

## **Turks in Western Europe: life chances in perspective (2002-2008)**

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### **Introduction**

The Turks are the largest immigrant group in Western Europe. Their immigration started in the early 1960s. The economic expansion of European countries after World War II and the economic transformations that started to take place in Turkey (industrialization and urbanization) made many people look for better opportunities in the Western European countries. Labour import contracts signed between Turkey and several European countries facilitated the movement of skilled and unskilled industrial and agricultural workers to the region. Although this migration was intended to be temporary, after late 1980s, it became permanent and Turkish origin Europeans now form the largest migrant group in Western Europe.

Given these facts, much of the research on immigrants that has been carried out in the European context is related to the integration of Turkish population in the destination societies. These studies have concentrated on the educational attainment and employment of immigrants as indicators of their social and economic integration. The perspectives that dominate in these integration studies are the comparisons with natives and/or other immigrant groups. This may not be at all the perspective that immigrants themselves find most relevant. The reasons why they came are not to compete with groups in the destination society, but to improve their life chances relative to what they would have been in the origin society without migrating. In order to understand international migration it is mandatory to take into account the comparison with the social origins. In this paper we adopt this perspective in two different, but equally important ways. First, we compare immigrants to their parents, by studying intergenerational reproduction / mobility with respect to both education and occupation. Second, we compare immigrants to those who stayed in the origin country.

Effectively, this leads to a counterfactual view of the outcomes of migration: what would have happened to Turkish migrants and their children, had they decided to stay in Turkey?

Migration has mostly been neglected in the most recent studies as a social force that influences social mobility in a society and individuals' status attainment (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Breen 2004) while it was considered an important determinant before 1970s, but mainly in the American literature (see Blau and Duncan, 1967; Sorokin, 1928). Platt's (2003, 2007) studies are exceptions in assessing intergenerational social mobility of the immigrants in Britain.

Blau and Duncan (1967) have provided us with the most comprehensive explanation for the relationship between migration and social mobility. They describe the intergenerational social mobility relationship as a multivariate causal model, the well-known status attainment model of social stratification (Blau & Duncan 1967), that will also be our tool of analysis. This model covers two different, but strongly related forms of social reproduction: intergenerational social reproduction with respect to education, and with respect to occupational status. Moreover, the model unpacks these intergenerational relationships by quantifying the role that early achievements play in the final pattern. In the simplified model (where we do not include first occupations), this is restricted to the role that education plays in the process of occupational status reproduction. This is the main explanatory mechanism in social reproduction and the one that matters most for migrants and non-migrants.

Our paper aims to improve the knowledge about Turks in Europe in two ways: through the analysis of intergenerational mobility and through the comparison with Turks in Turkey, something that our database, combined from the European Social Survey 2002-2008 and the European Value Study 2008 uniquely allows us to do. More specifically, we study the social mobility and status attainment among first and second-generation<sup>1</sup> Turkish migrants in nine Western European countries, in comparison with native populations and with Turks in Turkey. The main questions answered in this paper are:

- How do educational and occupational achievement of Turkish immigrants compare to parental education and occupation and how are they influenced by it?

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<sup>1</sup> The first generation refers to those who were born and did most of their studies in Turkey. The second generation (as defined in this paper) refers to those who were born in the country of destination, but we also include those who moved to Europe at a very young age (1.5 generation). In both cases (2<sup>nd</sup> and 1.5 generations) it is assumed that they received most of their education in the destination country.

- What is the impact of migration in the status attainment of Turks and how do patterns of social reproduction among Turks in Europe compare to those found among Turks in Turkey?
- Can differences between Turks and Natives (ethnic penalties) be accounted for in terms of social background?
- Are patterns of social reproduction different between Turks and Natives and between first and second generation Turks?

### **Turks in Western Europe**

Social and economic developments both in Western Europe and in Turkey made these two sites start relating as receiving and sending migration regions in the early 1960s. On the European side, the economic growth after World War II made the region emerge as an area in demand of a large-scale manual labour force, while at the same time educational expansion had created shortages of factory workers. In a context of lack of spontaneous immigration from the (former) colonies and increasing job vacancies in manufacturing, mines, construction and services, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Sweden (the countries with the highest percentage of Turkish population nowadays) started to look for new sources of manpower supply. Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) was their first option and, when that one stopped, Turkey (together with other countries, in particular Morocco) came in to fill the empty spaces. A 'guest worker' system was introduced, together with formal labour import agreements that these countries made with Turkey. Turks occupied places mainly in manufacturing, although the diversity of jobs depended on the country of destination (Akgündüz 2008).

On the Turkish side, important transformations in the economy and the society were also taking place before and during the period of emigration to Europe. Between the foundation years of the Turkish Republic and 1960s, the Turkey failed to create to start and speed up large-scale industrialization. However, this period has been followed by a speedy upward trend in population growth and urbanization (Lewis, 1961; Kongar, 1982; Kiray, 1999; Karadayi, 1974) and the country experienced mass population movements from rural to urban areas, especially to the three largest cities Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir and to other mainly westerns regions (Kocaman, 2008). Urbanization was at 17 per cent in 1935, 42 per cent in

1975 to increase to 67 per cent in 2005 (Karadayi, 1974; <http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/41.html>), which created massive social and economic problems such as ghettos in the big cities with segregation, poverty and unemployment (Korkmaz, 1991; Kiray, 1998, 1982; Kongar, 1996). Akgündüz (2008) states that one of the reasons for the migration was economic growth, which includes mechanization of agriculture (which produces surplus labour force) and also the start of the mass production. This “free labour” - both workers in agriculture (including small holding peasantry) and artisans - had to decide between becoming part of the impoverished urban proletariat or to look for better opportunities elsewhere.

These processes generated a context in which both rural and urban workers had to decide between proletarianization in Turkey or search of other ways for maintaining their income and well-being (Yener, 1974; Vergin, 1986). Temporary migration to Western Europe appeared as a good solution also to many members of rural and urban middle and middle-low classes, migrants coming from villages as well as urban areas, low-rank government officials and unemployed (Akgündüz 2008). Emigration to Europe was encouraged and orchestrated to pump foreign currency in the economy by means of remittances of the emigrants (Abadan-Unat, XX). Extant research is pessimistic about the influences of international migration on the sending communities and it has been claimed that Turkish migration to Europe has had only limited positive influence on Turkey’s national and regional economies (Massey et al, 1998). However, Turkish emigrants’ financial remittances produced an average of 34 percent of total import values in the 1970s in Turkey (Turkish Central Bank, 1986).

For many of the migrant Turks migration was envisaged to be temporary, but it became permanent. After the labour import contracts ended in 1974, Turks continued to migrate to Western Europe, mainly through family reunion. In 1973 the number of Turks in Western Europe was 1.35 million, among whom 900.000 were workers and 450.000 dependants. In spite of return flows since 1974, the Turkish population in Western Europe rose to about two million in 1980 to increase to around three million in 2006 according to Turkish figures, which include only Turkish citizens. European statistics, which include all Turkish descents show an even higher figure of around five million in 2006. Figure 2 shows that majority of Turkish citizens abroad reside in Germany (2 million), but sizeable groups are also found in France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. As a proportion of the

native population, the representation of Turks is highest in the Netherlands (XX How do we know this??).

## Figure 2

Turkey made some progress in educational attainment of the population and economic growth since the early periods of the migration to Europe. Nevertheless, the level of education is lower in Turkey than in any of the European countries where the emigrant Turks live (Tansel, 2002; Gunduz-Hosgor and Smits, 2008; O'dwyer, Aksit, and Sands, 2009; Smits and Gunduz-Hosgor, 2006). Table 1 shows the level of education of the Turkish population in 1970, 1996 and 2004 according to census data: although it shows a substantial improvement over time, the literacy rate of the Turkish population was only 87 per cent in 2004, and this is even lower for women. Additionally, for the same year, the proportion of people who obtained secondary or higher level of education is as low as 55 per cent (Table 1).

### Migration and status attainment

In this paper we study the relationship between migration and status attainment from a comparative perspective. We work with four main comparison groups: Turks in Turkey, first generation Turks (educated in Turkey), second generation Turks (educated in Europe) and natives in Europe. Which expectations can be derived from the literature about the differences between these groups in terms of status attainment? There are three main comparisons we plan to look : between non-migrant Turks in Turkey and migrant first generation Turks (to investigate the impact of migration in the status attainment), between Turks educated in Turkey and Turks educated in Europe (to explore the changes over generations), and between Turks in Western Europe and natives (to study the presence of ethnic penalties<sup>2</sup> and the different social reproduction patterns).

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<sup>2</sup> The concept of “ethnic penalties” is taken from Heath and Cheung (2007).

<sup>5</sup> Evidence has already been found in Sweden when the employment probabilities are estimated for immigrants and natives Jonsson, J. (2007). The farther they come, the harder they fall? First- and second-generation immigrants in the Swedish labour market. Unequal chances. Ethnic minorities in Western labour markets. A. Heath and S. Y. Cheung. New York, Oxford University Press..

The focus of the article is on the *origins*. Two main concerns will guide the hypotheses. First of all, studies on occupational achievement among immigrants usually refer to the relationship between education and occupation: the main argument is that ethnic penalties exist when comparing first and second generation immigrants with native populations. In the following paragraphs we will argue that our expectation is that part of the ethnic penalties is actually driven by the class of origin (something that has been discussed in the area of educational achievements. See Heath, Rethon et al. 2008 for a summary). Along the same lines, we also expect reproduction patterns to differ between immigrants and natives (the existence, for example, of social networks among immigrants could counterbalance the impact of the class of origin). The second concern refers to origins as well, but from a different perspective: we analyze how migrants and their descendants compare to those left behind. This, we believe, will give a different perspective to the analysis of occupational attainment: even if we find ethnic penalties, they might not be considered problematic if Turks in Europe are better off when compared to Turks in Turkey.

The structure of the hypotheses, as well as of the analysis, is guided by Figure 1. In this Figure, arrows 1, 2 and 3 refer to the ethnic penalties in terms of educational and occupational attainment. Arrows D and F refer to the differences in the reproduction patterns (in terms of education and occupation) that exist between the groups under study. Arrow F, finally, refers to the differences in the returns to education.

### *Educational Achievement and Occupational Attainment*

What are the returns to education (i.e. the strength of the effect of education on occupation) for the different groups? To start, we consider the comparison between non-migrants Turks in Turkey and Turks in Europe: was migration beneficial for the status attainment of Turks? The literature on international migration has hardly addressed the comparison between the movers with those left behind. With the exception of studies related to the selection of migrants (see for example Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Dronkers and De Heus 2009), the main concern among social scientists in this field has been the comparison with the native populations and/or other migrant groups.

According to rational choice theories, people usually move to look for a better life when they think that the opportunities in destination will be better than in the current place of location or

the gains higher than the costs (Sjaastad 1962). We might therefore expect that migration is usually beneficial for social mobility and career advancement, especially the one that occurs within the limits of a country (internal migration). But is this also the case for international migrants? Although the motivations to move might be similar, there are also many reasons to assume that the positive outcomes of migration might not be immediately visible for international migrants. While in terms of income and employment, migrants might find better chances outside their home country, this does not necessarily mean that their occupational status will also improve. Relative to internal migrants, international migrants suffer not only of adaptation problems (language, culture, etc), but also their educational qualifications are not always recognized. Additionally, given that migrants leave their parents behind, the positive influence in terms of resources that the parental background could have (for those with high status parents'), will not be so strong either. This might lead, therefore, to a situation in which emigrants end up doing work for which they are over-qualified (Johnston, Sirkeci and Modood, 2010). In this context we expect that Turkish migrants will have similar or lower occupational levels than Turks in Turkey given similar levels of education (hypothesis 1). This will be related to the fact that migrant Turks depend mostly on their not always recognized educational attainment. For the same reason, we also expect lower returns to education for migrants when compared with non-migrants in Turkey and natives in the destination countries (hypothesis 2).

The situation of migrants, however, might change over the generations. Following the assimilation hypothesis (Gordon 1964; Park and Burgess 1969; Alba and Nee 1997) one could expect that second generation Turks will do better than the first generation in terms of occupational attainment. In fact, being raised in the receiving country brings the advantage of receiving the local education and speaking the local language. We therefore expect that the returns to education will be much higher for the second generation Turks than for the first generation. In other words, we expect education to be more valuable for those who acquired it in the destination country (hypothesis 3). What about the differences with the native populations? Most work on immigrants' economic integration carried out in Western Europe has found that the transition from education to the labor market is problematic, not only for the first generation but also for the second. In fact, the levels of unemployment are usually higher and the access to higher occupations remains restricted (Kogan 2006; Heath and Cheung 2007; Silberman, Alba et al. 2007). The situation of Turks and Moroccans seems to be particularly vulnerable (Crul and Doornik 2003; Simon 2003; Worbs 2003; Heath,

Rothon et al. 2008). We therefore expect that at given similar levels of education, second generation Turks will lag behind the occupational levels of native populations. We thus expect the returns to education to be smaller among second generation Turks than among natives (hypothesis 4).

#### *Parental Background and Educational Attainment*

The occupational achievements of Turks in Western Europe will depend, to a large extent, on the educational level they acquire. In this context, an important topic in the literature on migrant integration refers to the success in school and the possibilities of moving up in education. We said earlier that we expected higher occupational status among second generation Turks. This will be partly related to the fact that they will acquire higher educational levels as compared to their parents. Studies in the US and Europe have shown, indeed, that the children of immigrants usually perform better than their parents. The fact that, in many cases, parents come with very low educational backgrounds, like Mexicans in the US or Turks in Western Europe, makes this trend more plausible and easy to happen (see for example Crul and Doornik 2003; Rumbaut 2008; Zhou, Lee et al. 2008). But, given this trend, do second generation immigrants acquire educational levels comparable to those of natives? This is a second topic very much discussed in the literature, especially in recent years. Although usually the educational level of immigrants still stays behind the native population mean, taking into account the low levels of parental education and occupation has helped to explain the differences between second generation immigrants – including Turks – and natives in countries such as the Netherlands (Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007), France (Simon 2003; Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007) and Germany (Kristen and Granato 2007). These results have also been found in the United States; both in classic studies like the one carried out by Blau and Duncan (1967) and in more recent studies (see examples in Kao and Thompson 2003). We expect similar outcomes for the Turkish descendants analyzed in this paper: they will not only have higher educational levels for the second generations (compared to the first) but also approach to natives' educational achievements, especially when controlling parental background (hypothesis 5).

What about the relationship between parental background and educational achievements? For the German case, where the majority of Turks is located, it has been found that the influence of the father's education in the chances of reaching the Abitur is smaller for second

generation Turks than for natives (Kristen and Granato 2007). According to the authors this shows that a higher parental education brings less advantage for Turks than for native populations (hypothesis 5).

Finally, it has been argued that motivation or aspiration can be an important component in the explanations of success of migrants (for a review see Heath, Rothson et al. 2008). In fact, there is evidence that the parents of second generation immigrants have particularly high aspirations for their children, whom they want to see succeed in the new society. This has two consequences: on the one hand, net of ethnic and social origin, higher aspirations could result in net advantages in terms of education (Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007); on the other, and in terms of social reproduction, this might also lead the parental background (especially in terms of education) to be less important when compared to natives. Highly motivated children will achieve high educational levels even with low educated parents. This will probably make the relationship between parental background (education) and second generation's education less strong. The extent to which this will be the case among Turks is uncertain.

#### *Parental Background and Occupational Attainment*

The next group of hypotheses, finally, refers to the relationship between parents' occupation and occupational attainment of respondents for the different comparison groups. According to the model in Figure 1, the occupational achievement of migrants depends not only on their education, but also on their socio-economic background. A low starting point in terms of parental occupation – as it is mostly the case with Turks – will probably work against the possibilities of getting higher occupations, as the theories of segmented assimilation have shown (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). However, it can also be argued that family and community networks that exist within the Turkish population (Crul and Doornik 2003; Crul and Vermeulen 2003) might reduce the effect of the (low) parental background in the occupational attainment. This leads us to hypothesize that, first, in spite of the fact that Turks will achieve lower occupational status when compared to natives, controlling for (the low) parental occupation will mitigate the differences between Turks and natives in terms of occupational achievement and also with regard to the returns to education (therefore reducing the ethnic penalties usually found in the literature)<sup>5</sup> (hypothesis 6). And second, the relationship between parental occupation and respondent's occupation will be

higher for the second generation than for the first (who have left the parents behind), but probably lower compared to the natives. This could be partly associated to the social networks created and the possibilities this brings for upward social mobility (given that Turks come mainly with low socio-economic backgrounds) (hypothesis 7). In extremis, we do not expect parental occupation to be crucial for the occupational achievements of younger Turks: the education will be the main determinant for success, something that has been found for immigrants in the UK (Platt 2005; 2007).

### **Data, variables and comparison groups**

Our analysis is based on the data from the *European Social Survey* for the years 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 (rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4). Taken over all four rounds, this survey covers almost all European populations and also Turkey (for 2004 and 2008), which makes it possible to compare Turkish migrants and non-migrants. While being primarily a social attitudes survey, the ESS stands out for its rather detailed inventory of migration status, with questions on country of birth of respondents and their parents, period of arrival, nationality and language spoken at home. Another salient feature of the ESS is that it has relatively good information on parents' educations and occupations<sup>6</sup>, as well a respondent's corresponding statuses. To this dataset we have added data on Turkish migrants in Western Europe from the *European Value Survey* that have recently become available. The data on migration and social mobility in the EVS are very similar to the ESS, even somewhat more detailed.

Using the migration inventory, we have created four main comparison groups:

- Turkish migrants in Europe and their direct descendants
  - First generation (educated in Turkey)
  - Second generation<sup>7</sup> (educated in destination country)
- Turks in Turkey
- Natives in destination countries

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<sup>6</sup> While information on parental occupations has been collected in the ESS with open questions, most of it is uncoded. We have been able to code parental occupations for most of the countries in our analysis and merge this information with precoded questions on parental occupations.

<sup>7</sup> Includes the 1.5 generation.

The definition we have used for “Turkish migrants in Europe” varies minorly between ESS round 1 and the rest. For rounds 2, 3 and 4 we consider Turks as those individuals who live in Europe and have at least one parent born in Turkey (actually, more than 90% of the cases in ESS have two parents born in Turkey). For ESS round 1 we define Turks as those who speak Turkish as first or second language, are Turkish citizens or were born in Turkey<sup>8</sup>. Natives and Turks in Turkey, on the other hand, are those whose parents are born in either the nine European countries in our effective sample or in Turkey, respectively. We restrict our analysis to nine Western European countries in which Turkish migrants are found by ESS or EVS: Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Norway, Denmark and Sweden.

We have further sought to differentiate between Turks who were educated in Turkey, that is to say, those who have completed all or most of their education in Turkey; and Turks who received their education in Europe, a group which includes Turks born in Europe and those who did all or most of their studies in the receiving country. These categories were constructed with the help of the country of birth of immigrants and the period of arrival to the destination country. Unfortunately, the ESS does not have the precise year or age of arrival of immigrants<sup>9</sup>. We approximated the likelihood of having completed education in the country of destination by combining the crude age of arrival with an estimation of the years required for respondent’s stated educational level (ISCED). We did this in two versions. First of all, we have created a continuous variable, called “Eduplace”, with values from 0 to 1, where 0 refers to individuals that have certainly completed their education in Turkey, and 1 to those that have certainly studied in Europe. The intermediate points express each individual’s likelihood of having been educated in Europe. For our main analysis, we have dichotomised this information. One category refers to those who were born in Turkey and/or have higher likelihood of having done most of their studies in Turkey (values from 0 to 0.5); the other, refers to those who have higher likelihood of having done most of their studies in Europe (values from 0.51 to 1). In the EVS the precise age of arrival has been collected and the problem does not arise.

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<sup>8</sup> The parents’ country of birth is missing in the first round of the ESS.

<sup>9</sup> The ESS variable has 5 categories: Arrived last year; between 1 and 5 years; between 6 and 10 years; between 11 and 20 years; and 21 years and more.

The respondent's and parents' education were measured with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), which we scale in a simple numerical way, from 0 (incomplete primary) to 6 (postgraduate level of tertiary education). We take into consideration the maximum value of father and mother, and for regression analysis, the categories were transformed into an approximate years of education. The respondents' occupations were measured with the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which is available for all countries and rounds: these have been transformed into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 2010). ISCO-88 codes are available for only part of the father's and mother's occupation. We have access to complete ISCO codes for Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and France. For the remaining countries the ISCO coding is incomplete and has been supplemented by crude self-classification scores. As with respondent's information, we converted the occupational classification to an ISEI score that ranges between 10 and 90. In order to obtain a measure for parents' occupation, we first considered the mean between the ISEI calculated with the ISCO codes and the ISEI calculated with the crude codes. We did this separately for fathers and mothers, and later on we considered the maximum ISEI value between both parents. In our analysis, we have divided the ISEI scores by 10, to obtain better readable coefficients.

**Table 2 – 3 – 4 to be discussed.**

### **Descriptive statistics**

**Table 5** presents descriptive statistics for the variables under analysis broken down by comparison group.

### **Table 5**

In the top two rows of Table 5, Turks in Turkey and Turks who received their education in Turkey are shown. We observe that there seems to be a positive selection of migrants, as the educational level of the latter group is higher. Moreover, their parents' educational and occupational status is also higher compared to those left behind. However, the acquired occupational status of the migrants is lower, something that could be reflecting ethnic penalties in the access to the European labour market. The third row of Table 5 shows that

Turks who received their education in Europe (1.5 and second generations) seem to be quite mobile in educational and occupational terms and are approaching the level of natives<sup>10</sup>.

More interesting conclusions, however, arise from further analysis based on regressions carried out for each group. We first study the educational attainment, to move later on to the occupational attainment.

### **Educational attainment**

We first explore the educational attainment. **Table 6** presents the influence of the parental education and occupation on that of the respondent, for the four comparison groups.

#### **Table 3**

Model 1 shows that the Turkish have generally lower levels of education compared to European natives, and this is the case both for Turks in Turkey and for Turkish immigrants (first, 1.5 and second generations). However, when controlling in Model 2 parental background (education and occupation) the differences between Turks educated in Europe and natives becomes smaller, although they remain statistically significant. Moreover, if we compare emigrated Turks with those left behind we also see that the former have higher levels of education than the latter, at similar backgrounds, **which supports our fourth hypothesis (?)**. This is pointing to a positive selection of Turks, which contrasts with Dronkers and De Heus 2009, **who found evidence of negative selection**. Finally, when looking at the interaction terms in Model 3, we observe that the influence of parental education for Turks educated in Europe is significantly smaller than for the native – migration has brought the Turks some additional social mobility. This stand in stark contrast to Turks in Turk and Turkish migrants who most likely received their education in Turkey, who appear to have higher levels of educational reproduction than European natives. The pattern is more complicated for parental occupation in Model 4, if which the influence is somewhat weaker than that of parental education. Again we find that Turkish migrants wh received their education in Europe are somewhat more mobile than natives, but the

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<sup>10</sup> This is clearer when we control by age in the regression tables, as 1.5 and second generations are still quite young.

interaction is not statistically significant. Moreover, with respect to parental occupation, we do not find stronger reproduction for this who were actually educated in Turkey.

### **Occupational attainment**

We now move to occupational attainment. **Table 7** shows the influence of the parents' occupational status and acquired education on the respondent's occupational status for each comparison group:

#### **Table 7**

Taking natives as baseline (also for the rest of models and tables), Model 1 shows the mean occupational status for the different groups, while controlling age and gender. The Natives is the group with the highest occupational mean. The group with the lowest expected occupational status is the first generation Turkish migrant. This is no surprise given that Turks came to Europe to occupy low-qualified jobs (even lower than those they might have occupied in Turkey, given the same age and gender). However, the low occupational status carries over into the next generation of 1.5 and 2.0 generation migrants, whose status is significantly lower than that of natives. In Model 2 the parents' occupational status is added to the model as a predictor, and here we observe that - given the same parents' occupation - the difference between Natives and Turks who received their education in Turkey becomes non-significant. Turks in Europe who studied in Turkey are still in disadvantage. In Model 3 we add interactions terms and observe that the father's occupation has a significantly stronger influence for Natives than for 1.5 and second generations Turks. The negative coefficient of the interaction term for the Turkish immigrant educated in Western Europe is of substantial size and statistically significant. For first generation migrants, there is also somewhat more mobility than for natives, but the difference is far from statistically significant. On the other hand, the reproduction in terms of occupational is higher for Turks in Turkey than for Natives.

Model 3f reestimates model 3 again, but now with inclusion of dummy variables for county of destination and data sources. These control variables do not change the pattern of association.

Models 4, 5 and 6 include the level of education. From Model 4 we observe that, given the same education and father's occupation, the difference in the occupational status of 1.5 and second generations Turks and Natives is non-significant. If we compare these results with those of Model 3, we observe that when we add the educational level as a control variable, the difference in the occupational achievements between first generation Turks and Natives becomes smaller, although it remains significant. It is also interesting to note that Turks in Turkey acquire now higher occupational levels than Natives, but also than those of the emigrated Turks. In other words, Turks who emigrated would have probably done better in Turkey (at least in occupational terms). However, the rewards of emigration are certainly more positive for their children.

When comparing Model 5 with Model 3 we see that when adding education, the negative coefficient of the interaction term of the parents' occupational status for Turks who studied in Europe becomes non-significant. The occupational outcomes for this group are therefore mainly mediated by their educational achievements. The difference in the occupational reproduction patterns for Turks in Turkey and European Natives also becomes non-significant when the level of education is taken into account.

Finally we move to Model 6, where interactions refer to parents' occupational status and respondent's level of education. Here we observe that the interaction term (FMISEI) for Turks in Turkey becomes almost significant. However, the most important aspect to note in this model is that the influence of the level of education on the occupational status acquired is significantly higher for Natives than for Turks educated in Turkey: in other words, one year increase in education in Turkey means less gain in occupational status compared to Natives. This suggests that Turkish suffer ethnic penalties in the access to higher occupations. Turks who received most of their education in Europe surprisingly do not seem to significantly suffer ethnic penalties. Although one could argue that our N is small and that more cases would give a different perspective (but note that that the interaction coefficient is substantial and close to being significant). This finding might also be related to the fact that we include a variable that many other studies do not: parental background.

## **Conclusions and Discussion**

The paper addressed two main concerns: the impact of migration for those Turks who left and the educational and occupational integration of emigrated Turks and their descendants in Europe. These concerns were developed in several comparative analyses. First, we compared emigrated Turks (or Turks born in Turkey) with those who stayed in the home country: Turkey. Secondly, we compared first and 1.5 and second generations Turkish immigrants among them and with native populations. The combined analysis has given us a greater perspective than the one given by most of the studies on international migration: not only we studied the processes of integration in the receiving country in terms of educational and occupational attainment, but also we tried to elucidate the extent to which migration implied a gain in status for emigrants and their descendants, compared to those left behind. Additionally, we included the role of the parental background as key explanatory variable in the models which -- as expected--, has helped to moderate (or “make less pessimistic”) the findings on educational and occupational attainment of Turkish newcomers.

A series of hypotheses have guided our work. The first group of hypotheses referred to the comparison between Turks in Turkey and those who emigrated: was migration beneficial for the status attainment of Turks? Our results confirm the hypothesis that, given similar levels of education and parental background, Turkish migrants tend to have lower occupational levels than Turks in Turkey. Furthermore, their returns to education are smaller compared to those left behind. This shows the ethnic penalties that first generation immigrants suffer upon arrival. Additionally, the influence of the parents’ occupational status is not significantly lower for those who left, as we expected. Given that Turkish migrants disproportionately have come from low socio-economic backgrounds, this may add to the low achievements in terms of occupational status for first generations.

The second group of hypotheses we introduced in our work was related to the integration of immigrants in the host societies: we focused in the comparisons between first and 1.5 and second generations, and between Turks in Europe and native populations. Regarding educational achievements, we confirmed the hypothesis that 1.5 and second generations Turks achieve higher levels than the first generation. Furthermore, we also observed that the educational levels of those educated in Europe are significantly closer to those of the native population, compared to the first generation. When controlling for the parental background (educational level and occupational status) the difference between 1.5 and second generation Turks and natives becomes even smaller, although still significant. Finally, Turks educated in

Europe are also more mobile in terms of education: the influence of the parental education is smaller for this group than for first generation immigrants.

Going to the occupational achievements, our results showed that the occupational achievements of 1.5 and second generations are better than those of the first, and this is also the case when controlling by the educational level. Furthermore, the returns to education (i.e. the strength of the effect of education on occupation) for the 1.5 and second generation are stronger than for the first generation, showing a decline in the ethnic penalties for those who got most of their education in Europe. We also observed that although the average occupational status of the 1.5 and second generation is generally smaller than that of the native population, when controlling for education and parental occupation the difference between both groups becomes non-significant (contrary to what we expected). The returns to education are also non-significantly different for both groups; however, this occurs only after we control for the parental background. In fact, most of the current literature on migration and occupational achievement (especially within Europe) does not take into account the socio-economic background of immigrants. An overestimation of ethnic penalties is therefore plausible to happen. Although it could be argued that we are working with a low N – and therefore the differences might be more pronounced when adding more cases – we have shown that the parental background moderated the differences between 1.5 and second generations Turks and natives: they became smaller after controlling for parent's occupational status and even non-significant after assuming that this variable has a different influence in the occupational status of individuals for each comparison group. Finally, our worked also showed that the parental occupation is not crucial for the occupational status of immigrants, being the education the main determinant for success, especially for 1.5 and second generation immigrants. This group is actually quite mobile in occupational terms, and this is acquired through education.

How can these results be summarized? First of all, we believe that in the long term, migration has been beneficial for Turks. Although the first generation was confronted (and continues to be confronted) with ethnic penalties in the access to occupations, expressed mainly in the lower returns to education when compared to natives; the 1.5 and second generations are doing better both in educational and occupational terms. We agree with previous studies (Simon 2003; Heath and Cheung 2007) that second generation still tends to concentrate in low qualified works (in addition to higher levels of unemployment) and that - to a certain

extent - there is still a reproduction of the social structure from parents to offspring. However, this result should not underestimate the important social mobility experienced by 1.5 and second generations Turks, mediated to a large extent by the improvement in the educational achievements. Furthermore, the important moderating role of the parental background also shows that the negative outcomes found in previous studies might probably become smaller if the socio-economic status of fathers and mothers was taken into account. Studies have already shown this is the case for the educational achievements, and our paper shows it is also the case for the occupational ones.


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
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**Figure 1: Blau and Duncan's Model (reduced version)**

**Figure 1: Blau and Duncan's Model (reduced version)**



**Figure 2: Turkish citizens in Western Europe by country of residence, 2006 (in %)**



Source: Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security

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**Table 1: Census Data of Percentage of literacy and net primary and secondary school enrolment in Turkey in 1970, 1996 and 2004**

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	1970	1996	2004
<b><u>Literacy rate (%)</u></b>			
<b>Total</b>	<b>54.7</b>	<b>85.1</b>	<b>87.4</b>
<b>Male</b>	<b>69.0</b>	<b>94.0</b>	<b>95.3</b>
<b>Female</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>79.6</b>
<b><u>Primary school education enrolment rate (%)</u></b>			
<b>Total</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>89.7</b>
<b>Male</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>91.8</b>	<b>92.6</b>
<b>Female</b>	<b>62.1</b>	<b>86.9</b>	<b>86.6</b>
<b><u>Secondary education and higher enrolment rate (%)</u></b>			
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>38.5</b>	<b>54.9</b>
<b>Male</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>59.1</b>
<b>Female</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>50.5</b>

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**Source: State Statistics Institute (2006)**

**Table 2: Total number of respondents in surveys, initial counts**

		ESS round					Total
		1 ESS1	2 ESS2	3 ESS3	4 ESS4	5 EVS2	
Country	AT Austria	2257	2256	2405	-	1510	8428
	BE Belgium	1899	1798	1799	1760	1509	8765
	CH Switzerland	2041	2229	1804	1819	1272	9165
	DE Germany	2919	2870	2916	2751	2075	13531
	DK Denmark	1506	1487	1505	1610	1507	7615
	FR France	1503	1806	1986	2073	1501	8869
	NL Netherlands	2364	1881	1889	1778	1554	9466
	NO Norway	2036	1760	1750	1549	-	7095
	SE Sweden	1999	1948	1927	1830	-	7704
	TR Turkey	-	1856	-	2416	-	4272
<b>Total</b>		<b>18524</b>	<b>19891</b>	<b>17981</b>	<b>17586</b>	<b>10928</b>	<b>84910</b>

**Table 3: Total number of respondents by comparison group, total counts**

		ESS round					Total
		1 ESS1	2 ESS2	3 ESS3	4 ESS4	5 EVS2	
Group	1 TurkTurk		1782		2341		4123
	2 TurkTR	61	66	56	64	39	286
	3 TurkXX	83	85	77	69	62	376
	4 Natives	15325	14774	14691	12238	9207	66235
	5 Others	3055	3184	3157	2874	1620	13890
<b>Total</b>		<b>18524</b>	<b>19891</b>	<b>17981</b>	<b>17586</b>	<b>10928</b>	<b>84910</b>

(1) TurkTurk: Turks in Turkey (2) TurkTR: Turks in Western Europe, education in Turkey, (3) TurkXX: Turks in Western Europe, educated in Western Europe, (4) Natives: Natives to Western Europe, (5) Others: other migrants in western Europe.

Table 4: Representation of comparison groups after sample selections.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
0 Others	13890	11231	10339	9510	9474	9907	9016	8474
1 TurkTurk	4123	3491	1630	1414	1413	2839	2291	2261
2 TurkTR	286	274	229	186	183	260	205	192
3 TurkXX	376	327	278	242	241	223	188	176
4 Natives	66235	50387	47568	45155	45107	44688	42161	40704
Total	84910	65710	60044	56507	56418	57917	53861	51807

A: All data

B: After selection ages 18-64 (working age)

C: B + selection on valid respondent occupation

D: C + selection on valid parental occupation

E: D + selection on valid education

F: A + after selection ages 25-64 (out of school age)

G: F + selection on valid parental occupation

H: G + selection on valid parental education

Table 5: Means of status characteristics of comparison groups

Means	Age	fmiscd	fmisei	lscd	isei
1 TurkTurk	36.7	6.3	31.1	8.6	38.1
2 TurkTR	40.3	7.9	34.6	10.0	33.8
3 TurkXX	29.7	8.9	32.7	11.6	38.9
4 Natives	42.4	11.8	44.0	13.2	45.1
5 Others	40.8	11.6	44.6	13.1	44.3
1 TurkTurk	3491	3449	2806	3485	1630
2 TurkTR	274	249	218	269	229
3 TurkXX	327	300	282	326	278
4 Natives	50387	48043	47642	50287	47568
0 Others	11231	10283	10232	11142	10339
Total	65710	62324	61180	65509	60044

**Table 6: Educational Attainment (ISCED in years), metric regression coefficients (t-values)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Natives (ref)	16.040 (237.4)	9.540 (108.2)	9.631 (108.9)	9.628 (108.7)
TurkXX	-2.116 (-8.7)	-.577 (-2.6)	-.153 (-0.3)	.101 (0.1)
TurkTR	-3.402 (-14.6)	-1.837 (-8.8)	-2.853 (-6.0)	-1.854 (-3.0)
TurkTurk	-5.116 (-73.4)	-2.886 (-43.6)	-4.509 (-30.8)	-4.611 (-24.6)
FeMale	-.311 (-10.1)	-.248 (-9.0)	-.248 (-9.0)	-.249 (-9.0)
Age	-.054 (-38.5)	-.020 (-15.0)	-.019 (-14.8)	-.019 (-14.8)
FISCED: Ref. Natives <sup>a</sup>		.330 (75.6)	.321 (72.3)	.321 (72.0)
FMISCED*TurkXX			-.050 (-2.3)	-.043 (-0.8)
FMISCED*TurkTR			.123 (2.3)	.165 (2.9)
FMISCED*TurkTurk			.250 (12.4)	.239 (10.1)
FMISEI		.248 (23.4)	.250 (23.6)	.250 (23.2)
FMISEI*TurkXX				-.098 (-0.5)
FMISEI*TurkTR				-.393 (-2.5)
FMISEI*TurkTurk				.057 (0.9)
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>0.129</i>	<i>0.298</i>	<i>0.300</i>	<i>0.306</i>
<b>N =</b>	<b>43328</b>	<b>43328</b>	<b>43328</b>	<b>43328</b>

a: For all tables, "Ref. Natives" applies only when the interaction terms are included.

Table 7: Occupational attainment in ISEI/10, unstandardized regression coefficients (t values)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3f	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 6f
Ref. Natives	4.327 (156.4)	2.651 (72.2)	2.652 (71.8)	2.594 (61.6)	.100 (2.5)	.094 (2.3)	.090 (2.2)	-.389 (-8.6)
TurkXX	-.520 (-5.0)	-.097 (-1.0)	.495 (1.6)	.466 (1.6)	.184 (2.1)	.547 (2.0)	1.093 (2.7)	1.117 (2.8)
TurkTR	-1.097 (-9.3)	-.798 (-7.1)	-.653 (-2.3)	-.698 (-2.4)	-.280 (-2.8)	-.298 (-1.1)	.747 (2.1)	.863 (2.5)
TurkTurk	-.670 (-15.4)	-.252 (-6.0)	-.438 (-3.7)	-.457 (-3.9)	.332 (8.7)	.473 (4.5)	.339 (2.7)	.758 (6.1)
FeMale	-.110 (-7.4)	-.105 (-7.4)	-.106 (-7.4)	-.114 (-8.0)	-.083 (-6.6)	-.083 (-6.6)	-.084 (-6.6)	-.102 (-8.2)
Age	.006 (10.2)	.014 (23.4)	.014 (23.4)	.013 (22.7)	.016 (31.1)	.016 (31.1)	.016 (31.2)	.017 (32.4)
FMISEI: Ref. Natives		.309 (65.8)	.309 (64.9)	.309 (65.0)	.171 (39.2)	.172 (39.0)	.172 (38.9)	.164 (37.3)
FMISEI*TurkXX			-.179 (-2.1)	-.183 (-2.1)		-.110 (-1.4)	-.092 (-1.2)	-.115 (-1.5)
FMISEI*TurkTR			-.042 (-0.5)	-.042 (-0.5)		.006 (0.1)	.045 (0.7)	.030 (0.4)
FMISEI*TurkTurk			.059 (1.7)	.071 (2.1)		-.044 (-1.4)	-.066 (-2.0)	-.051 (-1.6)
ISCED: Ref. Natives					.228 (110.8)	.228 (110.8)	.228 (107.7)	.228 (114.3)
ISCED*TurkXX							-.052 (-1.8)	-.050 (-1.8)
ISCED*TurkTR							-.112 (-4.3)	-.118 (-4.6)
ISCED*TurkTurk							.020 (2.0)	.000 (0.0)
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>0.011</i>	<i>0.094</i>	<i>0.095</i>	<i>0.102</i>	<i>0.282</i>	<i>0.282</i>	<i>0.282</i>	<i>0.306</i>
N=	46997	46997	46997	46997	46940	46940	46940	46949