

**CULTURAL PARTICIPATION AMONG ETHNIC MINORITY AND NATIVE  
MAJORITY ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR PARENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS**

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# **CULTURAL PARTICIPATION AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION AMONG ETHNIC MINORITY AND NATIVE MAJORITY ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR PARENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS**

## **Abstract**

This paper reports on cultural participation and cultural reproduction among adolescents (aged 16-19 and mostly enrolled in school) and their parents, comparing ethnic minorities and the majority of Dutch provenance. Ethnicity is defined by country of birth of adolescents and their parents. We distinguish six ethnic minority groups, who together constitute about 14% of our sample of 1051 parent-child units. Cultural participation is defined as participation in high or legitimate culture, which we -- in line with cultural reproduction theory -- conceptualize as a resource in attaining social status, in particular in education.

Parents in ethnic minorities participate decisively less in high culture than parents in the native Dutch majority, even when the former's lower education are taken into account. The parents in the six distinguished ethnic minorities vary in their cultural arrears, but most of these variations are due to educational differences, and the net effect of ethnic status is rather similar between minorities.

For the adolescent children, we find smaller, but still significant arrears in both educational attainment and cultural participation for the ethnic minorities, but these turn out to be mostly attributable to the parental background of these students: ethnic minority adolescents are not different from their native stock peers, once the parents' arrears are taken into account. The analyses confirm that participation in high culture is indeed a resource of some importance in acquiring and reproducing educational status. We find that cultural reproduction among ethnic minorities is significantly different from that among native stock. In ethnic minority groups, adolescents tend to follow their parents' cultural example to a lesser degree than among native, and if they do so, this is a way of becoming upwardly mobile.

We conclude that in public debate in the Netherlands the problems of the second-generation ethnic minorities may have been overestimated. The analyses reported suggest that while offspring of ethnic minority parents are still socially disadvantaged, they are hardly more so than children of other lower educated parents in the Netherlands. Also, the analyses suggest that taken over two generations a rather strong process of integration is taking place.

## INTRODUCTION

It has repeatedly been proclaimed that like many current Western European societies, the Netherlands over the last three decades effectively has become an immigration society (SCP 1998; De Valk et al. 2001). This statement is correct, but in need of amendment on at least two counts. First, the pertinent recent immigration history of the country is in fact a bit longer than three decades. Second, the number of immigrants in the Netherlands is still significantly lower than in many other Western European countries, including its neighboring countries Germany, Belgium, England and France, and ethnically more diverse (Castles & Milles, 1998). In order to illustrate these two points, it is useful to review the recent immigration history of the Netherlands. Table 1 provides an overview of immigration waves since World War II and some of the main characteristics of the immigrant groups.

**Table 1**

Even in the early 1950's -- a time that is generally characterized by government promoted family emigration towards Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand --, there were several years in which there is in fact a positive migration balance (CBS 1985). This is primarily due to the largest and most sudden inflow of immigrants that the Netherlands ever experienced in statistically recorded times, the "repatriation" of the 'European' and allied population of its former colony Indonesia. Precise numbers are hard to get, but the total number of net immigration from Indonesia in the late 1940's and early 1950's can be estimated at around 300.000. (The total Dutch population grew from 9.5 million in 1946 to 16 million in 2001), so at the time this amounted to about 3% of the total population.) Important parts of this group were the educated, entrepreneurial and governmental elites from the former colony, in majority part of Indonesia's 'European population'. Most of these had enjoyed Dutch language education and were well connected in the Netherlands. However, a considerable number of immigrants from Indonesia were ethnically Malay and carried with them a deep involvement with the language and cultures of Indonesia, and there was great concern at the time about their integration into Dutch society (Ex, 1966). A small but conspicuous part of the Indonesian migration were former soldiers of the Dutch colonial army, mostly christian and born in the South-Moluccan Islands. Associated with, but partly independent from the Indonesian repatriation, was also a small but conspicuous influx of Chinese, both from Indonesia and China, that would change the face of the Dutch restaurant business for ever.

It is important to bring up the Indonesian repatriates as an ethnic minority group in the Dutch

context, as they mostly are a successful example of multicultural integration. The Indonesian inheritance remains visible in Dutch society to this date, with many Dutch retaining Indonesian connections and an interest in Indonesian affairs, but also through permanent contributions to Dutch cultural life, most conspicuously in literature, cuisine, and (popular) music. The Indonesian case is illustrative also in another sense, as even after fifty years the Indonesian group remains the largest ethnic minority in the Netherlands, as it is now far larger than the group of Indonesian born immigrants. In standard Dutch statistical practice, ethnicity is defined by country of birth of the parents: if the one of the parents is Indonesian born, their offspring will be counted as having Indonesian ethnicity. Of course, this practice has as its odd consequence that the fastest growing minorities are those that intermarry to the highest degree, which is the case for the Indonesian born. Note, however, that the Indonesians are in practice almost always excluded from any discussion about ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, which may be the main testimony to their successful social and cultural integration.

After the fluctuations in the 1950s, in the 1960's the migration balance turned positive until further notice. Major migration flows were initiated from Morocco and Turkey through the 'guest worker' system. Expectations of return of these male labor migrants to their country of origin turned out to be largely unfounded. Major family reunion and associated chain migration took place in the 1970's and 1980's and continues until this day. The sizes of the Moroccan and Turkish minority groups are about equal now, and are estimated at around 250.000 each (De Valk et al., 2001). While to the native majority Turks and Moroccans are hard to tell apart and they have similar migration histories, they are culturally very different groups, with different languages, educations and varieties of islam. Both groups are mainly urban based, but Turks are more geographically dispersed than Moroccans. Despite their similar migration histories, there are persistent suggestions that Turks are by now more successfully integrated in Dutch society than Moroccans, in particular with respect of the integration on youngsters.

The 1970's and 1980's saw the influx of immigrants from the West-Indian part of the former Dutch colonial empire, first and primarily from Surinam (Dutch Guyana) and later and to a lesser degree from the Dutch Caribbean Islands: Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, St. Martin, St. Eustache and Saba that together to this date constitute the semi-independent Netherlands Antilles. This group constitutes the next major ethnic minority group in the Netherlands and is only slightly smaller than the Moroccans and Turks: their combined size is estimated at around 200.000 (i.e. immigrants). It may be important to know, that this West-Indian group is extremely diverse by itself, as not only Surinam and the Antillian Islands are different places in this world, but also in particular because the Surinam population is a multicultural mixture of

descendants of former slave and contract laborers imported from Africa, the Indian subcontinent and Indonesia. The nature of this postcolonial migration is quite different than the one from Morocco and Turkey, and also from the earlier waves that came from the Indonesian archipelago. Surinamese and Antillians did not come primarily as labor migrants, but rather due to the generally unstable political and economic situation in their origin countries. They also came as citizens and often in families. While Turks and Moroccans settled in large numbers in smaller cities all around the country -- connected to the factories that contracted them -- the Surinamese and in particular the Antillians primarily settled in and around Amsterdam, the main port of arrival.

Finally, in the 1990's, political turmoils around the world became the major source of immigration to the Netherlands, bringing in political and economic refugees from Eastern Europe, authoritarian ruled muslim countries (Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan) and many others. While these most recent immigrants are not dominated by any single country or region of birth, dividing them into Eastern Europeans, muslim countries (other than Turkey and Morocco) and non-muslim countries in Africa and Asia appears to be a sensible way of grouping them, doing justice to their cultural diversity. While this group as a whole is fairly heterogeneous, they have in common that they were not recruited as labor migrants, as most came to the Netherlands due to push factors. It is often held that they are therefore more positively selected than the Moroccan and Turkish migrant laborers.

Estimates of the total size of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands vary considerably depending upon whom to include. The highest estimates are that by 2001 about 12% of the total population is foreign born, which is about twice as high as in 1980 and ten times as high as in 1960. However, when restricted to the six areas discussed above, thus excluding all the western developed world and Indonesia, 8% might be the more appropriate estimate for number of foreign born. As discussed, ethnic minority status is most often defined by birth place of one of the parents, thus adding offspring from both ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous marriages. The membership of ethnic minorities in the total population, thus defined, is only around 10%, but varies by age. Among school children aged 6-18 the percentage in ethnic minorities is around 15%. Of course, ethnic minorities are concentrated in urban centers. It is estimated that in the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht) about 40% of the newly born is a member of some ethnic minority.

Like in other Western European countries, in the Netherlands the growing ethnic diversity of the population has primarily been perceived as a risk rather than a resource. Fear of ethnic

tensions, but in particular the fear of the development of a ethnically distinct underclass have been the major argument for active government intervention in both the process of immigration itself, as well as in the life chances of ethnic groups. The educational system has been one important target of such interventions. In an attempt to equalize educational opportunities for all, school funding has for a long time been dependent upon prevalence of risk factors in the student population. Being a child of a lower educated mother leads to a 20% bonus in school funds, being a child from incomplete family leads to a 40% bonus in school funds, but having at least one parent born in one of the designated disadvantaged areas of the world (including most of the countries where the major minorities in the Netherlands have been recruited from) leads to a 90% bonus. These particulars of the Dutch school funding system, which is echoed in other welfare state institutions, make clear that ethnic exclusion is indeed feared over and above the risks that are incurred by disadvantaged children in general.

### **Cultural resources, cultural participation and cultural reproduction**

In the present public debate, the social problems around ethnic minority groups are primarily defined as lack of participation in or exclusion from the benefits of the Dutch social system. To what extent will ethnic minorities develop into a socially excluded class of second-tier citizens, with limited access to earnings, status and social security, and limited ability to participate in the welfare and leisure institution of Dutch society?

In this paper we study one form of social participation, namely the participation of ethnic minorities -- relative to native Dutch stock -- in cultural activities, in particular high cultural activities, such as visiting theaters, concerts, museums and reading literature. High cultural activities are important markers of elite social status, in particular of highly educated strata. Not only do we witness in countries around the world a strong association between objective status indicators (primarily education, but also income and occupation) and cultural participation, it has been amply shown by previous research that command over cultural information is an important agent of intergenerational transfer of social status (DiMaggio 1982, De Graaf 1984, Ganzeboom, 1994). Bourdieu (1970) has suggested that command over cultural resources -- of which participation in high cultural activities is a prime indicator -- plays a crucial role in the intergenerational reproduction of educational status. Cultural knowledge and cultural control is a requirement to do well in school and has become so increasingly with educational reforms that have produced a more academically oriented curriculum. In this view, schools test the degree to which parents have prepared their children to do well in school.

The relationship between ethnicity and cultural participation thus is a particularly interesting one if we study educational participation and educational success of ethnic minority students. An obvious generalization of Bourdieu's cultural reproduction theory is that one way how minority students become excluded from educational success is by their lack of command over the desirable cultural resources. As they or at least their parents have had limited exposure to the cultural symbols of the native majority group, cultural activities may be one important part of the story how ethnic inequalities are generated and maintained.

Previous Dutch research on the relationship between ethnicity and cultural participation (Van Wel, 19XX) has indeed documented a sizeable gap in cultural participation between ethnic minority group members and native stock, and shown that there is a strong relationship between cultural participation of youngsters and their current level of education. However, this finding does not necessarily speak to the interpretation of cultural reproduction and exclusion proposed above.

The specific points to be addressed here is how cultural participation works out intergenerationally. To what extent is it true that students in ethnic minorities do not participate in high cultural activities, when we take into account that they have parents who hardly have access to these resources themselves? If so, can we interpret the lack of cultural resources as an intervening factor in the process of educational attainment?

We also study the intergenerational transfer of cultural resources itself. The research literature generally shows extremely high associations between parental and children's cultural participation, which is the backbone of the cultural reproduction process in education. Does this work in the same way for ethnic minority and native stock students? To what extent do ethnic minority students have the same return to cultural capital as their native peers? And to what extent can ethnic minority students escape from their disadvantaged cultural backgrounds?

To sum up, we seek to answer the following research questions:

1. To what extent do members of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands have limited access to high culture and to what extent is their exclusion ethnically based?
2. How do second generation members of ethnic minorities compare to first generation members? I.e. to what extent do we see a (gradual or sudden) cultural integration of ethnic minorities into the native majority with respect to cultural practices when we compare the

generations?

3. To what extent does the distribution of cultural resources in the parental generation act as a source of exclusion of ethnic minorities adolescent?

## **RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA**

The data are taken from an ongoing panel study of adolescents, who were first interviewed in September 1998<sup>[1]</sup>, when they were between 14-17 years of age and students in secondary schools in grades 3-5. (The earliest age to enter the first grade of secondary education is typically 12.) The students were enrolled in 31 schools in 8 cities, spread around the country. Although the schools are not a random sample of Dutch schools in any strict sense, it is important to point out that all four levels of initial secondary education in the Netherlands are about equally represented:

- VBO, or lower vocational training
- MAVO, or lower general academic school
- HAVO, or middle general academic school
- VWO, or university preparatory school.

It may be important to note too that in the Netherlands schooling is compulsory until age 16, and is part-time compulsory until age 17 -- our initial sample should cover all young inhabitants of the Netherlands to a large extent.

Interviewing in 1998 was conducted using a classroom administered write-in questionnaire. Students (a total N of 1521) were asked to report on their own cultural participation and that of their parents. A second wave was conducted using a mail questionnaire in the Fall of 2000, when the students were more than two years older (between 16-19 years of age). In this second wave, a separate questionnaire was mailed to the students' parents, with the explicit request to either father or mother to answer questions on their cultural consumption, and their social background. The response among the students the second wave was almost 69%, and among the parents it was over 62%. Of course, these responses do not completely overlap, we have about 55% data on parents and students.

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[1] The data-collection started in 1998 under the heading 'Youth and Culture' as a commissioned research project to evaluate the short-term effects of subsidizing secondary school students in culture consumption. Eight middle sized cities were selected for experimentation with subsidizing strategies. Ganzeboom & Nagel (1999) report on the effects of the subsidy programs. The panel continuation in 2000 is part of a larger project, entitled 'School and Culture', commissioned by the Minister of Education, to evaluate newly instituted arts instruction programs in secondary schools. The primary research aims are not of concern here, and have been reported on elsewhere.

### **Table 2 here**

Unfortunately, but only as to be expected, the non-response of neither student nor parents in 2001 was at random. In this type of design, non-response can be precisely analyzed. Table 2 shows a model of the response proportions of some of our major groups of interest. For the students, response is lower among boys, lower educated, and to some extent older students (who are more likely to have changed schools after two years). Unfortunately, the response is also low among the ethnic minorities, in particular when both student and parents were all foreign born. While our initial sample contained about 16% of students in ethnic minorities, the second wave sample has only about 12% of such students. An unknown, but likely small part of the lower non-response among immigrant groups will be due to remigration and/or our inability to locate these students and/or their parents, but the major part is in fact due to refusal to cooperate.

### **VARIABLES**

The analyses reported in this paper deal primarily with the information independently provided by adolescents and their parents in Fall of 2000. However, some data from the first wave of the panel in September 1998 collected among the students, will be used to supplement missing data in 2000, primarily with respect to place of birth and cultural participation of the parents. Apart from panel-attrition and differential non-response, there is thus a question how well the students in 1998 did as proxy respondents for their parents' characteristics. It turns out that students can quite satisfactorily report on the socio-economic characteristics of their parents, as judged by the parents' own report in 2000. For both parental educations the correlations are around .75. Report by the students about their parents' cultural habits is less accurate, with only a 0.58 correlation and a marked tendency for the students to bias the proxy reports of their parents' behavior towards their own cultural behavior.

### **Table 3**

#### **Education**

Education is measured on a hierarchical scale that ranks seven educational levels by cultural resources. In the case of parents, this reflects more or less the commonly used metric of years of education. For the adolescents in 2000, we need to adjust for the fact that some of students who

were in the lower tracks of secondary education in 1998, had completed these by 2000, and moved on to intermediate and post-secondary vocational training, while their peers in the higher general academic track remained in their initial secondary education. We adjust for this by grading middle vocational school (MBO) and vocational college (HBO) below the university preparatory tracks. A small proportion of the adolescents (5%) was no longer enrolled in school; they were classified by the last educational program attended.

### **Ethnicity**

In keeping with official definitions, ethnicity is measured by foreign country-of-birth. A person's ethnic minority status was established by counting whether father, mother and the student were born in one of the following six groups of countries:

- Surinam / Netherlands Antilles (due to low numbers we are not able to distinguish between the groups).
- Eastern Europe, ranging from Poland to Albania, and from the Czech Republic to Azerbeidjan.
- Morocco, which includes some scattered cases from Algeria and Tunisia.
- Turkey, including Kurdistan.
- Other Islam countries. The most prevalent among these were Syria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia.
- Other non-OECD countries, which included China and Hong Kong, South-American and Sub-Saharan African countries. Among the OECD countries, Brazil and Mexico were included here.

Note that we exclude all other European and associated countries of birth from the count, as well as Indonesia<sup>[2]</sup> and South-Africa, as preliminary analysis showed -- in line with expectations -- that the socio-economic and cultural positions of these groups were very similar to native stock.

### **Cultural participation**

Cultural participation was secured by a standard set of question used by the national Social and Cultural Planning Bureau. The set contains nine questions, that are commonly divided up in two dimensions:

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[2] Relative to the total population of the Netherlands, the number of adolescents and their parents from Indonesian provenance was rather small, but still over 4%. This reflects the age structure of the Indonesian immigrant groups, who are mostly older than the parents in our sample. Note that this constitutes still a sizeable group of "immigrants" relative to the other groups included in the analyses.

#### High culture:

- Museums
- Theater
- Cabaret
- Classical concert
- Ballet

#### Popular culture:

- Cinema
- Pop(ular) music concerts
- Dance parties
- Youth manifestations.

Needless to say that among the adolescents the second group of activities is much more frequently visited than the first one. However, it is important to note that visits to popular culture do not necessarily compete with high culture: among the students there is a 0.30 positive correlation between the two dimensions, while in the case of the parents the dimensions are in fact undistinguishable. This is partly due to the fact that parents hardly ever claim to visit dance parties and youth manifestations, but also to the fact that among the parents the two remaining indicators, cinema and popular concerts, cluster more firmly with the high culture indicators.

Our sole interest in this paper is in the high culture dimension, as this is important to provide the adolescents with the cultural resources for status attainment. We restricted the measures both at the adolescent and parent level to the five indicators for high culture.

Our constructed variables for cultural consumption do not simply sum the frequency of the visits. If we had done so, the more frequent activities (primarily museum) would outweigh the less frequently visited (like ballet) by some margin. In stead, we averaged rank scores for the separate indicators. Taking ranks stretches the distributions to a uniform one, which has the virtue of giving greater weight to the distances between the most frequently used categories (being no visits and 1-2 visits per year), and playing down the differences among the more frequent visitors. [Taking ranks has a similar effect as taking logarithms.]

The final constructed variables were transformed to 0..1 ranges, again using ranks (deciles) as the standardization tool. The scores can be usefully thought of as a gain or loss in term of percentile points. The particular advantage of using this rank standardization is that we can now

make meaningful comparisons of effects between all measures.

#### **Table 4**

In order to illustrate the sample composition further, Table 4 list the distribution of ethnicities in detail, by fraction. About 6% of the sample<sup>[3]</sup> qualifies as 2/3 immigrant, which almost always means that both parents were immigrants, while the adolescent was born in the Netherlands. Another 4% are 1/3 immigrant, which almost always implies that only one of the parents is foreign born, and contracted a marriage with a Dutch native. In these two groups together (10% of our sample) the adolescents constitute the second generation of ethnic minorities. Finally, some 3% of our sample are 3/3 immigrants. In a strict sense these adolescents are not second generation, but first generation immigrants.

### **MODELS**

We use linear regression models to assess the differences between ethnic minorities and the native stock, as well as between the six ethnic groups at the detailed level. As the N's of each of the groups are rather small, the models with detailed ethnic statuses serve mostly to check on the assumption that ethnic minorities resemble each other sufficiently for the over-all coefficient not to be misleading. Little conclusive can be said using these data about the differences between the six ethnic minorities. Note that as we measure all our variables on a 0..1 range, respectively in a 0,1 classification, the (unstandardized) regression coefficients are all comparable to one another, as they express the differences in percentile points over the total range of the independent variables.

### **Parents**

#### **Table 5**

The two models in Table 5 display the differences in educational level of the two parents in the ethnic minority groups, relative to the native stock. On average (model A1) the parents lag native stock by 24 percentile points, or a quarter of the total distribution. Model A2 shows these arrears to be quite variable by ethnic minority. Turks and Moroccans are far lower educated than the rest, which is in line with expectations. In line with expectations, Eastern European parents are relatively high educated. Two groups of ethnic parents have in fact on average the

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[3] This includes children from single parent headed families with a foreign born single parent.

same educational positions as Dutch natives: other OECD and other Islam. This is in line with the interpretation that the most recent economic and political refugee immigration has attracted relatively high status migrants from the various turmoiled areas in the world.

The most important thing about the models for parental education may be that the adj. R2s show significant variation between the groups; they cannot be treated as homogeneous.

### **Table 6**

The first set of models in Table 6 addresses the cultural consumption of the parents, according to their own specifications in 2000. Model A1 shows a clearly significant negative effect of the over-all index of ethnicity on cultural participation. Parents in 3/3 foreign families score about 26 percentage points lower than the native born group. In model A.2 we differentiate this among the six distinguished ethnic groups. As expected, the differences are somewhat larger for the three islamic groups. Due to the small numbers, none of the differences between ethnic groups or between the ethnic groups and the controls is statistically significant. Comparison of the adjusted R2s shows that over all differences, there is hardly significant variation among the ethnic groups. The parents in the six ethnic minorities have relatively similar scores with respect to cultural participation.

Models B1-2 take the level of parental education into account. This cuts the arrears of the ethnic minority parents by half, but the over-all negative effect of ethnic minority status remains statistically significant. Taken at the same level of education, the arrears of the parents still amount to 14 percentile points. Note, however, that the effect of parental education is dominant, as the differences between the lowest rank and the highest rank in this variable are well over 50 percentile points: going from the lowest educated to the highest educated parent is associated with a rise of more than half the range in the cultural participation pattern. Controlling parental education makes the effect of ethnicity much smaller, but also more similar to one another among the six ethnic groups. The comparison of the adj. R2s now suggests that the six groups can be regarded as homogenous and that a common estimate is to be preferred over the separate ones.

### **Adolescents**

In Table 7 we move to the adolescents' level. As more children have responded in the second wave than parents, this broadens the data-base somewhat, and we have now 1043 cases at our

disposal. As discussed, we followed the strategy to supplement missing data (most prevalent for the parents that did not respond in 2000, but occasionally occurring in the student's information as well) by supplementing it with information that was obtained in 1998.

### **Table 7**

The models in Table 7 study the level of adolescent's education in 2000, again on a 0..1 scale. We find much smaller arrears for the ethnic groups as a total than in the parents' case, but they remain statistically significant. When studied for the six groups separately (model A.2), we find minor variations. The main one is that the children in the non-OECD groups are doing better than the other five groups and even head the native Dutch. Otherwise the groups are pretty homogeneous, with Moroccans coming out on the bottom. The comparison of adj. R2 values suggests that the separate estimates are still to be preferred over the pooled estimate.

Models B1-2 add parental education as a control variable and thus answer the question whether children in the ethnic minority groups are different from native stock, when the lower educations of the parents are taken into account. The pooled estimate is still on the borderline of significance and so we are tempted to conclude that there is some ethnic exclusion going on in secondary schools: even when compared to native stock with similarly low educated parents, adolescents in ethnic minorities do worse. This conclusion is reinforced when we take the separate estimates into account. Controlling parental education does change the coefficient most dramatically for the Turks (whose parents are the lowest educated in our sample), but the changes are much less impressive for Moroccans, Surinamese and minorities from other Islamic countries, while actually increasing the lag for the Eastern Europeans.

Model C1-2 add parental cultural participation to the predictor set. In line with previous findings and cultural reproduction theory, we find a significant -- but modest -- effect of parental cultural participation on student's educational achievement, net of the effect of parental education. Children from cultured background do particularly well in school, and this explains parts of the arrears of the adolescents in ethnic minority groups. The overall effect of ethnic minority is now no longer statistically significant, although the changes for the separate groups in model C2 are not impressive. The arrears of children in the Moroccan and Eastern European minorities are still statistically significant on their own account.

Finally, models D1-2 test whether the positive effect of a cultured background operates in the same way for ethnic minorities and native stock. The interaction effect is negative and at the

border of statistical significance, suggesting that the cultural reproduction works out differently for the ethnic minorities. In fact, if taken at face value, cultural participation of ethnic parents has a negative effect on their children's educational outcomes and an adolescent in an ethnic minority is best-off with culturally inactive parents. This is the correct interpretation of the main effects for ethnic minority status, which refer to the children of the least active parents. However, one may argue that such an interpretation is overshooting the weak statistical basis of these coefficients. A more conservative, but sounder interpretation probably is that ethnic minority parents are less able to help their children through school than native stock, even when the former have access to equivalent cultural resources.

### **Table 8**

Finally, Table 8 addresses the culture consumption of the adolescents by social background. Model A1-2 show that there are small but significant arrears of ethnic minority youngsters in this respect. The arrears are fairly homogeneous across ethnic groups, with other non-OECD being a bit of the odd one out. All of these differences with the native group disappear, once the education of the adolescents is controlled in model B1-2. The effect of education on cultural participation of the adolescents is large, although not as overwhelming as in the parents' case<sup>[4]</sup>. At this point we can thus simply state as our conclusion that ethnic exclusion in cultural participation as seemed to be prevalent in the parents' case, is no longer present for the adolescents' case. All of the effect of ethnicity is indirect, due to ethnic exclusion in educational attainment.

This is all the more true when parental cultural participation is introduced as a control variable in models C1-2. As found in previous research, the parental example has a quite substantial effect, over and above education. The important thing in this context however is the interaction between ethnic minority status and parents' culture consumption in models D1-2, that is again found to be negative, although not statistically significant. This reinforces the interpretation that cultural reproduction does not work well among ethnic minorities: even if ethnic parents are culturally active, this does little for their children to acquire similar cultural resources. Phrased differently, ethnic minority adolescents are thus more culturally mobile than native stock, up to the point that they become indistinguishable from their native-stock class-mates.

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[ 4 ] However, take note that the most of the adolescents are still in school and differences between higher and lower educated are still likely to increase over the next part of their life cycle.

## CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Like many West-European countries, the Netherlands has become somewhat of an immigration society over the last three decades. The older generations of Moroccan and Turkish guest workers from the 1960's have become joined by their families, and since the 1980's increasing numbers of political and economic refugees have entered the country, initially from the (former) West-Indian colonies, and later from other troubled parts of the world, such as Eastern Europe and authoritarian ruled islamic countries other than Morocco and Turkey. In this paper, we studied the cultural consumption of these immigrants and their children, differentiated in six separate ethnic groups. Despite claim about the Netherlands as an emerging immigration society, by international standards, the size of ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands is still fairly limited: about 13% of all secondary school students in our sample can claim some ethnic minority background.

We study and compare the cultural participation of adolescents (age 16-19) and their parents, with respect to classical (high) culture. The research literature suggests and our analyses provide new evidence that command over such cultural resources help educational attainment.

For the parents we find that the cultural participation is much less prevalent among ethnic minorities than among native stock. This finding is mitigated, but is still maintained, when the parents' level of education is controlled. Even relative to native stock parents at similar low levels of education, parents in ethnic minority groups are excluded from cultural participation.

None of this comes much as a surprise -- the more important question is how this holds up in the second generation. To what extent have the children of ethnic minority migrants made up the arrears of their parents?

With respect to educational attainment, assessed when the second generation was between 16-19 years of age, we still find significant arrears of ethnic minority students. However, while their parents on average lagged the native stock by some 25 percentile points, the adolescents come out at about half of this. In addition, over half of these arrears can be accounted for by the low educational and occupational status of the parents. I.e., children of ethnic minority groups perform very similar to children of native born low educated. However, we do find significant ethnically based exclusion in the educational attainment process.

The findings are a bit simpler for the adolescents' access to cultural participation. The arrears of adolescents in ethnic minorities are much smaller than for their parents, and entirely attributable to the lower level of education of the ethnic minority adolescents. Minority youngsters are found to be quite similar to their native-stock school-mates, there is no evidence of ethnic exclusion per se.

Finally, both educational attainment and cultural consumption have been shown in the past to be directly influenced by parental cultural participation, that thus embodies an agent of social reproduction. Similar effects are found in our data, but they seem to be restricted to the native stock. When adolescents in ethnic minorities become higher educated and participate in high culture, it is so irrespective of their parents' cultural resources.

Some caveats should be given before jumping to conclusions. Despite our sample being a fair representation of the ethnic composition of the Netherlands, there are two problems with it. First, the size of ethnic minorities is still fairly small. Also, due to the selective panel attrition in our data, we are left with fewer ethnic minorities representatives than in the original sample. The selection occurred both with respect to ethnic minority status and level of education, and this may have biased our estimates on top of the sample size problems. Therefore our conclusions with respect to ethnic exclusion are tentative at best and need further confirmation using a broader database. Such databases will become available to us in the future, as we are in the process of interviewing and re-interviewing considerably larger groups of adolescents within the ongoing project School & Culture (Ganzeboom & Van Rees; Ganzeboom, Haanstra & Nagel).

If the statistical conclusions are tentative, the discussion of the implications of the findings for the public debate on ethnic minorities and the rise of a multicultural society can be preliminary at best. One important observation in this research is the still limited presence of ethnic minority students in Dutch secondary schools. Even as our urban sampling strategy is biased towards including as many ethnic minority students as we can, the numbers are still not impressive. This is also true when a comparison is made with the international context. At the same time, the ethnic composition of the immigrant groups is extremely diverse, as the six groupings we distinguished are not even being sufficient to do justice to the complex ethnic distinctions. At the same time, our research -- even in the presence of small numbers -- showed that there are significant variations among the groups in access to cultural participation and educational attainment and how these two are connected. It seems to me that the relatively small size and variability of the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands make it somewhat premature to discuss

the possibilities and pitfalls of an emerging multicultural society. The recent public discussion on the 'multicultural illusion' may have missed this point. Prerequisite to the question whether a multicultural society is desirable, it seems to us that we should ask whether such a society is viable. Our personal expectation is that the cultural influences of the ethnic minorities will remain limited and be possibly short-lived, when seen in a generational perspective. The second generation of immigrants will show some imprints of its minority status, but by the next generation it will have disappeared.

**Table 1: Immigrant waves in the Netherlands after 1945**

1950's	'Repatriates', born in Indonesia. Mostly (but by far not all) white, high status, Dutch speaking, education very similar to the Netherlands. Partly ethnic Chinese or Malay. Among these a small group of South Moluccans [Ambonese], ethnic Malay, partly Malay speaking, majority protestant, majority lower rank military.
1950's	Chinese recruited to restaurant business [providing Dutch-Indonesian food]. Mostly from the area around Hong-Kong. This migration continues to this date.
1960's	Moroccans (& small groups of Algerians and Tunesians). Exclusively men, mostly white, mostly unskilled laborers, rural descent, lower or uneducated, Muslem, Berber speaking. Family reunification started mid 1970's.
1960's	Turks (including Kurds). Exclusively men, white, mostly unskilled laborers, rural descent, lower or uneducated, Muslem, Turkish or Kurdish speaking. Family reunification started mid 1970's.
1970's	Surinamese. Mostly black, partly Asian, Dutch speaking, education rather similar to the Netherlands. Came to the Netherland before or around independence of Surinam around 1975, using bi-country nationality. The ethnic composition of Surinam (Dutch Guyana) is very complex. There are two main groups: creoles [former slaves] and hindustani [former contract laborers], but also groups of javanese [former contract laborers], chinese, marroons [escaped slaves] and native indians. Surinamese in the Netherlands are disproportionately from creole background. It is also believed that the Surinamese in the Netherlands are disproportionately selected from the higher educated.
1980's	Antillians from the remaining Dutch colonies: Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, St. Martin, St. Eustache and Saba. Mostly black, mostly Dutch speaking, education rather similar to the Netherlands. Unlike with the Surinamese, it is believed that Antillians in the Netherlands are not disproportionately higher educated than Antillians at home.
1990's	Political and economic refugees from (A) Eastern Europe (primarily Yugoslavia); (B) authoritarian Muslem countries (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afganistan, Pakistan, Somalia); (C) other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America.

**Table 3: Description of the Variables**

ETHNIC MINORITY	0..1 Count of foreign birth places of parents and child
- Surinamese	0..1 Count of birth place of parents and child in Suriname or Antilles
- Moroccan	0..1 Count of birth place of parents and child in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia
- Turkish	0..1 Count of birth place of parents and child in Turkey or Kurdistan
- Other Islam	0..1 Count of birth place of parents and child in other Islamic country, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia [but not Indonesia]
- Eastern Eur	0..1 Count of birth place of parents and child in Eastern Europe, ranging from Poland to Azerbeidzjan.
- nonOECD	0..1 Count of birth place of parents and child in other developing nations: South-America, Sub-saharan Africa and other Asia.
PARENTAL EDUCATION	0..1 Average education of the two parents, ranked within survey, using deciles ranks.
EDUCATION	0..1 Education of the student, ranked within sample, using quintile ranks
CULTURAL PARTICIPATION PARENTS	0..1 Average score on annual visits to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Theater</li> <li>- Cabaret</li> <li>- Classical Concert</li> <li>- Professional Ballet</li> <li>- Museum</li> </ul> Items were ranked before averaging. Index is ranked using deciles.
CULTURAL PARTICIPATION CHILDREN	0..1 Average score on annual visits to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Theater</li> <li>- Cabaret</li> <li>- Classical Concert</li> <li>- Professional Ballet</li> <li>- Museum</li> </ul> Items were ranked before averaging. Index is ranked using deciles.

**Table 2: Response patterns in 2000 wave of School & Culture panel (linear probability models)**

	PARENTS	ADOLESCENTS
Intercept	.257	.423
ADOLESCENT FEMALE	.095 (3.8)	.100 (4.3)
EDUCATION ADOLESCENT	.282 (7.7)	.212 (6.2)
CULTURAL PARTICIPATION ADOLESCENT	ns	.077 (2.5)
CULTURAL PARTICIPATION PARENTS	.159 (3.5)	ns
ETHNIC MINORITY	-.259 (5.4)	-.222 (4.9)
Adj. R2	11.2%	7.5%

Notes: See Table 2 for variable definitions. Overall response rate for adolescents was 69%, for parents 62%.

**Table 4: Distribution of foreign birth in the sample**

By fraction

	1/3	2/3	3/3	All
- Surinam/Antill.	.7%	.8%	.5%	2.1%
- Eastern Europe	.5%	.1%	.1%	0.7%
- Other non-OECD	3.0%	1.5%	.4%	4.9%
- Turkey	.4%	1.6%	.6%	2.6%
- Morocco	.3%	1.5%	.3%	2.1%
- Other Islam	.4%	1.0%	.1%	1.4%
All	3.3%	5.9%	3.0%	12.3%

**Table 5: Determinants of Education of Parents**

	<u>DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARENTAL EDUCATION (N=924)</u>	
	A.1	A.2
ETHNIC MINORITY	-.238	
	(5.4)	
- Surinam/Antil.		-.194
		(1.8)
- Eastern Europe		.313
		(1.7)
- Other non-OECD		.010
		(0.1)
- Turkish		-.501
		(6.0)
- Morocco		-.392
		(4.0)
- Other Islam		-.015
		(0.1)
- Dutch natives		0
Adj. R2	.029	.060

**Table 6: Determinants of Cultural Participation of Parents**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARENTAL CULTURAL PARTICIPATION (N=936)

	A.1	A.2	B.1	B.2
ETHNIC MINORITY	-.264 (5.4)		-.139 (3.1)	
- Surinam/Antil.		-.332 (2.7)		-.226 (2.1)
- Eastern Europe		-.104 (.5)		-.274 (1.5)
- Other non-OECD		-.129 (1.3)		-.135 (1.5)
- Turkish		-.296 (3.2)		-.032 (0.4)
- Morocco		-.247 (2.2)		-.046 (0.5)
- Other Islam		-.440 (2.3)		-.439 (2.6)
PARENTAL EDUCATION			.529 (16.1)	.542 (16.2)
Adj. R2	3.2%	3.0%	24.5%	24.2%

**Table 7: Determinants of Adolescent's Educational Attainment in 2000.**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ADOLESCENT'S EDUCATION (N=1037)								
	A.1	A.2	B.1	B.2	C.1	C.2	D.1	D.2
FEMALE	.027 (1.3)	.035 (1.8)	.023 (1.2)	.027 (1.5)	.019 (1.0)	.024 (1.3)	.019 (1.0)	.023 (1.3)
ETHNIC MINORITY	-.176 (4.2)		-.073 (1.8)		-.056 (1.4)		.042 (0.6)	
- Surinam/Antil.		-.275 (2.5)		-.163 (1.6)		-.149 (1.5)		-.049 (0.4)
- Eastern Europe		-.241 (1.4)		-.372 (2.3)		-.345 (2.1)		-.237 (1.4)
- Other non-OECD		.094 (1.2)		.100 (1.4)		.116 (1.6)		.218 (2.3)
- Turkish		-.294 (3.5)		-.069 (0.9)		-.060 (0.7)		.007 (0.1)
- Morocco		-.385 (3.9)		-.223 (2.3)		-.211 (2.2)		-.134 (1.3)
- Other Islam		-.156 (1.0)		-.130 (0.9)		-.098 (0.6)		-.096 (0.6)
PARENTAL EDUCATION			.465 (14.4)	.460 (14.0)	.408 (11.2)	.401 (11.0)	.409 (11.4)	.400 (11.1)
PARENTS' CULTURE					.127 (3.7)	.125 (3.7)	.140 (4.0)	.139 (4.1)
ETHNIC MINORITY * PARENT'S CULTURE							-.284 (1.7)	-.262 (1.8)
adj.R2	1.6%	3.2%	18.9%	19.5%	19.9%	20.6%	20.1%	20.7%

**Table 8: Determinants of Cultural Participation Adolescents**

<u>DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CHILD'S CULTURAL PARTICIPATION (N=1043)</u>								
	A.1	A.2	B.1	B.2	C.1	C.2	D.1	D.2
FEMALE	.078 (4.2)	.081 (4.3)	.067 (4.1)	.066 (4.0)	.060 (3.7)	.059 (3.6)	.056 (3.3)	.057 (3.4)
ETHNIC MINORITY	-.095 (2.5)		-.020 (0.6)		.029 (0.8)		.052 (0.4)	
- Surinam/Antil.		-.186 (1.9)		-.071 (0.8)		-.035 (0.4)		.012 (0.1)
- Eastern Europe		-.226 (1.3)		-.081 (0.5)		-.085 (0.6)		-.029 (0.2)
- Other non-OECD		.043 (0.6)		.002 (0.0)		.042 (0.7)		.094 (0.9)
- Turkish		-.097 (1.3)		.022 (0.3)		.081 (1.2)		.104 (0.9)
- Morocco		-.137 (1.6)		.022 (0.3)		.062 (0.8)		.095 (0.8)
- Other Islam		-.161 (1.1)		-.096 (0.7)		-.036 (0.3)		-.044 (0.3)
ETHNIC MINORITY *GIRL							.028 (0.4)	.015 (0.3)
LEVEL OF EDUCATION			.410 (16.0)	.411 (15.8)	.342 (13.2)	.342 (13.1)	.341 (13.1)	.341 (13.0)
PARENTS' CULTURE					.253 (9.3)	.255 (9.3)	.264 (9.3)	.265 (9.4)
ETHNIC MINORITY * PARENTS CULTURE							.196 (1.6)	-.188 (1.5)
adj.R2	2.0%	2.0%	21.4%	21.1	27.4%	27.2%	27.4%	27.2%