cohort differences. Over cohorts, we find again interesting patterns of socio-demographic change. The interaction effects indicate that in the early cohorts, Turkish mothers in Europe were less likely to have a third child than were mothers in Turkey. This pattern has clearly changed for younger cohorts in which Turkish mothers in Europe make a faster transition. Coefficients are not significant, but they clearly point in the same direction found for the transition to the second child. Remarkably, all four migrant groups show this distinct transition pattern of higher risks of a third child, when cohort effects and education differences are controlled (Model 7). While the effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels, they suggest a definite direction. Accordingly, lower raw transition in the second generation cannot be linked to specific patterns of adaptation (Hypothesis 5) but, rather, to compositional changes. Marriage migrants, just as other migrant women in Europe, appear more likely to have a third child than the stayer mothers in Turkey, even though the effect is not statistically significant in this necessarily smaller sample.

Table 9.5 reveals a different pattern in the transition to the fourth child. Transition rates are lower among mothers with three children in Europe than among their comparators in Turkey. This effect is independent of education, and, in fact, education does not play a distinctive role in the chances of making this transition (Model 3). Women of early birth cohorts (born until 1970) show much higher transitions than those born between 1970 and 1980. In later cohorts, birth risks are also higher (even if not significantly so), suggesting a U-shaped curve of child-bearing. When we look at specific
Table 9.4  Relative risk of 3rd childbirth, origin-destination differences and migration effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin-destination differences</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Migration effects</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women in Europe (Ref.: in Turkey)</td>
<td>0.94 (0.08)</td>
<td>1.02 (0.09)</td>
<td>1.19+ (0.11)</td>
<td>1.33+ (0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration experience (Ref: Women in Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st generation marriage migrant</td>
<td>1.13 (0.16)</td>
<td>1.17 (0.16)</td>
<td>1.17 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.17 (0.19)</td>
<td>1.10 (0.17)</td>
<td>1.12 (0.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 generation</td>
<td>0.87 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.93 (0.12)</td>
<td>1.22 (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.64** (0.11)</td>
<td>1.05 (0.17)</td>
<td>1.30 (0.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–1959</td>
<td>2.55*** (0.30)</td>
<td>1.89*** (0.23)</td>
<td>2.21*** (0.33)</td>
<td>2.47*** (0.30)</td>
<td>1.91*** (0.24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1969</td>
<td>1.50*** (0.14)</td>
<td>1.29** (0.12)</td>
<td>1.35* (0.17)</td>
<td>1.47*** (0.14)</td>
<td>1.30** (0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1989</td>
<td>0.80 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.86 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.69 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.81 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.85 (0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–2000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.71*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.70*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.70*** (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe* 1. cohort</td>
<td>0.57* (0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe* 2. cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91 (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe* 3. cohort</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe* 4. cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe* 5. cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data. Cox regression, hazard ratios, n = 1,165. Significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.10. Controlled for regions of origin.
Table 9.5  Relative risk of 4th childbirth, origin-destination differences and migration effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin-destination differences</th>
<th>Migration effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Europe (Ref.: in Turkey)</td>
<td>0.66** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration experience (Ref: Women in Turkey)</td>
<td>1st generation marriage migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation other</td>
<td>0.55* (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 generation</td>
<td>0.81 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>0.51* (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*1. cohort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*2. cohort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*4. cohort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe*5. cohort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data. Cox regression, hazard ratios, n = 649. Significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.10. Controlled for regions of origin.
migration experiences, we see women in Europe are less likely to have a fourth child across migrant statuses, but the pattern is most evident for those who migrated after the age of 13 but not for marriage; for them, the pattern is robust to the inclusion of controls for both cohort and education. A similar pattern can be seen for marriage migrants and second generation children, however, suggesting a more common migration effect.

Conclusion

This chapter sheds new light on patterns and mechanisms of fertility in a migration context. We are able to bring the dissimilation perspective (FitzGerald 2012) to bear, by drawing on the unique comparative data on women with the same regions of origin as migrants and their descendants in Europe (Guveli et al. 2014) available in the ‘2000 Families’ study. Such a region-of-origin perspective is important to take account of the ‘cultural backgrounds’ of women in Turkey and in Europe. Specifically, we consider general effects of socio-demographic change in the context of origin by comparing women from the birth cohorts starting in 1950 who live either in Turkey or in Europe with respect to their likelihood of entering parenthood or having subsequent children.

We developed our framework and hypotheses with reference to individual action-theoretical approaches (Huinink and Kohli 2014; Nauck 1997, 2007) and demographic research on fertility mechanisms in migration (e.g. Kulu and Milewski 2007). The former consider the choice to have a (subsequent) child as the outcome of cost-benefit calculations given the structural-institutional context, individual alternatives and values on parenthood. These opportunities and preferences may change in the course of women’s international migration, causing behavioural fertility changes, which become visible in fertility differences from women in the origin context. We expected structural-institutional influences of national welfare regimes to become visible in different fertility outcomes but find no such effects for the first and second child. After considering cohort and education effects, differences between women in Turkey and Europe are small. Considering the large socio-demographic changes in the regions of Turkey over the past decades, international migration to the low-fertility contexts of Western Europe with their specific structural-institutional contexts does not result in different fertility behaviours, once we factor out the contribution of differential educational attainment.

However, there are two exceptions to this general story. The transition to a third child is more likely in Europe, but women in Turkey with three children are more likely to have a fourth child. We suggest this pattern is linked to context differences. The lower costs of (multiple) children in Europe may explain the higher rates of a third child, and the greater benefits of a high number of children in parts of Turkey may lead to the higher rates of a
fourth child in certain population groups. Accordingly, the perceived costs and benefits are parity-specific. In Western Europe, the stopping pattern starts after the third child, whereas in Turkey, once three children are born, larger numbers of children are more likely. For Turkey, previous research shows fertility decline is mainly due to the reduction in higher parity families, with a large decrease in those having more than two children and desired fertility stopping at two children (Yavuz 2008; Klaus 2008). In Western Europe, the structural-institutional conditions seem to balance the individual cost-benefit calculations for having a third child, but only for migrants and their descendants. Milewski finds a third child is more likely among Turkish migrants than in the comparison group of Germans in Germany (Milewski 2010). Our data suggest the higher likelihood in all four migrant groups, namely marriage and other first and 1.5 migrants, as well as second generation migrant children. Having an additional third child is a migration-specific pattern, related to the specific contexts of origin and to the specific (structural-institutional) contexts of destination in Western Europe. However, the lower propensity to having a fourth child is also migration-specific and again relevant for all migrant groups. Overall, fertility decline in the sense of a reduced number of children is stronger among those who migrate or are the children of migrants.

A great deal of research suggests individual alternatives and related cost-benefit calculations vary substantially by educational level (Axinn and Barber 2001; Nauck and Tabuchi 2012). We find a strong effect of education for having a first, second or third child, but not for the fourth. As we hypothesised, educational composition effects account for the differences between women in Europe and Turkey to a large extent, at least for the first and second child. The strong effects of education are in line with findings for Turkey that longer periods of schooling reduce early child births (Günes 2013; Kirdar, Dayioglu and Koc 2009) and educational levels significantly affect the mother’s age at first birth (Yavuz, 2008), as well as the likelihood of having a third child (Yavuz 2006). In short, higher educational attainments and related individual alternatives make a difference to fertility (decisions) among European-born Turkish descendants.

Contrary to existing literature, we find no evidence that marriage migrants have higher transition rates than their non-migrant counterparts. Since this finding differs from earlier evidence (White 2011), it requires further attention (Milewski 2007; Andersson 2004). Nor do we find education-independent adaptation effects following assimilative changes for second generation women. That said, the hypothesis of effects of disruption or selection in terms of high costs of children can be partly supported: transitions to both first and fourth children among women migrating for reasons other than marriage are most certainly delayed.

The region-of-origin approach extends our understanding of migrant women’s fertility behaviours and links up with developments in recent
demographic and sociological research on family formation dynamics in migration contexts (Kulu and Milewski 2007). More importantly, it complements destination country-oriented research on Turkish migrants’ fertility behaviour that suggests ongoing higher fertility and higher transition rates among first, and to a lesser extent, among second generation migrants than among western populations. The patterns in Western Europe reflect the ‘homeland culture’ to a large degree, but we also find some migration-specific patterns.

Further work with the ‘2000 Families’ study might consider more indicators for the analysis of the theoretically relevant mechanisms, including destination country effects, as the study covers women in various different European countries. Numbers in any particular country may be low, but the analysis can contribute to recent discussions about the effects of national (family, social or integration) policies on fertility outcomes (Milewski 2011). Since the migration biographies of the women considered in this analysis are available, and the women were interviewed independently of their place of residence, it is possible to further differentiate migration patterns and their relation to fertility behaviours, including return migrants, migrants to other destinations outside Western Europe and those with multiple moves in their lives. This will be an interesting topic for future study.
Introduction

This chapter addresses the impact of migration on the size and composition of migrants’ social networks. Social networks, including acquaintanceships and informal contacts, friends and kin based ties, are a source of extensive sociological research for their significance in social mobility and status maintenance (Coleman 1988; Lin 1999), as well as their role in social support (see e.g. Seeman and Berkman 1988) and wellbeing, broadly defined (see e.g. Christakis and Fowler 2013). As Bourdieu (1997) has famously argued, forms of capital, including social capital, are ‘fungible’; hence, social networks can both enhance and interact with economic resources and human capital (Boxman et al. 1991). These complementarities between social networks and other embodied or asset-based resources can potentially render social networks especially salient for migrants (Aguilera and Massey 2003). At the same time, migration is likely to disrupt and transform the scale, type and meaning of social contacts that can be accessed in the destination context. The extent of such disruption and transformation is the key question in the ensuing analysis.

Networks are relevant at each stage of the migration and integration process. Migration systems are often regarded as being themselves located within social networks (Boyd 1989), and considerable attention has been paid to the compensatory role of social capital in the context of the disadvantage and exclusion that often follows labour migration (Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). A number of studies have emphasised the instrumental value of migrants’ social capital in the labour market, whether such networks are ethnically embedded, kin-based or operationised as contacts with majority members from the country of destination (Aguilera and Massey 2003; Kanas and Van Tubergen 2009), though Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) note the potential downsides of embeddedness within migrant communities. While the emphasis in the migration literature has often been on the social capital of working age men (Kanas and Van
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

Tubergen 2009), researchers are becoming interested in the wellbeing of older migrants and minorities and their access to social support (see e.g. Fokkema and Naderi 2013), as well as the role of social networks in supporting child health (Kana'iaupuni et al. 2005). In the context of recognition of the feminisation of migration (Curran et al. 2006), there is increasing interest in the specifics of women’s social networks and the gendered nature of social contacts of migrants and their descendants (Platt 2009a, 2012).

The chapter starts from the assumption that economic and subjective benefits can be derived from social networks, especially in the migration context, where processes of dislocation, cultural distance, relative inaccessibility of opportunities for economic advancement and discrimination may all place a premium on both regular and diffuse social contact. It also assumes the salience and nature of social contacts will vary with life stage and economic status, sex and migrant generation.

Despite the increasing attention paid to migrant networks in the literature and to comparisons with majority populations in destination countries, our understanding of the characteristics and correlates of European migrants’ social networks and how they are shaped by migration remains limited. While comparisons of migrants’ social networks and those of host populations in a given receiving society are informative of migrants’ experiences, such comparisons may capture differences associated with the origin societies rather than factors specifically related to migration. The contribution of this chapter, following the dissimilation perspective underlying this volume (see Chapter 1), is to address the extent to which migrants’ social networks diverge from those of their non-migrant counterparts. In the process, it goes some way towards isolating the impact of migration on migrants’ networks.

In what follows, we develop and test a number of hypotheses on the nature of migrants’ networks relative to the counterfactual of non-migration, covering network size and composition. In terms of composition, we focus on the extent to which friends are kin, men or women, employed or not, and university educated or not. We take into account the role of age and life stage in shaping different types of network. We explore men’s and women’s networks separately and distinguish between the migrant and second generation, as well as return migrants and stayers.

While the focus on those from Turkey means the findings cannot necessarily be generalised to other migrant groups, it does enable us to draw meaningful comparisons between migrants and non-migrants, as they share a common background and cultural and normative context. This renders comparison of responses to perceptual questions, such as measures of perceived network size, more robust. A common criticism of differential responses to such questions is that migrant and majority populations understand the questions differently or have different frames of reference. Because we avoid this problem, we claim our findings on differences between migrants and non-migrants in perceived network size, as well as
composition and frequency of contact, represent real differences that shed light on migration processes.

The design and coverage of the 2000 Families data provide an extremely rich set of measures of social networks and social contact. This, along with the study’s coverage of those at different ages and life stages, allows us to establish an unprecedentedly comprehensive picture of patterns of contact among migrants and non-migrants from Turkey.

Background: social networks, social capital and migration

Migration and migrants’ social networks

The relatively recent burgeoning of interest in social capital has highlighted the instrumental value of social networks and ‘sociability’ (Bourdieu 1997; Coleman 1988; Portes 1998). In Bourdieu’s emphasis on the access social capital provides to other forms of capital (human or economic) and Coleman’s emphasis on the incidental benefits of informal social contact, social networks are seen as providing an important element to understanding how some individuals ‘get on’ and others do not. Accordingly, social capital is much discussed in terms of its value for both individuals and societies (Lin 1999; Portes 1998; Putnam 1995, 2007). Social networks have also been highlighted as presenting challenges for individuals – and societies – depending on the extent to which they ‘bridge’ social groups or are based on alliances between those in a similar socio-economic position, ‘bonding’ them together (Granovetter 1973; Lin 2001).

The relevance and potentially positive impacts of social networks are as great for migrants as they are for majority society. In fact, social networks are likely to be even more important in a migration context, as they can act as a resource and as a source of support, protection and affirmation in an unfamiliar if not hostile environment (Bolt et al. 2009; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). At the same time, some argue migrant-based networks may inhibit social mobility and limit opportunities and social capital for those who ‘bond’ with their fellow migrants to the exclusion of others (Völker et al. 2008). As the preceding discussion suggests, the extent and composition of migrants’ social networks and how they are influenced by the fact of migration remain highly relevant questions if we are to better understand the situation of migrants in countries of destination.

It seems self-evident that social networks take on different significance and operate in different ways following migration, and an extensive literature has developed around the nature and significance of different forms of migrants’ social networks. There are a number of ways in which migration has been conceived as having relevance to the extent and type of social networks. Migration can disrupt social networks through the effect of mobility and separation. It can be embedded in and, hence, increase the salience of kin ties. It can introduce heterogeneity into migrant networks,
linking migrants to others who can enable their economic advancement and provide ethnic capital (Borjas 1992). Among migrants, social networks can be especially significant for job contacts. In addition, we would expect migrants’ social networks to be dominated by those from the same ethnic or national origins, in part as a by-product of these other processes (Völker et al. 2008). This means ethnic embeddedness should cross-cut many of these migration effects. In what follows, we take each of these points in turn and derive corresponding expectations for our counterfactual comparison.

Network size and intensity
First, we consider network size. Coleman (1988) assumes moving is disruptive for social capital. It is logical that a major move will result in a smaller range of acquaintances or close contacts. For example, moving to another country is likely to disrupt and limit social networks and reduce more casual contacts. Linguistic and social/cultural barriers may render the process of re-establishing networks in a foreign country challenging. Exacerbating the situation, migrants often move sequentially, causing multiple ruptures and making contacts harder to maintain. As a result, we anticipate migrants’ social networks (both friends and acquaintances) will be smaller than non-migrants’ social networks (Hypothesis 1).

While social capital is typically analysed on a neighbourhood basis, in contemporary society, networks can be maintained and reciprocal benefit obtained across substantial distances. In other words, the assumption that social capital is likely to be embedded in neighbourhood social relations may not be well-founded. Technology and greater ease of transport mean close relations can be maintained with those who are far removed (Dekker and Engbersen 2012; Williams and Baláž 2009). Nauck and Kohlmann (1999) show how distance/proximity are not necessary determinants of close networks among migrants. It is important to consider social networks directly to understand their nature and extent, rather than inferring them from neighbourhood characteristics, as is typically done (e.g. Becares et al. 2009). At the same time, contacts maintained across substantial distances or primarily by electronic or remote forms of contact are still likely to be harder to maintain than local ones. We therefore expect migrants will maintain extensive contacts with their social networks in Turkey, contributing to network and friendship size, but the intensity of contact will be lower overall (H2).

We expect to see some differences between men and women in network size, conditional on migration. In general, women have larger social networks than men (Haines and Hulbert 1992) and are more likely to have close friends to whom they can turn for support (Walens and Lachman 2000). But disruption to social networks consequent on migration may be particularly great for women, particular if they have moved as ‘tied’ migrants or for family reunification. For example, Platt (2009a, 2012) shows minority women’s social networks tend to be smaller than those of men, and women
face greater risks of social isolation. Hence, we expect migrant women will have smaller social networks and higher risks of having no friends than migrant men, the reverse of the position of non-migrants (H3).

**Kin networks**

Mobility can be embedded in patterns of social connection, including kin connection (Boyd 1989). The value of kin-based social relations in supporting migration processes is a critical element in migration, particularly given the transition from labour migration to chain/family migration across the family generations covered in our data (see Chapter 4). It is, moreover, in the closest family ties that most practical (Aguilera and Massey 2003) and emotional support may be found. This is especially likely to be the case for those with fewest resources (Kana'iaupuni et al. 2005). Rather than separating family ties from social networks, Nauck and Kohlman (1999) rightly call for family networks to be explicitly considered as part of those social networks which help migrants to integrate into their new lives. We therefore expect kin will be especially important in the friendship networks of migrants. We also expect kin will feature prominently among women’s friends. Even so, we expect the role of kin networks to dissipate across migrant generations; members of the second generation will be more comparable to their non-migrant counterparts than to the first migrant generation (H4).

**Network heterogeneity**

Kin contacts contribute to the ethnic homogeneity of migrant networks, but at the same time, kin outside the immediate family may contribute to the heterogeneity of networks in other dimensions, such as age, education or sex (Kalmijn 2002). Kin may also enhance links to others with relevant resources (Völker et al. 2008). While homophily can be regarded as the dominant principle of social networks (McPherson et al. 2001), a key argument in the social capital literature is that the more heterogeneous individuals’ networks are, the more likely they are to gain instrumental benefit. This is the well-known distinction between ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ capital or ‘strong and weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973; Lin 2001; Putnam 1995). Migrants are often regarded as especially liable to develop ‘bonding’ forms of capital at the expense of the advantages offered by bridging social capital (Cheong et al. 2007), but with ‘bonding’ defined as ethnically homogenous networks. Turks in Germany and the Netherlands are known for having largely Turkish friendships, even when compared to other migrant groups (see, e.g. the discussion in Völker et al. 2008), but does it necessarily follow that they are less likely to be heterogeneous in other ways, such as level of education, class, or gender?

While the dominant position is that weak ties offer greater access to varied social networks (Lin 2001), it has been shown that weak ties do not
necessarily offer more diversity than close ones (DiPrete 2011). Moreover, contra Völker et al. (2008), it may plausibly be argued that ethnically embedded networks can introduce diversity across conventional divides such as class and income through an appeal to common origins. Migration is also likely to disrupt standard social hierarchies through, for example, increased social mobility (i.e. less association between parental and own social class) following migration (see also Chapter 6), and it will tend to lower the value of qualifications and experience gained in other countries. Both factors are likely to lead to greater contact between those with different class origins and qualifications within ethnic networks. The dominance of co-ethnics in migrants’ social networks would lead us to expect greater heterogeneity in migrants’ than in non-migrants’ social networks (H5), as reflected in friends’ educational attainment, employment status and the sex composition of friendships. Social networks, including those of migrants, tend to be highly gendered (Zontini 2010). That said, the greater labour market participation of women in countries of destination, stronger egalitarian norms and higher employment rates of migrant women themselves relative to Turkish women are likely to reduce the extent to which friendships are same-sex, particularly among the second generation.

Networks and employment

Network heterogeneity and ethnic capital are likely to be reflected in the employment status of friends. In its focus on labour market outcomes of migrants, the migration literature has explored the role of contacts in facilitating employment opportunities. For ‘breadwinners’ of working age, networks may be critical in enabling employment or the maximisation of earnings (Rainer and Siedler 2009), and this is particularly relevant for migrants. For example, Aguilera and Massey (2003) show social capital can enhance employment and earnings for undocumented migrants, while Dustmann et al. (2011) provide evidence of the role of (co-ethnic) networks in enhancing job match. By way of contrast, other research demonstrates the extent to which having friends of the host country decreases unemployment risks (Kalter 2006).

The role of ethnic ‘enclaves’ in creating employment opportunities is less-clear cut (Cutler and Glaeser 1997). Some identify a notable lack of economic benefits of ethnic ‘enclaves’ (Clark and Drinkwater 2000; Zhou 2005), though the traditional model favours their productive value for migrant communities (Portes and Jensen 1989). However, as discussed, the relationship between neighbourhood characteristics and social networks may not be as direct as typically assumed. Even if enclaves do not bring economic advantage, it does not mean that (ethnically embedded) social networks are not relevant for access to employment. Moreover, it remains theoretically plausible that having employed friends will be highly relevant for the
labour market participation of migrants, providing some compensation for lack of familiarity with the context and local job search procedures (Frijters et al. 2003), particularly in the first generation.

We therefore expect men and women migrants of working age, particularly those who are employed, will have more employed friends than will comparable non-migrants (H6). Again, we expect this to be particularly likely in the migrant generation.

**Ethnic embeddedness**

Most of these processes imply some degree of ethnic embeddedness of migrants’ social networks. The importance of ethnic capital in sustaining minority communities and facilitating social mobility has been strongly argued (Borjas 1992; Shah et al. 2010). While the ethnic/national embeddedness of migrants’ social networks is not something we can compare with non-migrants, we expect it to be evident among migrants and the second generation but to become reduced over time.

Life stage trajectories undoubtedly play a role in shaping the social network patterns of both migrants and non-migrants, and to the extent there are differences in age, family or employment status between migrants and non-migrants, these are likely to explain part of any difference in social network composition. Accordingly, we account for these in the analysis.

Our hypotheses are summarised in Figure 10.1. The figure shows the differences we expect to find between migrants and non-migrants and whether we expect them to differ across migration generations or by sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of hypothesis</th>
<th>Migrants compared to non-migrants</th>
<th>Different for second generation compared to migrants?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1 Network size</td>
<td>Smaller</td>
<td>Yes; more similar to non-migrants’ network size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 Contact with those in Turkey</td>
<td>Less intense</td>
<td>No; less frequent contact with those friends in Turkey, as for migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3 Sex differences in size / no friends</td>
<td>Smaller for migrant women; migrant women greater chance of no friends</td>
<td>Yes; less marked sex differences expected among second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4 Kin based networks</td>
<td>More dominant</td>
<td>Yes; similar kinship base as for non-migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5 Heterogeneity of network (sex, education)</td>
<td>Greater</td>
<td>No; i.e. greater heterogeneity than non-migrants, as for migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6 Employed</td>
<td>Greater</td>
<td>No; i.e. greater number employed, as for migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 10.1  Social network hypotheses*
Data and sample

Data

We draw on a unique dataset (Guveli et al. 2016) that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families dataset, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012. From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone.

This chapter makes use of the personal data provided in main interviews with members of the surveyed families across three generations (see Chapter 2 for a full description of the data). The personal data comprise detailed information on social-economic resources, beliefs and values. These data were directly collected from the ancestors (if still living) and from two randomly selected children and four randomly selected grandchildren in the same lineage. The data cover around 6,000 individual respondents.

Since the network questions were not asked in the pilot study conducted in one of the sending regions (see Chapter 2), we only have information for the other four regions. Excluding missing data on acquaintances and friends, we have valid information about the friendship networks of 4,600 respondents (2,806 men and 1,794 women), and we have valid information on a slightly larger number of respondents in relationship to their overall network size 4,737 (2,918 men and 1,819 women). We use these full samples in the descriptive analysis of friends and networks. In the analysis adjusting for age, life stage and other influences, we use slightly smaller samples of 4,248 (overall network) and 4,142 (friends) for whom we have non-missing data on all included variables.1

Dependent variables

Our dependent variables are derived from questions asking about number of acquaintances, number of friends (including absence of any friends), and the characteristics of three (close) friends. Specifically, acquaintances are defined in the following terms: ‘I want to ask a question about the people you are acquainted with. By acquaintanceship, we mean that you know their name and would stop and talk at least for a moment if you run into them on the street’. ‘Friends’ are defined as follows: ‘Let us now talk a bit about the people who are important to you and who you feel close to. Please DO NOT include your parents, your partner or your children but you CAN include other relatives’.
In our descriptive analysis, we illustrate the unadjusted distributions of these variables. Given the clear left skew to the distribution of acquaintances and friends, to model the characteristics associated with larger or smaller networks, we transform them by taking the log value and then estimating Ordinary Least Squares regression models. Since log transformations do not accommodate zero values, we exclude those 16 cases with no acquaintances and 349 cases with no friends from the regression analysis (resulting in sample sizes of 4,232 and 3,793 respectively). Instead, we separately model those who report having zero friends as a measure of ‘social isolation’. We estimate binary logistic regression models to evaluate the correlates of isolation.

Follow-up questions to the friendship question were asked about (up to) three of these friends. We use these ‘three best friends’ questions to explore descriptively the type and intensity of contact. For each of the (up to) three friends we know what country they are living in, their sex, education level, employment status, whether or not they are kin and their frequency of contact. Contact (face-to-face or phone) was measured on a frequency scale ranging from 1 (rarely or never) to 6 (every day) and was separately calculated for contact with those living in Europe and Turkey to capture the extent of persistent transnational contacts and their intensity.

We estimate a series of ordered logistic regressions (with outcomes ranging from 0 to 3) for country, kin, sex, higher education, employed and Turkish origins to show the factors associated with respondents having additional friends of a particular ‘type’. For contact frequency, we estimate ordinary least squares models of average contact. For reasons of parsimony and ease of review, we summarise the results from these series of regression models in schematic form.

**Independent variable**

The key independent variable is migration status. Given the patterns of migration and remigration across generations evidenced in the data, there are a number of ways to differentiate ‘migrants’ from ‘non-migrants’. In this chapter, we define five types of migration status:

- non-migrants: those born in Turkey who have never migrated (46 per cent of sample);
- migrants: those born in Turkey who moved to and continue to live in Europe (23 per cent);
- second generation: those who were born in Europe and are still living there (16 per cent);
- return migrants: those who were born in Turkey, migrated to Europe and returned to Turkey (14 per cent);
- migrants to Turkey: those who were born in Europe and migrated to Turkey (1 per cent).
We use these terms throughout the chapter. Note that second generation consistently refers to the second migrant generation (i.e. born in Europe) and does not refer to the middle family generation, which is referenced by G2, as in the rest of this volume. Since the migrants to Turkey form such a small group, we include them in the analysis for completeness but do not discuss results relating to them.

Control Variables

Life stage is captured by age, marital status and presence of children. Employment status (employed or not) complements these life stage variables, as it is a component of the life stage itself; it also tests for the extent to which forms of networks are sensitive to being employed. Education (measured as a standardised set of levels and included as a continuous variable) provides a means to capture the expected relationship between network size/composition and education. That is, those with higher levels of education typically have larger social networks, and we expect them, on the grounds of homophily, to have more educated social networks. In addition, we interact education and employment with migration status in models on the education and employment status of friends to determine whether homophily differs among migrants and non-migrants.

All analyses control for sampling region. Our exploratory analysis tested for destination country effects on social networks and found no significant differences, so destination country controls are not included. All analyses adjust standard errors for within-family clustering.

Results

Network size

The first key finding is that Turks have large social networks. If we look simply at the number of acquaintances, Turks, whether in Europe or Turkey, count their networks in the hundreds with some numbering in the thousands. This is not out of line with estimates of network size using US data (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004), but there is a considerable range.

Table 10.1 shows the mean numbers of acquaintances and friends and the standard deviations for their distributions. While there appears to be some variation by migration status, there are no statistically significant differences in overall network size (acquaintances) between non-migrants and the different migrant types for either men or women. Women migrants and second generation women and men have significantly smaller friendship networks than their non-migrant counterparts. There are a number of differences between the sexes: non-migrant and return migrant men have larger overall networks and larger numbers of friends than their female counterparts, while migrant men have significantly larger friendship but not overall
network sizes than migrant women. Interestingly, there are no differences in friendship sizes between second generation men and women – and it is among this group that numbers of friends are fewest.

The patterns across migration types also combine substantial differences in age and life stage, and these vary by migration context. We therefore move to a regression framework to adjust for these factors. Table 10.2 shows the results of this analysis. As noted, we adjust for the skewed distribution of acquaintances and friendships, taking the log of acquaintances and friends, and separately model having no friends (accounting for around nine per cent of the sample) as social isolation.

Many of the predictors illustrate the direction of effect we expect; numbers of friends and acquaintances increase with age, though with an inverse u-shaped distribution. Numbers of friends and acquaintances also increase with education, and the risk of isolation declines with increasing education. Relative to employment, having family responsibilities is associated with a smaller network size, while unemployment puts respondents at greater risk of having no friends. Women have smaller networks than their male counterparts, but they do not seem to face greater risks of isolation overall.

Most interesting from our perspective are the migration effects. Once life cycle and economic factors are taken into account, migration is associated with reduced overall network size and fewer friends, in line with our expectations. Not only does this continue to be true for the second migrant generation, but they also face increased risks of having no friends compared to those who never left Turkey. By contrast, return migrants face no friendship

Table 10.1 Numbers of acquaintances and friends by migrant status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non migrants</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Second generation</th>
<th>Return Migrant</th>
<th>Migrant to Turkey</th>
<th>N (sample size)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men Acquaintances</td>
<td>491 (2699) 533 (5527) 346 (2645)</td>
<td>678 (2530) 1368 (4299)</td>
<td>2918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>17 (74) 13 (54) 7 (12)</td>
<td>17 (98) 18 (28)</td>
<td>2806</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Acquaintances</td>
<td>152 (305) 128 (265) 134 (285)</td>
<td>197 (346) 175 (268)</td>
<td>1819</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>9 (19) 6 (13) 6 (16)</td>
<td>7 (8) 8 (10)</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mean number; standard deviation (sd) in parentheses.
Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
### Table 10.2  Factors influencing log number of acquaintances, friends and the risk of isolation, estimates from OLS (acquaintances, friends) and logistic (isolation) regression models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of acquaintances</th>
<th>Number of friends</th>
<th>No friends (isolation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>b</strong></td>
<td><strong>se</strong></td>
<td><strong>b</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant type (Ref.=stayer in Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>(-0.47***) (0.06)</td>
<td>(-0.21***) (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migrant</td>
<td>(0.18^*) (0.09)</td>
<td>(-0.04) (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant to Turkey</td>
<td>(0.34) (0.23)</td>
<td>(-0.09) (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>(0.05***) (0.00)</td>
<td>(0.05**) (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared * 100</td>
<td>(-0.03**) (0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.06^*) (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status (Ref.=single never married)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>(0.05) (0.10)</td>
<td>(-0.04) (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated, divorced, widowed</td>
<td>(0.15) (0.15)</td>
<td>(0.02) (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in household</td>
<td>(-0.17^+) (0.10)</td>
<td>(-0.05) (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education level</strong></td>
<td>(0.07***) (0.01)</td>
<td>(0.05***) (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic status (Ref.=employed)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>(-0.09) (0.12)</td>
<td>(0.01) (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family responsibilities</td>
<td>(-0.47***) (0.07)</td>
<td>(-0.19**) (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In education</td>
<td>(-0.01) (0.09)</td>
<td>(0.00) (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>(-0.06) (0.12)</td>
<td>(-0.09) (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(-0.11) (0.16)</td>
<td>(0.20) (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(4.11***) (0.14)</td>
<td>(0.67^*) (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4232</td>
<td>3793</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Analysis controls for sampling region.

**Source:** 2000 Families study, personal data. ***\(p \leq 0.001\); **\(p \leq 0.01\); *\(p \leq 0.05\); +\(p \leq 0.1\)

Deficit on the basis of having migrated at some point, and return to Turkey even seems to bring an enhanced overall network.

We additionally tested (not illustrated here) whether any of the migration effects are distinct for women by interacting sex with migration type – to explore more explicitly our third hypothesis. While women do not experience the relatively reduced number of acquaintances faced by the second generation overall, there is some evidence that second generation women drive the association between the second generation generally (i.e. both men and women) and having no friends.
The findings suggest migrants experience disruptions in their social networks after leaving Turkey; this affects both men and women and persists markedly into the second generation who, surprisingly, do not appear to acquire compensatory host country networks. Since men tend to have larger network sizes whether in Turkey or Europe, migrant women, particularly second generation women, are left with the smallest network sizes, though with relatively greater equality with equivalent migrant men.

**Network composition**

The preceding analysis tells us little about the nature or quality of these friendships. Therefore, we move on to explore the composition of social networks by migration status. This gives us insight into variations in the extent to which these networks are kin-based and/or show heterogeneity. We also compare contact intensity for those with friends in Turkey. Finally, for migrants, we explore the extent to which networks are primarily composed of others with Turkish origins.

Table 10.3 illustrates the key network characteristics of men and women by migration status. The first measure is the number of friends, followed by their key characteristics. While respondents could name up to three, they often gave information about only two or one. Some said they had no friends. For each characteristic, some respondents had three friends who displayed that characteristic, while others had none.

There are a number of interesting findings across these measures. As we might expect, those living in Turkey make up a smaller share of a migrant’s social network and more so across generations. This is true for both men and women. Contact with those friends who do live in Turkey is also lower for migrants than for those living in Turkey, again as we might expect (H2), but it is not as much lower as we might expect if we assumed distance or proximity are the primary influences on contact maintenance. Instead, we see how technological developments are increasing ease of travel and ensuring high levels of contact (i.e. phone or Internet) with friends in Turkey, falling between 4.6 and 4.9, where four represents ‘every week’ and five represents ‘most days’. This is the case across migrants and the second generation.

Interestingly, the numbers of university educated friends are higher (for both men and women) among the non-migrants in Turkey than among the migrants. Additionally, the rate of university educated friends is greater in the second generation relative to the migrant generation, as we might expect given overall levels of education in Europe compared to Turkey. The finding of more ‘educated’ networks among the non-migrants counters our hypotheses on diversity of networks and access to social capital, an issue we explore further below. Among women, migrants are more likely to cite a lower share of women among their close friends than non-migrants. This supports our expectation that migration introduces greater diversity into networks, at least for women. We now test whether this is driven by women’s employment status and/or by men’s and women’s education.
Table 10.3  Nature of friendship networks by migrant status and sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men ($N = 2806$)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-migrants</td>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>Return migrant</td>
<td>Migrant to Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average N friends (of 3)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Turkey</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Europe</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number with university education</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number employed</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number women</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Turkish</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number relatives</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact with those in Turkey</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact with those in Europe</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women ($N = 1794$)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-migrants</td>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>Return migrant</td>
<td>Migrant to Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average N friends (of 3)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Turkey</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Europe</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number with university education</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number employed</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number women</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Turkish</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number relatives</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact with those in Turkey</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact with those in Europe</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
While Table 10.3 differentiates by sex, we expect these patterns to be driven, in part, by differences in age, life stage, and the respondent’s own education and economic context. We therefore address the extent to which the observed differences can be accounted for by these factors. With 11 dependent variables, this implies conducting many separate regression analyses, particularly as we also want to test interactions between migration status and sex for each model, that is whether differences by migration type are different for men and women. Two further interactions are of interest: first, whether the impact of employment status on numbers of employed friends differs by migration status and second, whether the influence of education level on the probability of having university educated friends differs by migration status.

We summarise the results from these 24 models schematically in Table 10.4. For each network characteristic, column 2 summarises the direction of any significant migration effects, with the control variables included. Column 3 summarises the coefficient for sex, identifying any statistically significant differences between women and men across migration statuses. Finally, column 4 summarises the findings from the models interacting sex and migration status. That is, it identifies whether the effects for migration status differ between men and women. The interactions between migration status and employment/education for the employed and highly educated friends’ models are summarised, at the relevant points, in column 2.

Table 10.4 amplifies the patterns illustrated in Table 10.3. Migrants are less likely to have/provide information about three close friends than non-migrants, and this is consistent for both men and women. As expected, close friends are more likely to be based in Europe for migrants and in Turkey for non-migrants and return migrants, though as we saw above, friends from Turkey still play a role in migrants’ social networks. Interestingly, once accounting for life stage factors, women migrants are less likely than their male counterparts to have friends from Turkey and commensurately tend to report higher numbers of friends from Europe within their close networks.

The propensity of those in Turkey to have more people with higher education among their close friends results from more highly educated migrants being less likely to have university educated friends, relative to more highly educated non-migrants. This suggests less homophily among migrants. However, this is also a gendered story, as the pattern applies only to migrant men. Women are more likely than men to number university educated friends in their close networks, and this is particularly true for migrant women.

Employment status is, as we might expect, linked to the propensity to have employed friends. However, while this is a clear relationship for non-migrants, among migrants, somewhat counter to our expectations (H6), those out of the labour market have a greater tendency than their counterparts in Turkey to have employed friends. Moreover, while women in Turkey tend to
Table 10.4  Nature of close networks, by sex and whether in Europe or Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Migrant status, relative to Stayers</th>
<th>Women different from men?</th>
<th>Different for W in Europe or Turkey?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N of friends (of 3)</td>
<td>Lower for migrants and second generation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Turkey</td>
<td>Lower for migrants and second generation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Even lower for migrant W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Europe</td>
<td>Greater for migrants, second generation and return migrants</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Even higher for migrant W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number with university education</td>
<td>Lower for migrants and second generation (for migrants, more highly educated migrants are relatively less likely to know university educated others)</td>
<td>More than men</td>
<td>Even higher for migrant W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number employed</td>
<td>No difference overall, but interaction with employment status suggests that relatively fewer friends among second generation and migrant employed, but relatively more among migrants with family responsibilities and in education</td>
<td>Fewer than men</td>
<td>But higher for women among migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number women</td>
<td>Fewer for second generation</td>
<td>More for women</td>
<td>But relatively fewer for migrant and second generation W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Turkish</td>
<td>Fewer for second generation compared to migrants</td>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number relatives</td>
<td>More for migrants and fewer for second generation</td>
<td>More for women</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact</td>
<td>Lower for migrants</td>
<td>Lower for women</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact with those in Turkey</td>
<td>Lower for migrants and second generation</td>
<td>Lower for women</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average contact with those in Europe</td>
<td>Greater for migrants and second generation</td>
<td>Lower for women</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Summaries of regression coefficients with a minimum statistical significance level of p<=0.05 from multiple multivariate regression models.

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
have fewer employed friends, even conditioning on employment status, we see the opposite pattern among migrant women. Migration appears to introduce heterogeneity into social networks (H5); this does not increase men's overall access to embodied social capital in the form of educated or employed friends, but it does appear to do so for women. Finally, reduced homophily or greater network heterogeneity among migrant women is reflected in the lesser extent to which their networks are dominated by women.

In line with our expectations, migrant networks are more likely to be embedded in kinship networks (H4), and this association dissipates somewhat in the second generation. Intensity of contact overall is lower for migrants and lower for women (though not so much for migrant women). Hence, while networks may be important to the migration process, this does not necessarily result in greater intensity of contact. As we noted in relation to Table 10.3, the differences are not great and may possibly reflect differences of context, for example, the relatively small town or village settings of non-migrants compared to the more urban settings of migrants.

What can we conclude about networks of migrants (and second generation) relative to non-migrants (or return migrants)? First, over the migrant and second generation, we see changes in the direction that we would expect, with the second generation’s networks becoming less ‘Turkish’. We also find the expected slightly greater dominance of kinship in the close networks of migrants. However, while there is less homophily among migrants’ networks, this does not result in greater access to ethnic capital for men. For women, the picture is slightly different. Migration seems to bring not only more diverse networks, not fully explained by migrant women’s greater likelihood of being employed, but also to bring greater social capital in the form of more highly educated and more employed friends than non-migrant women. In other words, migration appears to disrupt typical patterns of social networks, to some degree, but much more so for women who face different gender and employment norms.

**Conclusion**

According to the social capital literature, migration will disrupt social networks and refocus them around family. Social networks can have valuable instrumental uses for migrants in facilitating their migration and enabling access to labour market opportunities and social support. That said, the nature and utility of friendship networks are likely to vary by life stage. Therefore, we initially expected the degree and composition of social networks would be driven, in part, by factors relating to socio-demographic characteristics. Over and above this, however, we anticipated migrants’ social networks would have distinctive differences from those of non-migrants.

In fact, we find a considerable degree of continuity in network patterns across Turkish migrants and non-migrants, with typically large numbers of
acquaintances and friends, especially among men, and with a high level of ethnic embeddedness among the migrants’ networks. Even adjusting for differences in life stage and socio-economic position, however, some distinctive differences remain. Specifically, European Turks’ networks are somewhat smaller in both the migrant and the second generation, and second generation women are more likely to have no friends. There are also differences in friendship composition, with non-migrants having more university-educated friends, on average, among their networks, and migrants having more kin. The differences between women migrants and non-migrants in the composition of their networks are more distinctive. Women migrants’ networks differ more from the counterfactual of non-migrants’ networks than do men’s and exhibit more of the network heterogeneity and social capital accumulation that we might expect the migration process to introduce.

The implications of these findings are twofold. First, the substantial points of similarity between migrants and their counterparts in Turkey may indicate that comparisons with destination country populations overstate the distinctiveness of migrants’ social networks as a consequence of migration. This suggests we should be cautious about how we interpret claims of social capital accumulation and patterning of migrants’ social networks as a specific response to migration. We also see how it is possible to maintain relatively intensive links with friends at a distance, raising questions about equating ethnic networks with neighbourhood composition. At the same time, we see adjustment over generations to less Turkish-oriented networks, suggesting a gradual process of dissimilation rather than a specific moment of rupture.

Second, we find the expected impacts of migration in terms of network heterogeneity to some extent for both men and women, but more so for women, who seem to be relatively better positioned to exploit ethnic capital within their networks. This finding opens up avenues for future research to explore the role of social networks among migrants, especially women, and invites elaboration of the ways migration can both break and reinforce gendered expectations and patterns of social interaction.
Part IV
Introduction

Some academics assert that migrants embrace the lifestyles and values of host societies across generations, whereas others claim they find reassurance in a familiar religion in the unfamiliar environment (Alba 2005; Hagan 2006; Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). For example, some say the discriminatory and exclusionary environment of European countries increases interest in religion amongst younger Turkish Europeans (Connor 2010; Guveli 2015). Accordingly, recent studies on the religious devotion of migrants in Western secular societies are paying special attention to Muslim migrants, comparing Muslims to both non-Muslim migrant groups and native-born majority populations to evaluate the degree of integration of Muslims into secular societies. A recurring question in these studies has been to what extent Muslims assimilate into and adopt the secular lifestyles of Western societies over time and across generations.

Given the recency of this surge of interest in Muslim migrants’ religiosity, few studies conducted in the field of migrant transnationalism include a comparison with origin country religiosity. Those few that do so are mostly qualitative analyses of information obtained from a limited number of respondents or from the leaders of religious groups (Levitt 2003, 2007). For the most part, they find religion is revised in the process of migrant incorporation in destination countries, and this reformulated religion also shapes the origin country’s religious life. In addition, they suggest migrants are selected compared to stayers; that is, they are less religious (Alanezi and Sherkat 2008).

Much public discussion centres on the links of European Muslims with their origin countries and with religious communities in these countries. According to the 2000 Family study, about 50 per cent of Turks living in Europe visited Turkey four to five times in the last five years and almost all (97 per cent) want to be buried in Turkey. This tells us that migrant Muslims who may have moved to a more secular society continue to interact with
former neighbours, relatives and stay-at-home friends, exchanging beliefs, lifestyles and worldviews. But we have little insight into the religiosity of Muslim Turkish migrants compared to those who stayed behind. To reveal the impact of migration on religiosity, we need to compare migrant Muslims’ religiosity with that of those left behind, over time and across generations. Only by so doing can we clarify the progression of Islam in European destination countries and uncover the reciprocal relationship between sending and receiving countries.

In this chapter, we break new ground by directly comparing the religiosity of Turks in Europe with that of their peers in Turkey. Importantly, we are able to control for various pre-migration characteristics of first generation migrants that may have been associated with their religiosity; though we cannot fully rule out migrant selectivity. By contrast with destination-country migrant religiosity research, we focus on dissimilation from origins – becoming different than those in origin country lifestyles – rather than assimilation (becoming similar) to destination country practices and beliefs.

We also consider different dimensions of religious practice and involvement (Glock 1962), since these may fit better with and play out differently in different contexts. For example, Guveli (2015) compares European Turks to Turks in Turkey; she concludes that the religiosity of European Turks is not unidirectional, but shows different trends in relation to different manifestations of religiosity. Papers which utilise only one measure of religiosity (such as attendance at worship) or combine measures into a single index are likely to miss some of the dynamics of post-migration religiosity.

Studies using cross-sectional surveys find high rates of religiosity among Muslims in European countries (Diehl and Koenig 2013; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Guveli and Platt 2011; Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts 2010). Yet we have little information about the patterning of religiosity over time and across linked family generations (for exceptions, see Scourfield et al. 2012; Van de Pol and Van Tubergen 2013). Even where panel data exist, they typically do not show changes in religiosity over the life course among Muslims, as religiosity is assumed to be stable or fixed. Moreover, the majority of studies covering multiple destination contexts focus mostly on the first migrant generation (Aleksynska and Chiswick 2013; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 2011).

Using the unique multi-site and multigenerational qualities of the ‘2000 Families’ data, this chapter examines the religiosity of the first generation ‘guest workers’, their children and grandchildren and explores what happens to religiosity within families across these three generations, comparing them with their counterparts from the same regions of origin in Turkey. It addresses three pertinent but hitherto unanswered questions. The first relates to dissimilation from origin country religiosity. We ask to what extent migrants are more or less religious than stayers. The second and third
questions concern dissimilation from social origin (parents and grandparents). We ask to what extent the religiosity of parents (second generation) and grandparents (first generation/ancestor/guest worker) influences the religiosity of the third generation (grandchildren)? Finally, to what extent is the strength of religious inheritance different for Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey?

Dimensions of religiosity and their varying importance for movers and stayers

The Christian tradition of religious studies has defined various dimensions of religiosity (Cornwall et al. 1986; Faulkner and DeJong 1966; Fukuyama 1961; Glock 1962; Glock and Stark 1965; King and Hunt 1972; Lenski 1961; Mueller 1980; Roof 1979; Verbit 1970). Scholars have considered the importance of religion in everyday life over time and across the course of industrialisation using secularisation theories to explain particular manifestations of religion and their decline over time (Crockett and Voas 2006; Maliepaard et al. 2010; Need and De Graaf 1996; Van Tubergen 2007; Voas 2003).

These studies mostly focus on whether religion will survive in the modern world. They examine the impact of modernisation on religious affiliation, social and institutional religious commitment, values and beliefs (Berger 1967; Bruce and Voas 2004; Need and De Graaf 1996). They find that various forms of piety, including religious belonging, believing, practice and commitment to religious values, have been declining at varying rates, but all demonstrate a downward trend in Western Christian countries (Bruce 2002; Crockett and Voas 2006; Davie 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The mechanisms underlying these common trends are similar or strongly related.

Opportunities for religious practice depend on the structure and composition of societies. This is particularly true for minorities, for whom constraints and institutional structures are markedly different. For example, migrants might practise one form of piety more often in the origin society, but the infrastructure of the destination society may drive them to practise other forms. Migration creates new needs and risks for movers; they might end up in a minority position and experience discrimination from the majority population, causing them to change their religious habits (Alba 2005; Connor 2010; Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Understanding the mechanisms of one religious expression does not necessarily shed light on others (Fukuyama 1961; Glock and Stark 1965; Lenski 1961). Different migratory processes and specific social forces might influence the prevalence of these types of religiosity differently.

In their analysis of the dimensions or expressions of religiosity, Cornwall et al. (1986) note cognitive, affective and behavioural components of religion. The cognitive component includes beliefs and affiliation and is beyond
the scope of this study, as 99 per cent of our sample is affiliated to Islamic denominations. The affective component includes feelings and commitment to religious existence, lifestyles and institutions. The behavioural component includes both individual and communal religiosity, sometimes called devotionalism and associational involvement (Lenski 1961) or morality and solidarity (Mueller 1980).

We concentrate on three components of religiosity: following Verbit (1970) subjective religiosity reflects a person’s judgment of his/her own piety; individual religiosity comprises practises of religious duties such as praying or fasting that can be performed on an individual basis in private places without observance; communal religiosity is a public manifestation of religion such as communal worship or Friday prayers. Using the European Social Survey and distinguishing these dimensions, Guveli (2015) finds Turkish origin Europeans attend religious meetings (communal) as often as Turks in Turkey; they show higher subjective attachment (subjective religiosity) to their beliefs, but they pray (individual religiosity) less often.

Ethno-religious location and subjective, individual and communal religiosity

Scholars have argued that the size of the migrant group helps determine the degree and forms of its settlement (Breton 1964; Esser 2004). Migrants who put down roots in the destination societies – like Turks in European countries – will have higher levels of organisation than groups with smaller numbers. Maintenance of values, traditions and practices is dependent on the size of the group and on the ‘institutional completeness’ of that group in the destination societies (Breton 1964).

European Turks are mainly organised around their ethno-religious communities (Canatan 2001; Kentel and Kaya 2005; Kucukcan and Gungor 2009), and as Durkheim explains (1952), religion holds social groups together. Large numbers of studies indicate the influence of religion on group and identity formation (Alba 2005; Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Herberg 1955; Smith 1978). Historically, religion has been an important social force in the mobilisation of migrant cultural resources (Herberg 1955; Smith 1978). In this process, the competition between the host society and newcomers intensifies religious and cultural loyalties (Verkuyten 2009; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010). Migrants ‘develop a sense of peoplehood’ that depends ‘heavily upon a revitalisation of religious faith and commitment’ (Smith 1978: 12). This implies Turkish Europeans may become increasingly attached to their religion because it dissociates them from the wider society while creating a space in the ethnic community.

In European societies, Turks are establishing themselves, their interests, lifestyles, culture and institutions and organising ethno-religious communities, but have encountered resistance. Certain politicians and
other commentators argue that Turks refuse to accept the Western way of life, including human rights, making them unable to integrate. Islam is proclaimed the cause of social problems: prominent politicians have declared Islam a ‘backward’ religion and called for a ‘cold war’ against it (Ter Wal 2004). Paradoxically, the settlement of Turks in European countries may engender a growing resistance to the Turkish Islamic presence which, in turn, may contribute to group formation among migrants and sharpen boundaries between them and the wider society (Alba 2005). Yet Yang and Ebaugh (2001) show that migrant groups frequently reinterpret their religion to better integrate their practices into the new society and make the public manifestation of their religion more host-country specific and appealing to the majority.

On an individual level, the secularising processes of the host society might prove irresistible. For example, Muslims might feel a strong attachment to Islam or to their group, attending religious gatherings frequently because they want to stand together in establishing their own and their group interest and/or facing an antagonistic society. But praying five times a day might be experienced as too demanding in a secular environment that does not facilitate such practice within its infrastructure. Hence, individual expressions of religiosity may be expected to decline relative to the origin society.

We hypothesise that community formation predicts higher or similar rates of subjective and communal religious involvement among European Turks than among those left behind in Turkey. In line with earlier research (Guveli 2015), we expect to find lower rates of individual religious practices among Turks in Europe than in Turkey.

**Religiosity in Turkish versus Western European societies**

The level of religiosity in a society has an impact on an individual’s practices and beliefs (Kelley and De Graaf 1997; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 2011). According to assimilation theory, migrants adopt the lifestyles of the destination society and their social and cultural practices, beliefs and values fade across generations. Converting to a host country religion occurs in very small numbers among Muslim migrants, but it is often expected that Turks and other Muslim groups’ religious affiliation and religious involvement will decrease over time and generations in Western European secular countries (Van Tubergen 2006b, 2007). Consequently, with time, the religiosity of Turks in European countries would become different than that of Turks in Turkey, if the latter’s rates of religiosity remained constant over generations.

Amongst an extensive body of research on religion in Turkish society, only a few representative studies consider the rates of religiosity. Some of these claim Turkey and other Islamic societies have undergone a religious
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

resurgence in the last century, whereby religion has increased in significance in social and political arenas (Berger 1999; Carkoglu and Toprak 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The picture is complicated by the fact that other studies suggest there is a higher likelihood for less religious people to move (Alanezi and Sherkat 2008). When the European countries needed workers in the 1960s, Akgunduz (2008) argues, Turks were reluctant to move because of cultural and religious differences between Turkey and receiving countries. These labour migrants were predominantly from poorer regions of Turkey with relatively more religious people. As a result, it may have been the least religious among them who left. However, social and political developments in Turkey may have triggered a different process. Religious lifestyles have been suppressed since the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923. In top-down reforms pursued since then, the ruling elite banned all religious manifestations from state and semi-state institutions (Lewis 1961; Mardin 2006), creating a cleavage between a secular and pro-Western elite and an overwhelming majority who retained their religious commitment. To what extent these reforms secularised behaviour is an under-researched topic. It is possible that these antagonistic attitudes may have driven religious Turks to move to European countries as labour migrants, seeking freedom of religion.

The situation changed after 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (JDP), a conservative party with roots in the banned Islamist Virtue Party, instituted religion-friendly policies, with possible consequences for religious expression. In surveys, those reporting themselves devout Muslim constituted 81 per cent in 1999 and 93 per cent in 2006 (Carkoglu and Toprak 2006). According to the European Social Survey, the proportion of people in Turkey attending places of worship once a week or more often was 32 per cent in 2004 and increased slightly to 37 per cent in 2008. According to the European Social Survey, only 7 per cent of French, 8 per cent of Germans and 13 per cent of Dutch (countries hosting the majority of Turks) attended places of worship once a week or more often in 2008. By these standards, Turkey is a more religious society than western European countries, and according to some religiosity measures, the country is becoming more religious.

Based on the assimilation hypothesis, we would expect migrant first generation Turkish men and their second- and third-generation offspring in Europe to adopt the secular lifestyles of their host societies and become different from their counterparts in Turkey. That is, dissimilation from people in origin country would stem from assimilation into the destination country.

Religious reliance theory argues that migrants retain their religious involvement, identity and beliefs because religion is a resource in the new environment. Migration processes are risky, increasing the need for spiritual resources (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Levitt 2007; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007;
Religiosity

Smith 1978). Vulnerable people, in general, find reassurance in the sacred (Norris and Inglehart 2004), and migrants seek such reassurance when they face difficult conditions and lack control (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Upon arrival, migrants look to ethnic and religious networks and organisations to assist them in their secular needs such as work, education and health; at the same time, these networks pass on religious values, preferences and behaviour to the migrant offspring. Finally, as noted above, migrants necessarily reinterpret and revise religion in the light of their new experiences, which may strengthen religious commitment (Levitt 2007; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Therefore, the religious reliance hypothesis expects migrant Turks in Europe to be as religious as Turks in Turkey, if not more religious. On this basis, contrary to the assimilation hypothesis, we would expect no differentiation of Turks in Europe from Turks in their origin country because of the remaining high levels of religiosity in Turkey.

Transmission of religiosity across generations

Processes of religious transmission are critical to how religiosity develops across generations. Religion may be important for the offspring of migrant Turks because it might give them a sense of belonging and identity in a society where they have fewer roots than the natives of either origin or destination countries. Channelling theory states that the family, church and peers are the most important factors in determining religiosity. Of this triad, parents are the most important because they channel their children to church, peers and marriage (Martin et al. 2003: 171), bringing them into contact with socialising institutions that influence the type and number of friends (Todd, Martin and White 2003: 181). Studies suggest that even past adolescence, parents continue to influence their children’s (religious) life (Myers 1996).

There is increasing recognition that grandparents can play an important role in children’s socialisation. They are often involved in childcare, supporting parents and overseeing children’s activities. There is some interesting evidence of a ‘bounce-back’ effect (Chan and Boliver 2013): grandchildren reflect their grandparental origins, even if their parents have deviated from them (see also the discussion in Chapters 5 and 8). Grandparents might be an important source for religious education; they often look after grandchildren when parents are working or taking time for other activities, giving them the opportunity to teach religious rules and practices if they themselves are committed. Even if parents are not religious or do not practise their religion, they might ask grandparents to impart religious teachings to their children. Therefore, we expect grandparents’ religiosity to have a positive effect on the grandchildren’s religious involvement, over and above the influence of parents. But this may differ across migrant and non-migrant families.
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

Strength of transmission

Whether parents in less religious societies are better or worse at transmitting their religion is subject to debate. Van de Pol and Van Tubergen (2013) assert that in countries with a religious monopoly, like Turkey and Morocco, religious socialisation is easier than in secular European countries with plural lifestyles. They argue that European natives mostly disapprove of the values of migrant parents, making religious transmission to the children more difficult; their Dutch data support this contention for women but not for men, however. By contrast, Kelley and De Graaf (1997) show parents in secular societies are better at transmitting their religious commitments to their offspring than parents in religious societies. Although some contest this finding (Fleischmann 2011), it is plausible that in secular societies where religious socialisation does not occur through schools, clubs, associations and other social networks, imparting religious knowledge, norms, values and practices calls for careful planning.

Muslim Turkish parents in the historically Christian European societies may feel additional pressure to establish, facilitate and maintain the religious commitment of their children by bringing them in contact with religious networks, associations, mosques and friends. They may also adjust their lifestyles, buy religious books, invite children from religious families for dinner and send their children to religious classes in mosques or religious associations. By contrast, people in religious societies will assume their children will absorb beliefs and practices from social institutions and will not make specific efforts to ensure this happens. The strength of transmission hypothesis, therefore, states that parents in Europe are more successful in transmitting their religiosity to their children than parents in Turkey. This stronger inheritance of religiosity among Turks in Europe will slow down the process of dissimilation from origins.

Data, variables and methods

Data

We draw on the ‘2000 Families’ dataset, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012. From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone.

There are three data sources deriving from three different questionnaires: family tree, proxy and personal interview data (Guveli et al. 2016; see Chapter 2). In this chapter, we draw on the personal interview data, which
Religiosity comprises detailed information on social-economic resources, beliefs and values. These were directly collected from the ancestors (if still living) and from two randomly selected children and four randomly selected grandchildren in the same lineage and cover nearly 5,980 individual respondents. We supplement missing data on education or migration status measures with information from the proxy data.

We focus on three dependent variables representing the three dimensions of religiosity discussed above. Self-rated religiosity is measured by the question ‘How important is religion in the way you live your life?’ with responses on a 0 to 5 scale, with 5 the highest level of subjective religiosity. Praying represents the individual religiosity dimension and is measured with the question: ‘Apart from religious services, how often do you pray (namaz)?’ Its answer categories rank from 1, ‘never’, to 7, ‘five times a day’. The communal religiosity dimension is operationalised with the question: ‘How often do you attend religious services or go to a place of worship?’ with answer categories from 1 ‘never’ to 6 ‘every day’.

The responses on these variables by ancestors/grandfathers (G1) and parents/second family generation (G2) are also used as independent variables in the analysis of intergenerational impacts on grandchildren’s religiosity.

Migration status is measured using two variables. First, we include ‘migration status of the ancestor’, used to classify the original migrant or stayer ancestors and lineages for the study (see Chapter 2). The variable reflects whether the ancestor (grandfather/G1) ever moved to Europe between 1960 and 1974 for five years or longer (1) or whether he stayed in Turkey during this period (0). Note that these migrant ancestors and their children and grandchildren may be living in either Turkey or Europe. The second variable captures the current country of residence of the respondent and is categorised as: ‘lives in Turkey’ (0) and ‘lives in Europe or other country outside Turkey’ (1).

We address our first research question (to what extent migrants are more or less religious than stayers) by pooling all family members as independent observations. We address the second and third question (to what extent the religiosity of parents and grandparents influences the religiosity of the third generation; to what extent the strength of religious inheritance differs for Turks in Europe and Turkey) by limiting our analysis to those family lineages where we have three generations of data, with the grandchildren as the units of analysis (N = 2198) and parental and grandparent variables as characteristics of the grandchildren. In all analyses, we adjust our standard errors to account for the fact that observations are nested within families and are, therefore, not fully independent.

We estimate OLS models for subjective religiosity and Ordered Logistic Regression for praying and attendance. The models of transmission include interactions between country of residence of the grandparent/parent and their religiosity to reveal the strength of transmission of religiosity among Turks in Europe and Turkey.
Our models control for denomination (1 = Alevi, 0 = Sunni), regions, gender (0 = men, 1 = women), age, marital status (1 = married and 0 = otherwise) and education (primary or lower, secondary education and tertiary education).

**Religiosity among Turks in Europe and Turkey across family generations**

Figures 11.1 to 11.3 show subjective religiosity, praying and attendance at religious meetings among Turks in Europe and in Turkey across family generations. The figures show that all three dimensions of religiosity decline significantly across family generations, but to varying degrees. Generational differences in subjective religiosity are marginal: the second (G2) and third (G3) generation differ significantly from the grandfather (G1) but not from each other. Regarding communal religiosity (attendance), as with subjective religiosity, the second and third generations substantially differ from their first generation ancestors but not from each other. Individual religiosity (praying) tells a different story: a downward trend across generations.

Comparing the three religiosity dimensions among Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey across generations shows that the first generation migrant men and non-migrant men do not differ significantly on any religiosity

![Figure 11.1](image-url)  
*Figure 11.1* Subjective religiosity among Turks in Europe and Turkey across generations  
*Source*: 2000 Families study, personal data.
Figure 11.2  Praying among Turks in Europe and Turkey across generations
Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.

Figure 11.3  Attendance among Turks in Europe and Turkey across generations
Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
measures. This finding negates the assimilation hypothesis for first generation Turks, namely, that over time, migrants adopt the secular way of life of European countries. It supports the religious reliance hypothesis which expects migrants to be more religious than or as religious as non-migrants.

However, as our data are cross-sectional, we cannot make claims about selectivity of migrants in relation to religiosity. Migrants could have been less religious, and they could have become more religious through their migration experience, which in the end, may have resulted in the same levels of devotion to religion as among non-migrants in Turkey. To reveal the selectivity dynamic in migrant religiosity, we would need information about their pre-migration religious observances. These descriptive findings simply show the current position of those guest workers who moved to Europe 40 to 50 years ago.

There are some marginal differences between the second and third generation in Europe and Turkey in subjective religiosity and attendance at places of worship, but these are negligible. There is a relatively sharper decline in praying among the second and third generation in Europe than in Turkey, supporting both assimilation and community formation hypotheses. Overall generational differences might reflect the effect of the age of the generations, but the steepness of the decrease in praying among Turks in Europe appears to reflect the effect of the secular European context.

These differences in family generations in Europe and in Turkey are still found when we control for various other factors such as education and religious denomination (Alevi/Sunni); more information is available in the Appendix. We also estimated models (not illustrated) including destination country but they do not alter our conclusions. We estimated further models only for those in Europe, with additional factors summarising connections with Turkey to reveal whether transnational activities increase religious observance: these additional measures comprised the number of visits to Turkey in the last five years, frequency of communicating with relatives and friends by phone, text messages, email, mail or Internet and voting in the last elections in Turkey. There is no significant relationship between visits to Turkey and any of the three dimensions of religiosity, but we find a positive and significant relationship between communicating with relatives and friends in Turkey and all forms of religiosity. There is also a strong and positive relationship between voting in Turkey and all forms of religiosity.

To conclude, there are no significant differences between European Turks and those in Turkey in subjective and communal religiosity, but individual religiosity measured by praying decreases more sharply across generations among European Turks. These findings partly refute the assimilation hypothesis, but they support the hypothesis of community formation, namely, that individual religiosity is more subject to secularisation processes than communal religiosity, as the latter connects people with their ethno-religious community.
Tables 11.1 to 11.3 show the effects of grandparents’ and parents’ religiosity on the subjective, individual and communal religiosity of the grandchildren in Models 1 and 2 respectively. As we noted before, these models are based on triadic data: three generations of linked family members. Model 3 in each of the three tables shows the strength of transmission for Turks living in Europe compared to those in Turkey, represented in the interaction term (Parent lives in EU*[religiosity measure]). This model also includes an interaction term (Parent lives in EU*Lives in EU) showing the relationship between grandchildren’s religiosity and both the grandchildren and their parents living in European destination countries. This reveals the effect of exposure to the European secular environment in both family generations.

Grandparents’ religiosity has a significant and positive effect on subjective religiosity only: grandparents who rank themselves high on the religiosity scale increase the subjective religiosity ranking of their grandchildren (Model 1). This effect remains strong after controlling for parental subjective religiosity, partly supporting the expectation that devout grandparents produce devout grandchildren. Grandparents are, however, only successful in transmitting the importance of religion in one’s life. This manifestation of piety is not constrained by opportunities and restrictions such as time and facilities: people can find religion important in their lives regardless of the time or places that are tied to religious obligations. In addition, finding religion important tends to be associated with warm feelings towards religion, and this might reflect the feelings people generally have for their grandparents. Finally, parents have a significant positive influence on all three measures of religiosity (Model 2), supporting the hypothesis that children with religious parents have religious children.

The expectation is that religious parents in secular societies do their utmost to transmit religious commitment to their children. There is also a contradictory expectation about the strength of transmission: Muslim parents in European countries are less successful in transmitting religion because the context in which they raise their children is in opposition to their religious values, making it hard to pass them on. Our data show support for both suppositions. Third generation Turks whose parents are frequent visitors to mosques or other places of worship in Europe also attend religious meetings significantly more often than their counterparts in Turkey. By contrast, it is harder for Turkish parents in European countries to transmit the importance of religion in everyday life than for parents in Turkey. The strength of transmission of praying does not differ for those living in a European country and those living in Turkey. When the religious manifestations measures are considered together, living in a European country together with a parent does not decrease any form of religious devotion, as shown in the ‘Parent lives in EU*Lives in EU’ interaction.
### Table 11.1  OLS regression, transmission of subjective religiosity, grandparent and parent effect for Turks in Europe and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grandparent Model</th>
<th>Parent Model</th>
<th>Transmission in migrant families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant ancestor</td>
<td>–0.08</td>
<td>–0.06</td>
<td>–0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandparent’s subjective religiosity</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s subjective religiosity</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in EU* subjective religiosity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in EU * Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.27***</td>
<td>2.33***</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; controlled for sex, age and marital status; clustered around family level.  
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$  
Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.

### Table 11.2  Ordered logistic regression, transmission of praying, grandparent and parent effect for Turks in Europe and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grandparent Model</th>
<th>Parent Model</th>
<th>Transmission in migrant families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant ancestor</td>
<td>–0.31</td>
<td>–0.25</td>
<td>–0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandparent’s praying</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s praying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Lives EU * parent’s praying</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in EU * Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; controlled for sex, age and marital status; clustered around family level; intercepts of the models are not shown but are available upon request.  
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$  
Source: 2000 Families Study, personal data.
Table 11.3 Ordered logistic regression, transmission of attendance to places of worship, grandparent and parent effect for Turks in Europe and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grandparent Model</th>
<th>Parent Model</th>
<th>Transmission in migrant families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant ancestor</td>
<td>–0.06</td>
<td>–0.15</td>
<td>–0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandpa’s attendance</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Lives in EU*parent’s attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in EU * Lives in EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>–0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; controlled for sex, age and marital status; clustered around family level.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.

These tables repeat the findings above: third generation Turks in Europe only differ from their counterparts in Turkey in praying significantly less (Table 11.2). Another interesting finding is that those in the third generation with parents living in Europe (they themselves could be living in Europe or in Turkey) show higher rates of subjective religiosity than those with parents living in Turkey. This finding is not central to the hypotheses considered in this chapter, but merits further attention.

Conclusion

Turks in European countries are living in societies where traditional forms of religious manifestation are decreasing over time and across generations (Crockett and Voas 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2004). By contrast, some of these forms of piety have shown a slight increase in Turkey in recent years. Even so, this chapter finds minimal differences in religiosity between Turks living in European countries and Turks living in Turkey. Only in praying do Turks in Europe show a sharper decline across family generations than their counterparts in Turkey. Our data also show that the religious devotion of grandchildren who live in Europe with their parents does not differ from their comparators in Turkey on any of the three religious dimensions considered. That is, exposure to a secular lifestyle does not appear to decrease religiosity.
We find no differences between European Turks and Turks in Turkey in subjective religiosity and attendance at places of worship; providing some support for the religious reliance hypothesis. Turkey is a more religious society and remains religious; it has even increased in some forms of religiosity. The lack of religious differences in two measures of piety indicates that the secularisation dynamics do not apply fully for Muslim Turks in Europe. In addition, the needs religion fills in the lives of migrants and their offspring could be argued to be driven by their migratory and minority position.

Our findings support the hypothesis of community formation: the expectation that in the process of settlement in a new environment, migrants and their descendants observe religion differently than people in their origin country, with the result that community-based religious involvement increases in popularity among them. Individual religiosity is measured here by praying (*namaz*), one of the most important daily obligations. This type of religious practice can be performed individually everywhere and is, therefore, an individual manifestation of religious commitment. Results show this type of individual religiosity is decreasing more sharply among European Turks. However, communal religiosity (attendance) and subjective religiosity are practically and emotionally linked to the community and are at similar levels among comparators in Europe and Turkey.

Islam was introduced to Europe before the 1960s, but its influence was restricted to orientalist fiction and specialist books; a limited group of people, including diplomats, traders and adventurers, was familiar with it. The massive inflow of Muslim ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s introduced Islam more widely to Europeans of all social statuses. Places to practise religion were rare, but building these places and establishing an Islamic infrastructure for the Muslim community were priorities of these early Muslim migrants. Since labour migrants came in large numbers, and both the host countries and Turkey had much to gain from their labour, the Turkish state sent their imams and preachers to the Diyanet mosques, while the host country states subsidised cultural activities. In addition to this, Turkish migrants built mosques and other ethno-religious associations using membership dues and individual gifts. Cultural activities were organised around and held at the places of worship.

That attendance remains as high in Europe as in Turkey might be interpreted as a result of large Turkish communities in European countries. Some also say attendance at places of worship is not a manifestation of religiosity but shows the need to get together. Unlike mosques in Turkey, mosques in European countries often have cafés, cultural centres and basic sport and game places for young people. Obviously, these facilities *within* religious places meet secular needs, but the fact that they are organised at religious places indicates some level of religious involvement.
Our results for personal religious observance (subjective religiosity) indicate that European secularisation processes have influenced Islamic lifestyles. Our findings agree with Norris and Inglehart (2004) who show two developments in European countries: traditional expressions of religion are declining and personal ways of believing remain stable or are slightly increasing. This applies to Muslim Turks in European countries; religion is becoming a group-based activity rather than simply the fulfilment of religious duties.

Previous research shows religion functions as an important tool for migrant communities to stay in touch with their roots (Levitt 2003). We touch on this briefly when we note that people with frequent contact with relatives and friends, and who are also politically involved in Turkey, score significantly higher in all dimensions of piety. This implies transnational activities have an effect on the progress of religion in both origin and destination countries.

Since European Turks are better at transmitting attendance at religious meetings to their offspring than praying, religion can be expected to develop differently in European countries than Turkey across generations. Communal manifestations of Islam will remain important in the life of European Turks and in European destination societies generally, but individual religious practices will decrease across generations. This tells us dissimilation from origin country is not unidirectional in religion, not that it operates consistently across different dimensions of religious life. Religion will continue to shape the lives of European Turks; at the same time, it will be shaped by their lives and new secular environments.
12
Attitudes towards Gender Equality

Introduction

Migration and integration debates in society and politics are focusing more and more on the issues of gender inequality in both origin societies and migrant communities (Ayers 2007; Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2013; Fekete 2006; Ghorashi 2010; Prins and Saharso 2008; Roggeband and Verloo 2007). Academia has shown increasing interest as well, in particular, in the role of Islam in shaping gender equality attitudes (Alexander and Welzel 2011; Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2013; Diehl et al. 2009; Huschek, De Valk and Liefbroer 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Read 2003; Röder 2014; Scheible and Fleischmann 2013; Teney 2009). This growing literature, however, focuses on differences in support for gender equality between natives and migrants in destination societies, asking whether migrants have assimilated to destination country norms. It ignores how these attitudes are perpetuated from the origin society or how migration influences the reproduction of gender equality attitudes within the household or family. Yet the family as a site for social reproductions is particularly important in migrant communities, given the family-oriented cultures of many origin societies, including Turkey (Nauck 1989; Schönpflug 2001; Schwartz 1992; Spierings 2014).

This chapter applies the dissimilation from origins perspective (see Chapter 1), using a multi-generational frame to address the question of how gender equality attitudes are reproduced through intergenerational transmission and how migration mediates this transmission. First, we chart the multi-generational development of gender equality attitudes among about 700 families with different migration histories. Besides (European) settler lineages, we investigate Turkish stayer (non-migrant) and return-migration lineages. This origins perspective establishes a benchmark: how would gender equality attitudes develop intergenerationally independently of migration? Using this approach, we can gauge the impact of migration and the societal meaning of strengthening or weakening intergenerational transmission.
The chapter adds to existing knowledge in several ways. First, socio-economic and attitudinal intergenerational transmissions have not been studied in the context of gender equality attitudes among migrant societies, even though they may be important mechanisms of reproduction or retention. Second, the importance of the extended family in Turkish society, where the nuclear family is not the norm (see Nauck 1989; Spierings 2014), alongside our multi-generational perspective leads us to include grandparents as an additional possible source of reproduction. We theorise their direct and indirect influence and test this empirically. Third, we theorise several ways migration histories might weaken or strengthen intergenerational transmission, building on the concept of migration as a transmission belt, as migration is an event that interrupts peoples’ lives and leads to multisite families (Schönpflug 2001).

**Theoretical background**

**Gender equality attitudes in a transnational context**

The literature on gender equality attitudes is dominated by modernisation theory, which predicts a general increase in attitudes supporting gender equality linked to economic and technical developments (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). These processes are considered universal, with modernisation theory predicting that higher education, declines in religiosity and being younger lead to more support for gender equality (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2003). In addition, the culture and socio-economic structure of a country shapes people’s attitudes (Baxter and Kane 1995; Crompton and Harris 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Sjöberg 2004). These factors include what Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) label exposure-based explanations of gender attitudes. The culture and actual gender relations to which people are exposed, both in the place and time they grow up and in the place(s) where they later live, are, thus, influential in shaping attitudes.

The migration literature draws similar conclusions on the contextual culture and importance of age and education (e.g. Alexander and Welzel 2011; Bejarano et al. 2011; Huschek, De Valk and Liefbroer 2011; Leaper and Valin 1996; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Read 2003). The major exception is religion, which seems more ambiguous in a context of migration, partly because of the new and different environment, which can be experienced as threatening and lead to a stronger embracing of religion as a resource (see Chapter 11).

With respect to the different contexts, Schwartz (1992; see also Schönpflug 2001) shows Turkey has a collectivist culture in which the focus is on group maintenance, whereas Germany is individualist and focused on, for instance,
self-development. Similarly, Nauck (1992) discusses the family orientation of Turkish culture (vis-à-vis Germany), and Spierings (2014) shows the public sphere in Turkey is relatively male dominated. More generally, Turks in Turkey live in the context of an industrial, more traditional country compared to the post-industrial (post)modern part of Europe. While gender equality support is generally higher in postmodern societies, relatively little change in attitudes is expected. In societies in the process of modernisation (starting with industrialisation), attitudes towards gender equality are initially less supportive but are expected to increase more rapidly, for instance, with women’s entry into the labour market (Crompton and Harris 1997; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Figure 12.1 illustrates this pattern using data from The World Value Surveys (WVS). It shows the developments and differences in the support for gender equality in Turkey and several of the most important destination countries of Turkish labour migrants.¹

Three main conclusions can be drawn from the figure: first, the support for gender equality in the Western European countries is higher than in

Figure 12.1  Support for gender equality in five countries

Turkey; second, the gap among the European countries is relatively small (at most 0.1) compared to the difference with Turkey, which scores at least 16 percentage points lower; third, support for gender equality in the Western European countries seems stable, whereas Turkey shows more fluctuation, with a steady increase of about 1 percentage point a year during the first three waves and a decline again in the 2010s, probably a direct effect of the economic crisis that hit Turkey after 2008 (e.g. Cafariello 2013). Moreover, in the last wave, the respondents are, on average, more than three years older than in the other three years, and this is likely to have impacted the rates of support for gender equality. Intergenerational transmission patterns should be understood against the background of these developments.

Intergenerational transmission: (grand)parents’ values

In general terms, parental socialisation is an important avenue through which all kinds of attitudes are reproduced or culture is maintained (De Valk and Liefbroer 2007; Glass, Bengston and Dunham 1986; Kohn, Slomczynski and Schoenbach 1986; Schönpflug 2001). This socialisation can be intentional or unintentional and is clearly not the same as exact replication (Schönpflug 2001). It might partly work through behaviour: the parents act on their beliefs, leading to traditional gendered household roles, which are then translated into children’s gender attitudes via descriptive norms. In the context of migration, we can certainly expect parents to deliberately attempt to transfer their core attitudes, including gender roles and religion (discussed further in Chapter 11) to prevent dissimilation from their and their children’s origin culture. This might be related to feeling threatened in the new and possibly hostile environment, a point we discuss below.

Empirically, Bisin and Verdier (2000) show this intergenerational transmission for cultural views, while Farré and Vella (2013) offer a rare study on the intergenerational transmission of gender roles or equality attitudes. However, relatively little is known about the strength of intergenerational transmission of gender equality attitudes in general and among migrant communities in particular.

In the field of intergenerational transmission, while increasing attention is paid to the role of grandparents (Amato and Cheadle 2005; Jaeger 2012; Pilkauskas 2012), this has not extended to gender equality attitudes. Assuming grandparents play an important role in the lives of their grandchildren, they can also be expected to have an influence on the attitudes of their descendants, as has been found for religiosity, depression and social dominance (Chatard and Selimbegovic 2008; Copen and Silverstein 2008; Walls and Whitbeck 2012). First of all, there will evidently be indirect grandparental transmission if intergenerational transmission between parent and child exists, because some children will become parents later in life.

In addition, grandparents might have an independent impact on their grandchildren (Chatard and Selimbegovic 2008). This influence can
be exerted, for instance, by way of example or transmitting views by discussions and opinion, as is the case of transmission by the parents. Grandparents might be particular relevant here, because in societies involved in on-going industrialisation or modernisation, grandparents tend to have a more revered position in the household, and extended families in which the grandparents and grandchildren live in the same household are common. Consequently, grandparents might have a stronger connection to and influence on the Turkish (migrant) families and their grandchildren.

In sum, we expect that gender equality attitudes are reproduced among Turkish stayer and migrant families through parents’ direct influence and grandparents’ direct and indirect influence.

Migration and transmission
So far, we have discussed the intergenerational transmission of gender equality attitudes as a uniform process, but migration can be seen as a breakpoint that changes the conditions under which transmission takes place, altering the power of intergenerational transmission (cf. Schönpflug 2001). In other words, migration and (grand)parental influence interact in shaping people's attitudes (cf. Alba and Nee 2003). Empirical research on these more complex multi-generational and multisite forms of intergenerational transmission is scarce, however.

In her study of Turkish migrants in Germany, Schönpflug concludes: ‘A continuous cultural context does not lead to intensified transmission. Turkish father-son dyads living in Turkey did not reveal more transmission than did Turkish father-son dyads living in...Germany’ (2001: 184). On the one hand, the absence of an effect might indicate that transmission in Turkish father-son dyads in Germany and in Turkey are similar; on the other hand, multiple effects acting at the same time may be counteracting each other.

We consider three ways migration histories may affect the intergenerational transmission of attitudes. The first is straightforward and directly taps into the mechanism underlying transmission. We expect the effect of transmission is considerably stronger if the (grand)parent is physically close to the child during childhood. If there are more than 1,000 kilometres between parent and child, transmission by example cannot take place; therefore, transmission overall is expected to be less strong if only the parents or the child has migrated.

Second, a parent’s European experience can be expected to strengthen transmission. Schönpflug claims – but does not test – that transmission will be weaker among migrants because some parents will decide ‘to let their children adapt behaviour patterns that are functional in the new environment’ (2001: 176), but she ignores a possible desire to retain the origin culture. Under labels of retention, resistance and revival (Guveli and Platt
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2011; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Phalet and Schönpfleg 2001; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010), some research has explored how aspects of the origin culture are reified through cultural in-group peer pressure, as a way to seek reassurance of one’s identity and prevent dissimilation from the origin society, and as a response to the threat of the new and considerably different, and sometimes rather critical or outright hostile, environment. A 52-year old Turkish migrant to Hamburg we interviewed said: ‘I come [to Turkey] once every two years...to present them [the children] the culture of here, the homeland’. This reification is particularly important for gender equality attitudes as they are at the core of people’s identity (Berger and Luckman 1967), and the sometimes critical or outright hostile receiving society can further foster the desire to consolidate one’s identity (Alba 2005; Portes et al. 2005; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2010). Overall, these mechanisms can be expected to make (grand)parents transmit their culture and attitudes more strongly if they have a migration experience.

Third, by contrast, a weakening impact can be expected if the children grow up in Western Europe: ‘In a foreign land, parental controls can wane fast when confronted with the sustained challenges of deviant lifestyles, media-driven consumerism, and peer influences’ (Portes et al. 2005: 1013). Children growing up in such a context have to balance the culture their parents try to maintain and the host society’s culture, as embodied in, for instance, their friends at school. Migrant (school-going) youth face so much more diverse and new information outside the family that the socialisation in the family becomes much weaker (Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Sapiro 2004), while those growing up in Turkey are less intensively and only indirectly confronted with western European attitudes.

To sum up, we expect three different migration characteristics will shape the strength of intergenerational transmission from parent or grandparent to child: (1) having (grand)parents and children living in different countries is expected to weaken transmission; (2) having (grand)parents with a migration history is expected to strengthen transmission; (3) having the child grow up in a different culture is expected to weaken transmission.

Data and methods

Data

We draw on a unique dataset that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families dataset, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012. From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants.
Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone. This chapter makes use of the personal data provided in main interviews with members of the surveyed families across three generations (Guveli et al. 2016; see Chapter 2 for a full description of the data).

The 2000 Families personal data include 785 three-generation lineages for which the migration status as well as the attitudes to gender equality is measured in three consecutive generations from four areas: Acipayam, Akçaabat, Emirdağ, and Kulu. These data over-represent rural communities and cannot be treated as a fully national representative sample of Turkish migrants. This might have some implications for this study, as gender equality values are generally expected to be lower in rural areas (e.g. Gündüz-Hosgör and Smits 2007). The 2007 WVS data distinguish between respondents living in the (urban) western and coastal areas, and (rural) central and eastern Turkey. In fact, we found no significant differences in gender equality scores between these regions, and three of our rural areas are in the urban west as well (Acipayam, Emirdağ, Kulu). In addition, as Figure 12.2 shows, the trend among non-migrants in the 2000 Families data closely resembles the development in Figure 12.1. Such an overall increase in support for gender equality is mirrored in other data, such as the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which collects women’s survey items on gender equality attitudes (see Appendix 12.1). In those data, the rise in support for gender equality from 1998 to 2008 shows similar patterns for women in rural and urban areas. The lack of a clear increase in support between 1998 and 2003 is probably caused by strong internal migration from the rural areas to the larger cities (Eryurt and Koc 2012). In sum, the data do not suggest clear distinctions in gender equality attitudes outside the rural areas studied, but this background should be acknowledged when interpreting the results.

Gender equality attitudes

We used the following two statements to measure the support for gender equality among our respondents:

(1) ‘A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl’.
(2) ‘On the whole, men make better business executives than women do’.

These are very similar to EVS and WVS items. They do not cover private gender roles and sexual liberalisation attitudes (Bejarano, Manzano and Montoya 2011; Diehl, Koenig and Ruckdeschel 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2012), sometimes included in a broader concept of emancipatory attitudes. However, they do focus on the spheres of leadership and education and closely resemble other operationalisations of general gender equality attitudes and public gender roles, making this study comparable to others (e.g. Alexander and Welzel 2011; Röder 2014; Schieble and Fleischmann 2013).
On both questions, respondents could choose between five answers (strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree). The scores were added up and rescaled to a 9-point scale, of which the lowest score is ‘0’ and the highest ‘1’, 1 being the most supportive of gender equality. The gender equality scores of the adult (grand)children (G3) serve as dependent variables, those of the parent (G2) and grandparent (G1) respondents as independent variables.

**Independent variables**

To trace the intergenerational development of gender equality attitudes, we charted the different migration histories by distinguishing between stayers (non-migrants), migrants, return migrants, respondents born in Europe of migrant parents, and European born ‘return migrants’. Linking these across generations leads to over 50 migration lineages. Based on the 2000 Families framework and group size, we distinguished three specific categories and a residual group: (1) lineages of which all members always lived in Turkey (\(n=80\)) – ‘stayer lineages’; (2) lineages of which the (grand)parent was a (re-)migrated guest labourer, and the lineage members of the third generation lived their whole lives in Turkey (\(n=321\)) – ‘return-migrant lineages’; (3) lineages of which the first or second generation migrated from Turkey to Europe and of which the third generation was born in Europe (\(n=264\)); (4) a wide variety of all other kinds of lineages (\(n=120\)).

In the regression models, we used the scores on gender equality attitudes of the parents (G2) and grandparents (G1) as the core independent variables. For the interaction effects, we created three additional variables on migration-related characteristics for both the grandparental and parental transmission. First, we created a dummy variable for whether (grand)parent and child were living at the same place during the first 16 years of the life of the child (1 = yes). If both migrated at the same time or did not migrate the score was ‘1’. If the (grand)parent was abroad 16 years, but the child not, the score was ‘0’. For the remainder of cases, we calculated how many years the (grand)parent and child shared their country of living; if this was 8 or more, the dummy was coded ‘1’, otherwise ‘0’. Second, we created a dummy for whether the (grand)parent lived or lives in Europe (1 = yes). Third, we distinguished respondents (G3) by their place of living during the first 16 years of their lives: Europe, Turkey or a bit of both.

The migration history of the G3 respondent itself was a covariate in the regression models, as was the type of migration lineage (see above and Figure 12.2). For the migration history of the G3 respondent, we distinguished four categories: always lived in Europe; born in Turkey, migrated to Europe; lives in Turkey, has lived in Europe; always lived in Turkey (reference). We took the contextual differences into account by adding dummies for which of the four origin regions the family came from and dummies for the current country of living of the G3 respondents. All countries with
37 or more respondents were coded separately (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey); the others – 10 or fewer respondents each – were grouped together as ‘other’.

We controlled for age, education, sex and religiosity. Age was measured in years, for education we included the common metric variable comprising 11 categories, and sex was measured by a dummy variable (1 = woman). Finally, for religiosity, we used the same conceptualisation as in the previous chapter, distinguishing subjective, individual and communal religiosity. The models have been estimated with all three religiosity measures, but show – surprisingly – no significant relationship whatsoever. Even though there is no multicollinearity problem, the variables seem to interfere with each other: if only subjective religiosity is included, it shows a (marginally significant) effect, which seems logical, as this is the attitudinal instead of behavioural dimension of religiosity and, thus, more closely related to the dependent variable in this chapter. We present the models with only that variable included. Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in Appendix 12.2.

Model
Since the G3 respondents are embedded in their families and there are fewer (grand)parental observations, we estimated multilevel models. The higher level is defined at the G2/parent level.

Results

Gender equality attitudes across generations
Figure 12.2 shows the distinct differences in the developments of the support for gender equality between different groups of lineages, excluding the ‘other kinds of lineages’. First, the non-migrant lineages, of which all members have always lived in Turkey, show a linear increase in support for gender equality. The first and second generations (G1 and G2) are among the most conservative: however, the third generation (G3) members of these non-migrant lineages become much more progressive. Second, the settler-migrant lineage shows highest support among the first two generations (G1 and G2) and a slow increase from second to third (from G2 to G3). Third, the guest labourers who returned and whose offspring only lived in Turkey (the return-migrant lineages) show a relatively low support of gender equality in the first two generations (G1 and G2) (which include the migrants) and a decline from the second to the third generation (G2 to G3). All major differences shown in the figure are statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis H tests: \( p < 0.001 \)). Among the first two generations, non-migrant and return-migrant lineages are less supportive of gender equality than the settler-migrant lineages. Among generation three, non-migrant lineages are
similar to settler-migrant lineages; together, they differ significantly from the return-migrant lineages. The within-generation differences between lineages are not caused by age differences, as the difference in average age is about one year across lineage types.

Selectivity might be one cause of these differences. That the (grand) parents who migrated to Europe during the 1960s through 1990s show more egalitarian attitudes could be the result of people who already had more ‘European attitudes’ migrating, whereas the ‘potential migrants’ who were less supportive of gender equality from these regions might have decided not to migrate after all, because they did not want to live in Europe. Nonetheless, that the European descendants of these settling migrant generations show the highest support for gender equality of all groups is unlikely to be a result of selectivity. Most of this third generation was young or not yet born when their parents migrated. Their gender equality attitudes can be an indirect selectivity effect only if very strong intergenerational transmission exists.

We can derive two important insights from this. First, the third generation of the Turkish non-migrant lineage shows similar scores to the third generation among the European settler-migrants. The developments in the origin society are strong, whereas the development among the settler-migrants

![Figure 12.2 Gender equality attitudes among three-generation lineages with different migration histories](source: 2000 Families study, personal data.)
flattens considerably in the European destination countries. One interpretation is that the relatively high scores among the first two settler-migrant generations (G1 and G2) hit a virtual roof and flattened out. This seems likely, if we take another look at Figure 12.1: the gender equality scores in Europe are steady around a score of 0.8, the level from which the flattening out takes place. It would have been highly surprising if the third generation of settler-migrants not only dissimilated from their origin society but also surpassed their destination society.

Second, and more surprisingly, the return-migrant lineage results indicate a resistance effect in the origin society – instead of the destination society. Of all third generation respondents living in Turkey, the ones with ancestors who migrated to Europe and moved back to Turkey are far more traditional than the third generation of stayers. In addition, they are equally or even more traditional than their returned migrant parents. Substantively, it might be that the (grand)parents saw Europe, disliked the morals and brought up their children to remain ‘Turkish’, as suggested in some of our in-depth interviews. A 61-year-old man from Akçaabat talks about how people returning from Europe have changed and hints at ‘moral decline’: ‘people orient towards luxury, become victims …. I didn’t encounter such a person from my village, but we hear ... the bad things they do ... [selling] heroin, smuggling whatever’. A 67-year-old return migrant from another village in the same region is even more explicit: ‘It is clean, its money is good .... I mean we liked many things, of course we were rich then .... What I didn’t like; their culture is not appropriate for us. Their lack of morality for example’. Then he tells a story about how Turkish women in Europe can go out with other men, whom their family did not know; this ‘of course’, is not good. These views on Europe might actually be quite common among return-migrants and part of the reason why people returned to Turkey. Their children cannot make a similar judgement, because they have not lived in Europe, so their (grand)parents’ views can be expected to be a major source of information and judgement, and the parents behaviour towards their children might be affected by their experiences and consequent views. As the data here oversample rural families and many return migrants came from and returned to agricultural households, this resistance effect might be specific to groups returning to more traditional environments.

**Intergenerational transmission of gender equality attitudes**

Table 12.1 presents the core results of the regression models testing for (grand)parental transmission of gender equality attitudes. The models’ statistics and coefficients of the control variables are given in Appendix 12.3. In short, women and more highly educated respondents are more favourable to gender equality; more subjectively religious respondents seem slightly less supportive, indicating the importance of understanding educational
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no significant differences between the origin regions in Turkey, but the destination dummies show the respondents living in Turkey are generally less supportive of gender equality attitudes than the settler-migrant lineage respondents. In addition, the dummy for belonging to a return migration lineage shows that respondents living in Turkey are far less supportive of gender equality, as discussed above.

Turning to the intergenerational transmission of gender equality attitudes, Table 12.1 shows parents’ attitudes have a clear positive impact, and were among the most important explanatory variables, together with the sex of the respondent. The average transmission is about 0.14. This clearly shows that, on average, parents have a considerable influence on their children’s attitudes, which is not a consequence of their influence on educational levels or religiosity, but independent of those, and seemingly a direct effect of their own gender equality attitudes.

For the grandfathers, this is less evident. In the models without the parents’ attitudes they have a small, but statistical significant impact, which becomes even smaller after controlling for the parents’ gender equality attitudes and less certain ($p = 0.089$). So there seems to be a small overall effect of grandparents, but both the indirect effect via parents and the direct effect additional to the parental one are weak or somewhat uncertain, and the model statistics (Appendix 12.3) show that adding grandparents to Model 2 adds little in explanatory power. Additional models, however, show grandparents have a considerable impact under certain circumstances. For instance, we re-estimated Model 3 separately for the respondents whose parents were absent during their youth ($n = 42$); in that model, the parents’ effect was not statistically significant, but the grandfathers’ attitudes were influential (0.282) and statistically significant differences (Chapter 5) and developments in religiosity (Chapter 11) to understand the gender equality attitudes in a migration context.

Table 12.1 Mixed regression models on the support for gender equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 grandparents</th>
<th>Model 2 parents</th>
<th>Model 3 grandparents &amp; parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather’s gender equality attitudes</td>
<td>0.07* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.06+ (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s gender equality attitudes</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.14*** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The standard errors are given between brackets. All models are multilevel models, with the parent level as higher-level context. The coefficients of the control variables are found in Appendix 12.3. Destination- and origin contexts are also controlled for.

+<0.10 *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
(p = 0.039). Given the low number of cases, this result should be treated with care.

A more general consideration about interpreting these correlations is that they might not indicate parent-to-child transmission, but two-directional transmissions. Evidently, this can be part of the relationship and, therefore, we should be careful to avoid interpreting correlation as causality. Yet the results we present in the next section undermine the idea that migration strengthens transmission; transmission becomes two-directional when children help their parents, given their higher destination language skills and acculturation (Bloemraad and Trost, 2008; Wong and Tseng, 2008). Among migrants, the transmission is weakest.

**Migration as a transmission belt**

Above, we hinted at the impact of migration on intergenerational transmission as a means of reproducing gender equality attitudes by looking at the role of grandparents when parents are absent due to migration. In line with the theoretical concept of migration belts, we tested several interaction relationships between the intergenerational transmission of (grand)parents’ gender equality attitudes and migration characteristics – (grand)parent and child being at a different location, (grand)parents having a migration history, and growing up in new culture (not illustrated). Only one shows signs of statistical significance: the place of growing up. Growing up in Europe may severely weaken the influence of parents’ attitudes (p = 0.083) compared to growing up in Turkey. The interaction coefficient almost completely nullifies the effect of transmission and, in itself, parental transmission is not statistically significant among the Turkish descendents growing up in Europe. Figure 12.3 shows the estimated average scores among people who grew up in Turkey or in Europe dependent on parents’ gender equality attitudes. It clearly illustrates the differences in the impact of parents’ attitudes: the impact is far weaker for youth who grow up not in Turkey but in the new and different context of Europe. In addition, this leads to the widest gap among respondents with very traditional parents (0.25); if the parents are more pro gender equality, the difference between European and Turkish raised children is far smaller (0.1). This finding suggests it is worthwhile to study whether the many more, different, and extra-familial cultural signals received by the child who grows up in Europe weaken the parents’ influence. We also tested whether the parents’ influence was different in different types of lineages (see Figure 12.2); the coefficients confirmed the divide between the settler-migrant lineages (with children growing up in Europe) and the two other lineages. There was also a considerable difference amongst these two other lineages: the parents from return-migrant lineages had a much stronger transmission coefficient. However, none of the interaction coefficients was statistically significant.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have focussed on the gender equality attitudes of Turkish migrant families, including intergenerational changes and reproduction, as this is a salient issue in the debates about the integration of migrants in western European societies. Taken together, the results in this chapter underscore the importance of including a multi-generational, multisite, origin, and dissimilation perspective in migration studies.

The third generation respondents who grew up and lived in Turkey but whose parents or grandparents returned from Europe show, on average, a levelling or decreasing support for gender equality compared to their parents, and are considerably more traditional than the descendants of non-migrant families, who show a strong increase in support. This strongly indicates resistance to modernisation or Westernisation among this generation – which has not been in Europe. As illustrated by the in-depth interviews, the return-migrant parents seem to choose to bring up their children with traditional values or unconsciously project an image of a high risk of moral decay. This migration effect on non-migrant youth’s attitudes in the origin country can only be detected if an origin country and a multi-generational perspective are combined.

This finding points to the importance of the dissimilation perspective in understanding how gender equality attitudes change and are reproduced. It
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

seems parents do not think in terms of assimilation, but in terms of dissimilation: they try to prevent their children from moving too far away from the society of origin (possibly based on their perception of the country as it was when they migrated). These results and the dissimilation perspective also put the results on intergenerational transmission into perspective. Our finding that the intergenerational transmission of gender equality attitudes from parents to children is weak among youth growing up in Europe might not be an effect of parents deciding ‘to let their children adapt behaviour patterns that are functional in the new environment’ (Schönpflug 2001: 176). Rather, extra-familial influence may be overwriting the transmission by parents. This explanation seems supported by the transmission results among Turkish stayer and return migrant lineages. As selectivity could play a role here, more in-depth and comparative research is needed.

The multi-generational-origin perspective establishes an important benchmark, not only for comparing the return migrant lineages to the stayer lineages, but also for comparing the settling migrant lineages to the stayers. The results for grandparents and parents suggest some selectivity takes place in those who migrate (less traditional Turks) and those who return (more traditional migrants), but as discussed above, the results for the third generation are less likely (solely) due to selectivity, as these individuals did not make a migration decision themselves and because the intergenerational transmission among settler-migrant lineages is weak. Consequently, it seems safe to conclude migration does not lead to the development of gender equality attitudes in a completely different direction; instead, it accelerates the increasing support for gender equality until the ceiling is reached, arguably the average level of support in the destination context.

The multisite, multi-generational perspective sheds light on how intergenerational transmission reproduces traditional gender equality attitudes. All-in-all, our analyses show Turkish parents have a positive influence on their offspring’s gender equality attitudes, as long as these children are not growing up in Europe. The overwriting impact of extra-familial influences goes against existing ideas that transmission of cultural attitudes is easier in less heterogeneous societies (Van de Pol and Tubergen 2013) or more liberal societies (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Nevertheless, the general notion of migration as a transmission belt (Schönpflug 2001) and the context dependency of intergenerational transmission deserve more attention. Our framework offers several ways to theorise this. The indirect and direct effect of grandparents seems limited, but the results suggest the effect is stronger if the parents migrate and leave their children behind. We do not find strong grandparental effects, as has been argued elsewhere, for the transmission of other attitudes and positions (Amato and Cheadle 2005; Chan and Boliver 2013; Jaeger 2012; Pilkauskas 2012). One of the causes of this absence might be that we only include grandfathers. Given the highly gendered nature of the attitudes discussed in this chapter, the grandmother might actually
be more important and, in this line of reasoning, she might influence her granddaughters more strongly, because transmission might take place within but not across the maternal and paternal lineage. Overall, our findings on parental and grandparental transmission indicate the importance of the site of growing up and to what extent this site is shared by the actors involved in the transmission.
13
Identities

Introduction

During the early decades of the Turkish labour migration to Europe, migrants were considered ‘guest-workers’ (Zorlu and Hartog 2002) who would eventually return home. Their integration was not expected. Today, with a second and third generation being born and raised in Europe, a well-established Turkish migrant community now lives in Europe with strong cultural ties to Turkey. This has stimulated heated debates on their attachment to the destination countries, often evaluated in terms of how far they have renounced their commitment to Turkey. Many participants in such debates assert newcomers should adapt to the receiving society. Typically, such adjustment is measured by assimilation, how similar they become to the majority population in the receiving country and not by their dissimilation, how different they become from those in their country of origin. This obscures understanding of how they may have changed through migration, even though this is at the core of assimilation theory. In this chapter, therefore, after first reviewing patterns of migrant attachment to Turkey and to the destination country on a range of measures, we then consider the extent to which Turkish migrants’ and their descendants’ identification with Turkey differs from that of their non-migrant counterparts in Turkey. To do so, we contrast theories of assimilation and retention and discuss arguments on the development of transnational migrant identities.

Classical assimilation theory suggests a linear story of adaptation: migrants embrace the lifestyles and values of the new environment in direct proportion to their exposure to it (Alba and Nee 1997); certain factors, such as education, enhance and accelerate their assimilation (Portes 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). This expectation owes much to the progressive narrative of a receiving society ideal. A contrasting perspective argues that obstacles to inclusion experienced by migrants and their descendants accumulate and lead them to resist the receiving society culture and to take a retentive
stance towards their origin culture and identity (Hansen 1954; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; also Tajfel and Turner 1979).

Both assimilation and retention are built on the contrast between origin and destination identities. But migrant identities are, in fact, re-constructed, negotiated and revised during the establishment process in destination countries (Massey 1994): this is what constitutes the migration experience. The boundaries of origin and destination country identities can blur (Alba 2005) or become merged in the course of the settlement in the new societies, and research suggests that the 50 years of Turkish migration experience has nurtured a transnational Turkish migrant identity (Bozkurt 2009; Sözeri 2011; van Vliet 1998). It is, therefore, important to consider the nature of Turkish identification by comparing Turks in Europe with Turks in Turkey.

A limitation in extant research is that, despite developments in the analysis of identities, the literature often does not distinguish early labour migrants and their descendants from those who migrated later via other types of migration, such as family reunion (Akgündüz 2008; Abadan-Unat 2002; Levitt 2001; Massey et al. 1987; for exceptions, see Maliepaard et al. 2010; Güveli and Ganzeboom 2007; Kaya and Kentel 2005). Early and later migrant generations may differ in terms of their citizenship status, education history and the strength of their social and cultural ties with Turkey. Despite the richness of qualitative data on this topic, there is a significant lack of large-scale studies about the Turkish migrant population in Europe which can look beyond single country cases to discover overall patterns in Europe. We argue the migration experience of the Turkish migrant families and their descendants is an important factor in shaping Turkish national identification, both among migrants with different migration backgrounds and in different generations. We focus on the original labour migrants and explore the extent to which patterns of identification vary across families (and migrant cohorts) of migrants and non-migrants. We also consider the varied elements that might be considered to constitute transnational migrant identities. Since these elements do not have counterparts in the non-migrant population, we evaluate instead stability or change in migrant transnationalism by comparing across generations of migrants.

In what follows we expand on the theoretical and empirical background and establish our expectations of identity change that stem from them. We briefly describe the data and measures used before turning to the results. To illustrate the diversity and complexity of migrants’ identities, we first describe different dimensions of the identities of migrants and their descendants living in Europe to provide a broader context of migrant identification and illustrate the extent to which transnational identities appear to be a feature of migrant Turks’ experience. We go on to explore specific questions raised by the patterns we find in national identity across migrants and non-migrants. Overall, we find identity change is broadly in line with the assimilation rather than the retention hypothesis.
Background

Origin, destination or transnational

There are two sources from which to construct a merged or transnational identity: identification with the origin and identification with the destination country. These identities may be in conflict or in harmony (Fortin 2002; Platt 2014). Migrants may express a third, transnational – or panethnic – identity (Muttarak 2014) either alongside or substituting for these two.

The country of origin (homeland) component does not necessarily refer to the place of birth; for those born in the destination country, homeland can refer to an idealised entity with which a cultural belonging is established. Such an entity is not entirely geographical: it also reflects a particular period and narrative of home country (Billig 1995). In the migration context, only (adult) migrants have a first-hand memory of the homeland; for those born abroad, homeland is recalled and retold, in part to satisfy feelings of nostalgia and to stimulate a sense of belonging among the younger generations (Baudrillard 1995; Blokland 2003; Massey 1994; Savage et al. 2005). In an attempt to reveal the origin country influence on transnational migrant identities, Mügge (2013) has explored origin country differences on the nationhood of Turkish and Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands and argues that Turkey has long been running an active policy to maintain Turkish migrants’ sense of nationhood. But little is known about how effective these policies are or what role they play in maintaining the Turkish national identity among migrant Turks and their descendants in the European countries. Even if a certain level of transnational communication is maintained between the current place of residence and the homeland, elements that have to do with the current time and space are left incomplete, providing opportunities for other components of identity.

While memories and family narratives feed on the homeland identity, new experiences and observations contribute substantially to this component, as the destination country provides the actual space and context where the daily encounters, relationships of all sorts and practices around them occur (Brodsky et al. 1999; Morley 2001). Even though the adoption of destination cultural practices may be challenging, knowledge of destination practices is straightforward. Recognition of the differences between homeland and destination country practices intrinsically leads to comparisons between the homeland and the destination country’s lifestyles (Bozkurt 2009; Fortin 2002), which might increase or decrease the strength of the homeland identification – or combine with it to create a transnational identity.

Advances in technology in the means and practices of communication facilitate the influence of the homeland at an advanced pace and scope (see also the discussion in Chapter 1), and the effects of globalisation can
be felt among the migrants’ social interactions at the destination (Giddens 1990; Harvey 1989; Held and McGrew 2003). However, migrants may find themselves caught on the horns of a dilemma – simultaneously estranged from their past and failing to fit their current environment. To deal with this, migrant identity can converge into a transitional state where the homeland narrative influences the daily experiences until the destination culture becomes a part of the homeland narrative (Bozkurt 2009; Mallett 2004; Scholte 2003; Tucker 1994; van Vliet 1998). A football player on the German national team, an MP in the Dutch Parliament, or a singer in the Eurovision song contest can ‘represent’ Turkishness with a Turkish-descent flavour.

There is, additionally, a distinct literature on the national identity of Turkish migrants in Europe that connects national identity with ethnic (Turkish) and religious (Muslim) identities. Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) examine the process of dis-identification with the Dutch when ethnic and religious identities strengthen. They describe the mechanism as minority group identification (ingroup: Turkish-Muslim) and rejection of the majority (outgroup: Dutch) identity. Similarly, Maliepaard et al. (2010) investigate ethnic and religious attachment from a generational point of view. Their results are mainly in line with the assimilation theories that suggest ethnic attachment declines over generations, and ethnic attachment decline is linked to the decline of religious attachment (Maliepaard et al. 2010). However, these studies do not explore the change migrants and their descendants experience in their homeland identities (Turkish identities) over time. This is important, as homeland identities are both a significant transnational connection to the homeland and an important shared value transferred within the migrant family. Interestingly, some research on Muslim migrant groups in Europe suggests dual origin and destination identities are common and can co-exist alongside strong attachment to religious identity (Manning and Roy 2010; Nandi and Platt forthcoming; Platt 2014). At the same time we do not know how such homeland identities compare directly to those of non-migrants in the country of origin. Such a comparative approach is, however, necessary to fully test the theories of assimilation, retention and reactive ethnicity that we consider further below.

Assimilation as dissimulation, retention and reactive ethnicity
A common approach to studying the evolution of a migrant identity is the assimilation hypothesis (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes 2003). According to Alba and Nee, assimilation is the inevitable consequence of social and cultural interaction between migrants and the destination society. Building more ties with the natives of the destination society necessitates fewer and weaker transnational ties with the origin society, a process that eventually increases migrants’ social and cultural integration.
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

To this, segmented assimilation theory adds that the process of assimilation does not occur at an equal pace among migrants: it is dependent on the ties they set up in the destination society. Conditions that determine the type of such ties also indirectly determine migrant assimilation. Of particular relevance for this chapter is the argument that less educated migrants are more inclined to retain transnational ties with the people from the origin country than are the higher educated, while higher educated people are more often involved in transnational activities (Portes 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

In opposition to assimilation theory, Hansen (1954) suggests a revitalisation of identification (ethnic or cultural) in the later migrant generations. In a life-long settlement process, where first generation migrants aim to adapt, the third generation often recognises continuing discrimination and identifies with the idealised homeland, adopting what Portes and Rumbaut call ‘reactive ethnicity’ (2001: 152). Thus, there might be ‘an alternative reaction that may lead to the rise and reaffirmation of ethnic solidarity and self-consciousness against assimilation, and retention’ (2001: 284). While existing studies have suggested that in Europe there is little evidence of reactive ethnicity, potential cohort differences may mean dis-identification is still slowed down relative to comparable cohorts in the country of origin: a proposition current studies have been unable to test.

Arguments for reactive ethnicity also align with certain formulations of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), which claim those migrants who strongly identify with their national in-group (Turkish in this case) are likely to have negative attitudes about the destination society and its culture. Retention, having a reactive nature, necessitates a stance or attitude that is visible towards the out-group. Unlike migrant identity, a process of identity construction that starts in the family, and different from assimilation, a gradual change in one’s identity, retention does not require a change in the emotional or practical aspects of identity; rather, it becomes visible through symbolic preferences or expressive attitudes.

The dissimilation from origins perspective takes the reference point of those left behind in the origin society and deals with the change as the outcome of migration (FitzGerald 2012; see also the discussion in Chapter 1). In the case of Turkish migration to Europe since the 1960s, it is possible to see changes in beliefs and practices among migrants over the course of 50 years and through three generations. We can observe weakening or strengthening of Turkish national identity between individuals and over family generations. In addition, our dissimilation perspective takes the non-migrant Turkish citizens’ national identity as a reference point and explores how exposure to the European context leads to either dissimilation from origins as migrants identify with Turkey less, consistent with an assimilation perspective, or identity retention.
Our main expectation is that Turkish migrants have weaker national identity compared to non-migrants, because longer exposure to Europe weakens their Turkish national identity. Furthermore, we anticipate higher educated migrants will have weaker Turkish identity because higher education in Europe is an accelerating factor in assimilation to the destination culture, and as level of education increases, Turkish national identity weakens.

**Multiple dimensions of migrants’ identities**

At the same time, national identity is complex for migrants in ways that do not apply to non-migrants. An offshoot of national identity, ‘long-distance nationalism’ can be defined as the binding medium between the migrants and the homeland (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001: 20), resulting in transnationalism. The nationhood of citizens is limited not only by the ‘political unit’ (i.e. the state), but also by the ‘shared language, history and culture’ (FitzGerald 2009: 170–174). Transnational ties are not limited to regular visits to the origin country but include mass communication (e.g. Internet), expanding possibilities for shared language, history, and culture. In addition, the origin country may make attempts to retain the loyalty of its former citizens. Even if the history of Turkish migration to Europe is relatively recent, nation-states’ strategies to keep their departing citizens loyal is not (Lucassen and Penninx 2009). FitzGerald remarks that states extend their capacity to ‘realize [their] economic and political projects’ with the presence of members outside of their borders who share a common language, history, and culture (2009: 171). In short, transnational identities may be facilitated by actions by the origin nations.

Among migrants, identification with both origin and destination societies can be represented by various indicators, from symbolic attitudes to practical performances. These are specific to the migrant identity and context and do not apply to non-migrants. Of the indicators we selected, some are only significant when performed by migrants, such as supporting a Turkish song in the European song contest (and not the destination country song); others are simply not applicable to non-migrants, such as frequency of visits to Turkey. We group these attitudes and practices under the following two aspects: first, language use and destination country identification and second, transnational ties. We regard voting in Turkish national elections to be a manifestation of the second. Since, by definition, we cannot compare these indicators with similar ones for non-migrants, we simply draw comparisons between migrant generations. This, of course, constitutes a divergence from the book’s overall plan, but in our view, yields much of value. To sum up, we expect younger generations will have stronger identification with the destination country, be more proficient in the destination country language, and have weaker transnational ties with Turkey, including having less interest in Turkish politics and voting less in Turkish general elections.
Data and variables

Sample
We draw on a unique dataset that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families dataset (Guveli et al. 2016), collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012. From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone (see Chapter 2 for a full description of the data).

In this chapter, we draw on the personal interviews conducted with 5,980 family members across family generations in the 1,992 families. Where relevant, we have supplemented these data using the proxy questionnaire, discussed in Chapter 2 and other chapters in this volume, for completing missing information on migration history. Our main sample, for whom we have information on migration history and Turkish identity comprises 5,884 cases. We use a smaller sample of 2,828 cases when estimating the impact of migration history and the mediating role of education, as we have fewer cases with complete migration histories. Due to the family design of our data collection, generations G1, G2 and G3 (explained below) can be members of the same family. We therefore adjust our standard errors for within family association.

Variables
Our main dependent variable is Turkish national identity. The question on Turkish national identity in our questionnaires is phrased as ‘How much do you feel close to people from Turkey?’ and answered on a scale of 5, from ‘none’ (0) to ‘entirely’ (5). A similar formulation has been used to measure national identity in previous studies (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Unlike many migration studies, this study also asked the question of non-migrants in Turkey.

As in other chapters, generation denotes the respondent’s place in the family tree. The first generation (ancestors, G1) are the male respondents who migrated to Europe themselves between 1960 and 1974 and their comparators who did not. The second generation (G2) comprises their children, and the third generation (G3) represents their grandchildren. This generation variable is a representation of the family generations in our data and does not necessarily overlap with migration generation.

Migration status is a categorical variable based on the respondent’s place of birth, place of residence and migration history. Table 13.1 shows the
Table 13.1  Distribution of respondents in migration status by family generations (row = percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G1</th>
<th>G2</th>
<th>G3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-born</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migrant</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>5884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal interviews.

distribution of respondents across three generations by four migration categories: Non-migrants are Turks who did not migrate to Europe; migrants are those from any of G1 to G3 who migrated to and are currently living in Europe; Europe-born respondents are those from G2 and G3 who were born in Europe; return migrants are those from G1 to G3 who returned to Turkey after migrating to Europe.

Exposure to Europe is a continuous variable measured as the proportion of one’s age (in years) spent in Europe. This is a more sensitive measure to evaluate the assimilation hypothesis and allows us to distinguish return migrants who spent a few years in Europe and returned to their place of birth from migrants who spent most of their adulthood in Europe and returned only after retirement. For non-migrants, we allocate an exposure score of 0; EU-born Turks have a score of 1.

Education comprises an 11-scale common metric (based on the ISCED scale used in the European Social Survey) which measures European education qualifications and maps them to corresponding Turkish educational qualifications.

Other variables: In our analysis of national identity, we control for sex and age, variable age ranging from 17 to 92; we also control for sending region and European destination country in order to absorb any differences in identity shaped by a specific receiving context or associated with particular regional origins.

Measures of migrants’ transnationalism: connection with the country of settlement: We use the following items to capture migrants’ links with the country of settlement: having citizenship in the country of residence (0 or 1), use of Turkish with friends and colleagues (1 to 5) and mirrored phrasing of the dependent variable asked about the country of residence nationals: ‘How closely do you feel connected with [COUNTRY] nationals?’ answered from ‘none’ (0) to ‘entirely’ (5) on a 5-point scale.

Measures of migrants’ transnationalism: ties to Turkey: To capture transnational ties, we use frequency of contact with Turkey measured in frequency of visits to Turkey and frequency of communication with friends.
Intergenerational Consequences of Migration

and extended family, measured on a 5-point scale, from none (0) to very frequent (5). Sending remittances to Turkey captures the transfer of money to family, to friends, to local community (usually in the sending region) or as personal investment in Turkey. Even though a similar measurement has been employed at the national level in previous studies (for a good example, see Mügge 2013), or taken as an ‘ethnic identity’ in contrast to the national identity of the destination country (Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2007), we measure the outcome: the connectivity of the individual to the homeland.

Maintaining Turkish citizenship might be considered an important indicator for the political aspect of transnational ties with Turkey, together with voting in the latest (2011) Turkish elections. Both variables take the value of 1 if true; otherwise they take the value of 0. Finally we use preferred place of burial. This has three categories: country of residence, Turkey, or somewhere else. We recode it into a dichotomous variable: 1 for Turkey and 0 for any other country.

Analysis
We illustrate the various aspects of migrant identity using simple descriptive statistics. When investigating Turkish national identity in a comparative perspective, we estimate linear (OLS) regression models of the strength of Turkish identity. Since our respondents are nested in families, the errors are adjusted for clustering at the family level.

Results
Dimensions of migrants’ identities
As discussed, a range of variables shed light on the various components of migrant identities, helping us to understand the strength of identification of migrants with the people from both origin and destination countries.

Amongst the measures indicating a link to the receiving country society, language use is critical. Accordingly, some previous studies have considered language use and language proficiency among migrants (see Maliepaard et al. 2010). Identity construction starts with socialisation in the family, and migrants who express a stronger sense of closeness to Turkey can pass their attachment to their children by speaking Turkish at home. The use of the mother tongue is a powerful way to transmit identity, especially as language use is the first step in the building of identity. Although identifying with Turkey and feeling closer to people from Turkey is an essential aspect of migrant identity, however, it is not the only component. Although Maliepaard et al. (2010) measure national identity with a single item that contrasts the homeland identity and the destination society identity, these identities can coexist (Nandi and Platt forthcoming). In their study
of migrant identification, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) propose a migrant identity is not necessarily mutually exclusive to a destination country identity; dual identities are both possible and commonplace. We come back to Turkish identity, which is pervasive across Turks in Europe as well as Turkey (see Table 13.4, below); but in Table 13.2, we measure not only language use, but also identification with the destination country through feelings of closeness to destination country nationals and through having citizenship of the destination country.

In the table, a lower score in using Turkish language with friends and colleagues means an increasing use of the destination country language in an individual's personal and professional network; as the table shows, this goes hand-in-hand with increasing closeness to its people. Gaining citizenship in the destination country increases in later generations as well. Note that while use of the destination country language shows a similar pattern with the destination country citizenship starting from the second generation (arguably related to citizenship requirements in some countries), a feeling of closeness increases a generation later in the G3. These generational changes are statistically significant across all measures. Nevertheless, as we see in Table 13.4 (below), feeling closer to Turkish people is higher than feelings of closeness to people from the destination country among all generations in Europe.

Turning to transnational ties, Turkey keeps its departed migrants on its political agenda by funding Turkish associations, sending Turkish teachers and Muslim religious officers to the European destination countries, addressing Turkish migrants in Europe as voluntary ambassadors in political discourse and counting economic remittances as national revenue (Mügge 2012, 2013; TMFA 2014). We expect migrants with more transnational ties to have stronger identification with Turkey and people from Turkey, and vice versa. Using the measures of contact, remittances, citizenship, voting and preferred place of burial, Table 13.3 illustrates the extent to which these vary across generations of migrants (and those born in Europe). With these measures, we aim to link the cumulative efforts of migrants to sustain their

Table 13.2 Mean scores of feeling close to (country) nationals, use of Turkish language with friends and colleagues and having (country of residence) citizenship across migrant generations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feeling close to [country] nationals</th>
<th>Turkish with friends &amp; colleagues</th>
<th>Having [country] citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal interviews.
ties with Turkey. We are also looking for a confirmation of the attempts of the Turkish state to maintain transnational ties with the Turkish migrants in Europe.

In the table, all items of transnational ties in the Turkish migrant identity are observed to decline in later generations. Younger migrants have fewer contacts with Turkey and are less likely to send remittances. This may be linked to different migration motivations, as they are more likely to be family migrants. They are also more likely to have been born in Europe (not the case for any G1 migrants). We also observe that despite the decline, the retention of Turkish citizenship resists this trend. With changing integration policies and dual-citizenship restrictions in mind (Ersanilli 2010; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011; also TMLSS 2014), we found this result surprising. What is even more remarkable, however, is the preferred place of burial. As the most skewed item, it sheds some interesting light on belonging and identity. Ninety per cent of migrant or European-born respondents (regardless of their place of birth, their country of education, social status and connections) prefer to be buried in Turkey. Although further official statistics should be gathered to measure the actual practice, the intention is extremely strong.

Turning to voting behaviour, as luck would have it, our fieldwork was conducted a month after the general elections; therefore, we believe this instrument is reliable. Table 13.4 illustrates Turkish migrants’ determination to cast their votes in Turkey despite the constraints on voting; specifically, migrants had to physically visit Turkey at least one month before the elections to register. At the same time, the table shows decreasing interest in voting among the younger generations; this suggests a decreasing interest in Turkish politics among Turkish migrant youth, in line with political disaffection among younger populations in Europe more generally (Heath et al. 2014).

The descriptive results on migrant identities present a consistent trend when read through generations from a family perspective: younger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of contact with Turkey</th>
<th>Sending remittances to Turkey</th>
<th>Having Turkish citizenship</th>
<th>Voting in Turkish elections</th>
<th>Place of burial (Turkey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal interviews.
generations feel closer to the people from the destination society, more often speak the destination country language with friends and colleagues and increasingly obtain a European passport in their country of residence. They certainly have weaker transnational contacts with Turkey, make less material and social investment in Turkey and engage much less in Turkish politics – at least in voting. That said, Turkish migrants in Turkey overwhelmingly prefer to be buried in Turkey, maintain Turkish citizenship even if they were born in Europe, and have other people from Turkey or of Turkish descent in their networks, as we deduce from their transnational ties and from their language use. This suggests that despite the decline, Turkish national identity remains a prominent feature among Turkish migrants in Europe.

National identity among migrants and non-migrants

We now turn to dissimilation and retention in Turkish identity among Turkish migrants and their descendants compared to non-migrants. Table 13.4 shows that Turks feel overwhelmingly connected to people from Turkey across generations: combining ‘mostly’ and ‘entirely’, we find 86 per cent of G1, 77 per cent of G2 and 74 per cent of G3 feel connected to people in Turkey. Despite the very strong Turkish national identification across all generations, this suggests some decline in Turkish identity among younger generations, in line with expectations about age and cohort effects in national identity more generally.

We go on to test whether exposure to Europe reduces national identity across generations and whether education accelerates dissimilation from Turkish national identification among migrants, holding other relevant demographic characteristics constant. Table 13.5 addresses the extent to which migration has an impact on Turkish national identity across generations. The effect of migration on Turkish national identity is linear, in that Turkish migrants have weaker national identity than non-migrant Turkish natives, with the EU-born identifying even more weakly with Turkey, demonstrating dissimilation from origins and supporting the traditional assimilation perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-None</th>
<th>2-Hardly</th>
<th>3-Somew.</th>
<th>4-Mostly</th>
<th>5-Entirely</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>2710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>2204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>5960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal interviews.
Adding exposure to Europe in Model 2 renders migrant status categories insignificant. In other words, it is not migration status specifically that accounts for the weakening national identification, but the proportion of years spent in Europe. Controlling for age allows us to disentangle the exposure effect from the age effect. In line with our expectations, younger people have weaker national identification. These results stand in sharp contrast to what retention theories suggest, pointing us towards dissimilation, despite the more general change among younger people. Model 3 tests whether education contributes to lower national identification, especially for those with greater exposure to Europe. Contrary to our expectations, it neither influences national identification in general, once we have controlled for age, nor does it accelerate the process of dis-identification among those with migration experience. This runs counter to the segmented assimilation hypothesis.

### Conclusion and discussion

In this chapter, we find the effect of migration – or more specifically exposure to Europe – on Turkish national identity is linear: Turkish migrants have weaker national identity than their non-migrant counterparts, and identification diminishes with the increasing proportion of life spent abroad. This effect persists over and above a general trend among younger people towards weaker identification. As noted, our results support the dissimilation – and

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**Table 13.5** Influence of migrant status, age, sex, education and exposure to Europe on Turkish national identity (OLS estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.46***</td>
<td>3.79***</td>
<td>3.79***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>−0.17***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>−0.23***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>−0.21***</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-born</td>
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<td>−0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migrant</td>
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<td>−0.01</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (female=1)</td>
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<td>−0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exposure to Europe</td>
<td>−0.37***</td>
<td>−0.39***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Educ.*Exposure</td>
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<td>−0.10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (in families)</td>
<td>5884 (1761)</td>
<td>2828 (1209)</td>
<td>2828 (1209)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 2000 Families study, personal interviews. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.*
Identities

thereby assimilation – arguments. By contrast, we find little evidence for retention. Interestingly, education plays a very minor role in influencing identification or enhancing the rejection of Turkish identity among those with greater exposure to Europe.

Despite the common anti-immigrant discourse in Europe suggesting identification with the homeland creates an obstacle to integration, it appears Turkey’s ongoing communication with its migrants will not halt the steady progress of their identity assimilation in Europe, even if it may slow their political dissimilation from Turkey. Future research should consider whether the Turkish government’s policies to maintain the strong ties with Turkish migrants and their descendants have had an impact on the high levels (albeit decreasing) of attraction to Turkey among European Turks. As for the political involvement of the migrant generations in Europe, a few lessons can be learnt from our findings. Notably, the Turkish migrants in Europe who keep their Turkish citizenship should not be ignored in Turkish domestic politics. Given the impressive migrant participation in the Presidential elections of August 2014, it seems likely that when the burden of visiting Turkey is lifted, migrants will show up in even larger numbers to vote in the Turkish elections.

Overall, this chapter demonstrates that despite the strong persistence of Turkish identity among those of Turkish origin in Europe, this does not represent a fossilisation of identity or an increase in ‘Turkishness’ among those living abroad. Instead, Turkish identity can co-exist with strong transnational ties, facilitating the merging and the maintenance of dual identities, despite a clear trend towards dissimilation from Turkish origins.
Part V
14

Conclusion

Introduction

For some time now, the Turkish-origin diaspora has been the biggest single minority population in Europe. While there have been close contacts between Europe and Turkey for centuries, this large flow was initiated with the major labour migration of the 1960s to early 1970s, facilitated by collateral agreements between Turkey and a number of countries requiring labour. With ongoing labour migration and expanding family migration, the European, Turkish-origin population continues to increase. Alongside clear differences between the migrant and subsequent generations certain continuities render the community recognisable through generations. At the same time, there is substantial cross-national variation in these patterns, with Turkish-origin ‘disadvantage’ more pronounced in some countries and second generation ‘success’ in others (Crul and Schneider 2010), leading to debates about how to interpret the migration experience.

Migration has touched the lives of many more Turks than those currently living in European countries. For one thing, there has been a marked return migration after both shorter and longer periods in foreign labour markets. Some families were split by migration, with family reunification occurring only later or achieved with the return of the migrant. Even among those who stayed in Europe and their children and grandchildren, many have retained close links with Turkey, something made easier by relative proximity, as well as declining costs of travel and communication. This has brought migration, or at least contact with migrants’ lifestyles, perceptions and experiences, into Turkey, not just into urban, cosmopolitan centres but more traditional towns and villages. At the same time, processes of globalisation and global communications, not to mention economic, social and political changes that have taken place over the same period, have transformed to a greater or lesser degree both the migrant’s destination countries and Turkey.
These processes of Turkish migration, the experience of migrants in destination countries, social change in Turkey, the impact of migration, and, for example, the impact of migrant remittances, on the Turkish economy and society have been extensively studied, but primarily as discrete fields of study. In this book, we offer a unique perspective: simply stated, we compare those labour migrants and their descendants who stayed in Europe, those who returned, and those who could have migrated, but did not. Unlike studies that merely compare migrants and non-migrant populations in destination countries (the bulk of European migration literature), our work takes the migrants’ own starting points as a point of departure. In so doing, we shed light on the actual impacts of migration, noting how far migrants (and their children) have ‘gained’ from migration, and the extent to which they have adopted different social, attitudinal and behavioural practices than their non- or return-migrant comparators.

We reveal the complexity of notions of ‘migrant’, often represented as a simple binary category with a single direction of movement. Instead, we suggest the multiplicity of transnational lives and multidirectional migration flows. As Chapter 1 shows, while there is increasing interest in transnational lives, much extant research remains small in scale, comprising qualitative studies of particular, often more elite, migrant segments. Finally, we show how migration crosses migrants’ lives and family generations. Amongst the migrant population overall, temporary migration dominates; nevertheless, half of migrants’ children are settled in Europe (see Chapter 4).

While Turkish migration is, in many ways, unique in its scale and timing, in other ways, it is typical of labour migration as it is portrayed in migration theory, characterised by the matching to rather low level jobs in times of high labour demand and subsequent settlement and family reunification. The insights from this volume have the potential to illuminate other migration flows and contribute to the modification of empirical understandings of the migrant experience as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ by comparison with destination country experience. These insights can also pave the way towards theoretical developments in migration literature on the impact of migration, a topic best served by the ‘origins-of-migration’ design used here and our dissimilation from origins theoretical perspective.

In what follows, we briefly touch on key contributions of the individual chapters and suggest some overarching messages. We consider how patterns and processes of dissimilation from origins are both similar and different for economic, social and cultural outcomes. We bring together the findings from across the chapters, noting their contribution to the migration literature and commenting on their ability to contribute to new and emerging research agendas. We end by noting some limitations and pointing to potential research opportunities.
Summary of main findings

Chapter 4 discusses the transition occurring in migration as it becomes embedded in and driven by family and kinship networks. It highlights the discrepancy between education and achieved occupational position and suggests its relationship with the strong economic motivations of the initial ‘pioneer’ migration, consistent with models of labour migration. This selected migration stream gives way in later periods and across generations to a less- (or negatively) selected family migration that represents a response to changing barriers to entry and labour market conditions in countries of destination and is embedded in the kinship group itself.

Different national-level regulations of migration or provision will be of limited relevance to the nature of flows, as kin networks will shape migration flows whatever the policy regime may be. The theoretical implications of this chapter include the need to pay much more attention to the migration kinship network, not treating migrants as individual ‘free agents’. The family and the status of individuals within a kinship migration flow require further attention if we are to understand the perpetuation of migration streams and their transformations. The ‘tipping point’ in migration related to the location of family members draws attention to how family migration position (i.e. pioneer or kinship-driven migrant), as well as migrant generation (i.e. first or second or subsequent settled generation), is likely to be relevant to other (economic, social, cultural) domains of life. This possibility is explored in later chapters of the book.

Chapters 5 to 7 explore the impact of migration on employment, education and self-employment. They reveal, as anticipated from the theoretical perspective outlined in the Introduction, that transmission of socio-economic position is weaker across generations, in both occupational and educational domains, demonstrating dissimilation from origins in an intergenerational perspective. This is reinforced by the inclusion of grandparental associations within the analysis of educational outcomes; we find a ‘grandparent’ effect for non-migrants but not migrants, suggesting long-standing family origins are less significant for the latter.

Chapter 5 demonstrates the educational gains from migration across generations, something that is starting to be explored in other literature. In light of concerns about poor attainment, not to mention the strong influence of educational systems on differential Turkish outcomes (Crul and Schneider 2010), it is important to be able to demonstrate the extent to which migrant motivations for their children are being realised. We find dissimilation from origins in relation to the comparison between stayers and migrants. At the same time, with educational expansion in Turkey and some potential plateauing as the specific migration motivation becomes generationally removed from their descendants’ schooling, we see a narrowing of the migrant educational advantage. Dissimilation ‘as assimilation’ in
our formulation in Chapter 1 seems, in part, to be giving way to common trends.

Chapter 6 demonstrates that migrants are more socially mobile than their non-migrant counterparts: their occupational outcomes are less strongly associated with their parents’ socio-economic status. We can thus demonstrate dissimilation from regional origins and from family origins in this aspect of migrants’ experience. Interestingly, we also show that those who migrated as labour migrants were already more socially mobile before they left Turkey.

Chapter 7, focusing on self-employment, reveals distinctive differences in transmission and self-employment entry. As well as supporting the weaker levels of intergenerational transmission among migrant compared to stayer populations, our findings raise questions about the meaning of self-employment. In Europe, it seems to constitute an ‘ethnic option’ to European barriers. This is quite different from the family investment model in the Turkish context. Overall, the picture painted is of dissimilation from origins and strategic achievement of migration gains.

When we turn to social aspects in Chapters 8–10, the picture becomes more complicated. Given the attention to inter-ethnic partnerships and marital homogamy in existing literature, the lack of attention to marriage mode is striking. While a number of local studies have explored issues relating to cousin marriage, we have a limited understanding of arranged marriage patterns and how they are (or are not) changing across generations. Chapter 8 brings strong new evidence to our understanding of migrant and minority partnerships. The story of arranged marriages, interestingly, is very consistent with the narrative of educational outcomes in Chapter 5. Specifically, migrants already tend to have fewer arranged marriages than non-migrants, but they are also less likely to demonstrate the intergenerational transmission of marriage mode. That said, marriage patterns are showing a secular trend in both Europe and Turkey towards partner-initiated unions; the scale of this trend dwarfs the differences between migrants and non-migrants across generations and in terms of transmission. In this case, we are seeing dissimilation from origins in terms of weaker transmission and lower rates of arranged marriage among migrants, but the substantial changes across family generations are not specific to migrants; nor do they demonstrate an impact of migration. Rather, they are in line with a common trend taking place in Turkey. This trend itself, of course, may not be immune to the impacts of migration on the origin country, as partner selection from those with Turkish origin continues. Even so, such selection may be driven by the potential fiancé(s) themselves.

Chapter 9 shows that the dramatic declines in fertility in Turkey render any apparent ‘assimilation’ of migrants’ fertility towards destination country norms potentially misleading. Fertility is, however, linked to educational level, and to the extent migrants achieve higher levels of education (as seen
in Chapter 5), they also experience lower fertility. However, the rates are in line with those of commensurately educated non-migrants in Turkey. Rather than a migration effect suggesting some form of dissimilation from origins, then, we are witnessing a general decline in fertility, particularly among more educated women. Fertility patterns, at least for first and second births, are on parallel paths (or dissimilation towards globalisation) rather than following distinct pathways. At higher parity, the picture is more complicated, suggesting migrant women may be moving towards family completion more quickly – the first indication of some dissimilation towards revitalisation. But the findings are not sufficient to build a theoretical case for revitalisation.

Chapter 10 illustrates the impact of migration as disruption – in this case on social networks. It shows how networks tend to be greater and provide higher educational resources for non-migrants than for migrants, of whatever generation. While migrants’ friendship networks do not provide strong evidence that ethnic communities abroad can provide additional resources for their members and link them to ‘more advantaged’ others, migrant women's networks are more diverse than their non-migrant counterparts. There is some evidence that migration effects are particularly strong for women. This important finding accords with the fact that migrant Turkish women have higher employment rates than their non-Turkish counterparts and contrasts with the emphasis in much of the European-focused literature on the cultural and economic constraints on Turkish women. To the extent women are, as they are typically seen to be, the ‘carriers’ of culture, this could be expected to have implications for transmission of more cultural domains of life – as well as how they are reinterpreted – with greater likelihood of dissimilation from country of origin but not necessarily family of origin. This topic is taken up in the final section of the book.

Chapters 11 and 12 treat religiosity and gender attitudes across migrants and non-migrants, and their transmission. Despite the differences in religious context in Europe and Turkey, Chapter 11 tells a story of continuities not dissimilation. While rates of prayer are declining to some degree in both contexts, rates of institutional and subjective religiosity remain high. Moreover, religiosity shows sensitivity to family transmission processes, implying substantial continuity over time. There is some evidence of variations in the dimension considered: transmission in individual/personal manifestations of religion are more subject to secularising influences and to weaker intergenerational transmission among European Turks, in contrast to institutional forms, which are more similar and remain more stable in later generations across the two contexts. In sum, there is a limited amount of support for dissimilation as a consequence of migration, but the patterns are very different from those operating in the economic- and social-spheres.

Gender attitudes, covered in Chapter 12, have been changing rapidly across countries. Turkey is no exception. The context of overarching change
rather than stability is somewhat different from religiosity, but even within this context, we find attitudinal changes towards egalitarian views are ‘speeded up’ among migrants, with attitudinal transmission weakened by migration. This chapter provides evidence of migrants’ dissimilation from origin both in comparison to non-migrants and in relation to within-family continuities. Interestingly, the return migrants are the most conservative in their attitudes, providing some evidence of reaction or ‘revitalisation’, not among those who remain in Europe but among those who return. Of course, their more conservative attitudes could be part of what drives their return. Nevertheless, this shows how the impact of migration on the origin country is not necessarily always in the direction of greater Europeanisation.

Finally, Chapter 13 explores how migrants actually feel about their origins – that is how strongly they identify with Turkey. We find a straightforward dissimilation from Turkish origins (consistent with assimilation to destination country norms) stemming from greater exposure to European contexts. Nevertheless, migrant Turks, though becoming more attached to destination countries over generations remain closely linked to Turkey in a range of affective and behavioural ways. Overall, however, there is a trend towards less identification with origins with time away from Turkey, a finding in line with the destination-country-based migration literature.

Bringing all the findings together is fascinating and enlightening. First, the volume produces strong support for the impact of migration on multiple aspects of migrants’ lives, even though this is much more evident in some areas than others. The impact of migration can be clearly seen in terms of educational attainment, the composition of friendship networks, patterns of marriage formation, gender role attitudes and identity. Second, we see how major changes occurring in Turkey and Europe inflect our understanding of apparent ‘assimilation’ to European norms. Educational expansion means the relative educational gains of the third family generation are less for migrants than they might otherwise appear. Changes in fertility, arranged marriages and gender role attitudes are also appearing, albeit with some differences, in Turkey. Hence, while migrants may be ahead of the curve, the differences are more of degree. That said, relative stability in religiosity in Turkey suggests the high levels of religiosity among migrants cannot readily be conceived as revitalisation.

One of the factors contributing to change is the family context. The chapters shed light on the ways family transmission operates to loosen or sustain not only transnational links but also attitudes, identities, beliefs and behaviours. In line with our general theoretical propositions, we find migration tends to reduce family transmission. This is the case for occupation, education and self-employment, along with marriage mode, gender attitudes and, to a limited extent, religiosity. The new context in which migrants and children find themselves, therefore, tends towards dissimilation rather than economic and cultural maintenance. Lower rates of transmission do
not necessarily imply greater Europeanisation, as the children of migrants could become more conservative, especially as they are no longer driven by the motivations driving the pioneer labour migrants. Interestingly, we find this loosening of generational connections leads away from similarities with non-migrants and away from distinctive migrant or minority ways of being.

**Contributions**

These findings contribute to ongoing and emerging debates in a number of ways. They embed migrants’ experiences and outcomes in their local, temporal and family histories, thereby responding to Vermeulen’s criticism, discussed in Chapter 1, that migrants are generally seen as people without histories. Our findings explicitly demonstrate the selectivity (or otherwise) of migrants on multiple dimensions and the transformations in or persistence of their beliefs and behaviours. We find migrants are linked to earlier migrations through family connections to preceding migrants, through exposure to those who have migrated and returned, or through more distant kinship and family relationships. This has implications for their expectations of migration. In addition, by looking at within-family processes, we distinguish the role of migration from the role of family transmission. For example, the children of migrants are likely to be less ‘traditional’ in some respects (such as arranged marriages) simply because their parents were less traditional as well. We would not have found this without our control group of those who remained, accompanied by our multi-generational perspective.

Our results address a number of themes raised by the transnationalism literature (Levitt 2003; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Portes 2003; Portes et al. 1999). We show not only the levels of intercourse between origin and destination countries, but also the patterns of onward and dispersed migrations. Rather than revealing a dependence on homogenous populations living in relatively stable circumstances in concentrated areas of destination countries, we capture the diversity of migrant trajectories, mobilities and networks. We observe how networks are practically maintained in our digital age, with high levels of personal contact more easily achieved than ever before. While this is a not a new point, we offer large scale empirical evidence across generations to substantiate it. Moreover, we show transnational patterns not for cosmopolitan sophisticates but for those travelling from relatively rural areas to the factories of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and elsewhere.

Our study speaks directly to critiques of methodological nationalism (Amelina and Faist 2012). By incorporating origin and destination sites, we are better able to explain the processes and mechanisms driving migrant practices and orientations. In a word, migrants are different. They are not
simply translated from another country with a fixed set of beliefs and orientations. Rather, they both differ from and dissimilate from those left behind – and those who return ‘home’ more quickly. While they bring many of the expectations and attitudes from a particular era and location, they do not ‘fossilise’ in comparison to their non-migrant compatriots.

Importantly for future research, we move beyond the dependence in the international migration literature on assimilation and segmented assimilation theories to frame and explain the experiences of migrants (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993). Such theories focus on the mechanisms driving the extent to which migrants become similar to destination country natives. In addition, the arguments are commonly proffered through a US lens, thus yielding minimal understanding of migrants’ incorporation into European destination countries with different legal regulations and policies (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Following FitzGerald (2012), we offer an extended theoretical perspective that includes trajectories and changes in the origin country. Our theoretical framework of dissimilation from origins takes into account, in equal measures, the impact of global/national changes on the individual in origin countries and changes/stability in processes of migration and settlement.

Admittedly, there are limits to what we can cover, and the range of questions we can adequately address in a single volume is circumscribed. Important areas relating, in particular, to women’s employment experiences, wellbeing, cultural practices, political engagement, income and forms of transnational exchange are outside the scope of the present book but their examination would paint a fuller picture of the impacts of migration on migrants and their families and, at the same time, develop our dissimilation perspective. To this, we should add that the clear benefits of the origins-of-migration design in disentangling the impact of migration and tracking the complexity of migrant flows comes at the cost of a reference point in terms of country of destination populations. This is central to an examination of gains from migration; determining a relative position in the local context is likely to provide a relevant reference point, particularly for those born outside Turkey.

While some claim the nation-state is declining as a significant factor in outcomes, a growing literature (see, e.g. Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011) argues for the importance of national contexts and polices in shaping migrant outcomes. Although there is scope (see, e.g. Chapter 5) for demonstrating differences across contexts, it is hard to disentangle these from potential unobserved factors impacting selection into different contexts or the inter-connection between certain origin regions and destination contexts. More work could be done to ascertain how the impacts of migration play out in different destination contexts. By focusing on the period of labour migration and male migrants from this period and their families, our account of later migration waves, such as political migration, is necessarily limited.
While we may observe some of the features of changing migrant flows, such as the move to family migration discussed in Chapter 4, we are limited to observing them in families from high labour migration areas. In a related issue, our data (Guveli et al. 2016) cannot speak to more urban and cosmopolitan migrations streams.

Nevertheless, we provide a first account of what an origins-of-migration perspective can offer to the study of migration. It has enabled us better to specify our dissimilation perspective and empirically to test its theoretical implications. We hope others will build on this work, applying an origins-of-migration approach to other large scale migrations, including recent and developing flows, such as migration from eastern to western Europe. In this way, migration scholarship may address some of the hitherto unanswered questions and move beyond deficit models of migration and conceptions that situate migrants as unconnected individuals making independent and decontextualised economic decisions.

While not understating the challenges that migrants and their descendants face in new destinations, especially following the upheaval of an international move, our approach addresses and evaluates the gains and the pains that follow from the migration decision. It speaks to the ways these pains and gains relate to the ongoing ties between migrants and the origin country. On the one hand, Turkish migrant success is made visible in the conspicuous demonstration of economic resources at rural weddings or in grandiose summer homes. On the other hand, ambivalence to the impact of migration is expressed in the regrets and anxieties of both those who have remained and those who have left when they speak of the dramatic social changes since the 1960s.

Our evidence speaks to the complexities of migrant trajectories and to the international outlook and interconnected perspectives that shape migrants’ lives. We opened the book with the story of Osman, so we will close with him. While Osman and his wife could not know what their life would have been like had they stayed in Açaabat, the achievements and diversity of their children’s and grandchildren’s experience speaks to the possibilities that may not have been realised had they stayed – even if these possibilities included a preference for ‘returning’ to live and work in Turkey.
### Appendix, Table A11.1  Subjective religiosity, praying and attendance among Turks in Europe and Turkey across generations

<table>
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<th>Praying</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>−0.003*</td>
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<td>0.022</td>
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**Note:** *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

**Source:** 2000 Families study, personal data. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; subjective religiosity are OLS; others are Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) models, and the intercepts of the OLR are dropped.
Appendix A12.1 Gender equality attitudes in Turkey

Note: These surveys include nationally representative samples of women aged 15 to 49. Index based on three ‘agree or disagree’ items: (1) Important decisions should be made by men; (2) Women should not argue with men; (3) It is better for male children to have education than for female children.

### Appendix A12.2 Descriptive statistics

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<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent in same country during youth</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather in same country during youth</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent lives in same country</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather lives in same country</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent has lived or lives in Europe</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandfather has lived or lives in Europe</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up in...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
### Appendix A12.3  Control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td>0.011*</td>
<td>0.011*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.106***</td>
<td>0.108***</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>–0.001</td>
<td>–0.002</td>
<td>–0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective religiosity</td>
<td>–0.033*</td>
<td>–0.029#</td>
<td>–0.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration status (ref=Always lived in Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once in Europe</td>
<td>–0.002</td>
<td>–0.028</td>
<td>–0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated to Europe</td>
<td>–0.082</td>
<td>–0.096</td>
<td>–0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always lived in Europe</td>
<td>–0.143</td>
<td>–0.169</td>
<td>–0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineage migration history (ref=Stayer lineage)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remigration lineage</td>
<td>–0.121***</td>
<td>–0.120***</td>
<td>–0.121***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler lineage</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other lineages</td>
<td>–0.033</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>–0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin region dummies</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination country dummies</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.873***</td>
<td>0.789***</td>
<td>0.766***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-level variance</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child-level variance</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–2 Restricted Log likelihood</td>
<td>162.724</td>
<td>149.906</td>
<td>151.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>175.821</td>
<td>163.003</td>
<td>165.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The standard errors are given between brackets. All models are multilevel, with the parent level as higher-level context.

Source: 2000 Families study, personal data.
Notes

1 Introduction: The Origins of Migration

1. The ancestors of our family lineages are only men but the study includes their female descendants. The research design will be introduced in Chapter 2 in detail.
2. The figure is from the Turkish Ministry of Development, consulted 27 March 2014: http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/EkonomikSosyalGostergeler.aspx
3. The latter migratory flow forms the basis for studies of the most influential international migration theories and methodologies (Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Rumbaut 2001b; Telles and Ortiz 2008).

2 Research Design and Data

1. For occupations, we can extend our models to include the occupation of the father of the G1 ancestor (G0). In a small number of families, G4 members have reached adulthood.

3 The Five Regions of Origin in Turkey

1. This number does not consider the naturalised former Turkish citizens or those born in Europe as citizens of a European country. Independent of their citizenship status, the OECD claims 2.2 million first generation migrants from Turkey live in the major European destination countries. Not included in this figure are individuals of Turkish descent who were born in Europe. Since the states apply varying definitions for registration, no exact number of all people of Turkish descent in Europe exists (http://www.csgb.gov.tr/csgbPortal/diyih.portal?page=yv&id=1).
2. The Turkish Employment Service classified as ‘skilled’ those workers (1) who had formal education in vocational and technical schools and (2) who had learned on-the-job and through the master-apprentice system and could show and certify their skills in short-term courses organised by the Employment Service.
3. Note again that most official data are only available at the province level. The populations of the selected districts comprise about 3 per cent (Kulu in the province of Konya), 5 per cent (Emirdağ in the province of Afyon and Acipayam in Denizli province), 6 per cent (Şarkışla in Sivas) and 15 per cent (Akçaabat in the province of Trabzon, TUIK, 2012) of their respective provinces’ total populations.

5 Educational Attainment

1. The mean age is 42.6 for G2 (min:18, max:74) and 26 for G3 (min:18, max:58).
2. Although we do not focus on gender differences, we opt for specific values for sensible specimen cases.
7 Self-Employment

1. A separate cross-country analysis reveals all settlers in Europe except those currently living in Sweden and Denmark are less likely to become self-employed (probits for settlers in Germany = –0.90, \( p < 0.000 \), the Netherlands = –0.79, \( p < 0.000 \); France = –0.33, \( p < 0.05 \); Austria = –1.16, \( p < 0.000 \); Belgium = –0.38, \( p < 0.000 \); Denmark = –0.24, \( p = 0.162 \); Sweden = –0.20, \( p = 0.232 \); Other EU = –0.55, \( p < 0.05 \)). Those settled in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, where 53 per cent (1,238 out of 2,346) of the settlers currently live, continue to display significantly lower levels of self-employment when farmers are excluded (probits for settlers in Germany = 0.71, \( p < 0.001 \); the Netherlands = 0.60, \( p < 0.001 \); Austria = 0.94, \( p < 0.01 \)).

2. The large share of the self-employed farmers amongst the first generation of returnees and stayers might cause us to wonder if the settlers would have proved more entrepreneurial if their relationship with farming had not been broken through migration. But, as shown earlier, the settlers remain less entrepreneurial even when farmers are excluded.

8 Marriage


1. In the 2000 Families study, the share of interethnic marriages among individuals with some sort of international migration experience, that is marriages with a partner of native western European origin, of all marriages, was two per cent. The share was below one per cent in the first and about two per cent in the second and third generations. This low prevalence might partly be driven by the rural selection of the sample.

10 Friends and Social Networks

1. The descriptive findings were the same even if we used this reduced sample in the analysis. Given the distinctive age and sex profiles of the first family generation (G1), we re-estimated all the analyses excluding G1. The results did not alter the overall conclusions.

12 Attitudes towards Gender Equality

1. The two WVS questions on gender equality in education are similar to the 2000 Families questions. The leadership question in 2000 Families focuses on large enterprises, while the WVS question considers political leadership.

2. In the pilot phase in Şarkışla, the gender equality questions were not included. Of the 2,222 available three-generation lineages, 347 (15.6 per cent) third-, 329 (12.9 per cent) second- and 91 (9.7 per cent) first-generation respondents have missing scores on both gender equality items, leaving 1,875 third-generation respondents. For 785 of these, there was information available on both a parent and a grandparent (most missing observations were found at the grandparental level).
Notes

3. The support reported in the WVS data is lower than that in the 2000 Families (stayer) data. Here the different natures of the datasets are important. First, next to education, the WVS data focus on politics and the 2000 Families on business. The first is more masculine in Turkey. Second, the 2000 Families data cover generations, so the G3 respondents are, on average, 24 years old, while in each WVS wave, the average age is 36 to 40. Both elements predict a difference in the direction found.

4. Model 2 has also been estimated including all respondents for whom we had missing data on the grandparents’ attitudes (total $n = 1,513$). The origin and lineages dummies had to be removed as well. This did not change the interpretations; the transmission coefficient was somewhat stronger: 0.188 (0.024).

5. Focusing on cases where the grandparents were physically in the same country as the grandchildren reduced the number of cases so much that an analysis could not be run. That the grandparents are not present is not a problem, as we expect the influence of parents becomes weaker when they are not present; this increases the relative influence of all other factors (ceteris paribus), so we can compare these models to the ones in Table 12.1 as the grandparents might not be present in those cases either.

6. For the very small group (7 per cent of the sample) growing up in both Europe and Turkey, the parental intergenerational transmission coefficient is almost the same as for growing up in Turkey. This group is very small, however.

7. We used the sample averages methods to estimate these figures: in the regression equation, all variables are held constant at their means, except the interaction variable and its two base parts.
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