

GROWING APART OR GROWING TOGETHER? SUPPORT FOR SHARED-EARNING AND SHARED-CARING IN THE EU BETWEEN 1990 AND 2008

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Abstract

Social norms on female employment and childcare are changing across the European Union (EU) member states. The EU institutions have supported female employment since the 1970s, but initiatives to fill the childcare vacuum that a female workforce leaves behind have only recently begun. This paper uses data from the European Value Study from 1990-2008 in all 27 EU member states to show that support for shared-caring and shared-earning have different patterns of development over the past twenty years. The results show that attitudes on whether women should work (shared-earning) have largely converged across the EU member states prior to 1990 and have since remained largely stable. Support for women sharing their care roles with other actors (shared-caring), on the other hand, still shows great variation across countries, but for young low-educated men, support for shared-caring is converging toward higher support across all EU member states.

Introduction

“If both a higher fertility rate and a higher number of women in employment are both considered desirable, it quickly becomes clear that Malta will have to make a serious effort to increase support to mothers so that they can remain in the labour market and also be able to cope effectively with the child-rearing role. How trends and attitudes will morph alongside these changes, only time will tell.” Editorial, *di-ve.com* (Malta), 13 May 2012¹

“Fathers, meanwhile, could take on some of the logistical brain-mulch of childcare, so that neither sex need be incapacitated by it.” Jemima Lewis, *The Telegraph* (UK), 12 May 2012²

¹ “The price of motherhood”, <http://www.di-ve.com/Default.aspx?ID=72&Action=1&NewsId=92146>, accessed 30 May 2012

² “Paternity leave: We all benefit if new dads stay at home”. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/family/9261014/Paternity-leave-We-all-benefit-if-new-dads-stay-at-home.html>, accessed 30 May 2012

The debate about changing gender roles rages all over Europe, from Malta to the United Kingdom, as illustrated by the above quotes from two recent editorials. The past fifty years have seen women increasingly entering the workforce across European Union (EU) member states. This has been actively supported by the EU institutions since the 1970s. As women have entered the workforce, this has created a vacuum for childcare in European homes that European governments have dealt differently with (Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard, 2011). Depending on the country in question, the “brain-mulch of childcare” (see quote above) is now partly being taken over by different combinations of state and market institutions. The involvement of other family members for childcare has also to differing extents been encouraged or expected. That a care vacuum is created by female employment was underappreciated at the European level until the 1990s when slow progress began at the EU level to address the tension between female employment and childcare needs (O'Connor, 2005).

There have been policy changes in all EU member states since the 1970s to accommodate the growing number of women working. The EU has a long history of encouraging women to enter the labor force (Mazey, 1988). Because EU policies on anti-discrimination and equal opportunities were instituted early, there have not been many additional policy changes in this area in the last twenty years. Unlike in the area of childcare, where action at the European level to address the care vacuum have been initiated mainly in the last twenty years (O'Connor, 2005). In line with the predictions of the theory of gender arrangements, these institutional or policy changes (or: changes in the gender order) would go hand-in-hand with changes in attitudes toward the gendered division of labor (or: the gender culture) (Pfau-Effinger, 2011). In other words, the culture and order will “morph alongside” each other (see quote above). A comparison will be conducted here between developments of public support for shared-earning and shared-caring over a twenty-year time period (1990-2008). These two aspects of gender culture represents areas where, according to the literature, policies have changed immensely in one area (childcare), but not in the other (female employment). “Shared” here refers to sharing roles between partners and/or with the state and/or with the market and/or other actors (e.g. extended family). Supporting “shared-caring” thus refers to supporting childcare models where women are not the sole care provider, but rather that the role can be shared with other actors. “Shared-earning” refers to supporting the ideal of both partners being in paid employment. This measurement of gender roles hereby recognizes the multitude of different family structures that exist across the EU and how they deal with their childcare needs.

During this period of changes in gender policies, it is unlikely that all social groups relate to these changes in the same way. According to the theory of gender arrangements, changes in gender policies is encouraged by certain social groups who need changes in the policies to allow them to their ideals into practices. In this study, a comparison of attitudes across gender, age and educational levels will therefore be included to more closely examine changes in gender cultures over time.

According to the cultural constraint argument, policies are difficult to harmonize completely across countries, because countries will always have their own unique cultures shaping their policy preferences (Antokolskaia, 2006). Within a supranational structure, such as the EU, gender policies would therefore not be able to converge because different countries will always different ideals about gender relations. Antokolskaia (2006) shows in relation to the harmonization of family law, that this argument is too simplistic and that there are opportunities for harmonization. Indeed, past studies suggest that attitudes regarding gender roles may be converging across the EU member states; changing away from an ideal of a male-earner-with-female-carer family model (Inglehart et al., 2002; Voicu and Voicu, 2002). These past studies do not take differences between ideals on shared-earning versus shared-caring into account, however, thus not recognizing the literature on the differences in changes to these different aspects of the gender order. Past studies also do not examine whether possible convergence of ideals may be taking place only in certain social groups. This paper thus attempts to address these shortcomings by asking: have attitudes toward shared-earning and shared-caring converged across EU member states and different social groups from 1990-2008?

Theoretical framework

Many theorists examine differences in values across countries. A common approach is to explain developments in values with modernization theory or the theory of value change (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987) and categorizing countries by value types or dimensions (Hofstede and McCrae, 2004; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004). For looking specifically at gender and how gender norms change over time, however, Pfau-Effinger's (1998; 2002; 2004) theory of gender arrangements is widely used (Haas, 2005; Hooren and Becker, 2012; Lück, 2005; Lück and Hofäcker, 2003). The theory is also used here, as in other studies, to clarify expected developments of gender norms across countries and across time, beyond the simplistic approach of modernization theory. As will be explained later in the paper, gender arrangement theory is

also applied here beyond this basic use to derive the quantitative approach to studying gender norms, to explore further (supranational) influences on change and to explain the necessity in examining intra-national differences in gender norms.

The theory of gender arrangements is based on the assumptions that within a population, there are dominant ideas about what the “correct” gender relations are (gender culture) and these norms are institutionalized in a gender order (Pfau-Effinger, 2002). The term “culture” is used in the theory to mean “the system of collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality. It includes stocks of knowledge, values and ideals – in sum: ideas.” (Pfau-Effinger, 2011:51). Gender cultures include ideas about the appropriate spheres of work for men and women and valuation of these spheres (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). Gender orders, on the other hand, refer to the gender structures of power and the range of institutions that surround those structures, including welfare institutions and the labor market. The interrelated system of these gender orders and gender cultures is termed the “gender arrangement”. In the development of this theory, Pfau-Effinger explores the link between the gender orders and gender cultures and stresses the potential tensions between and within the gender orders and cultures, with the practices of individuals. She, for example, looks at the interrelation between policies to encourage female employment (gender order) and attitudes toward female employment (gender culture) and how these have changed across countries and time with the influence of collective actors (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). Taking this approach allows for seeing gender arrangements not as static “types”, but as arrangements where the institutions and norms often contradict and change over time due to attempts of collective actors to resolve tensions within the gender arrangements.

Gender culture: shared-earning and shared-caring

Gender culture is multifaceted but one of the key elements is the gendered division of labor. This core of gender culture can be derived from Pfau-Effinger’s theory of gender arrangements. From her models of the family and her definition of gender culture, gender norms appears to be fundamentally about who earns the family income and who takes on the childcare duties. Although support for women in paid labor and support for women’s role in the home may appear to be two sides of the same coin, this is in fact not found to be the case in quantitative studies. Rather, support for women in the workplace and women in the home have been shown to form distinctly separate attitude dimensions (Lück and Hofäcker, 2003; Voicu and Voicu, 2002).

Gender culture is suggested here to be fundamentally about norms about women working and about women's role in the home. This can be derived from Pfau-Effinger's identification of the five dominant family models identified in European countries, excluding single-headed households: "(1) the family economy model [agrarian societies with gendered but equally valued division of labor]; (2) the housewife model of the male breadwinner marriage [separation of the sphere of the male earner and female carer] (3) the part-time carer model of the male breadwinner marriage; (4) the dual breadwinner model with external childcare; and (5) the dual breadwinner model with partner-shared childcare" (Pfau-Effinger, 2004:383). The difference between models 4 and 5, for example, is that in model 5 earning and caring is shared between the partners, and in model 4, care is shared with either the market, state or other actors. In family models 3-5, the care vacuum stemming from a female workforce is filled by childcare responsibilities being shared between individuals (e.g. partners or with extended family members) or with market and/or state institutions. The distinction between these family models thus appears to be fundamentally about who cares and who earns.

This study expects that the distinction found in the five family models between who earns (one or two partners, fulltime/part-time) and who cares (two partners, market, state or other actors) is mirrored in gender cultures. According to the gender arrangement theory, gender culture includes ideas about the appropriate spheres of work for men and women, including the spheres of paid employment outside the home and childcare (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). This study assumes that this means that gender culture is fundamentally about ideas on who should earn – should women *and* men work and should this be equally so – and ideas about who should care for children – should this be just the woman or should other parties relieve her of some of these duties (e.g. private or public childcare, a spouse or other family members). According to the theoretical framework and the family models discussed above, childcare can be shared with actors beyond partners, but shared-earning refers just to earning between partners.

This study does not expect the relation between attitudes toward shared-earning and shared-caring to be perfectly inversely related. As outlined by gender arrangement theory, tensions are common within gender cultures. According to past studies, these tensions are reflected in the often contradictory relation between the ideals of a woman as an earner and as a carer. Indeed, as explained by Lück (2005:10):

We might find women who are “just” supportive of traditional gender roles, or “just” job-oriented. But we also might find women who want both, a job career and the responsibility for the children, with a male breadwinner taking over the main responsibility for the economic support of the family. And we even might find women who find none of the two very attractive.

Measuring these gender norms is notoriously difficult. Quantitative studies of gender norms have developed tools in recent years to better measure gender norms across countries. In the past, single scales were used to represent gender norms. For example, the sex role orientations scale with fifty-three items has been used to study attitudes toward gender roles in small-scale studies (Brogan and Kutner, 1976). Studies using existing cross-national survey data have also used a common scale. Eydal and Rostgaard (2011), using the World Value Survey (WVS), include questions on working mothers and on women wanting a home and children in one scale. Nordenmark (2004), using the International Social Survey Programme data (ISSP), also uses a single gender equality scale combining questions on women working and women caring in the home. But, examining gender norms with a single scale, does not illustrate possible tensions with gender arrangements; attitudes about earning and caring should usefully be studied separately.

Studies using cross-national quantitative surveys do indeed find two distinct dimensions of attitudes regarding the gendered division of labor in line with the above theoretical expectations, when conducting simple factor analyses on the ISSP, WVS and the European Values Study (EVS) data (Lück and Hofäcker, 2003; Voicu and Voicu, 2002). These studies using similar items as those used here, also argue for moving away from a single scale on gender equality. In these studies, the two dimensions of attitudes are referred to either as family-orientation versus job-orientation (Lück and Hofäcker, 2003) or household modernity versus equal labor (Voicu and Voicu, 2002). These terms do not adequately express the theoretical and methodological distinction between these attitude dimensions, however. Firstly, family/household versus labor/job does not adequately reflect the inter-relatedness and possible contradictions between the different roles of women. Theoretically, within the gender arrangements, it is not about women *wanting* a family or being *oriented* towards a family; it is about the gender order and gender culture supporting women as a sole caregiver and supporting women’s role in the workplace. Saxonberg (2011), using the ISSP data, refers to the caring dimension as the “mother-child dimension”, which is more in line with the measurement Saxonberg uses, but does not reflect any theoretical underpinnings. This study will include

similar measures of attitudes toward gendered division of labor as past studies, but will use the terms “shared-earning” and “shared-caring”, as these are more in line with theoretical expectations and the methods of measurement. “Shared” in shared-earning will refer only to sharing between partners, but “shared” in “shared-caring will refer to sharing also with the market, state or other actors. This is in line with the theoretical distinctions of family models outlined above. Differences can be expected in the development of these attitudes over time, but also in the relation between these two dimensions, as there are bigger practical problems in some countries with combining shared-earning and shared-caring (i.e. greater tensions within the gender order). These expectations are in line with the theory of gender arrangement of coherence between the gender order and the relevant aspects of gender culture.

Gender arrangements across countries

Cultural differences are often studied across countries using cross-national surveys, calculating attitudinal item means and presenting these “majority” or “average” attitudes as representation of cultural differences (Hofstede and McCrae, 2004; Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004; Smith et al., 2006). This approach is based on the assumption that there are national norms that express national conceptions of what is “good and desirable” (Schwartz, 2006:139). Similar to the approaches in these studies, the theory of gender arrangements also assumes that there are important country-differences in gender cultures and gender orders. The theory of gender arrangement does not presume that gender arrangements will remain the same over time, however, and therefore does not assume that country-differences will remain stable.

National differences in gender arrangements can be expected, according to gender arrangement theory, because institutions of the gender order are to a large extent national. Pfau-Effinger (2002) suggests that norms have been institutionalized in gender orders and that institutions such as welfare state institutions can be resistant to change. A study of gender arrangements therefore have to take country-differences into account, because many institutional differences remain national.

Gender arrangements are also expected to differ by country, according to gender arrangement theory, because there are assumed to be some national cultural differences. Gender cultures, according to socialization theory, are shaped by nations’ unique combination of geography, history, language and religion (Schwartz, 2006; Welzel et al., 2003). This suggests

that there is a “cultural heritage passed on to the next generations by a subtle but permanent and strong influence through the social environment” (Lück and Hofäcker, 2003:2). The national gender culture thereby remains distinctly national over time through the socialization of subsequent generations by parents, peers and institutions. Following these propositions, some country-differences in gender arrangements would persist over time.

These stable national differences in cultures are often extended to group countries in regimes. “Gender regimes” are for example theorized to exist and these often follow closely Esping-Andersen’s (1990) division of welfare states into *liberal*, *conservative* and *social-democratic* welfare regimes (Adler and Brayfield, 2006). Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) outlined three different welfare regime types based on structural characteristics such as the level of social spending of the welfare state, tax (dis)incentives, labor demand, etc. He hereby identified three welfare regime clusters with certain countries most representing the ideal types: the social democratic (e.g. Sweden), the conservative (e.g. Germany) and the liberal welfare regime (e.g. United Kingdom). Gender norms are suggested to follow these regime types, with highest support for female employment and women’s role outside the home in countries where the gender order supports this behavior. According to this reasoning, socio-democratic regimes (e.g. Sweden and Denmark) are expected to have gender cultures idealizing shared-earning and shared-caring, whereas conservative regimes, expected to idealize women’s place in the home, (e.g. Germany and Belgium) would show the lowest for shared-earning and shared-caring (Nordenmark, 2004). But this regime-approach risks creating simplistic categorization of countries, as already established by a range of scholars. Van Hooren and Becker (2012) for example show how the policies within one country can be socio-democratic, liberal and conservative at any one time and policy types can change in policy-areas independently of each other (e.g. female employment policies changing independently from childcare policies). This study thus does not expect coherence between policies on shared-caring and on shared-earning within countries. It further expects that this lack of coherence will be related to contradictions within the gender culture. This is in line with the gender arrangement theory that suggests tensions within and between the gender order and gender culture. This study will therefore be sensitive to expectations of national differences in gender arrangements, but will not presume categorization of countries.

Gender arrangements across time

Despite the assumption that there are national differences in gender arrangements and the suggestion that cross-national differences will persist, Pfau-Effinger (1998) does stress that arrangements do not remain unchanged over time. Gender orders and gender cultures are expected to change over time, because (collective) actors react to tensions within the gender arrangements and push for changes to the gender arrangements. This study goes further than the original theory to suggest that these collective actors can also be supranational actors who influence gender arrangements over time. This would be observed by diminishing national differences between countries under the influence of a supranational actor.

There are many social actors within societies with alternative attitudes and norms. When social actors are able to organize and push for changes, gender arrangements develop and change. Pfau-Effinger (1998) claims that what may appear as long-lasting cultural traditions are in fact the results of past struggles between social groups. Collective actors push for change when there are tensions within the gender arrangements. These tensions can be within the gender order, for example, having limited access to childcare, while at the same time, the collapse of the family wage forcing women to work (Fraser, 1994). There can also be tension within the gender culture, for example having an ideal of shared-earning, while at the same having a lack of general support for a shared-caring family model. There can also be tension between the gender order and gender culture, for example, having limited access to childcare, while at the same time having public support for shared-caring families. These tensions arise partly because there is a time lag in the effects of gender orders on gender cultures and vice versa. These lags mean that the gender arrangements cannot accommodate the practices and beliefs of groups of individuals developing different ideals and practices. Collective actors then push for changes to resolve the tensions. There will of course be differences in how groups experience the tensions (e.g. men versus women or old versus young or low versus highly educated), and not all collective actors will succeed in changing the gender arrangements to resolve *their* tensions. But the previous century has shown that activism of collective actors can change gender arrangements to keep up with developments such as changes to family structures, higher female employment and lone parenthood (Lewis, 2002).

Gender orders can also change because of actors that do not directly experience the abovementioned tensions. Though not specified by Pfau-Effinger as one of the collective actors in her original theory, the European institutions can also be expected to be supranational actors

having an external influence on gender arrangements in member states over time. The European institutions have their own agenda and can influence the gender order and gender cultures of EU member states. In 1996, the Treaty of Amsterdam formally committed the European Commission to gender mainstreaming across all policies (O'Connor, 2005). This meant that the European Commission committed “to incorporate[ing] gender into all areas and all levels of public policy, rather than considering gender issues as a discrete policy problem” (O'Connor, 2005). The European institutions have generally been shown to encourage egalitarian gender norms, for example in family law (Marella, 2006) . In terms of actual gender order influences, it is important to make a distinction between EU actions on women’s access to the labor market and support for childcare. The European institutions have a longer history of encouragement of female employment, than with attempts to fill the care vacuum that female employment leaves in European homes.

Actions at the EU level for female employment date back to the 1970s. In 1976, a landmark judgment by the European Court of Justice ruled that Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, guaranteeing women equal work for equal pay, should have a direct effect in member states regardless of national laws (Mazey, 1988). This was coupled with new Directives that guaranteed non-discrimination of women in the labor force, including the Equal Pay Directive in 1975 (75/117/EEC), the Equal Treatment Directive in 1976 (76/207/EEC) and the Social Security Directive in 1978 (78/7/EEC) (Mazey, 1988). The Equal Pay Directive prohibited discrimination in pay on the grounds of gender. The Equal Treatment Directive aimed to ensure gender equality in working conditions and access to employment, vocational training and career advancement. The Social Security Directive required non-discrimination in contribution to benefits, the duration and the retention of benefits (Mazey, 1988). The motives for these changes was not female emancipation, but the Commission rather had economic motives for expanding the European workforce and increasing the EU’s competitiveness both externally and internally (O'Connor, 2005). Regardless of the motives, these Directives had direct influence on member states’ institutions, encouraging gender equality in employment.

Action at the EU level on childcare are more recent and scarce. The commitment and the progress here has generally been slow (O'Connor, 2005). Actions at the EU level on childcare have been more in the form of intergovernmental cooperation and encouragement rather than in the direct and binding form of EU Directives. Action on childcare have included the start of the

European Commission Childcare Network (1988, 1990, 1996), the Council Recommendation on childcare in 1992 (92/241/ EEC), the Commission's affirmation in 1994 White Paper of the importance of family-friendly working arrangements and the agreement at the 2002 Barcelona European Council that by 2010 Member States should provide a certain level of childcare (O'Connor, 2005). None of these actions have direct influence on legal institutions in member states. They do not directly influence the different European gender order, but are rather non-binding forms of encouragement toward a specific policy goal. This is shown by two years after the Barcelona deadline, , only ten EU member states having met the Barcelona target of 33% childcare coverage rate for children under three years old and only nine member states having met the Barcelona objective of a 90% coverage rate for children between three years old and the mandatory school age (European Commission, 2012). The goal does appear to finally connect female labor with the care vacuum and the need to resolve the tension, but the actions to realize the goal are recent, hesitant and scarce across the member states.

All of the above suggests that there have been changes to gender arrangements of EU member states between 1990 and 2008. Welfare states have been changing to keep up with changes in family structures and there has been a push for reforms to resolve tensions from collective actors, including from the European institutions. Overall, it can be expected that gender arrangements have changed in all countries during this time period, but arguably to differing degrees regarding the two attitude dimensions. The debates about shared-earning happened largely *before* the studied period. This happened prior to 1990 in the old member states through activism of Western feminists and the EU's push for non-discrimination and equal pay (see dates of Directives mentioned above). It happened in the new member states through Communist regimes' policies aim of full employment (Saxonberg, 2011; Voicu et al., 2008). In the Communist regimes full female employment was a part of the Communist ideology for women's emancipation through work. There was no aim for women to give up the caring role at home, however. Poor quality state nurseries and generous parental leave meant that women, on fully paid maternity leave, largely cared for their children until the children reached the age of three (Saxonberg, 2011). Alternatively, due to early-retirement policies, *grandmothers* would often take over the child-care duties (Saxonberg, 2011)

This study expects fewer country differences in support for shared-earning than for shared-caring, as these are likely to have converged toward greater support before the studied

period both in Eastern and Western Europe. This study further expects that this convergence of country-differences in gender cultures has happened also alongside the actions of the EU as a supranational collective actor encouraging this agenda. Attitudes on shared-earning are thus expected to have converged to a point in 1990 where there is no tension between the gender order – institutions and policies encourage female employment – and the gender culture – the accepted norm is that women work. Few country differences can be expected and these differences can be expected to remain steady throughout the study period.

Unlike the few expected changes outlined above for support for shared-earning, support for shared-caring is expected here to have changed greatly from 1990-2008. The tension between female employment and the care vacuum was only experienced widely once women entered the workforce *en masse*, which happened across the EU in this time period. In this period there remain tensions between the gender order - institutions and policies do not fully and easily allow women to reconcile work and childcare – and the gender culture – there remains disagreement in norms about who should take over childcare responsibilities. In tandem with the policy changes on care, this study expects that a general convergence on support for shared-caring will not (yet) have been reached across EU member states.

H1. There will be convergence in gender norms in those areas where gender orders have been harmonized across EU member states.

Gender arrangements moving beyond country differences – tensions and social cleavages

When studying norms or values, most studies remain at the level of country-comparison. When national comparative studies find considerable differences in norms *within* countries, this is sometimes dismissed as measurement error, authors arguing that aggregating values to the national level is desirable because it cancels out extreme value measurements (Welzel et al., 2003). In line with the theory of gender arrangements, however, it is exactly these “extreme” values that can change gender arrangements over time. In the theory of gender arrangements, national cultural coherence is not presumed because gender arrangements are assumed to be rife with tensions (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). These tensions come to light, for example, as social cleavages in the gender culture, e.g. differences in attitudes about gender norms across class or gender.

Ideally, changes to the gender order should be consistent with the gender culture. There should be a coherent relationship between the public's ideals and the options that the gender order provides for realizing these ideals (Pfau-Effinger, 2011). A coherent gender arrangement would exist when developments in policies and institutions go hand-in-hand the preferences of individuals. For example, public support for female employment policies should go hand-in-hand the progression for policies encouraging female employment. In other words, a period where there are policy changes to promote female employment there should be an increase in support, across social groups, for women working. Such results would indicate a gender order that it is able to cater for the preferences of all groups and thereby remove tensions within the gender arrangement and therefore the potential for collective action.

In reality, there can be a range of tensions within the gender arrangements: tensions within the gender order, within the gender culture, between the gender culture and the gender order, between the practices of individuals and the gender arrangements, as well as tensions between different social groups and the gender arrangements (Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard, 2011). These tensions, according to the theory, are widespread and part of the normal process of change to gender arrangements. When there are tensions in the gender order, these tensions will then be visible. This study will look only at one of these types of tensions, namely the social cleavages in the gender culture.

According to the existing literature, in the period from 1990 to 2008 there have been few changes to the gender order relating to shared-earning. Relating to shared-caring, on the other hand, the literature suggests that there have been several changes to childcare policies during this time period, as explained above. These changes to the gender order should ideally parallel changes to the gender cultures, but changes to gender arrangements is, according to the theory, fraught with tensions. One of the reasons may be that initial gender order developments tend to cater for only a sub-section of the population, as changes are initiated by collective actors of social actors (or supranational actors) whose interest it is for gender orders to change. These changes to the gender order may (still) lack broader support. Tensions in the period of change to gender arrangements would then be seen in the form of what Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard refer to as "social cleavages in the social system" (2011:6). These cleavages are seen in gender culture differences across social groups, for example across different ages, genders and educational levels. This study expects that different social groups will show different development of gender

culture. The gender attitudes of some groups would need to change more to “catch up” with the changes to the gender orders in order to ensure a coherent gender arrangements. While at the same time, the social groups that acted collectively to change the gender order will already have the gender culture to support the new gender order, so their attitudes will not need to change as dramatically. This study thus expects differences across social groups in the development of support for shared-caring from 1990 to 2008, because of the changes to the gender order on childcare during this paper. This study does not expect differences across social groups in the development of shared-earning, because of the lack of changes to the gender order between 1990 and 2008.

H2. Where there are changes to the gender order, there will be differences in the development of gender culture across social groups.

Data and methodology

Data

The European Values Study (EVS) is a European-wide survey fielded every nine years (European Values Study, 2008).³ Data from three waves (1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010) are used here for all 27 EU Member States, where they participated in the survey.⁴ The EVS is a de-centralized organization using national professional survey organizations, many of which are members of the Gallup group (Inglehart, 2000). Respondents are selected using random probability sampling with the size of the sample depending on a country’s population. Data is collected using mostly face-to-face interviews (European Values Study and GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences, 2011). For the 27 EU countries, the average number of respondents for all waves was 1380. In the pooled sample of the 27 EU countries at the three waves, there were 106,421 respondents, 45.8% men and 54.2% females with an average age of approximately 46.

Dependent variable – attitudes toward gendered division of labor

³ <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu>

⁴ Data from the first wave of the EVS in 1981 was not used as too many of the countries and items were missing. Some countries did not participate at all time points and some countries were excluded at other time points because not all the selected items were asked. The countries not included in the 1990 wave were: Cyprus, Greece, and Luxembourg, and in 1999 were: Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland and Great Britain have been combined into the United Kingdom, in 1999, the UK thus excludes Northern Irish respondents.

Using the EVS to compare gender norms across Europe is very applicable as it is the only EU-wide survey that covers the time period between 1990 and 2008 and includes a range of repeated items on attitudes toward gender roles. There are five items on the gendered division of labor that were repeated across waves, these were re-coded so that higher values indicated more egalitarian gender norms:

1. Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income (0: strongly disagree, 3: strongly agree)
2. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (0: strongly disagree, 3: strongly agree)
3. A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children (0: strongly agree, 3: strongly disagree)
4. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (0: strongly agree, 3: strongly disagree)
5. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (0: strongly agree, 3: strongly disagree)

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using SPSS 20 on the pooled data for these five items using Principal Axis Factoring with oblimin rotation, assuming correlated factors. This resulted in a two-factor model that was in line with the theoretical expectations of two dimensions of attitudes toward gendered division of labor: support for shared-earning and support for shared-caring (see Table 1). The finding of two factors is also in line with past studies, although using similar items, these studies do not term these factors as support for shared-earning and shared-caring (Lück, 2005; Lück and Hofäcker, 2003; Saxonberg, 2011; Voicu, 2009; Voicu and Voicu, 2002). The items of the factor A do indeed, however, appear to measure whether women as well as men should earn a living. And the three items of the factor B all measure whether women should be the primary caregiver – being the caring wife and mother. The inverse coding of the items of Factor B indicate that women do not necessarily want (items 3 and 4) or need (item 5) to be the single-carer, but rather that this role can be shared, e.g. with a pre-school (item 5). These items measure the acceptance of women wanting and being able to be more than the primary-caregiver and whether it is acceptable to share the caring role with other actors.

The correlation between the two factors is .185 in the pooled data, meaning that people who support shared-earning also support shared-caring, although the positive relation is relatively small. This correlation differed across time points and countries. The highest correlation was found in Germany in 2008 (.395) and the lowest in Bulgaria in 2008 (.002). Some countries also showed a negative correlation between the two factors, the highest negative correlation being found in Romania in 2008 (-.183). This means that high support for shared-caring is related to low support for shared-earning. This appears contradictory, but is in line with the theoretical expectations outlined above and past findings that there can be a tension between these two dimensions of attitudes toward gendered division of labor and that these tensions can differ across countries. The lowest correlation between the two factors were found in the former Communist countries, illustrating the above claim that the tension between female employment and women's caring role was not addressed by Communist policies on full employment. Other than this finding, there does not appear to be any consistent pattern of countries in the relation between shared-caring and shared-earning. To understand the individual relation between shared-caring and shared-earning would require a separate study. But, overall the country-rankings of the correlations showed that it is a stable phenomenon over time with real country-differences to be examined (1990-1999: .746, 1999-2008: .777, 1990-2008: .670). These stable country-patterns will be explored further below.

TABLE 1 HERE

Two un-weighted mean scales were created using the abovementioned five items, where there was a value for at least two items for each scale: the shared-earning scale with two items (Cronbach's α .511) and the shared-caring scale with three items (Cronbach's α .599). The reliability analysis of the shared-caring index ranged from the lowest Cronbach's alpha in Romania in 1999 (.264) to the highest in Germany in 2008 (.734). For the shared-earning index, it ranged from .276 in Estonia in 1990 to .646 in Germany in 2008. These low reliability scores can be expected with the limited number of items in each of the scales. Overall, the Cronbach's alphas were relatively stable at around .50 across countries and time points for both indices. These low Cronbach's alphas can be problematic if using individual-level predictors, but a different method is employed here, as explained below.

Independent variables

Time, education, gender and age are the four independent variables suggested to influence the change in attitudes over countries. The three *time* points in the data are: 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010. These time points are included in the analysis as a variable ranging from -1 to 1. *Gender* is coded as female =1. *Age* is included as a dichotomous variable with old =1, split at the mean (age 46).

The *education* variable that was included in the EVS in all EU countries at all time points measures at what age respondents completed their education. The other educational variables were not included at all time points, but where they were available were highly correlated with this variable. The age-completed variable was re-coded into three categories, broadly corresponding to primary, secondary and tertiary education as follows:

0. Low: age 16 or lower when finished education
1. Middle: age 17-20 when finished education
2. High: age 21 or above when finished education.

Depending on the country and the time period, the distribution between the three educational groups varied. Over time, this can be explained by the general increase in educational levels across the EU in the last twenty years. The differences in distribution over countries can be explained by some countries having higher levels of education than others, but can also be explained by differences in school systems. For example, in the Nordic countries, people are older when they finish their education because of the later age of starting school.⁵

There were 3851 out of the 106,421 cases with missing values on age-completed educational variable. This high level of missing values was partially remedied using another educational variable that was included in the survey in the third wave only, namely the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) one digit codes. The correlation between these two variables was .736. For those cases with missing values on the age-completed educational variable, but with valid cases on ISCED variable, these were replaced as follows:

⁵ Statistics from the Norwegian government: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kd/dok/nouer/2003/nou-2003-16/11/1.html?id=370701>

<i>Age finished education</i>	<i>ISCED</i>
0. Low	0. Pre-primary education or none education
	1. Primary education or first stage of basic education
	2. Lower secondary or second stage of basic education
1. Middle	3. (Upper) secondary education
	4. Post-secondary non-tertiary education
2. High	5. First stage of tertiary education
	6. Second stage of tertiary education

Including this other educational variable, meant that an additional 1813 cases were included in the analyses.

Methodology

Descriptive analysis

Before establishing possible convergence of attitudes across countries, country-means of the two scales were first simply examined across the three time periods. These are shown in Charts 1 and 2. These charts indicate that the support for shared-earning is generally higher than support for shared-caring. The charts also indicate that there is more variation across countries in support for shared-caring than in shared-earning. Chart 1 further shows that the Netherlands may be a possible outlier for shared-earning index and Chart 2 suggests that Denmark may be an outlier for the shared-caring index. Sensitivity analyses were therefore later conducted, taking a note of these cases.

CHARTS 1 AND 2 HERE

In Table 2, the observed means of the shared-caring and the shared-earning scales are shown. These are ranked from highest to lowest mean for each year, with the highest and lowest means being highlighted in grey. From the perspective of the traditional regime approach to the study of gender arrangements, the ordering of the countries appears out of line with expected groupings. This approach assumes that the gender culture will consistently be in line with a static grouping of countries by gender regimes. The results would be surprising with this approach, for example, because the socio-democratic regimes (i.e. countries such as Sweden with gender

orders that most support shared-earning and shared-caring) do not rank as the countries with the most supportive attitudes of shared-earning and shared-caring. For example, Sweden ranks as one of the top three countries in supporting shared-earning in 1990 and 1999, but drops to the middle of the table in 2008. Germany, on the other hand, is a country that is categorized traditionally as a conservative welfare state and, according to this classification, German gender culture should show high support for women's role in the home. Contrary to these expectations, in Table 2 Germany is ranked in the top third of countries supporting shared-caring and even in the top three in 2008. Table 2 does give some indication of how previous authors may have found support for regime-types in gender norms with similar data. Finland is here ranked as having high levels of support for shared-caring, in line with its suggested classification as a socio-democratic regime type. In-depth studies have shown, however, that in Finland, childcare until the age of three is the responsibility of mothers (Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011). This goes against the traditional expectations of a socio-democratic regime and against the findings in Table 2. The descriptive results thus hint at the value of moving away from categorizing countries along the simplistic lines of regime types.

These results also hint at the importance of looking separately at shared-earning and shared-caring. For example, Table 2 ranks the Netherlands as having the lowest scores of all countries for shared-earning, but also shows that its ranks in the top third for shared-caring. Finland, similarly scores high for shared-caring, but low for shared-earning. This supports the propositions of the gender arrangement theory, that tensions between the gender order and the gender culture is widespread.

TABLE 2 HERE

The abovementioned findings of the seemingly random positioning of the different countries could indicate a problem with measurement error of the scales. To check whether this was the case, the correlations between the means over time was examined. As shown in Table 3, the correlation between the rankings over time is relatively high, for example for shared-caring the correlation between the means at 1999 and 2008 is .870. This indicates that the positioning of the countries are not random across time; they are actually relatively consistent. This is indicated further by the calculations shown in column D. Column D is the multiplication of the correlation between time point 1&2 and 2&3, subtracted from the correlation between time point 1&3. This

number should ideally be 0 (i.e. there is no direct effect between from time point 1 to 3) and as can be seen by the calculations, the differences shown in column D are indeed close to 0. These results show that the created scales are steady and can be examined across this time span. The observation that the rankings of countries are not in line with expectations of gender regimes can thus not be used to suggest a rejection of the measurement method of these attitudes. Rather, these results should be seen as support for moving away from the static rankings of countries' gender arrangements.

TABLE 3 HERE

Meta-analysis: are countries and social groups converging?

To allow for the examination of country-convergence of these attitudes by time, education, gender and age, an aggregated dataset was created. This was done creating a grouping variable that created 899 groups by country, time point, education, gender and age⁶ (e.g. Group 1: Austria-1990-low education-male-young). Similar to a meta-analysis, the analyses here were conducted on this aggregated dataset. There were 2284 individual cases that did not have a valid number on the grouping variable, as they had missing values on age, gender and/or education. These cases were deleted from the analyses.

Separate analyses were conducted using SPSS 20 for the two dependent variables: support for shared-earning and support for shared-caring. In all analyses, the data was weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the mean of the dependent variable. Two weights were created based on the standard error of the two separate dependent variables – shared-earning and shared-caring. The correlation between these two weights was .909. Because of this high correlation, the same weight was used for all analyses, namely the squared standard error of the mean of attitudes toward shared-earning. The correlation between this weight and the N of shared-earning was .929 and .927 with the N of shared-caring. Applying this weight allowed for correcting for the sample size in each country, as well as addressing the abovementioned concerns about the distribution of the educational groups over time and countries.

⁶ This number is not $27 \text{ countries} \times 3 \text{ timepoints} \times 3 \text{ educational groups} \times 2 \text{ age groups} \times 2 \text{ genders} = 974$, because there were some countries missing at some time points, see footnote 4, as well as some missing values on the independent variables.

To investigate the convergence of norms over time, a dissimilarity constraint had first to be created using preliminary regression analyses. First, separate regression analyses were run on each of the dependent variables including dummy variables for all 27 countries, specifying a slope varying by country. The dissimilarity variable was created for each dependent variable, by taking the regression coefficients from this analysis of the country dummy variables and correcting them for the overall average of these coefficients. This created two country-dissimilarity constraints, one for shared-earning and one for shared-caring, representing the country differences in the means of the dependent variable at the center of the data (or \hat{y}). This dissimilarity term thus refers to the differences across the dependent variable at the center of the data. To examine convergence of countries over time, this dissimilarity term was included in interaction with time. This interaction term (\hat{y} *time) refers then to *country divergence*. A negative term indicates convergence (i.e. less divergence or fewer differences between countries over time) and a positive term indicates divergence of countries (i.e. more differences/divergence between countries over time).

Using the aggregated dataset and the created dissimilarity constraint, further analyses were conducted in two steps. First, general convergence over time was examined. For this step, three separate analyses were run and compared, one with time as a fixed slope, one with the slope of time varying by country and one with country-divergence constraint. The second part of the analysis tested whether convergence of attitudes over time differed for the other independent variables – education, age and gender. A combined analysis was run with all independent variables including each independent variable as a fixed effect and in interaction with the dissimilarity constraint, with time and with the country-divergence constraint. These regression analyses allowed for examining whether shared-earning and shared-caring attitudes have developed differently between 1990 and 2008 for some (age, gender, educational) groups.

Sensitivity analyses were conducted for both dependent variables. For shared-earning, the Netherlands, with its very low support, skewed the results and was therefore excluded. The very low support for sharing paid employment equally between partners is likely a reflection of the Netherlands having a disproportionately high level of part-time work compared to the rest of the EU (Eurostat, 2012). In 2011, 76.7% of women in the Netherlands worked part-time. For shared-caring, Denmark was excluded because it also skewed the analyses with its very high scores. This very high support for Danish women being able to share their childcare role with other

actors may be a reflection of Denmark having by far the highest percentage of 0-2 year olds in formal childcare (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). In Denmark 73% of 0-2 year olds are in formal childcare arrangements. These extreme positions in the gender order appear to be reflected in the gender cultures.

Results

The first part of the analysis examined whether there was indeed convergence of attitudes over time. The results of the analyses (in Table 4) showed that time had a positive effect on support both for shared-earning ($\beta = .074$, $p < .001$) and for shared-caring ($\beta = .150$, $p < .001$). These results confirmed expectations that support for shared-caring has increased significantly in this time period and support for shared-earning has increased slightly less. The results also showed that there was no significant country-divergence for the general population. As shown in Table 5, the model including country-divergence had identical adjusted R squared values as the model including time as a fixed effect (shared-earning: .551; shared-caring .475). The model including a time with the slope varying by country had a higher adjusted R squared for both dependent variables (shared-earning: .684; shared-caring: .530). The results of Table 4 and Table 5 thus showed no indication that attitudes toward shared-caring or shared-earning across the general population are converging across EU member states from 1990 to 2008. In other words, even if support for shared-caring and shared-earning is generally increasing, the differences between countries are not disappearing across time.

TABLES 4-5 HERE

The results of the first part of analysis showed that there was no convergence of attitudes over time for all sections of the population. The second part of the analysis looked at whether there was convergence of attitudes only for some age, gender and educational groups. The third-order effects that were not significant for either dependent variable were removed from the analyses. These were female*country divergence and education*country divergence. The insignificant results for these third order effects indicated that there was no divergence of norms just for some educational groups or just for one gender. The final model tested was thus:

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{country} + \beta_2 \text{time} + \beta_3 \text{time} * \hat{y} + \beta_4 \text{female} + \beta_5 \text{female} * \hat{y} + \beta_6 \text{female} * \text{time} + \beta_7 \text{education} + \beta_8 \text{education} * \hat{y} + \beta_9 \text{education} * \text{time} + \beta_{10} \text{old} + \beta_{11} \text{old} * \hat{y} + \beta_{12} \text{old} * \text{time} + \beta_{13} \text{old} * \text{time} * \hat{y} + e$$

As the results of the final regression analyses shown in Table 7 indicate, there are some differences across age groups for support for shared-caring, but not for shared-earning. The results are reported as un-standardized coefficients, but because of the way the items have been coded, the effect sizes are comparable. The dissimilarity term is included as a main effect through the country dummy variables that are not shown in the table. All of the main effects in the analyses shown in Table 7 refer to effects for older, low-educated men.

As also shown in the previous analysis, time had a positive effect on support for shared-earning ($\beta_2 = .064$, $p < .001$) and for shared-caring ($\beta_2 = .108$, $p < .001$), meaning that attitudes are becoming more positive over time. For shared-earning, being female had the biggest main effect on support for shared-earning ($\beta_4 = .110$, $p < .001$), meaning that women support shared-earning more than men. Women also supported shared-caring more than men, but the effect was not the greatest main effect ($\beta_4 = .098$, $p < .001$). Education also had a positive effect both on support for shared-earning ($\beta_7 = .014$, $p < .001$) and shared-caring ($\beta_7 = .141$, $p < .001$). This means that having a higher education is related to more egalitarian gender norms. Being old had a negative effect on shared-caring ($\beta_{10} = -.164$, $p < .001$), but had a small positive effect on support for shared-earning ($\beta_{10} = .023$, $p < .001$). This means that age decreases support for women sharing their care work, but increases support for women working.

The dissimilarity effects shown in Table 7 indicate the extent of the differences across countries by the three independent variables. In other words how large the country-differences are across genders, ages and educational groups. Women are shown to be more different from each other across countries than men in their support for shared-earning ($\beta_5 = .167$, $p < .05$) and shared-caring ($\beta_5 = .245$, $p < .001$). Country-differences were also found to be greater for higher educational levels than for lower educational levels in their support for shared-caring ($\beta_8 = .184$, $p < .001$). There were no educational differences in country-variation in support for shared-earning. The results also show that older people are more similar across countries in their views on shared-caring than younger people ($\beta_{11} = -.292$, $p < .001$). This means that there is *less* country-

variation in support for shared-caring for the old than for the young. There were no such age differences in country-variation in support for shared-earning.

Differences in the independent variables across time were also examined. The effect of education was found to increase over time for support for shared-caring ($\beta_9 = .016$, $p < .05$). This means that over time, there is greater effect of high education on whether people support shared-caring. The effect of age on support for shared-caring was also found to be increasing over time ($\beta_{12} = -.043$, $p < .001$). There were no differences in the effect of gender over time for shared-earning or for shared-caring.

Lastly, the country-divergence was examined for different social groups. As mentioned above, the insignificant third order effects for female and education were removed from the analyses. As shown in Table 7, attitudes were found to be diverging for older, low-educated men ($\beta_{13} = .201$, $p < .001$). Further, the attitudes of younger, low-educated men were found to be converging ($\beta_3 = -.115$, $p < .005$). This meant that while the older generation of low-educated men are becoming more different across the 27 countries, the attitudes on shared-caring of younger low-educated men are becoming more similar.

TABLE 6 HERE

Charts 3 and 4 show the expected values of support for shared-caring with the full model of Table 7. Both charts shows that support is generally increasing for shared-caring. Chart 3 further shows that attitudes of older, low-educated men are diverging between 1990 and 2008. Chart 4 shows the convergence of attitudes for younger, low-educated men towards greater support. For other social groups, these differences in the development of norms were not seen.

CHARTS 3 AND 4 HERE

Conclusion

This study asked whether attitudes toward female employment (shared-earning) and women's role in the home (shared-caring) have converged across different national populations and social groups in the EU between 1990 and 2008. The results showed support for both stated hypotheses.

H1 speculated that a harmonization of attitudes would parallel harmonization of policies. As explained above, policies on female employment were largely harmonized before the studied

period. In support for H1, there is some evidence to suggest that support for shared-earning could have converged to the current levels before the studied period. This is indicated by the low variation and the relative stability of this variation across countries in support for shared-earning across countries in 1990 and through until 2008. It is also shown by the minimal effect of time on support for shared-earning. These results suggest that the harmonization in the gender order may be paralleled to harmonization in gender norms. Regarding support for shared-caring, there was a greater effect of time and there was a greater difference between countries. These results seem to suggest that a lack of harmonization in the gender order on shared-caring was paralleled with a lack of harmonization of attitudes.

The changes in the gender order for shared-caring was found also in the support for **H2**. H2 expected differences in the development of norms for different groups during times of changes in the gender order. For this study, this meant an expectation of differences in development of norms for age, gender and educational groups in support for shared-caring, but not for shared earning. The results confirm these expectations. Gender attitudes were shown to develop steadily across social groups for shared-earning, but for shared-caring differences were found among old and young low-educated men. Young, low-educated men not only support shared-caring more than older low-educated men, but these younger people are also becoming more similar across the EU over the studied time period. The young, low-educated men there is convergence in supporting women moving away from the role as the sole carer. At the same time, older low-educated men are becoming more different from each other. While they are generally supporting shared-caring more, the rates of these developments are different for this group across countries. This is different to the results for support for shared-earning, where there are no such social-group differences in attitude developments in this time period. This supports the hypothesis that there are differences across social groups in the development of gender culture where there are changes in the gender order. The policy changes on shared-caring may be catering toward what is currently only a subsection of the population, but if the findings for shared-earning are anything to go by, then attitudes may converge across all social groups in the EU in the future. The results do suggest that differences in ideals about the family do not need to be a barrier to harmonization. Unlike the proposition of the cultural constraint argument, cultures can change and converge over time.

Discussion

There are a range of lessons learned for further research on this topic. Firstly, this study showed that it is indeed useful to examine support for shared-caring and shared-earning as separate dimensions of attitudes toward gendered division of labor. This is shown especially by the two dimensions having distinctly different patterns of development over time and social groups. Secondly, the results show that it is indeed important not to split countries into simplistic regime types, as countries' mean attitudes cannot be ranked in terms of these regime types, i.e. socio-democratic with the most egalitarian gender norms versus conservative countries with the least egalitarian gender norms. Thirdly, it is important not to look purely at country differences, but to look at internal differences in attitudes over time. This is shown by one attitude measure having significant differences in developments over time for different age groups. This part of the study could usefully be further expanded to include different social structures.

Further research could also usefully expand on other aspects of this study. Firstly, gender culture could be measured using more comprehensive methods, not only with additional survey items to improve reliability, but also with measures beyond cross-national survey data. Recognizing thereby that there may be limitations in the sole use of cross-national surveys in exploring gender cultures. Secondly, gender attitudes could be examined during the period prior to 1990, in order to look at the time period when significant changes in policies on female employment took place. Doing this for all EU countries would require the availability of information, not available with cross-national survey data, but this exercise would help to further confirm H1 and H2. It would show whether attitudes developed steadily in the period of changes to the gender order on shared-earning across countries and social groups to arrive at the current relatively steady levels. Another improvement on this study would be to look more closely at the actual development of EU involvement in the relevant policy area to more adequately trace the harmonization of policies during this period to see whether they change in parallel with the gender norms.

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TABLES AND CHARTS

Table 1. Two-factor structure from principal Axis Factoring with oblimin rotation, correlation between factors: .185

	Factor loadings	
	A. Shared-earning	B. Shared-caring
1. Husband and wife should both contribute to income	.597	-.053
2. Job best way for women to be independent	.585	.065
3. Women want a home and children (reverse coding)	-.139	.851
4. Being a housewife just as fulfilling (reverse coding)	.137	.467
5. Pre-school age child suffers with working mother (reverse coding)	-.005	.459

Table 2. Country means over time for two dependent variables

Shared-earning index						Shared-caring index					
1990		1999		2008		1990		1999		2008	
PT	2.465	SE	2.317	FR	2.401	DK	1.645	DK	1.861	DK	2.109
SE	2.239	BG	2.259	BG	2.370	FI	1.479	SE	1.702	SE	1.838
SI	2.196	EL	2.236	HU	2.327	UK	1.419	NL	1.621	DE	1.697
RO	2.184	FR	2.220	CY	2.291	NL	1.404	DE	1.619	FI	1.668
FR	2.133	HU	2.215	EL	2.275	ES	1.393	ES	1.518	ES	1.565
CZ	2.109	SI	2.206	LU	2.267	IE	1.312	UK	1.508	NL	1.559
ES	2.074	RO	2.198	SK	2.264	DE	1.269	PT	1.419	FR	1.541
DK	2.046	SK	2.181	LV	2.260	IT	1.228	SI	1.392	UK	1.515
PO	2.024	PO	2.149	ES	2.252	BE	1.217	FI	1.373	BE	1.499
IT	2.002	CZ	2.140	DE	2.250	FR	1.207	BE	1.370	SK	1.487
BG	1.999	LV	2.138	RO	2.227	RO	1.201	RO	1.323	BG	1.451
SK	1.988	PT	2.117	SE	2.211	SI	1.152	FR	1.282	LU	1.446
FI	1.981	BE	2.085	DK	2.201	PT	1.092	LV	1.280	IE	1.437
DE	1.920	ES	2.047	PT	2.191	AT	1.042	LU	1.268	CZ	1.403
LV	1.916	EE	2.038	AT	2.185	SE	1.036	BG	1.268	PT	1.373
HU	1.912	DK	2.034	CZ	2.165	CZ	0.947	CZ	1.244	LV	1.370
BE	1.892	LU	2.019	SI	2.102	EE	0.822	IT	1.198	IT	1.295
UK	1.828	IT	1.999	IT	2.092	BG	0.800	SK	1.189	HU	1.283
IE	1.744	FI	1.821	PO	2.060	LV	0.798	HU	1.158	PO	1.279
LT	1.719	UK	1.726	MT	1.975	PO	0.763	PO	1.102	EE	1.254
MT	1.695	MT	1.616	LT	1.964	LT	0.763	LT	1.056	RO	1.251
NL	1.437	NL	1.538	IE	1.875	MT	0.739	MT	0.964	CY	1.167
CY		AT		FI	1.835	CY		AT		EL	1.114
EL		CY		UK	1.825	EL		CY		LT	1.090
LU		IE		NL	1.669	LU		IE		MT	1.012

Table 3. Correlation between country means over time

Shared-earning index			
A) 1990-1999	B) 1999-2008	C) 1990-2008	D.) C - (AxB)
0.710	0.837	0.608	0.014
Shared-caring index			
0.744	0.870	0.712	0.064

Table 4. Regression analyses with time with convergence-constraint on dependent variables: support for shared-earning family model index and support for shared-caring family model index (country-dummy variables not shown). The Netherlands is excluded for shared-earning and Denmark is excluded for sharing caring. All coefficients are un-standardized.

	<i>Shared-earning</i>				<i>Shared-caring</i>			
	β	SE	t	Sig.	β	SE	t	Sig.
Country	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Time	.074	.006	13.103	.000	.150	.009	17.467	.000
Country divergence	-.026	.042	-.615	.539	-.039	.051	-.762	.446

a. country dummy variables not shown

Table 5. Comparison of model fit - adjusted R square and degrees of freedom with models, with weighted data. The Netherlands is excluded for shared-earning and Denmark is not included for shared-caring.



<i>Model</i>	<i>Shared-earning</i>		<i>Shared-caring</i>	
	<i>Adjusted R squared</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Adjusted R squared</i>	<i>df</i>
Time as fixed slope	.551	26	.475	26
Time with country-varying slope	.684	49	.530	49
Country divergence	.551	27	.475	27
Country divergence on age, and education, gender and age with dissimilarity constraints	.641	37	.809	37

Table 6. Regression analyses with independent variables (gender, age, education and time) on dependent variables: support for shared-earning family model index and support for shared-caring family model index. Divergence as a main effect is included as the country-dummies. Denmark is not included for shared-caring. The Netherlands is not included for shared-earning. All coefficients are un-standardized.

	<i>Shared-earning</i>				<i>Shared-caring</i>			
	β	SE	t	Sig.	β	SE	t	Sig.
	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Country								
Time	.064	.011	5.895	.000	.108	.011	9.527	.000
Country divergence	-.041	.038	-1.065	.287	-.115	.042	-2.754	.006
Female	.110	.008	13.335	.000	.098	.008	11.512	.000
*Dissimilarity	.167	.061	2.719	.007	.245	.049	5.019	.000
*Time	-.008	.010	-.882	.378	.011	.010	1.128	.260
Education	.014	.006	2.366	.018	.141	.006	23.903	.000
*Dissimilarity	.045	.043	1.038	.299	.184	.034	5.378	.000
*Time	.011	.006	1.690	.091	.016	.007	2.381	.017
Old	.023	.009	2.691	.007	-.164	.009	-18.256	.000
*Dissimilarity	.124	.064	1.930	.054	-.292	.052	-5.593	.000
*Time	.001	.010	.078	.938	.043	.010	4.124	.000
*Country divergence	.018	.036	.515	.606	.201	.060	3.359	.001

a. country dummy variables not shown

Charts 1-2. Observed means for support for shared-earning and shared-caring



Charts 3-4. Predicted values of final model: support for shared-caring for older, low-educated, men, versus young low-educated men

