

**To vote or not to vote? Electoral participation of immigrants from different countries of origin in 24 European countries of destination.**

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## Abstract

*Electoral participation of immigrants is an important issue in Europe. Immigrants vote less often in national elections than non-immigrants; this may suggest a lack of political integration of immigrants into their host society. Besides, a low electoral participation rate of immigrants might also result in proportionately lower representation in parliament. This reflects on the legitimacy of the democracies concerned. This research analyses the electoral behaviour of 8132 immigrants from 62 countries and regions of origin in the 24 countries included in this study- the countries of destination. The data that we used are the second and third round of the European Social Survey. We find that although the largest differences in electoral participation of immigrants are at the level of the country of destination, the characteristics of the country of origin are more powerful for the explanation of differences in electoral participation of immigrants **from** certain countries of origin **in** countries of destination. We conclude that immigrants from countries with more political opportunities, social-economic opportunities and that are prevalently Roman-Catholic or Protestant have a higher propensity to vote. Also immigrants who live in countries with a higher economic level will vote more often. To heighten the electoral participation of immigrants it is suggested that the political integration together with the social-economic integration of immigrants should be advanced in the countries of destination, promotion of education might do part of the trick..*

**Keywords:** electoral participation, immigrants, multilevel modelling, European Union, origin countries

## Introduction

In Europe the constant inflow of immigrants has led to a changed composition of the population and the electorate. This has resulted into two related challenges: the lack of political integration of immigrants in the destination countries and the legitimacy of representative democracy.

It can be argued that immigrants in Europe should integrate into their host society in more than one way. For example: following the norms of their destination country (social integration), participating in the labour market (economic integration) and participating in elections (political integration). Conceivably the different forms of integration can strengthen each other. Political integration, for example, could lead to more social and economic integration; economic and social integration could lead to more political integration. Some would argue that electoral participation is the most important form of political integration of immigrants into the destination country (Tillie, 2000). Indeed, electoral participation could be said to be an important element of political participation for every citizen of a country: *“turning out to vote is the most common and important act citizens take in a democracy and therefore is one of the most important behaviours for scholars of democratic politics to understand.”* (Aldrich, 1993, p. 246).

Unfortunately electoral participation of immigrants in Europe lags behind participation of the non-immigrants (van Londen, Phalet & Hagendoorn, 2004). An increasing part of this population does not vote in national elections. As a low turnout in national elections in general is considered an indicator of a lack of democratic legitimacy (Mair, 2005; Webb, 2005). The low turn-out of immigrants can therefore be seen as an indicator of a growing lack of legitimacy in the European countries concerned. Political integration of immigrants and legitimacy of democracy will be enhanced when more immigrants vote. That is why it is important to understand why some immigrants vote and others do not.

Most of the research on electoral participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities originates in the United States and focuses on comparison of voting behaviour of Afro-Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans with voting behaviour of the European-American population (Cho, 1999; Chong & Rogers, 2005; DeFransceco Soto & Merolla, 2006; Jackson, 2003). Few studies on political and electoral participation have been done in Europe. Most of these concerned a single city or country and focused on the largest immigrant groups in those cities or countries and their social integration.

Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw (2004) studied Turks and Moroccans in Brussels and tested the hypothesis of Fenemma and Tillie (1999) that ethnic social capital explains differences in political participation between groups of immigrants. Their results showed that this was not the case for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants living in Brussels. However, they did find origin effects: the electoral participation rates of Turks are lower than those of Moroccans. They pointed out that these differences in political integration could be explained by differential integration levels into Belgium society. Although not tested in the research, an explanation that was put forward was that Moroccan

immigrants might be better socially integrated because they speak French (one of the languages spoken in Belgium), since Morocco is a former French colony.

In two different Dutch studies, immigrants in two cities were investigated. Van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn (2004) researched differences in voter participation of Turks and Moroccans in the city of Rotterdam. They discovered that cross-ethnic organisations (with immigrants and non-immigrants) were important in explaining voter turnout in local elections, whereas ethnic organisations (with only members of the ethnic group) only indirectly effected participation in local and national elections. In other words, organisational membership explained the differences in electoral participation of the two immigrant groups. Tillie (2004) studied immigrants in Amsterdam. Significant differences in the voter turnout of immigrant groups in 1994 were found: Turkish immigrants had the highest turnout in local elections followed by the Moroccan and Surinamese/Antillean immigrants. The last two groups switched places in the elections of 1998 and 2002. These differences in political participation between individual immigrants in Amsterdam were only partly explained by individual attributes such as gender, employment, ethnic and cross-ethnic organisational membership, trade union membership and social activities ( $R^2$  adjusted is 0.14). In both studies, origin effects (differences in electoral participation between immigrant groups) were found that could not be explained with 'simple' individual variables. This indicates that other explanations need to be sought for the differences between immigrants. And that social integration fosters political integration.

Odmalm (2004, 2005) researched the possibilities of political participation of immigrants in Malmö (Sweden) and found that the political climate around immigrants and the cleavage structure of politics were important in addressing immigrant-related issues and political participation of immigrants. Destination effects were found, the political structure around immigrants of the country of destination is supposed to influence the electoral participation of immigrants. Again, factors outside the individual immigrant seemed to be important in explaining political participation. Togeby (2004) examined the turnout of (former) Yugoslav, Turkish and Pakistani immigrants in Denmark. Organisational membership did not have an effect on the electoral participation of Pakistani and (former) Yugoslav immigrants and only a small effect for Turkish immigrants. The results differed for immigrant groups and for different forms of political participation.

For Germany, Koopmans (2004) found a strong positive effect of inclusiveness of local governments on political participation of immigrants. After comparing German cities with each other, Koopmans compared the whole of Germany with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The differences *between* the countries were larger than the differences *within* each country (between the cities in a country). This signifies that there are effects of the country of destination on the political integration of immigrants in different countries. Koopmans concluded that the country of destination is important in analysis of differences. Another German study (Berger, Galonska and Koopmans, 2004) focused on the city of Berlin. They found that immigrants who were more socially active in ethnic

organisations were also more politically active. However, they were not more politically interested than immigrants who were less socially active in ethnic organisations. They did find origin effects, Italians participated more than Turks and Russians; they did not study destination effects.

In all of the studies described above, different immigrant groups were investigated separately (Berger, Galonska & Koopmans, 2004) or with dummy variables for the immigrant groups (Tillie, 2004). Most of them focused on a single city or country; one focused on three countries (Koopmans, 2004). What is lacking is a comprehensive study that simultaneously describes and explains effects of the country of origin and effects of the country of destination on voter turnout in immigrants. The research reported on in this paper, therefore, focuses on the electoral participation of immigrants in 24 European countries and seeks to answer the question: *how does the electoral participation in national election of immigrants **from** different countries of origin **in** different countries of destination differ?* To our knowledge, this has not been done before. This study, therefore, can contribute to the knowledge of differences and similarities in the explanations of electoral participation in Europe.

Furthermore, many studies do not explain differential electoral participation by considering meso- and macro-factors outside the individual immigrant. We focus on the countries of destination and the countries of origin of the immigrants as explanatory factors, since these are expected to be the most important explanations for the differences in electoral participation between immigrants. This, therefore, leads to the second, explanatory research question of this study: *how can the differences in electoral participation in national elections between immigrants **from** different countries of origin **in** the different countries of destination in Europe be explained with characteristics of the country of origin and the country of destination?*

### **An immigrant perspective on electoral participation: the expressive vote**

Immigrants often live in two worlds at the same time: the country they, or their parents, were born in, (the country of origin) and the country they live in (the country of destination). This has an effect on the electoral participation of these immigrants. Because we wanted to explain the electoral participation of immigrants *from* certain countries *in* certain countries, two models were developed. A model based on the country of destination and a model based on the country of origin. Therefore Durkheim's integration theory (1897) will be combined with the sociologically-based socialization approach.

Voting is an expression of belonging to a social group (original: Campbell, 1960; also used and elaborated by: Van Egmond, 2003; Smeenk, de Graaf & Ultee, 1995; Need, 1997). In integration theory, voting for a party or a candidate signifies identification with that party or candidate. Besides, integration theory states that if people are more integrated into a social group, they will feel more pressure to follow the norms of that group. Immigrants are integrated into two groups; they are citizens of the country of destination and they are immigrants from a certain country of origin in the country of destination. It is assumed that if immigrants are more integrated into the host society they

will feel more pressure to follow the norms of the host society, including the norm that a good citizen votes in elections. Voting can thus be an expression of belonging to the country of destination and adherence to the norms of the country of destination. It can also be an expression of belonging to an immigrant group in the country of destination, for example when an immigrant votes for an immigrant candidate. The norms of the groups an immigrant is integrated in are ‘learned’ through socialization in these groups.

The sociological approach in electoral studies claims that the environment in which one is socialized as well as a person’s current social environment, influences one’s voting behaviour and thus electoral participation. People are influenced by the people they socialize with and this is a live long process. That is why it is important to take into account the early socializing environment of the country of origin and the current socializing environment of the country of destination. Since first-generation immigrants are socialized in an environment other than the one they live in, their electoral participation can be expected to be different from the electoral participation of second-generation immigrants and non-immigrants. They have ‘learned’ their political behaviour in their country of origin and can therefore be expected to participate in the country of destination more or less in a similar way as they did in the country of origin (McAllister & Makkai, 1992). When they never learned how to engage in electoral participation, it is no surprise that they do not vote. This socialisation effect can also occur in second-generation immigrants: parents are the most important socialisers when it concerns political behaviour (Plutzer, 2002). The second generation that is born in the country of destination is partly socialized in the destination country and – through their parents – partly in the social and political environment of the country of origin. The possible negative influence of the country of origin (in cases where countries of origin are less democratic than the destination countries) continues through in the second generation.

From these two theoretical viewpoints, integration and socialization, two models of explaining electoral participation of immigrants will be developed: the model for the country of destination and the model for the country of origin.

### *The destination country*

The factors presented in this paragraph are represented as a ‘national electoral model’ in Figure 1. It suggests that political and social-economic opportunities foster electoral participation and that institutional opportunities effect electoral participation positively. The three general hypotheses combined result in our *destination hypothesis* that stems from this model and reads: *immigrants in countries of destination with more political, social-economic and institutional opportunities, will have a higher propensity to vote.*

**<About here figure 1>**

The country of destination of immigrants is assumed to influence the electoral participation of the immigrant; this is concluded because the differences between countries are larger than the differences within countries of destination (Koopmans, 2004). We expect that the influence of the country of destination is stronger than the influence of the country of origin, since the socializing environment now is of more influence than an earlier socializing environment (Need, 1997, for effects of religious voting). Franklin (2004) also finds that the political and social environment of the country of destination is important. In the European countries under study, the general norm is that voting is important. When immigrants are better integrated into the destination country they will feel more pressure to follow this norm. The first generation is socialized in the country of origin, but may also integrate into the country of destination and may feel the need to learn and follow the norms of the country of destination. The second generation is to a large extent socialized in the country of destination and we would expect this generation to be more influenced by the characteristics of the country of destination than their parents' generation.

It could be argued that the country of destination has two roles. Firstly, the country of destination is an environment in which the second generation is partly socialized, and thus functions as a socializing environment. Secondly, the country of destination is an environment in which the first and second generation immigrants will integrate and whose norms and values they will adopt. In countries with more opportunities to socialize and integrate, electoral participation of immigrants will be higher.

Characteristics of countries that are usually associated with higher turnout can be divided into political, social-economic and institutional factors (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998). The general hypothesis regarding the political structure of a country is that: *immigrants who live in a country of destination with more political opportunities will turnout more often in elections*. In a country with more political stability and with more democracy, citizens will feel that their vote is taken seriously and that their vote counts (Aldrich, 1993), which makes the propensity to vote higher.

The social-economic structure of a country is also important. The general hypothesis here is: *immigrants in a country with more social-economic opportunities will turnout more often in elections*. Social-economic opportunities consist of the economic level and the educational level of a country. In countries with a higher economic level the turnout will be higher, in these countries people can worry about politics since the bare essentials are taken care off (Lipset, 1959; Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998). Also from Lipset we derive the idea that in countries with a higher mean level of education, democracy will flourish more. In countries with more social-economic opportunities, immigrants are expected to have more opportunities to develop themselves and to become acquainted with politics in the country of destination.

The third factor is the institutional one. The general hypothesis is: *immigrants in a country with more institutional opportunities will turnout more often in elections*. In countries where the

electoral system gives each vote an equal weight, the 'lost vote syndrome' will be smaller (Franklin, 2004). In other words, in a more proportional system, the lost vote syndrome will be smaller and the propensity to vote will be higher. From earlier research (Franklin, 2004) also emerges that in countries where there is more choice in parties, people are more likely to vote. To capture all institutional factors together we will also take into account the turnout of non-immigrants in the country of destination. If non-immigrants do not vote in elections, immigrants are very well integrated if they do not vote in elections either.

Besides these 'standard' political, economic and institutional factors that influence turnout, we add four variables to the model to help explain the (lack) of turnout of immigrants in Europe. Three of these variables are political: left-wing government, anti-immigrant party and integration policy. First, we hypothesize that if a country has a longer tradition of left-wing government; immigrants are better integrated into the destination country and will turnout more often. Left-wing parties are often seen and also see themselves as the "natural" immigrant party, because they see the more poor sections of society as their clientele. Besides, pure immigrant parties do not seem to flourish in Europe (Odmalm, 2005). Therefore, where an anti-immigrant party (in most cases rightwing parties) flourishes in a country, immigrant groups are likely to rally against this party by a higher level of electoral participation and by voting for another party (in most cases leftwing parties). Third, we expect that in countries where the integration policy is more inclusive, immigrants will have more opportunities to integrate politically and will participate more in elections.

The last characteristic is the size of the immigrant group. The bigger the electorate, the smaller the influence of one vote (Franklin, 2004). But, the bigger the immigrant group, the more influence these groups can exercise. The size of the immigrant group (from a certain country of origin into a certain country of destination) is added to our model.

### *Country of origin*

In the same manner in which we developed a model for the country of origin, we build one for the country of destination. This model is depicted in Figure 2 in which the political, social-economic and institutional opportunities as well as the origin characteristics are shown. The *origin hypothesis* that corresponds with this figure is: *immigrants from countries of origin with more political, social-economic and institutional opportunities, will have a higher propensity to vote.*

<About here figure 2>

Since immigrants and their children are only partly socialized and influenced by their country of destination, we expect their country of origin to be of influence on their electoral participation. In research into the socioeconomic integration of immigrants, the country of origin should be generally

taken into account (Van Tubergen, 2004; Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2008; Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp, 2008; André, Dronkers & Fleischmann, 2009). Also, in explaining the political preferences of immigrants in Europe, the country of origin is generally studied (Dancygiers & Saunders, 2006).

The three general hypotheses proposed above on political, social-economic and institutional opportunities concerning the country of destination, can also be applied to the country of origin. Immigrants who are from countries that offer better political, social-economic and institutional opportunities are socialized to vote. However, some characteristics of the country of origin are taken into account, that are not used for the countries of destination. The model, therefore, will be expanded to take into account explanations that are specifically aimed at different socialization in the country of origin.

Besides economic level, societal development and social inequality are taken into account as indicators of the socioeconomic opportunities. Societal development in a country in this context means that the people in a country have a decent standard of living, can live a long and healthy life and can enjoy education. If the societal development is lower, people will not feel the need to participate politically (a Maslow effect). In a country where the social inequality is higher, people may feel that they have no influence on politics and will be less socialized to vote.

Three other specific origin characteristics will also be taken into account: religion, 'Arabism' and colonialism. In earlier research Islamic countries were characterised as not democratic and thus not providing a good socializing environment (Fish, 2002). We therefore expect that immigrants who are socialized in countries of origin that are predominantly Islamic, will vote less often. The same reasoning goes for being an Arabic country (Stepan & Robertson, 2003). As in most research, however, it is not clear if it is the effect of being Arabic or Islamic that fosters anti-democratic regimes, we take both variables into account. The last characteristic regards the colonial origins of a country. Immigrants from former colonies of the destination country are found to vote more often than immigrants from countries not colonised by the destination country (Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2004). It can be reasoned that immigrants from former colonies or former territories are socialized in an environment that resembles the country of destination more and will therefore vote more often in national elections in the country of destination.

It is also possible that compositional factors cause the differences in the electoral participation of immigrants in different countries. If – for instance – a country of destination only receives illiterate immigrants from non-democratic countries of origin, the difference found in electoral participation is caused by a compositional effect. That is why the most important variables that are known to explain individual differences in voting behaviour are also taken into account. Broadly speaking, immigrants, who have more resources, more social capital, are less integrated and have less political interest and

confidence will have a lower propensity to vote. We will therefore control for: economic integration (resources: educational attainment, age), social integration (labour union, religious organisation, marital status, mastery of language, length of stay), political integration (political interest, internal and external political confidence), gender and religious orientation.

## **Data and method**

The dataset used for this study is drawn from the second and third round of the European Social Survey (Jowell, 2005; Jowell 2007). The European Social Survey is a survey that is held in 30 countries; the second round of the survey was conducted in 2004/2005 and the third round in 2006/2007. The survey designers seek to keep track of a range of changes in European societies. We use only the second and third round, since in these rounds it is possible to distinguish first- and second-generation immigrants from non-immigrants of the countries of destination. We used nested data: all immigrants living in countries of destination specific communities (e.g. Turkish immigrants in Germany), countries of destination (Germany) and countries of origin (Turkey). For nested data it is recommended to use multilevel analysis (Bosker & Snijders, 1999). An assumption for multilevel analysis is that the levels are nested hierarchically, level 1 (individual) is nested into level 2 (community) that is nested into level 3 (country of destination / country of origin). The country of destination and country of origin, however, can not be ordered hierarchically. They are both at the third level, level 3a (country of destination) and level 3b (country of origin) and the second level (community) is nested into both level 3a and level 3b. The country of destination (3a) and country of origin (3b) are crossed levels. To correctly account for the nesting of the data, we used a cross-classified multilevel analysis. This method to model the different levels that influence immigrants correctly was first used by Van Tubergen (2004). Since our dependent variable is binary (to vote or not to vote), we will use the logistic cross-classified multilevel analysis. The analyses are done in R.

We labelled all respondents who were born outside the country of destination as ‘first-generation immigrants’, except for the cases where both parents were natives of the destination country. Respondents of whom one or both of the parents were born abroad were labelled ‘second-generation immigrants’. The country of destination of the respondent is the country of the survey, the country of origin is the country in which the first-generation immigrant was born or the country of origin of the mother of the second-generation immigrant. Where the country of origin of the mother was not known, the country of the father was taken. This follows the strategy of Fleischmann & Dronkers (2008) and Tillie (2000). Of the more than 12,000 immigrants, only immigrants who were citizen of the country of destination and 18 year or older, were selected. These were the immigrants who were in principle eligible to vote. Immigrants who said they were not allowed to vote in the last national elections were not selected. This resulted in 8,132 immigrant respondents from 24 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great-Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden,

Slovenia, Slovakia and Switzerland. The other countries that participated in the survey but were not selected were: Bulgaria, Iceland, Romania, Russia, the Ukraine and Turkey, because these countries were non-European Union members and therefore less comparable or not included in the MIPEX index (see below), an important macro variable to measure integration policy that we wanted to include in the analysis. The immigrant respondents come from 42 countries of origin and 20 regions of origin. If there were less than 25 immigrants from a certain country of origin, these immigrants were given a region of origin.

The variables for the level of the country of destination were operationalized as follows. The democratic quality of the countries did not differ across the countries and were therefore not analyzed. **Political stability** was measured with the Kaufmann index for political stability and ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 (Kaufmann et al, 2006). **Left-wing government** was measured with the data of Beck et al. (2001): for each year between 1975 and 2006 in which a country had only social-democratic parties in government the country received a score of 1, for each year in which part of the government was social-democratic, the country received a 0.5. A sum score was computed on these data. Where a country had **anti-immigrant parties**, a value was computed with the data of Van Spanje (2008) on pariah parties in Europe. A dummy and the number of seats are taken into account. Another dummy was entered for the countries that were not included in his research and therefore received the mean score of the rest of Europe on this variable. The last political variable was the inclusiveness of the **integration policy**; here the MIPEX index was used which evaluates the integration policy of European countries in six different areas (Niessen, Huddleston & Citron, 2007). We used the total measure of the integration policy.

The economic opportunities were measured with GDP per capita (**economic level**) from the OECD (2008) and the **educational level** is the percentage of the population that participated in tertiary education (WDI, 2009). **Proportionality** is measured by the Least Squares index (LSQ) of Gallagher & Mitchell (2008). This takes into account how proportional the number of votes is transferred into the number of seats. The **effective number of parties** (parties that had seats in parliament) are from Elections around the World (2009). The **group size** was calculated from the ESS data (number of immigrants from a country of origin in a country of destination / number of respondents from a country of destination).

The characteristics of the country of origin were operationalized as follows. The **democratic quality** was divided into two variables: political freedom and civil rights of a country. The data for this was taken from Freedom House (2008). **Political stability**, **economic level** and **proportionality** were measured the same as in the country of destination. **Societal development** of social-economic opportunities was operationalized with the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008). **Social inequality** was measured with the GINI coefficient for income in a country (CIA World Factbook, 2008). Three variables remained. A dummy was created to indicate whether a country was **Arabic** or not based on Stepan and Robertson (2003). Another four dummies were created to indicate the seven

**prevalent religions**; ‘no prevalent religion’ was the reference category, the other dummies: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Islam, and other religion. A country was coded ‘1’ when more than 50 % of the population adhered to one of these religions. The last variable indicated whether the country of origin was a **former colony** of the country of destination. The descriptives of the used variables are given in Table 1, the values of the used variables can be found in the Appendix, Table B for the country of destination and Table C for the country of origin.

We will control these macro-effects for a number of individual characteristics, which are used often to explain voting behaviour (Franklin, 2004) or differences between immigrants (Tubergen, 2004). We include these individual characteristics only to be sure that the effects of the macro-variables are not spurious due to the omission of individual variables. Educational attainment of the parents (both father and mother) is measured in six categories ranging from not-completed primary education (0) to second stage of higher education (5). The educational attainment of the respondent is measured in five categories, ranging from not-completed primary education (0) to second stage of higher education (4). The age of the respondent is computed by subtracting the year of birth from the year of survey. Gender is a dichotomous variable where females score (1). Being married is also dichotomous with being married or living together coded as (1). The second generation consists of respondents who are born in the country of destination, but at least one of the parents of these respondents is born abroad. Religion is coded as: none, Roman-Catholic, other Christian and other non-Christian. Respondents receive a (1) at perceived discrimination when they answer confirming at one of the five possibilities for perceived in-group discrimination (race, religion, language, nationality or ethnicity). Labour union membership and speaking a minority language at home (is not a official language of the country of destination) are dichotomous. Social trust is measured with the standard question: “in general do you trust other people” on a scale from (0) to (9). Political interest consists of interest in politics on the radio, television and in newspapers. Internal political efficacy is measured with two propositions: politics is always to hard for me (very much (1) to not very much (5). And thinking about politics is difficult (1) to easy (5). External political efficacy is measured with a scale of trust in parliament, the jurisdiction, politicians, and political parties in the country of destination.

**<Table 1 about here>**

## **Results**

The first research question was how the electoral participation of immigrants *in* different countries of destination differed and how the electoral participation of immigrants *from* different countries of origin? The results in Figure 3 and Figure 4 provide the answer to this question.

**<Figures 3 & 4 about here>**

Figure 3 shows the variety of turnouts of immigrants in national elections in the countries of destination. The turnout of immigrants is lowest in the Czech Republic with 51.5 per cent and the highest in Luxembourg with 94.9 per cent. The high percentage in Luxembourg can likely be explained by the fact that Luxembourg has compulsory voting, just as Belgium and Greece, who also score high on electoral participation. In Table 2 the scores of all 24 countries are given. From this we can conclude that electoral participation in different countries of destination differs. In Table A of the appendix it is shown that immigrants from different countries of origin differ in their electoral participation in different countries of destination (the communities) as well. In the last column the mean percentages of electoral participation are given for the group of immigrants in all 24 countries. This mean is the lowest for immigrants from the area 'Northern Africa' (43 % voted) and the highest for immigrants from the Congo (92 %). This high number is partly due to the fact that 19 of the 29 Congolese immigrants are settled in Belgium where voting is compulsory. Now we have established that electoral participation of immigrants from different countries of origin differs, and that the electoral participation in different countries of destination differs, we will answer the question: how can the differences in electoral participation in national elections between immigrants **from** different countries of origin **in** the different countries of destination in Europe be explained with characteristics of the country of origin and the country of destination?

<Table 1 about here>

Four models were estimated with the logistic cross-classified multilevel analysis. The first model was the null model; this was the model with only an intercept. In this model we can see that the variance at the destination level was the largest (0.28), followed by the variance at the community level (0.13) and the variance at the origin level (0.10); the latter is not significant. From this we can conclude that turnout differs significantly between immigrants in different countries, between immigrants from different countries and between immigrants living in different communities, and that this variance is largest between destination countries and smallest between countries of origin.

<Table 2 about here>

Firstly the effects of the country of destination were tested bivariately, without controlling for individual characteristics. We sought to establish which country-level variables had a significant effect on the electoral participation of immigrants? This was tested by adding the variables one by one to the null model. The results are shown in model 1 of Table 2. None of the political variables of the country of destination were significant: political stability, left wing government, anti-immigrant party and the Migrant Integration Policy Index did not explain the electoral participation of immigrants in destination countries<sup>ii</sup>. From the social-economic variables, only the economic level of the country of

destination was significant, the educational level was not. Bivariate analysis revealed that the institutional opportunities variables, including the turnout of the non-immigrants, were not significant.

The effects of the country of origin were more often significant: all three variables that measured the political opportunities were significant. Immigrants from countries with more political stability, political freedom and civil rights showed a higher propensity to vote. The proportionality of the system of the country of origin had no significant effect<sup>iii</sup>. All three variables related to social-economic opportunities were significant. Immigrants from countries with a higher economic level, more societal development and less income inequality showed a larger propensity to vote. The proportionality in a political system of the country of origin had no effect on the electoral participation of immigrants in Europe. Immigrants from an Arabic country had a lower propensity to vote, just as immigrants from Islamic countries. When tested together, the effect of Islamic origin country stayed significant, but the effect of an Arabic country did not stay significant. Also, immigrants from countries of origin where the dominant religion is Roman-Catholic or Protestant, had a higher propensity to vote, this is largely the distinction between western immigrants and the other immigrants. These significant effects of the characteristics of the country of origin indicate that the country of origin is much more effective in explaining the differences in the electoral participation of immigrants than the characteristics of the country of destination.

These effects of the country of origin became less significant when we controlled for individual variables. In model 2 of Table 3 the macro variables that were used to characterize the political, economic and institutional environment of the country of destination and country of origin were bivariately controlled for individual variables. These individual variables were presumed to be of influence on electoral participation and stemmed from several theories of electoral participation. Controlled for these individual variables, five of the ten characteristics of the country of origin were significant. This could suggest that immigrants from predominantly Roman-Catholic or Protestant countries with a high societal development index and with more political freedoms and civil rights, are more likely to vote in the national elections of their country of destination than immigrants from countries with a different profile but the same values for the individual variables. In other words, certain country of origin characteristics are important, even when controlled for individual characteristics.

The effect of economic level of the country of destination is still significant, controlled for individual variables. The effect of turnout of non-immigrants becomes significant when individual variables are controlled for. This signifies that turnout of non-immigrants has an effect for immigrants with for example the same educational level.

That the effects of other country of origin characteristics (Arabic country, Islamic country of origin, social inequality, economic level and political stability) are now not significant, indicates that immigrants from these countries have different characteristics than individuals from non-Arabic, non-Islamic countries with more social inequality and a lower economic level and political stability. These

countries of origin 'produce' different kinds of immigrants with individual characteristics that make them less inclined to vote in national elections. Immigrants from these countries are less politically and social-economically integrated into their country of destination, not because of their origin or their destination, but because of their individual characteristics.

Table 3 shows the effects of the individual characteristics, without and with control for the features of the countries of origin and destination. These results for the electoral participation of individual immigrants are not amazing or deviant. Model 1 and 2 are without control, model 1 shows the results bivariately and model 2 shows the multilevel effects. We can conclude that: older immigrants vote more often, just like married, Roman Catholic and other Christian immigrants, members of labour unions, immigrants with higher levels of social trust and immigrants with more political interest. Nothing large happens when in model 3 of Table 2 the model is tested multivariately controlled for the significant macro variables from model 3 of Table 2.

**<Table 3 about here>**

Now that we have controlled for individual characteristics we can conclude that our hypotheses are only partly confirmed. The destination hypothesis predicted that *immigrants in countries of destination with more political, social-economic and institutional opportunities, will have a higher propensity to vote*. We now know that economic opportunities in the country of destination are of influence; political and specific institutional opportunities do not influence the propensity to vote. The turnout as an overarching measurement of institutional opportunities was of importance. Our second hypothesis is also partly confirmed, but fewer parts are rejected from it. We predicted that *immigrants from countries of origin with more political, social-economic and institutional opportunities, will have a higher propensity to vote*. After controlling for individual characteristics we can conclude that immigrants from countries that are more democratic (have political freedom and civil rights), have a higher societal development index and where the dominant religion is Roman-Catholic or Protestant have a higher propensity to vote. But the negative constant shows that first generation immigrants votes far less often than natives in their countries of destination. Although the second generation votes more often (the positive parameter in table 3 is relative to first generation), this does not compensate this negative constant. Therefore, naturalized immigrants participate far less often in national elections than comparable natives.

The last model of Table 2 (model 3) shows a combined model, with only the significant predictors of the country of destination and the country of origin that give a good fit of the model. All significant country of origin characteristics from model 2 are still significant in combination with economic level of the country of destination and turnout of non-immigrants. In combination with other country of origin characteristics they are not significant anymore. Countries with a high economic

level are also likely to be the countries with more civil rights and political freedom. By including one of them, there is not enough variance left to be explained by the other(s).

The best model is the model with the economic level and turnout of non-immigrants of the country of destination and civil rights and social inequality of the country of origin. These variables offered the best fit. The variance of the country of destination decreased from the null model to model 3 from 0.277 to 0.193, the variance of the country of origin from 0.098 to 0.000 and the variance at the community level from 0.129 to 0.048. This means that this model is a good explanatory model for electoral participation, especially for the country of origin and the community level. The deviance decreased and thus the increase of the fit of the model is 1178 points.

## **Discussion and conclusion**

Electoral participation of immigrants is an important issue in Europe for two reasons. Firstly, immigrants vote less than non-immigrants in national elections in Europe and this could indicate a lack of political integration of immigrants. This lack of political integration can partly be explained by lacking social-economic integration at the individual level and the country level. Secondly, immigrants are a growing part of the population in Europe. This group of the population is voting less than the rest of the population resulting in an overall lower voter turnout in the country of destination, and leading to a lack of democratic legitimacy. That is why it is important to understand the lack of electoral participation of immigrants. Therefore two questions were posed, first the descriptive question: *how does the electoral participation of immigrants in different countries of destination from different countries of origin differ?* We showed that the differences between countries of destination were larger than between countries of origin. The lowest voting rate among immigrants was found in the Czech Republic (51.2 per cent) and the highest in Luxembourg (94.9 per cent). The differences between countries of origin ranged from 43 percent in the area Northern Africa to 93 per cent in the Congo. Immigrants differ between countries of origin; between countries of destination and between communities of immigrants from a country of origin in a country of destination.

Then we turned to our explanatory research question: *how can the differences in electoral participation in national elections between immigrants from different countries of origin in the different countries of destination in Europe be explained with characteristics of the country of origin and the country of destination?* We concluded that the characteristics of the country of destination that we assumed to affect the voter turnout of immigrants were hardly capable to explain electoral participation. Only the economic level and the turnout level of the non-immigrants of a country explained differences between countries. Characteristics of the countries of origin were much more effective in explaining differences between immigrants from different countries. Ten of the sixteen indicators of the country of origin were significant when analysed bivariately. Of those ten indicators, six were also significant when tested multivariately and controlled for individual characteristics. Civil

rights, political freedoms, societal development and a predominantly Roman-Catholic or Protestant religion in the country of origin contributed to electoral participation in the country of destination. Tested together, the economic level and the turnout of non-immigrants of the country of destination and the civil rights of the country of origin were the best explanatory variables. It is also important to note that integration policies like access to nationality, anti-discrimination policy and political participation has no significant effect on immigrants' voting behaviour.

The main message suggested by the results of this study is that it is important to understand that the integration and behaviour of immigrants in Europe is affected both by the country of destination as well as the country of origin, but the effect of the former is far more important than the latter. This large country of destination variance in comparison with the country of origin variance in electoral participation is however rare. In most cases (educational performance, labour market outcomes, discrimination) the variance on the country of destination is much smaller in comparison with the variance on the country of origin level (Tubergen, 2004; Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2008; Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp, 2008; André, Dronkers & Fleischmann, 2009). More research is needed to explain the differences in immigrants' electoral participation between countries of destination. This research showed that it is not only important to consider the country immigrants live in, but also the country immigrants are from. This means that for policy makers it is important to differentiate between the groups of immigrants. Immigrant status is not the only factor, confounding factors of the individual immigrant such as lower education, lower income and less social capital have to be taken into account. To heighten the electoral participation of immigrants it is suggested that the political integration together with the social-economic integration of immigrants should be advanced in the countries of destination, promotion of education might do part of the trick..

Furthermore, immigrants are from a particular country of origin and were socialized in that country of origin; immigrants in turn socialize their children (the second generation) in the country of destination in the political behaviour they (the parents) have learned in their country of origin. Education and voter turnout campaigns aimed at immigrants are one possible way to heighten the turnout among immigrants. Only when the turnout of immigrants is raised to the level of non-immigrants, the goal of political integration of immigrants is realised. When immigrants are politically fully represented democratic legitimacy can be said to be restored.

We improved upon earlier research by taking into account twenty-four countries at the same time and studying more than 3 immigrant groups in all of these countries. We explained a lot of the differences between immigrant communities and between countries of origin. A challenge remains for explaining differences between countries of destination.

## **Limitations**

In considering the results and conclusion, a number of limitations need to be considered. This research has only focused on the electoral participation of immigrants in national elections in European

countries. Electoral participation in other elections, such as local government elections, were not considered.

Also, only those immigrants were selected who were citizens of the destination country and 18 years or older. These immigrants had obtained citizenship status of their country of destination, indicating that they lived there for at least five years and, in case of most countries, that they had passed their naturalization examination. In other words, not all immigrants were included. This signifies that we have analyzed the 'better' immigrants, meaning that effects might be underestimated. When more immigrants are included who have integrated less socially and economically, more effects of as well the country of origin as the country of destination might be found.

Then there is the problem of the selectivity of the European Social Survey. In the European Social survey, respondents were only interviewed when they spoke one of the official languages of the country reasonably well. They had to be capable of answering the questions of the survey. The immigrants were thus a selective sample of the immigrants of Europe; this could have influenced the results. Having said that, we found some effects of the country of origin and it could be assumed that these effects would be larger for those immigrants who had not gained citizenship status yet or did not speak the language and thus did not participate in the European Social Survey. This is important to remember when interpreting the results and when using this study for future research. For example when electoral participation in local elections or political participation in other contexts is researched, citizenship status is not relevant and more immigrants are available from the European Social Survey.

Another point has to be made. Despite the larger amount of variance at the destination level, we did not find significant effects of the measured characteristics of the country of destination, except for a positive effect of economic level and turnout of non-immigrants. It is possible that we have not researched all relevant characteristics that are vital for immigrants to engage in electoral participation. For example, the presence of immigrant candidates for parliamentary elections, and/or press coverage related to political participation of immigrants may make a difference. Future research may want to combine a comparative study approach (as used in this research) with more information about the countries of destination and the political and social environment for immigrants. A combination of extensive comparative research and a political opportunities structure might enhance our understanding of the electoral and political participation of immigrants.

## **Acknowledgements**

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
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
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## Figures and Tables


**Figure 1: destination electoral model for immigrants**



**Figure 2: origin electoral model for immigrants**




**Figure 3: turnout of immigrants in national elections in the country of destination**



Source: ESS round two and three, own computations

Figure 4: electoral participation per country of origin



Source: ESS round two and three, own computations

**Table 1: descriptives of the variables used in the analysis**

	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean or proportion</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Country of destination</b>				
<i>Political opportunities</i>				
Political stability	0.22	1.51	0.88	0.32
Left wing government	2.50	30.00	8.02	6.01
Anti-immigrant party	0.00	1.00	0.38	
Migrant Integration Policy Index	39.00	88.00	55.64	12.75
<i>Social-economic opportunities</i>				
Economic development	16.20	80.80	34.87	11.75
Educational level	10.00	93.00	61.43	15.78
<i>Institutional opportunities</i>				
Proportionality	1.00	17.80	5.46	5.07
Number of parties	5.00	12.00	8.38	2.24
Size of immigrant group	0.02	19.26	3.44	5.09
Turnout natives	39.00	76.00	59.91	9.42
<b>Country of origin</b>				
<i>Political opportunities</i>				
Political stability	-2.91	1.92	0.17	0.71
Civil rights	0.00	7.00	4.21	2.02
Political freedoms	0.00	6.00	4.09	2.21
<i>Social-economic opportunities</i>				
Economic development	1.00	55.60	21.32	12.41
Social inequality	23.00	60.00	34.44	6.83
Societal development	0.45	0.97	0.84	0.11
<i>Choice</i>				
Proportionality	1.05	16.73	5.64	3.19
<i>Origin</i>				
Arabic country	0.00	1.00	0.05	
Dominant religion (none=ref)				
Roman Catholic	0.00	1.00	0.36	
Protestant	0.00	1.00	0.11	
Eastern Orthodox	0.00	1.00	0.13	
Islam	0.00	1.00	0.13	
Other religions	0.00	1.00	0.03	
Former colony	0.00	1.00	0.14	

Source: ESS round two and three, own computations

**Table 2: cross-classified multilevel analysis of electoral participation of immigrants, logits (standard errors) N=8132**

	Null model	Model 1 (bi)	Model 2 (mi)	Model 3
<b>Country of destination</b>				
<i>Political opportunities</i>				
Political stability		0,368 (0,322)	0.211 (0.354)	
Left wing government		-0,005 (0,011)	-0.006 (0.012)	
Anti-immigrant party		0,238 (0,237)	0.248 (0.258)	
Migrant Integration Policy Index		0,003 (0,009)	0.007 (0.010)	
<i>Social-economic opportunities</i>				
Economic level		<b>0.023 (0.008)</b>	<b>0.026 (0.008)</b>	<b>0.024 (0.009)</b>
Educational level		0,000 (0,007)	-0.003 (0.007)	
<i>Institutional opportunities</i>				
Proportionality		-0.034 (0.026)	-0.025 (0.028)	
Number of parties		-0.005 (0.054)	0.035 (0.057)	
Size of immigrant group		0.011 (0.018)	<i>0.027 (0.014)</i>	
Turnout natives		0.013 (0.008)	<b>0.018 (0.008)</b>	<b>0.016 (0.007)</b>
<b>Country of origin</b>				
<i>Political opportunities</i>				
Political stability		<b>0.144 (0.066)</b>	0.032 (0.054)	
Civil rights		<b>0.108 (0.027)</b>	<b>0.063 (0.019)</b>	<b>0.047 (0.021)</b>
Political freedoms		<b>0.095 (0.026)</b>	<b>0.049 (0.018)</b>	
<i>Social-economic opportunities</i>				
Economic level		<b>0.015 (0.004)</b>	0.005 (0.003)	
Social inequality		<b>-0.024 (0.007)</b>	-0.006 (0.006)	
Societal development		<b>2.036 (0.335)</b>	<b>0.801 (0.319)</b>	0.445 (0.341)
<i>Choice</i>				
Proportionality		-0.016 (0.014)	0.013 (0.011)	
<i>Origin</i>				
Arabic country		<b>-0.441 (0.193)</b>	-0.211 (0.153)	
Dominant religion (none=ref)				
Roman Catholic		<b>0.287 (0.118)</b>	<b>0.250 (0.093)</b>	
Protestant		<b>0.450 (0.166)</b>	<b>0.410 (0.134)</b>	
Eastern Orthodox		0.030 (0.220)	0.129 (0.135)	
Other Christian		0.407 (0.924)	0.249 (0.885)	
Islam		<b>-0.513 (0.132)</b>	0.054 (0.123)	
Eastern religion		-0.177 (0.286)	0.280 (0.226)	
Other non-Christian		-0.623 (0.569)	-0.239 (0.430)	
Former colony		-0.042 (0.139)	-0.141 (0.113)	
Constant	<b>0.958 (0.126)</b>	Values not computed because all macro variables are tested individually with individual variables.		<b>-3.856 (0.421)</b>
Destination variance	0.277 (0.527)			0.193 (0.495)
Origin variance	0.098 (0.314)			0.000 (0.000)
Community variance	0.129 (0.359)			0.048 (0.219)
Deviance decrease	0			1178

Source: ESS round 2 and 3, own computations, bold figures are significant  $p < 0,05$ , italic figures are significant  $p < 0,10$

Note: effects in model 2 and 3 are controlled for: educational attainment, educational attainment of the parents, age, gender, being married, second generation, individual religion (roman-catholic, other christian, other non-christian), perceived discrimination, labour union membership, social trust, minority language and political interest, internal and external political efficacy (see table 3).

**Table 3: logit effects of the individual characteristics model**

	Individual model (bi)	Model 2 (mi)	Model 3 (mi with macro's)
<b>Educational attainment father</b>	0.022	0.047	0.045
<b>Educational attainment</b>	-0.012	0.027	0.026

<b>mother</b>			
<b>Educational attainment</b>	0.056***	0.015	0.017
<b>respondent</b>			
<b>Age</b>	0.033***	0.029***	0.029***
<b>Gender (female)</b>	-0.075	0.097	0.104
<b>Being married</b>	0.624***	0.318***	0.502***
<b>Second generation</b>	0.019	0.508***	0.287***
<b>Religion (none)</b>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
<b>Roman-catholic</b>	0.299***	0.213**	0.228**
<b>Other Christian</b>	0.474***	0.154**	0.136
<b>Other non-Christian</b>	-0.721*	-0.109	-0.189
<b>Perceived discrimination</b>	-0.422***	-0.198	-0.177
<b>Labour Union</b>	0.746***	0.297***	0.302***
<b>membership</b>			
<b>Social trust</b>	0.086***	0.054**	0.053***
<b>Minority language</b>	-0.364***	-0.079	-0.033
<b>Political interest</b>	0.811***	0.638***	0.641***
<b>Internal political efficacy</b>	0.101***	0.001	0.001
<b>External political efficacy</b>	0.084***	0.033	0.030

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## **Appendix**

**Table A: percentage of the immigrants that vote and between brackets the number of immigrants in a community**

**Table B: values of macro variables for each country of destination**

**Table C: values of macro variables for each country of origin**

**Table A: percentage of the immigrants that vote and between brackets the number of immigrants in a community**

	AU	BE	SW	CY	CZ	GE	DE	ES	SP	FI	FR	UK	GR	HU	IR	IT	LU	NE	NO	PI	PR	SE	SV	SW	Total country of origin	
<b>Angola</b>			100 (1)															100 (1)			56 (39)	100 (6)			<b>59 (45)</b>	
<b>Austria</b>		100 (1)	60 (63)		55 (11)	70 (27)	100 (3)				100 (1)			86 (7)	100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (3)	100 (4)	100 (2)	67 (3)			72 (25)	88 (8)	<b>71 (170)</b>	
<b>Belgium</b>	100 (2)		80 (10)						100 (1)		86 (21)	50 (6)	100 (1)	100 (7)	100 (1)		100 (33)	80 (20)	100 (1)				0 (1)		<b>87 (103)</b>	
<b>Congo</b>		100 (19)	100 (1)			100 (2)					0 (1)	0 (1)						100 (1)				100 (1)			<b>92 (27)</b>	
<b>Switzerland</b>	78 (9)					100 (4)	100 (2)				86 (7)	100 (5)					100 (2)	100 (3)	100 (1)						<b>92 (38)</b>	
<b>Czech</b>	84 (63)	100 (2)	25 (4)			88 (40)					50 (2)	100 (1)	100 (1)	75 (4)		100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)						72 (104)	<b>78 (231)</b>	
<b>Germany</b>	85 (109)	88 (17)	70 (172)		42 (7)	50 (2)	93 (55)	0 (1)			68 (22)	59 (22)		80 (5)	67 (3)	100 (2)	97 (66)	79 (87)	80 (10)	54 (46)			85 (61)	69 (16)	100 (1)	<b>78 (723)</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	100 (2)		100 (1)			50 (2)	100 (2)					100 (1)					0 (1)		89 (28)				94 (18)		<b>89 (57)</b>	
<b>Algeria</b>		100 (2)	100 (3)								69 (80)				100 (1)			100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)					<b>72 (104)</b>	
<b>Egypt</b>	50 (4)	100 (1)	100 (5)	100			100 (1)				100 (1)	100 (2)	86 (7)		100 (1)	100 (1)		100 (1)					100 (1)		<b>88 (27)</b>	
<b>Spain</b>	100 (3)	100 (11)	50 (14)			83 (6)			100 (8)		84 (50)	80 (5)			0 (1)		100 (4)	50 (2)	100 (1)		57 (7)	100 (5)			<b>81 (128)</b>	
<b>Finland</b>	100 (1)		100 (4)				100 (8)	73 (11)														71 (165)			<b>87 (205)</b>	
<b>France</b>	100 (8)	93 (76)	72 (64)	100 (1)	0 (1)	80 (10)	100 (1)		71 (7)			75 (4)			100 (3)	100 (3)	93 (56)	100 (1)	100 (2)	57 (7)	83 (6)	100 (2)	89 (9)		<b>85 (277)</b>	
<b>Great-Brittain</b>	91 (11)	100 (7)	70 (10)	75 (4)		100 (3)	80 (5)				33 (6)	100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (2)	100 (139)			67 (7)	74 (19)			80 (10)			<b>71 (232)</b>	
<b>Greece</b>	100 (5)	100 (4)	100 (4)	72 (7)		100 (3)					100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)				0 (1)	100 (2)				50 (1)	100 (1)	<b>76 (39)</b>	
<b>Hungary</b>	88 (43)	100 (4)	50 (6)	67 (3)	63 (8)	71 (17)	100 (2)				100 (1)				100 (1)		100 (1)	67 (3)	100 (1)			100 (3)	100 (1)	79 (48)	<b>81 (148)</b>	
<b>Indonesia</b>			100 (2)				100 (3)										100 (43)	80 (89)							<b>81 (95)</b>	
<b>Ireland</b>	100 (1)						100 (1)		50 (2)			69 (104)						0 (1)							<b>69 (110)</b>	
<b>India</b>		100 (2)	100 (1)								100 (1)	78 (58)						0 (1)	100 (1)		80 (5)	33 (3)			<b>74 (75)</b>	
<b>Iraq</b>	100 (2)	100 (2)	100 (1)				100 (1)				100 (1)	0 (1)						70 (10)	33 (3)	0 (1)		60 (15)			<b>65 (38)</b>	
<b>Iran</b>	100 (1)		0 (2)			100 (2)	100 (2)											100 (3)	80 (5)				71 (17)		<b>76 (35)</b>	

	AU	BE	SW	CY	CZ	GE	DE	ES	SP	FI	FR	UK	GR	HU	IR	IT	LU	NE	NO	PI	PR	SE	SV	SW	Total country of origin	
<b>Italy</b>	93 (45)	79 (42)	64 (122)			50 (14)	50 (2)		67 (3)		82 (102)	33 (9)			75 (4)			75 (4)				100 (1)	86 (22)		<b>77 (431)</b>	
<b>Jamaica</b>							100 (1)					67 (30)														<b>68 (31)</b>
<b>Sri Lanka</b>			50 (2)			100 (1)	33 (3)					69 (13)			67 (3)			100 (1)				100 (3)				<b>69 (29)</b>
<b>Morocco</b>		84 (37)	50 (2)			80 (5)	100 (2)		64 (14)		82 (28)							53 (15)				100 (1)				<b>72 (133)</b>
<b>The Netherlands</b>	83 (45)	96 (49)	92 (13)			75 (4)		100 (1)	100 (1)		100 (1)	0 (2)			50 (2)		87 (15)		100 (1)			100 (3)	100 (1)			<b>90 (100)</b>
<b>Norway</b>		100 (1)	0 (2)				100 (15)											100 (1)				70 (32)				<b>77 (58)</b>
<b>Phillipined</b>	0 (1)		33 (3)			0 (2)	33 (3)		100 (1)			100 (3)						100 (3)	75 (4)			100 (4)		0 (1)		<b>64 (27)</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>		100 (1)							0 (1)			65 (37)	0 (1)						60 (25)							<b>62 (50)</b>
<b>Poland</b>	100 (13)	100 (6)	55 (11)		53 (17)	75 (123)	100 (12)	86 (7)			82 (28)	64 (37)		100 (3)	100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (4)	71 (7)	100 (6)			89 (37)	0 (1)	72 (11)		<b>78 (292)</b>
<b>Portugal</b>			60 (5)			50 (2)	0 (1)		58 (12)		67 (24)	50 (2)						71 (17)	50 (2)			100 (1)				<b>64 (73)</b>
<b>Romania</b>	69 (29)	100 (3)	33 (3)		100 (4)	82 (22)					100 (2)	100 (1)		84 (64)		100 (1)	100 (2)	0 (1)		100 (1)		100 (2)		100 (4)		<b>81 (144)</b>
<b>Russian Federation</b>	80 (5)	75 (4)	29 (7)	100 (1)	75 (12)	67 (101)	100 (1)	63 (503)	50 (2)	88 (16)	75 (8)	100 (1)	93 (40)	33 (3)		0 (2)		100 (3)	100 (1)	33 (33)		76 (5)	100 (4)	75 (3)	100 (3)	<b>67 (791)</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	100 (3)		100 (1)	0 (1)		90 (20)		0 (1)		83 (12)		100 (2)							86 (29)				100 (1)			<b>86 (72)</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	83 (12)		50 (2)		48 (138)	100 (3)								92 (25)				100 (1)		100 (1)			100 (1)	100 (1)		<b>58 (191)</b>
<b>Suriname</b>																		66 (44)								<b>66 (45)</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	100 (2)	80 (5)	0 (1)								58 (31)							100 (1)								<b>63 (44)</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	62 (21)	72 (18)	63 (8)	100 (2)		62 (34)	100 (5)				50 (4)		94 (145)					64 (25)	50 (6)			54 (13)				<b>80 (293)</b>
<b>Ukraine</b>	100 (1)				60 (5)	82 (11)		67 (62)	100 (1)		67 (3)		100 (1)	75 (4)		0 (1)	100 (2)	0 (1)		71 (21)			100 (1)	80 (5)		<b>70 (121)</b>
<b>United States</b>	100 (1)	100 (2)	25 (4)	100 (2)		89 (9)	80 (10)				100 (3)	88 (8)	100 (3)	80 (10)	91 (11)	83 (6)	100 (2)	100 (2)	90 (20)	80 (5)		88 (8)	100 (7)	86 (7)		<b>87 (127)</b>
<b>CzechSlovakia</b>	100 (3)		0 (2)			100 (12)	0 (1)							100 (5)				0 (1)		100 (1)		100 (3)	100 (1)			<b>86 (30)</b>
<b>Yugoslavia</b>	59 (69)	100 (3)	44 (27)		50 (6)	74 (19)	100 (6)				80 (5)	100 (2)	100 (3)	75 (24)			66 (6)	100 (3)	80 (10)	50 (6)	67 (3)	86 (42)	366 (63)			<b>66 (639)</b>
<b>Spanish Caribbean &amp; South America</b>	67 (3)	100 (2)	45 (20)	0 (1)		50 (2)	100 (3)	100 (1)	81 (32)		50 (2)	0 (2)	0 (1)		0 (1)	7 (7)	100 (1)	80 (5)	100 (5)		71 (14)	86 (22)				<b>74 (132)</b>

	AU	BE	SW	CY	CZ	GE	DE	ES	SP	FI	FR	UK	GR	HU	IR	IT	LU	NE	NO	PI	PR	SE	SV	SW	Total country of origin		
							80												100							100	
<b>Northern Europe</b>							(10)												(1)							<b>83 (12)</b>	
<b>Western Asia</b>	0 (2)	100 (2)	33 (6)	0 (1)		50 (2)	80 (5)	75 (4)	100 (3)		67 (3)	56 (9)	50 (6)					50 (4)		50 (2)						54 (13)	<b>56 (68)</b>
<b>Eastern Africa</b>			67 (6)	17 (6)		100 (1)	100 (2)				100 (7)	50 (24)		100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)		50 (2)	80 (5)			75 (16)				63 (8)	<b>65 (86)</b>
<b>South-East Asia</b>			100 (5)	50 (6)		0 (2)	60 (5)				44 (9)	80 (5)			0 (1)			50 (4)	100 (4)							67 (6)	<b>62 (53)</b>
<b>Western Africa</b>	100 (1)	50 (2)	50 (2)						0 (1)		46 (13)	67 (18)					100 (3)	75 (4)	100 (1)		47 (17)				100 (2)	<b>59 (72)</b>	
<b>Southern Europe</b>			100 (1)			100 (1)						50 (8)														100 (1)	<b>64 (11)</b>
<b>Southern Asia</b>		100 (2)	0 (2)			100 (1)	100 (1)		0 (1)			86 (14)					100 (1)	69 (13)	100 (1)		100 (1)					100 (1)	<b>76 (40)</b>
<b>Dutch caribbean</b>											0 (1)							58 (26)									<b>56 (27)</b>
<b>Eastern Asia</b>	33 (3)	100 (1)				100 (1)						0 (1)			50 (2)		100 (1)	100 (1)								100 (3)	<b>69 (14)</b>
<b>Middle Africa</b>			80 (5)	0 (2)							100 (2)						100 (1)					100 (1)					<b>73 (14)</b>
<b>Eastern Europe</b>	78 (18)	0 (1)	50 (6)	100 (1)		100 (5)	100 (3)	69 (26)		0 (1)	100 (2)	33 (3)	56 (18)	0 (1)	0 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)	75 (4)	0 (1)	50 (4)			92 (12)		100 (1)	<b>69 (117)</b>	
<b>English caribbean</b>											100 (1)	5 (5)															<b>83 (7)</b>
<b>Northern Africa</b>				100 (1)					0 (1)		100 (1)	0 (1)			0 (1)			100 (1)								100 (1)	<b>43 (9)</b>
<b>Northern America</b>		100 (4)	50 (2)	100 (1)			91 (11)					67 (3)			50 (2)	100 (1)		100 (2)	100 (2)								<b>86 (33)</b>
<b>Pacific</b>				0 (1)		100 (1)					100 (1)	78 (9)			100 (1)			50 (2)								100 (1)	<b>75 (17)</b>
<b>Southern Africa</b>		100 (2)					100 (1)					55 (11)						50 (2)									<b>63 (16)</b>
<b>French caribbean</b>		100 (1)									38 (8)																<b>44 (12)</b>
<b>Western Europe</b>	100 (2)	100 (2)	50 (2)								50 (2)							100 (1)									<b>75 (8)</b>
<b>Unkown</b>	84 (25)	87 (15)	55 (20)		50 (78)	52 (63)	76 (17)	55 (86)	40 (5)	77 (56)	80 (30)	73 (70)	70 (10)	79 (19)	69 (42)	100 (1)	100 (9)	60 (5)	68 (50)		75 (16)	67 (9)	68 (25)	66 (61)		<b>67 (754)</b>	
<b>Total country of destination</b>	<b>80 (561)</b>	<b>90 (409)</b>	<b>62 (701)</b>	<b>75 (37)</b>	<b>51 (306)</b>	<b>73 (576)</b>	<b>89 (2370)</b>	<b>63 (721)</b>	<b>71 (107)</b>	<b>79 (92)</b>	<b>73 (589)</b>	<b>68 (534)</b>	<b>88 (246)</b>	<b>83 (184)</b>	<b>68 (235)</b>	<b>84 (39)</b>	<b>95 (278)</b>	<b>73 (448)</b>	<b>80 (249)</b>	<b>64 (138)</b>	<b>65 (131)</b>	<b>83 (553)</b>	<b>67 (496)</b>	<b>74 (265)</b>		<b>73 (8321)</b>	

Source: ESS round 2 and 3, own computations

**Table B: values of macro variables for each country of destination**

<b>Country</b>	<b>MIPEX</b>	<b>GDP</b>	<b>Left wing</b>	<b>Immigration total</b>	<b>Democracy</b>	<b>Stability</b>	<b>Anti-immigrant party</b>	<b>Educational level</b>	<b>Proportionality</b>	<b>Effective number of parties</b>
Austria	39.0	38.0	17.0	8.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	50.0	2.1	9.0
Belgium	69.0	36.5	14.0	11.0	1.0	0.7	1.0	63.0	4.3	10.0
Switzerland	50.0	39.8	13.5	6.0	1.0	1.4	1.0	46.0	3.5	6.0
Cyprus	39	27.1	9.5	5.0	1.0	0.4	0.0	33.0	2.0	8.0
Czech republic	48.0	24.4	22.0	9.6	1.0	0.8	0.0	50.0	5.7	7.0
Germany	53.0	34.4	11.0	8.5	1.0	0.8	0.0	65.0	2.1	8.0
Denmark	44	37.4	13.5	8.4	1.0	0.8	1.0	80.0	1.2	9.0
Estonia	46.0	21.8	2.5	32.1	1.0	0.8	0.0	65.0	3.5	12.0
Spain	61.0	33.7	14.0	3.4	1.0	0.3	0.0	67.0	5.2	10.0
France	67.0	35.5	14.0	6.6	1.0	1.5	1.0	93.0	3.2	9.0
Finland	55.0	33.8	15.0	16.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	56.0	17.8	12.0
Great-Britain	63.0	35.3	56.0	7.9	1.0	0.5	0.0	59.0	17.2	6.0
Greece	40.0	30.5	20.0	7.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	90.0	7.2	11.0
Hungary	48.0	19.5	23.0	7.7	1.0	0.7	0.0	69.0	6.7	6.0
Ireland	53	45.6	7.0	12.6	1.0	1.2	0.0	59.0	6.2	8.0
Italy	65.0	31.0	9.0	2.7	1.0	0.3	1.0	67.0	2.7	12.0
Luxembourg	55.0	80.8	12.5	36.9	1.0	1.5	0.0	10.0	3.3	5.0
the Netherlands	68.0	38.6	7.5	19.3	1.0	0.8	0.0	60.0	1.0	10.0
Norway	64.0	55.6	15.5	5.6	1.0	1.2	1.0	78.0	2.9	7.0
Poland	44.0	16.2	29.0	3.3	1.0	0.2	0.0	66.0	5.8	5.0
Portugal	79.0	21.8	11.5	3.2	1.0	0.9	0.0	55.0	5.2	11.0
Sweden	88.0	36.9	21.0	15.4	1.0	1.1	0.0	79.0	2.3	7.0
Slovenia	55.0	27.3	8.0	16.9	1.0	1.1	0.0	83.0	3.1	7.0
Slovakia	40.0	19.8	10.0	14.2	1.0	0.9	0.0	45.0	6.3	6.0

Source: ESS round 2 and 3, own computations

**Table C: values of macro variables for each country of origin**

	Propor- tionality	Societal development	GDP	Stability	Inequality	Prevalent Religion	Political Freedoms	Civil Rights	Arabic
<b>Albania</b>	30.2	0.8	5.5	-0.4	26.7	6.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
<b>Angola</b>	4.3	0.4	8.8	0.1	37.0	8.0	6.0	5.0	0.0
<b>Argentina</b>	5.0	0.9	13.0	0.0	49.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
<b>Austria</b>	2.8	0.9	39.0	1.0	26.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Australia</b>	8.6	1.0	37.5	0.9	35.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	5.9	0.8	6.6	-0.5	26.2	6.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
<b>Bangladesh</b>	5.9	0.5	1.4	-1.6	33.4	6.0	4.0	4.0	0.0
<b>Belgium</b>	3.4	0.9	36.5	0.7	28.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Bulgaria</b>	4.0	0.8	11.8	0.3	31.6	3.0	1.0	2.0	0.0
<b>Brazil</b>	3.0	0.8	9.7	-0.1	56.7	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
<b>Belarus</b>	5.9	0.8	10.2	0.2	29.7	3.0	7.0	6.0	0.0
<b>Canada</b>	8.6	1.0	38.2	0.9	32.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Congo</b>	5.9	0.5	3.7	-1.0	60.0	1.0	6.0	5.0	0.0
<b>Switzerland</b>	2.5	1.0	39.8	1.4	33.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Chile</b>	6.8	0.9	14.4	0.9	54.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>China</b>	5.9	0.8	5.3	-0.4	46.9	7.0	7.0	6.0	0.0
<b>Colombia</b>	5.9	0.8	7.2	-1.6	53.8	1.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	5.9	0.9	7.7	-0.7	30.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	0.0
<b>Cuba</b>	5.9	0.8	4.5	0.1	45.0	1.0	7.0	7.0	0.0
<b>Cape Verde</b>	4.2	0.7	7.0	0.9	41.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Cyprus</b>	2.4	0.9	27.1	0.4	29.0	4.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Czech Republic</b>	5.7	0.9	24.4	0.8	26.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Germany</b>	2.2	0.9	34.4	0.8	28.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Denmark</b>	1.8	0.9	37.4	0.8	24.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Algeria</b>	5.9	0.7	8.1	-0.9	35.3	6.0	6.0	5.0	1.0
<b>Ecuador</b>	5.9	0.8	7.1	-0.9	46.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
<b>Estonia</b>	3.4	0.9	21.8	0.8	34.0	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Egypt</b>	5.9	0.7	5.4	-0.9	34.4	6.0	7.0	6.0	1.0
<b>Spain</b>	4.3	0.9	33.7	0.3	32.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Finland</b>	3.2	1.0	35.5	1.5	26.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>France</b>	13.6	1.0	33.8	0.5	28.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>United Kingdom</b>	16.7	0.9	35.3	0.5	34.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Greece</b>	7.4	0.9	30.5	0.5	33.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	0.0
<b>Croatia</b>	7.6	0.9	15.5	0.5	29.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
<b>Hungary</b>	5.1	0.9	19.5	0.7	28.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Indonesia</b>	4.5	0.7	3.4	-1.2	36.3	6.0	2.0	3.0	0.0
<b>Ireland</b>	5.9	1.0	45.6	1.2	32.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>India</b>	4.5	0.6	2.7	-0.8	36.8	7.0	2.0	3.0	0.0
<b>Iraq</b>	4.4	0.5	3.6	-2.9	43.0	6.0	5.0	6.0	1.0
<b>Iran</b>	5.9	0.8	12.3	-1.3	43.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	0.0

	Propor- tionality	Societal development	GDP	Stability	Inequality	Prevalent Religion	Political Freedoms	Civil Rights	Arabic
Italy	3.6	0.9	31.0	0.3	33.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Jamaica	4.8	0.7	4.8	-0.3	45.5	2.0	2.0	3.0	0.0
Lebanon	5.9	0.8	10.4	-1.8	38.0	6.0	4.0	4.0	1.0
Sri Lanka	2.8	0.7	4.1	-1.6	50.0	7.0	4.0	4.0	0.0
Lithuania	5.0	0.9	16.7	0.9	36.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Latvia	4.8	0.9	17.7	0.8	37.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Morocco	5.9	0.6	3.8	-0.3	40.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	1.0
Macedonia	5.2	0.8	8.4	-0.7	39.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
Mauritius	5.9	0.8	11.9	0.9	37.0	7.0	1.0	2.0	0.0
Mozambique	5.9	0.4	9.0	0.5	47.3	1.0	3.0	4.0	0.0
Nigeria	5.9	0.5	2.2	-2.0	43.7	6.0	4.0	4.0	0.0
Netherlands	1.1	1.0	38.6	0.8	30.9	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Norway	2.7	1.0	55.6	1.2	28.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Peru	14.0	0.8	7.6	-0.9	52.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	0.0
Philippines	5.9	0.8	3.3	-1.3	44.5	1.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
Pakistan	5.9	0.6	2.6	1.9	30.6	6.0	6.0	5.0	0.0
Poland	7.0	0.9	16.2	0.2	36.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Portugal	5.8	0.9	21.8	0.9	38.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Romania	3.7	0.8	11.1	0.1	31.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
Russian Federation	4.3	0.8	14.6	-0.7	41.3	3.0	6.0	5.0	0.0
Sweden	3.0	1.0	36.9	1.1	23.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Slovakia	4.8	0.9	19.8	0.9	26.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Suriname	7.4	0.8	7.8	0.1	43.0	7.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
Syrian Arab Republic	5.9	0.7	4.5	-0.9	40.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	1.0
Thailand	5.9	0.8	8.0	-1.0	42.0	7.0	7.0	4.0	0.0
Tunisia	5.9	0.8	7.5	0.2	40.0	6.0	6.0	5.0	1.0
Turkey	11.8	0.8	9.4	-0.7	43.6	6.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
Ukraine	8.6	0.8	6.9	-0.3	31.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	0.0
United States	2.1	1.0	46.0	0.3	45.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Viet Nam	5.9	0.7	2.6	0.4	37.0	0.0	7.0	5.0	0.0
South Africa	0.3	0.7	10.6	-0.1	57.8	1.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
Czechoslovakia	11.5	0.9	22.1	0.8	26.0	9.0	7.0	7.0	0.0
Yugoslavia	5.9	0.8	14.5	0.1	29.6	9.0	7.0	7.0	0.0
Spanish Caribbean and South America	5.9	0.8	7.8	-0.2	52.0	1.0	2.3	2.6	0.0
Remaining Northern Europe	5.9	1.0	35.2	1.6	25.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
Western Asia	5.9	0.8	16.6	-0.2	37.7	6.0	4.6	4.4	1.0
Eastern Africa	5.9	0.5	2.1	-0.7	44.3	4.3	4.6	4.5	0.0
South-East Asia	5.9	0.5	43.1	0.0	38.0	6.0	5.3	5.1	0.0
Western Africa	5.9	0.5	2.1	-0.3	44.1	6.0	3.5	3.5	0.0

	<b>Propor- tionality</b>	<b>Societal development</b>	<b>GDP</b>	<b>Stability</b>	<b>Inequality</b>	<b>Prevalent Religion</b>	<b>Political Freedoms</b>	<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>Arabic</b>
<b>Remaining Southern Europe</b>	5.9	0.9	26.8	1.1	26.0	1.0	1.3	1.0	0.0
<b>Remaining Southern Asia</b>	5.9	0.5	1.0	-2.3	47.2	9.0	5.0	4.5	0.0
<b>Dutch Caribbean and South America</b>	5.9	0.5	18.9	1.3	30.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Eastern Asia</b>	5.9	0.8	26.1	0.6	41.8	7.0	2.3	2.5	0.0
<b>Middle Africa</b>	5.9	0.5	1.3	-1.1	53.0	9.0	4.5	4.5	0.0
<b>Remaining Eastern Europe</b>	5.9	0.8	8.4	0.0	31.9	9.0	2.0	2.7	0.0
<b>English Caribbean and South America</b>	5.9	0.8	14.4	0.4	43.2	1.0	1.4	1.8	0.0
<b>Remaining Northern Africa</b>	5.9	0.7	7.8	-1.0	44.1	6.0	7.0	6.5	0.0
<b>Remaining Northern America</b>	5.9	1.0	2.0	0.3	45.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
<b>Australia and New Zealand</b>	5.9	0.8	10.7	0.5	36.2	9.0	3.7	2.7	0.0
<b>Southern Africa</b>	4.3	0.5	4.2	0.3	59.0	9.0	3.7	3.7	0.0
<b>French Caribbean</b>	5.9	0.5	1.9	1.4	59.2	1.0	4.0	5.0	0.0
<b>Remaining Western Europe</b>	5.9	0.9	44.3	1.1	27.5	4.0	1.0	1.0	0.0

Source: ESS round 2 and 3, own computations

## Notes

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<sup>ii</sup> Also the six scales of the MIPEX (long-term residence, access to nationality, anti-discrimination policy, family reunion, political participation; labour market access) did not yield significant effects, nor did the inclusion of the number of seats of the anti-immigrant party. The dummy of anti immigrant party western-Europe was significant, which indicates that imputing the mean of the anti-immigrant party of the western-European countries to the missing countries was not a good measurement.

<sup>iii</sup> The dummy for proportionality was significant, which indicates that the imputations were not a good measurement.